American  Diplomacy 

under 

Tyler  and  Polk 


THE  ALBERT   SHAW  LECTURES 
ON  DIPLOMATIC  HISTORY 


By  the  liberality  of  Albert  Shaw,  Ph.  D.,  of  New 
York  City,  the  Johns  Hopkins  University  has  been 
enabled  to  provide  an  annual  course  of  lectures  on 
Diplomatic  History.  The  courses  are  included  in  the 
regular  work  of  the  Department  of  History  and  are 
published  under  the  direction  of  Professor  John  M. 
Vincent. 


THE   ALBERT   SHAW   LECTURES   ON 
DIPLOMATIC   HISTORY,    1906 


American  Diplomacy 

under 

Tyler  and  Polk 


By  JESSE  S.  REEVES,  Ph.  D. 

Assistant  Professor  of  Political  Science  in  Dartmouth  College 


BALTIMORE 

THE  JOHNS  HOPKINS  PRESS 
1907 


COPYRIGHT,  1907 
THE    JOHNS    HOPKINS    PRESS 


v  s  r 


v 

0 


PKESS    OF 

KOHN  &  POLLOCK,  INC. 

BALTIMORE 


CONTENTS 

Introduction       .        .  ... 

CHAPTER  I 
The  Northeastern  Boundary  Controversy      .        .          i 

CHAPTER  II 
The  Ashburton  Treaty 28 

CHAPTER  III 

The  Relations  between  Mexico  and  the  United 

States  concerning  Texas,  1825-1840       .        .       58 

CHAPTER  IV 

The  Relations  between  the  United  States  and  . 
Mexico  during  the  Secretaryship  of   Daniel 
Webster,  1841-1843  .       89 

CHAPTER  V 
The  Negotiations  for  Texas  under  Upshur    .        .     114 

CHAPTER  VI 

Calhoun  and  the  attempted  Annexation  of  Texas 

by  Treaty 1 38 

CHAPTER  VII 
The  Annexation  of  Texas  by  Joint  Resolution     .      162 

CHAPTER  VIII 
The  Northwestern  Boundary  Controversy     ."       .      190 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  IX 
The  Joint  Occupation  of  Oregon     .  224 

CHAPTER  X 
The  Oregon  Treaty    .  -243 

CHAPTER  XI 
Folk's  attempted  Negotiation  for  California         .     265 

CHAPTER  XII 
The  Outbreak  of  the  Mexican  War  .     288 

CHAPTER  XIII 
The  Treaty  of  Guadalupe  Hidalgo,  1848  309 

Index .     331 


TO    MY    BROTHER, 

WILLIAM  PETERS  REEVES,  PH.  D. 


INTRODUCTION 


The  selection  of  the  administrations  of  Tyler  and 
Polk  for  treatment  in  a  course  of  lectures  upon 
American  diplomatic  history  may  seem  somewhat  arbi 
trary.  Upon  closer  view,  however,  one  sees  that  there 
is  so  much  of  continuity  in  the  foreign  relations  of 
the  United  States  during  the  terms  of  these  two  Presi 
dents,  both  of  whom  have  been  called  "accidental," 
that  the  years  1841  to  1849  may  fairly  be  said  to  con 
stitute  an  epoch  quite  distinct  from  the  Jacksonian  era, 
which  preceded  them,  and  the  ante-bellum  period 
proper,  which  followed.  Yet  it  would  be  misleading 
to  state  that  this  epoch  presented  for  solution  prob 
lems  altogether  novel.  The  problems  for  the  most 
part  were  as  old  as  the  nation.  It  was  the  method 
of  their  solution  which  was  new.  The  questions  which 
dominated  the  foreign  policy  of  Tyler's  and  Folk's 
time  were  mainly  those  of  boundary,  dating  from  the 
first  treaty  of  peace  with  England.  The  administra 
tions  of  these  two  Presidents  accomplished  the  settle 
ment  of  three  boundary  questions :  the  northeastern 
and  northwestern  through  negotiation,  the  southwest 
ern  by  conquest. 

These  chapters  in  the  history  of  American  diplo 
macy  deal  principally  with  the  questions  of  boundary. 
To  have  considered  all  of  the  diplomatic  events  dur 
ing  the  years  1841  to  1849  would  have  exceeded  the 
limits  of  the  present  volume.  The  relations  with 
China,  Hawaii,  New  Granada,  and  Yucatan,  to  name 


only  a  few  matters  of  importance,  have  been  omitted 
in  order  to  give  space  for  sketches  of  the  develop 
ment  of  the  three  boundary  problems.  These  prelim 
inary  outlines  were  necessary  for  the  purpose  of  show 
ing  the  diplomatic  issues  as  they  existed  in  1841. 

With  the  exceptions  of  Chapters  XII  and  XIII  the 

text  is  printed  substantially  as  delivered  in  the  form 

of  lectures  at  the  Johns  Hopkins  University.     Chapter 

XIII  appeared  in  the  American  Historical  Review  for 

January,  1905  ;  Chapter  XII  is  largely  taken  up  with 

the  report  of  Mackenzie  upon  his  visit  to  Santa  Anna, 

which,  I  believe,  has  never  before  been  printed.     Per- 

ihaps  it  should  be  stated  that  the  book  was  written 

'wholly  from  materials  accessible  in  the  United  States. 

I  take  this  opportunity  of  expressing  my  obligations 
to  the  authorities  of  the  Lenox  Library,  New  York, 
of  the  Chicago  Historical  Society,  of  the  Library  of 
Congress,  and  of  the  Department  of  State  for  courte 
sies  had  at  their  hands.  To  Mr.  Worthington  C.  Ford, 
of  the  Library  of  Congress,  and  to  Messrs.  Andrew 
H.  Allen  and  Pendleton  King,  formerly  chiefs  respec 
tively  of  the  Bureau  of  Rolls  and  Library  and  of  the 
Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives  of  the  Department 
of  State,  I  desire  to  express  my  thanks  for  their  un- 
•failing  kindness  and  ready  assistance.  I  am  under 
many  obligations  to  Professor  Vincent,  of  the  Johns 
Hopkins  University,  for  valuable  suggestions,  and  to 
Miss  Mabel  M.  Reese,  of  Baltimore,  Maryland,  for 
her  assistance  in  seeing  the  book  through  the  press. 

JESSE  S.  REEVES. 
Richmond,  Indiana, 
August  12,  1907. 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  NORTHEASTERN  BOUNDARY  CONTROVERSY 
1783-1841 

The  treaty  of  peace  with  England  was  signed  Sep 
tember  3,  1783.  The  second  article  of  the  treaty  set 
out  the  boundaries  between  the  United  States  and  the 
British  possessions  on  the  north  as  follows :  "From  the 
northwest  angle  of  Nova  Scotia,  viz.  that  angle  which 
is  formed  by  a  line  drawn  due  north  from  the  source 
of  the  Saint  Croix  River  to  the  Highlands ;  along  the 
said  Highlands  which  divide  those  rivers  that  empty 
themselves  into  the  river  St.  Lawrence,  from  those 
which  fall  into  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  to  the  northwest- 
ernmost  head  of  Connecticut  River ;  thence  down  along 
the  middle  of  that  river,  to  the  forty-fifth  degree  of 
north  latitude;  from  thence,  by  a  line  due  west  on 
said  latitude,  until  it  strikes  the  river  Iroquois  or 
Cataraquy ; *  thence  along  the  middle  of  said  river  into 
Lake  Ontario,  through  the  middle  of  said  lake  until 
it  strikes  the  communication  by  water  between  that 
lake  and  Lake  Erie;  thence  along  the  middle  of  said 
communication  into  Lake  Erie,  through  the  middle  of 
said  lake  until  it  arrives  at  the  water  cbmmUtiicaticn 
between  that  lake  and  Lake  Huron;  theace:  along  th? 
middle  of  said  water  communication  into  the  Lake 
Huron;  thence  through  the  middle  of  said  lake  to  the 
water  communication  between  that  lake  and  Lake 

1«.  e.,  the  St.  Lawrence. 


2  DIPLOMACY    UNDER    TYLER    AND    POLK 

Superior;  thence  through  Lake  Superior  northward  of 
the  Isles  Royal  and  Phelippeaux,  to  the  Long  Lake; 
thence  through  the  middle  of  said  Long  Lake,  and 
the  water  communication  between  it  and  the  Lake  of 
the  Woods,  to  the  said  Lake  of  the  Woods ;  thence 
through  the  said  lake  to  the  most  northwestern  point 
thereof,  and  from  thence  on  a  due  west  course  to  the 
river  Mississippi."  On  the  east  the  boundary  was  to 
be  a  line  "drawn  along  the  middle  of  the  river  St. 
Croix,  from  its  mouth  in  the  Bay  of  Fundy  to  its 
source,  and  from  its  source  directly  north  to  the  afore 
said  Highlands,  which  divide  the  rivers  that  fall  into 
the  Atlantic  Ocean  from  those  which  fall  into  the 
river  St.  Lawrence." 

These  terms  are  identical  with  those  earlier  used 
in  the  provisional  articles  of  peace  concluded  Novem 
ber  30,  1782,  and  the  discussion  of  the  reasons  for 
their  adoption  belongs  to  an  earlier  period  of  history. 
At  this  time  it  will  be  necessary  to  confine  ourselves 
to  a  consideration  of  the  problems  to  which  the  treaty 
of  peace  gave  rise,  and  of  the  methods  used  in  adjusi> 
ing  the  differences  in  regard  to  boundary,  which,  in 
1842,  were  as  old  as  the  nation  itself. 

The  question  of  the  northeastern  boundary  may  be 
described  as  a  purely  geographical  question.  The  suc 
cessive  negotiations  for  the  settlement  of  the  boundary 
for  sixty  yjsiys,  after  the  treaty  was  signed  proceeded 
'upon  'the  theory  that  the  points  described  in  the  treaty 
vyene'  capable-  pf  being  definitely  determined  and  lo 
cated.  In  other  words,  sixty  years  were  spent  in  an 
attempt  to  elucidate  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  a  period 
which  has  been  properly  characterized  as  one  of  "un 
certainty  and  danger."  The  line  as  set  out  in  the 


THE    NORTHEASTERN    BOUNDARY    CONTROVERSY         3 

treaty  was  "drawn  in  much  ignorance  of  geography 
and  in  trustful  dependence  in  some  parts  on  anterior 
definitions  of  the  bounds  intended."  :  The  American 
negotiators,  Adams,  Franklin,  and  Jay,  were  deficient 
in  exact  knowledge  of  the  places  mentioned  in  the 
treaty,  partly  on  account  of  inadequate  information  as 
to  what  had  been  definitely  ascertained,  but  more  on 
account  of  the  inaccuracy  of  the  maps  that  they  used. 
This  inaccuracy  of  the  maps  almost  immediately  pre 
sented  questions  of  dispute.  The  first  was :  "Which  of 
the  several  rivers  running  into  the  Bay  of  Fundy  is  the" 
St.  Croix  mentioned  in  the.  treaty?"  Second:  "Where 
is  the  northwest  angle  of  Nova  xS^otia  to  be  found  ?" 
Third :  "What,  and  where,  a£e  the  Highlands  along 
which  the  line  was  to  run,  from  the  northwest  angle 
of  Nova  Scotia  to  the  northwesternmost  head  of  the 
Connecticut  River?"  Fourth:  "Which  is  the  north- 
westernmost  head  of  the  Connecticut  River?"  and 
finally :  "Are  the  rivers  emptying  into  the  Bay  of 
Fundy  those  which  'fall  into  the  Atlantic  Ocean,'  in 
the  words  of  the  treaty?"3  To  state  it  otherwise,  the 
whole  of  the  boundary,  as  agreed  upon  by  the  peace 
commissioners,  from  the  Atlantic  Ocean  to  some  point 
in  the  forty-fifth  parallel  of  latitude,  west  of  the  Con 
necticut  River,  was  scarcely  a  boundary  at  all.  It  was 
like  a  deed,  which,  although  purporting  to  convey  land 
by  metes  and  bounds,  is  based  upon  inaccurate  sur 
veyor's  notes.  Until  1842  diplomatic  activity  was  di 
rected  in  unsuccessful  efforts  to  explain  the  boundary 

2  Winsor,  Narrative  and  Critical  History  of  America,  VII., 
171. 

'Webster's  Defence  of  the  Treaty  of  Washington,  Works, 
V.,  82. 


4  DIPLOMACY    UNDER    TYLER    AND    POLK 

line  to  the  satisfaction  of  both  countries,  to  restate 
the  old  line,  rather  than  to  redetermine  it. 

The  question  as  to  what  river  the  treaty  meant  by 
the  St.  Croix  was  eliminated  from  the  controversy  as 
a  result  of  Jay's  treaty,  which  provided  that  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  should  each  appoint  a  com 
missioner  and  the  two  thus  appointed  select  a  third. 
This  board  of  commissioners  was  given  power  to  take 
evidence  and  make  surveys,  and  its  finding  was  to  be 
conclusive  "so  that  the  same  should  never  be  called  in 
question  or  made  the  subject  of  dispute  or  difference 
between  them."  The  commissioners  met  and  reported. 
A  decision  was  made  as  to  what  was  the  true  St. 
Croix ;  the  source  of  this  river  was  found  and  a  monu 
ment  placed  there.* 

Thus  one  portion  of  the  dispute  was  removed,  and  an 
attempt  was  made  by  Jefferson  in  1802  to  settle  the 
remaining  questions  through  Rufus  King,  the  Ameri 
can  minister  at  London.  King  was  instructed  to  press 
for  the  extension  of  the  line  from  the  source  of  the  St. 
Croix.  "In  fixing  the  point  at  which  the  line  is  to 
terminate,  and  which  is  referred  to  as  the  northwest 
angle  of  Nova  Scotia,  the  difficulty  arises  from  a  refer 
ence  of  the  treaty  of  1783  to  the  'Highlands,'  which 

4  Great  Britain  claamed  that  the  Magaguadavic  was  the  St. 
Croix  of  the  treaty;  the  United  States  insisted  upon  the 
Schoodiac.  The  commission  under  Jay's  treaty  adopted  the 
American  claim.  Moore,  International  Arbitrations,  I.,  Chap 
ter  i,  "The  Saint  Croix  Commission;"  American  State  Papers, 
Foreign  Relations,  I.,  486,  488,  492,  493,  520;  Webster,  Works, 
V.,  82.  Explanatory  article  to  Jay's  treaty,  releasing  the  com 
missioners  under  the  fifth  article  from  particularizing  the 
latitude  and  longitude  of  the  river  St.  Croix;  in  Treaties  and 
Conventions  between  the  United  States,  and  Other  Powers, 
1889,  396. 


THE    NORTHEASTERN    BOUNDARY    CONTROVERSY         5 

are  now  found  to  have  no  definite  existence."  6  The 
instructions  suggested  that  commissioners,  appointed 
as  in  Jay's  treaty,  should  determine  upon  a  line  to  be 
substituted  for  that  following  the  crest  of  what  the 
former  treaty  called  the  Highlands,  from  the  north 
west  angle  of  Nova  Scotia  to  the  northwesternmost 
source  of  the  Connecticut  River,  that  line  to  be  drawn 
with  such  references  to  intermediate  sources  of  rivers 
or  other  landmarks  as  to  admit  of  easy  and  accurate 
execution.  In  the  negotiations  which  followed,  King 
and  Lord  Hawkesbury  agreed  upon  the  northeastern 
boundary  in  terms  substantially  those  of  Madison's 
instructions.  The  treaty  provided  for  the  running, 
instead  of  the  mere  description,  of  the  line  between  the 
northwest  corner  of  Nova  Scotia  and  the  source  of  the 
Connecticut  River."  Such  an  arrangement  was  emi 
nently  desirable,  and  so,  too,  might  have  been  a  further 
provision  which  King  and  Hawkesbury  included  in 
reference  to  the  northwestern  boundary  beyond  the 
Lake  of  the  Woods.7  Between  the  time  the  treaty  was 
agreed  upon  and  its  formal  signing  Livingston  and 

5  This  is  the  first  official  intimation  that  the  boundary  as  set 
forth  in  the  treaty  of  1783  was  incapable  of  being  determined. 
Madison  thus  "conceded  a  point  which  it  was  never  possible 
to  regain."  Moore,  International  Arbitrations,  L,  68.  Gallatin 
long  afterward  expressed  regret  that  the  United  States  had 
so  blundered.  Adams,  Gallatin,  II.,  546.  Quoted  by  Moore, 
ut  sup. 

e  Madison  to  King,  June  8,  1802,  American  State  Papers, 
For.  Rel.,  II.,  585;  J.  C.  B.  Davis's  notes  in  Treaties  between 
the  United  States  and  Other  Powers,  1324,  and  references 
there  given;  Moore,  International  Arbitrations,  I.,  65-69; 
American  State  Papers,  II.,  584-91. 

7  Article  5  of  treaty.  American  State  Papers,  For.  Rel,  II., 
584- 


0  DIPLOMACY    UNDER    TYLER    AND    POLK 

Monroe  had  secured  the  cession  of  Louisiana.  The 
Senate  struck  out  the  article  referring  to  the  north 
western  boundary  upon  the  ground  that  it  might  limit 
the  claims  of  the  United  States  to  the  territory  ac 
quired  from  France.8  Madison  believed,  as  did  Mon 
roe,  and  probably  also  many  in  the  Senate,  that  the 
United  States  had  succeeded  to  the  claim  of  France 
under  the  treaty  of  Utrecht.  "We  have  reason  to  be 
lieve/'  wrote  Madison  to  Livingston,  "that  the  Northern 
boundary  was  settled  between  France  and  Great  Britain 
by  Commissioners  appointed  under  the  treaty  of 
Utrecht,  who  separated  the  British  and  French  terri 
tories  west  of  the  Lake  of  the  Woods  by  the  49th  de 
gree  of  latitude." '  But  there  is  no  evidence,  either  in 
the  French  or  British  archives,  that  a  boundary  com 
mission  under  the  treaty  of  Utrecht  agreed  upon  such 
a  line. 

With  the  failure  of  King's  treaty  the  controversy 
rested  until  after  the  War  of  1812.'°  In  the  prolonged 
negotiations  which  led  to  the  treaty  of  Ghent  the  ques- 
tions  of  boundary  filled  a  large  place.  Any  adequate 

"The  treaty  was  agreed  upon  April  u,  1803  (King  to  the 
Secretary  of  State,  December  9,  1803.  American  State 
Papers,  For.  Rel,  II.,  591),  and  signed  May  12,  1803.  The 
Louisiana  treaty  was  signed  April  30,  1803,  but  King  knew 
nothing  of  it  until  May  15.  The  Senate  consented  to  the 
ratification  of  the  King  treaty  after  it  had  expunged  the  fifth 
article.  Ratifications  of  the  amended  treaty  were  never  ex 
changed.  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  II.,  584. 

"Madison  to  Livingston,  Jan.  31,  1804;  Am.  State  Papers, 
For.  Rel,  II.,  574- 

10  A  negotiation  begun  by  Monroe  and  Pinkney  in  1807  upon 
the  subject  of  the  northern  and  northeastern  boundaries  was 
interrupted  by  the  Leopard-Chesapeake  occurrence.  Am. 
State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  III.,  162-65,  185. 


THE    NORTHEASTERN    BOUNDARY    CONTROVERSY         7 

treatment  of  the  subject  would  involve  a  greater  space 
than  can  be  given  it  here.11  The  British  commissioners 
early  stated  that  they  were  authorized  to  revise  the 
northern  boundary,  but  at  first  they  expressly  dis 
claimed  any  intention  of  acquiring  any  increase  of  ter 
ritory,  saying  that  they  desired  a  revision  merely  to  pre 
vent  uncertainty  and  dispute.12  The  purpose  of  this 
revision  was  soon  disclosed,  however,  when  the  British 
commissioners  demanded  a  direct  communication  from 
Halifax  to  Quebec  by  a  cession  of  that  portion  of  the 
territory  claimed  by  the  district  of  Maine  and  of  a  part 
of  the  so-called  ''Highlands,"  which  intervened  between 
the  places  named  and  prevented  that  communication. 
This  proposal  was  rejected,  the  American  commission 
ers  denying  any  authority  to  cede  any  part  of  the  terri 
tory  of  the  United  States.13  To  this  it  was  replied  that 
the  boundary  of  Maine  had  never  been  ascertained, 
that  possession  by  the  United  States  of  the  territory 
never  occupied  which  interrupted  communication  be- 

11  Moore,   International   Arbitrations,   I.,   69-72;   Am.    State 
Papers,  For.  Rel.,  III.,  695-748;  IV.,  808- n. 

12  The  American  Commissioners  to  Monroe,  August  12,  1814 ; 
Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rel,  III.,  705.     Protocol  of  August  8, 
1814;  ibid.,  708. 

13  The    American    Commissioners    to    Monroe,    August    19, 
1814;  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  III.,  709.     Moore,  L,  69. 
"It  must  be  admitted  that  the  propositions  and  the  explana 
tions  of  the  British  commissioners  did  not  fit  well  together. 
It  was  they  themselves  who  brought  forward  the  subject  of 
the  boundaries;  and  they  at  the  outset  proposed  a  Variation' 
of  the  line   for   a   specific  purpose.     Nor  had   the   American 
government    'asserted'    any    boundary    line    but    in    the    lan 
guage  of  the  treaty  of  1783."     But  compare  Madison's  opinion 
that  the  Highlands  had  no  definite  existence.     The  American 
Commissioners    to    the    British    Commissioners,    August    24, 
1814;  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rel,  III.,  712. 


8  DIPLOMACY     UNDER    TYL£R     AND    POLK 

tween  Halifax  and  Quebec  was  not  contemplated  by 
the  treaty  of  1783."  The  American  representatives 
thereupon  took  the  ground,  which  was  afterward  main 
tained  by  the  United  States,  that  there  was  no  uncer 
tainty  in  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  1783,  and  that 
nothing  further  was  required  than  that  the  boundary 
line  so  described  should  be  definitely  ascertained  by 
surveys.  So  the  matter  stood  until  the  American  com 
missioners  submitted  a  projet  of  a  treaty.  In  it  a  stip 
ulation  was  inserted  for  the  location  of  the  boundary 
line  from  the  St.  Croix  through  the  Highlands  to  the 
head  of  the  Connecticut  River,  or  to  the  forty-fifth 
parallel,  by  commissioners  named  and  acting  similarly 
to  those  appointed  to  determine  the  true  St.  Croix 
under  Jay's  treaty.  This  stipulation  was  agreed  to  by 
the  British  plenipotentiaries.15 

The  temper  of  the  negotiation,  however,  marked  a 
new  stage  in  the  northeastern  boundary  contention. 
The  war  had  demonstrated  to  Great  Britain  the  desir 
ability  of  communication  overland  between  Halifax 
and  Quebec,  and  her  demand  was  based  upon  that  fact. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  American  commissioners  took 
the  firm  position  that  no  part  of  the  district  of  Maine 
could  be  ceded,  a  position  which  was  hostile  to  the 
spirit  of  compromise.  Not  until  1821  did  the  commis 
sioners,  appointed  under  the  treaty  of  Ghent  to  deter 
mine  the  boundary  line,  finish  their  work  and  then  only 
by  agreeing  to  disagree,  each  making  a  separate  report 

14  The  British  Commissioners  to  the  American  Commission 
ers,  September  19,  1814;  ibid.,  717-18. 

15  Articles  5  and  6,  Treaties  and  Conventions,  402 ;  Davis's 
Notes,  ibid.,  1329;  Decision  of  the  Commissioners  under  the 
Sixth  Article  of  the  Treaty  of  Ghent,  June  18,  1822 ;  ibid.,  407. 


THE:    NORTHEASTERN    BOUNDARY    CONTROVERSY         9 

to  his  government.16  Thus  the  matter  stood  as  it  had 
since  1794  until  1823,  when  the  United  States  again  be 
gan,  through  Rush  and  afterward  through  Gallatin, 
the  negotiations  which  resulted  in  the  treaty  of  1827."  *.<• 
In  this,  resort  was  had  to  the  arbitration  of  a  friendly 
sovereign,  or  state,  as  was  provided  by  the  treaty  of 
Ghent,  in  case  the  commissioners  thereunder  finally 
disagreed.  This  arbitration  convention  of  1827  set 
forth  with  definiteness  the  method  of  submitting  the 
case  for  arbitration.  Each  side  was  to  prepare  a  state 
ment  of  its  case  together  with  all  the  documents  bear 
ing  thereon,  with  the  understanding  that  Mitchell's 
map,  which  was  used  by  the  framers  of  the  treaty  of 
1783,  and  an  agreed  map  of  later  date  (upon  which 
the  watercourses  were  shown)  were  to  be  the  only 
maps  to  be  admitted  as  evidence.18  Gallatin,  who  ne 
gotiated  the  treaty  and  afterward  prepared  the  Ameri 
can  statement  of  the  case  (probably  the  most  complete 
ever  made),  correctly  predicted  the  outcome  of  the 
arbitration,  which  was  referred  to  the  King  of  the 
Netherlands,  when  he  reported  that,  in  his  judgment, 
"an  umpire,  whether  he  be  King  or  farmer,  rarely  de 
cides  on  strict  principles  of  law :  he  has  always  a  bias 
to  try,  if  possible,  to  split  the  difference."  Such  a  de 
cision,  indeed,  was  made  by  the  judge  early  in  1831. 
Of  the  twelve  thousand  square  miles  in  controversy, 

18  American  State  Papers,  For.  Rel,  V.,  138-39;  VI,  821,  893- 
945,  999-1000;  Davis,  Notes,  1329;  Moore,  International  Arbi 
trations,  I.,  72-83. 

17  Am.    State   Papers,   For.    Rel,    VI.,   643,  .700-6;    Adams, 
Gallatin,  II.,  544-45;  Moore,  Int.  Arbitrations,  I.,  85-138. 

18  Treaties  and  Conventions,  429. 


IO  DIPLOMACY    UNDER    TYLER    AND    POLK 

about  eight  thousand  were  given  to  the  United  States.19 
The  state  of  Maine,  which  had  taken  strong 
ground  against  the  encroachment  of  Great  Britain 
and  had  memorialized  Congress  upon  the  subject, 
refused  to  agree  to  the  decision  of  the  arbitrator. 
Jackson  was  in  favor  of  adhering  to  the  decision 
of  the  King  of  the  Netherlands.  The  constitu 
tional  objections  to  the  cession  of  territory  be 
longing  to,  or  at  least  claimed  by,  a  state  was 
not  seriously  considered  by  Jackson,  who,  before 
making  any  offer  to  Maine  of  a  land  grant  in  the  west 
as  a  douceur  for  its  concession,  was  determined  to 
accept  the  award  of  the  King  of  the  Netherlands  as 
final  and  to  issue  his  proclamation  so  announcing  it, 
without  consulting  the  Senate.  It  is  stated,  upon  the 
authority  of  Forsyth,  that  Jackson  was  driven  from 
this  course  by  the  representation  of  his  friends  in 
Maine,  who  said  that  such  a  proceeding  would  lose 
the  state  to  the  Democratic  party.  Jackson  was  further 
reported  to  have  said  that  "it  was  somewhat  singular, 
that  the  only  occasion  of  importance  in  his  life  in  which 


"Award  of  the  King  of  the  Netherlands;  Moore,  op.  cit., 
L,  119-36.  In  the  place  of  the  line  of  the  Highlands  a  con 
ventional  line  was  suggested  by  the  arbitrator  because,  while 
the  term  "Highlands"  was  applicable  to  a  watershed  even 
though  it  might  not  be  mountainous,  or  even  hilly,  it  was  not 
shown  that  the  boundaries  described  in  the  treaty  of  1783 
coincided  with  the  ancient  limits  of  the  British  province,  nor 
in  fact  did  the  line  of  the  Highlands  as  claimed  by  either 
Great  Britain  or  the  United  States  answer  the  requirements 
of  that  treaty.  The  British  claim  as  to  the  northwesternmost 
head  of  the  Connecticut  was  allowed.  Admitting  that  Rouse's 
Point  was  within  British  territory,  the  award  recommended 
that  "the  United  States  be  left  in  possession  of  it."  The 
award  was  thus  "recommendatory  rather  than  decisive." 


THE    NORTHEASTERN    BOUNDARY    CONTROVERSY      II 

he  had  allowed  himself  to  be  overruled  by  his  friends, 
was  one  of  all  others  in  which  he  ought  to  have  ad 
hered  to  his  own  opinions."  :  He  then  proposed  that 
Maine  should  accept  a  million  acres  of  public  land  in 
the  West  as  an  equivalent  for  the  territory  claimed  by 
her  beyond  the  line  designated  by  the  award  of  the 
Dutch  king.  Nothing  came  of  the  proposal.21  The  re 
sults  of  the  arbitration  were  unsatisfactory  to  Great 
Britain  and  the  award  was  rejected.22  From  this  time 
until  Tyler's  administration  nothing  was  done  looking 
toward  the  settlement  of  the  northeastern  boundary 
question  beyond  an  intermittent  correspondence,  which 
grew  more  and  more  bitter  in  tone.  Frequent  clashes 
upon  the  border,  which  resulted  in  the  so-called 
"Aroostook  War"  of  1839,  together  with  the  feeling 
against  Great  Britain  growing  out  of  the  Caroline  and 
McLeod  cases  and  the  domineering  attitude  of  Lord 
Palmerston's  ministry,  tended  to  bring  the  relations 
between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  to  a  state 
of  high  tension,  and  such  it  was  when  Webster  suc 
ceeded  Forsyth  as  secretary  of  state. 

Buchanan,  as  chairman  of  the  Senate  committee  on 
foreign  relations,  reported  April  14,  1840,  and  thus 
stated  the  position  of  the  Van  Buren  administration, 

20  Webster,    Diplomatic    and    Official    Papers,    Introduction, 
IX. ;   Benton's   Speech,  Cong.   Globe,  27  Cong.,  3  Sess.,  App., 
5;  Webster,  Works,  V.,  97,  note;  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  3,  22  Cong., 
i  Sess. 

21  Moore,  op.   cit.,  I.,   138;   Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  431,  25  Cong.,  2 
Sess.     In  1832  an  agreement  to  this  end  was  entered  into  by 
Livingston,  McLane,  and  Woodbury  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States  and  by   Preble,   Williams,   and   Emery  on  the  part  of 
Maine,  but  no  ratification  followed. 

22  Br.  and  For.  State  Papers,  XXIL,  772,  776,  783. 


12  DIPLOMACY     UNDER    TYLER    AND    POI.K 

with  which  the  committee  was  in  accord :  "The  terri 
torial  rights  of  Maine  have  been  uniformly  asserted, 
and  a  firm  determination  to  maintain  them  has  been 
invariably  evinced;  though  this  has  been  done  in  an 
amicable  spirit.  So  far  as  the  committee  can  exercise 
any  influence  over  the  subject,  they  are  resolved  that 
if  war  should  be  'the  result,  which  they  confidently 
hope  may  not  be  the  case,  this  war  shall  be  rendered 
inevitable  by  the  conduct  of  the  British  Government. 
They  have  believed  this  to  be  the  surest  mode  of  unit 
ing  every  American  heart  and  every  American  arm  in 
defense  of  the  just  rights  of  the  country.  .  .  . 
While  the  Committee  can  perceive  no  just  cause  at  the 
present  moment  for  anticipating  hostilities  between  the 
two  countries,  they  would  not  be  understood  as  express 
ing  the  opinion  that  their  country  should  not  be  pre 
pared  to  meet  any  emergency." '  This  was  hardly  the 
attitude  to  take  if  a  successful  plan  of  arbitration  was 
to  be  arrived  at.  Fox's  pro  jet  for  an  arbitration  treaty 
was  followed  by  Forsyth's  counter-pro  jet  in  August, 
1840,  and  Fox  referred  it  to  Palmerston.  Webster 
thus  described  the  last  stage  of  Van  Buren's  negotia 
tion  :  "Lord  Palmerston  would  have  nothing  to  do 
with  [Forsyth's  counter-pro j et] .  He  would  not  an 
swer  it;  he  would  not  touch  it;  he  gave  up  the  nego 
tiations  in  apparent  despair.  Two  years  before,  the 
parties  had  agreed  on  the  principle  of  joint-explora 
tion,  and  the  principle  of  arbitration"  as  a  faithful 
adherence  to  the  stipulations  of  the  treaty  of  Ghent. 
"But  in  their  subsequent  correspondence,  on  matters 


23  Reports  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations, 
V.,  601. 


THE)    NORTHEASTERN    BOUNDARY    CONTROVERSY       13 

of  detail,  modes  of  proceeding,  and  subordinate  ar 
rangements,  they  had,  through  the  whole  two  years, 
constantly  receded  farther,  and  farther,  and  farther 
from  each  other.  They  were  flying  apart ;  and,  like 
two  orbs  moving  in  opposite  directions,  could  only 
meet  after  they  should  have  traversed  the  whole 
circle."  *4 

Earlv  in  March,  1839,  Forsyth,  tiring  of  the  inter 
minable  discussion  of  the  .northeastern  boundary  ques 
tion,  suggested  to  the  President  that  Webster  be  sent 
to  England  as  a  special  envoy  to  take  charge  of  the 
emoarrassing  negotiations  and  to  endeavor  to  frame 
a  treaty  which  would  effectually  remove  all  causes  of 
irritation.  Webster  was  not  displeased  at  the  sugges 
tion,  although  it  came  from  his  political  opponents, 
and  at  once  drew  up  a  scheme  for  the  settlement  of 
the  boundary  question,  which  he  submitted  to  the  sec 
retary  of  state.  Forsyth's  suggestion  was  not  adopted 
by  Van  Buren.  Webster,  however,  outlined  a  plan 
for  the  settlement,  of  which  three  years  afterward  he, 
himself,  made  use.  Curtis,  in  his  life  of  Webster,  says 
that  he  had  been  unable  to  find  the  sketch  of  Webster's 
scheme,  though  he  knew  such  a  one  had  been  in  ex 
istence.25  Dr.  Van  Tyne,  in  his  recently  printed  "Let 
ters  of  Daniel  Webster,"  has  supplied  the  deficiency.*8 
When  Webster  became  secretary  of  state  and  began 
the  consideration  of  the  boundary  question,  he  adopted 
mutatis  mutandis  the  scheme  which  he  had  submitted 
to  Forsyth  three  years  before.  The  plan  proposed 

"  Webster,  Works,  V.,  93- 

23  Curtis,  Life  of  Webster,  II.,  3,  note. 

29  Van  Tyne,  Letters  of  Daniel  Webster,  215. 


14  DIPLOMACY    UNDER    TYLER    AND    POLK 

that  the  negotiation  should  be  conducted  from  the  first 
in  a  manner  at  once  informal  and  conciliatory,  and 
that  the  case  of  the  United  States  should  be  presented 
as  concisely  as  possible,  in  order  that  England  should 
be  bound  to  take  her  ground,  either  by  asserting  a 
line  conformable  to  her  interpretation  of  the  original 
treaty,  as  she  had  done  prior  to  the  former  arbitration, 
or  else  by  assuming  the  position  that,  owing  to  the  in- 
definiteness  of  the  description  in  the  treaty,  the  boun 
dary  line  could  not  be  found.  If  she  adopted  the  first 
position,  the  United  States  should  show  how  impossible 
it  would  be  to  reconcile  Great  Britain's  pretensions  with 
the  terms  of  the  treaty ;  if  the  second,  the  United  States 
should  urge  the  ex  parte  surveys,  especially  the  one 
made  by  the  state  of  Maine.  "But,"  Webster  con 
tinued,  "however  the  argument  may  stand,  it  is  prob 
able  that  England  will  not,  gratuitously,  yield  her  pre 
tensions  and  something  must  be  yielded  by  us,  since 
the  subject  has  actually  become  matter  of  negotiation. 
A  conventional  line,  therefore,  is  to  be  regarded  as  a 
leading  and  most  promising  of  adjustments,"  to  which 
the  consent  of  the  state  of  Maine  should  be  first  had. 
Only  in  case  a  conventional  line  could  not  be  agreed 
upon  should  recourse  be  again  had  to  arbitration. 
That  it  would  be  necessary  to  gain  the  previous  con 
sent  of  Maine  and  Massachusetts  to  any  settlement  was 
not  a  new  idea  with  Webster.  Van  Buren  had  already 
attempted  it,27  and  so  had  Jackson  after  the  award  of 
the  King  of  the  Netherlands.  Nor  was  the  proposition 
to  adopt  a  conventional  line  instead  of  standing  upon 


"Moore,   Int.   Arbitrations,   I.,    140;    S.    Ex.   Doc.   319,  2$ 
Cong.,  2  Sess. 


THE    NORTHEASTERN    BOUNDARY    CONTROVERSY       15 

the  terms  of  the  original  treaty  a  new  one.  The  King 
of  the  Netherlands  had  suggested  a  conventional  line. 
The  germ  of  the  idea  is  referable  to  Madison,  who 
believed  that  the  Highlands  had  no  existence.  In  1838 
Forsyth,  as  Van  Buren's  secretary  of  state,  sounded 
the  government  of  Maine  upon  its  willingness  to  agree 
to  a  conventional  line  in  preference  to  another  resort 
to  arbitration.  The  legislature  of  that  state  answered 
that  it  was  equally  opposed  to  a  conventional  line  and 
to  a  new  arbitration ;  the  occupation  of  all  the  territory 
claimed  by  it  was  insisted  upon. 

Palmerston's  suggestion,  made  after  the  repudiation 
of  the  arbitration  award,  that  the  disputed  territory  be 
equally  divided,  even  if  seriously  made,  was  not  con 
sidered  by  the  United  States.28  It  can  hardly  be  called 
a  proposal  for  a  conventional  line.  The  adoption  of  a 
conventional  line  would  have  been  as  if  two  parties 
who  had  fallen  out  over  a  contract,  the  impossibility 
of  a  proper  performance  of  which  had  been  demon 
strated,  were  to  agree  to  a  supplementary  contract,  re 
affirming  the  terms  of  the  original  agreement  in  so  far 
as  that  was  possible,  and  coming  together  upon  new 
terms  in  place  of  those  found  impossible  of  execution. 
In  other  words,  a  new  boundary  treaty  should  define 
the  terms  of  the  former  instrument  without  dependence 
upon  any  interpretation  which  might  have  been  placed 
upon  that  earlier  treaty  by  either  party  or  by  a  tribunal 
of  arbitration.  Webster's  plan  was  essentially  a  non- 
litigious  one;  concession  upon  one  side  implies  con 
cession  upon  the  other.  The  impracticability  of  his 
idea  was  that  it  was  essentially  a  compromise.  The 

28  Walpole,  History  of  England,  Ed.  1890,  V.,  328. 


1 6  DIPLOMACY    UNDER    TYLER    AND    POLK 

danger  of  all  quid  pro  quo  treaties  is  that  popular  ap 
proval  of  them  is  difficult  to  obtain.  Reference  to  arbi 
tration  was  a  programme  of  litigation  pure  and  simple, 
by  which  each  side  would  be  sure  to  claim  every 
thing  possible  in  the  hope  that  the  award  of  arbitration 
would  be  a  compromise  of  conflicting  pretensions. 

Van  Buren's  administration,  instead  of  adopting 
Webster's  plan  because  blocked  by  the  opposition  of 
Maine,  again  proceeded  upon  the  theory  that  arbitra 
tion  was  the  only  method  of  solution.  Webster,  with 
some  show  of  partisanship,  thus  characterized  the  ne 
gotiations  immediately  prior  to  his  taking  office :  "The 
merits  of  the  boundary  question  were  never  discussed 
by  Mr.  Van  Buren  to  any  extent.  The  thing  that  his 
administration  discussed  was  the  formation  of  a  con 
vention  of  exploration  and  arbitration  to  settle  the 
question.  .  .  .  the  whole  correspondence  turned 
on  the  arrangement  of  details  of  a  convention  for 
arbitration.  ...  It  was  because  these  subordinate 
questions  respecting  the  convention  for  arbitration  had 
got  into  so  much  perplexity,  were  so  embarrassed  Avith 
projects  and  counter-projects,  had  become  so  difficult 
and  entangled ;  and  because  every  effort  to  disentangle 
them  had  made  the  matter  worse,"  that  the  Van  Buren 
negotiation  came  to  nothing.  "It  was  an  endless  dis 
cussion  of  details  and  forms  of  proceeding  in  which 
the  parties  receded  farther  and  farther  from  each  other 
every  day."  : 

The  northeastern  boundary  controversy  was  but  one 
of  the  legacies  left  by  the  administration  of  Van  Buren. 
The  McLeod  case,  the  seizure  of  the  Caroline,  and  the 

29  Webster,  Works,  V.,  114. 

i 


THE:    NORTHEASTERN    BOUNDARY    CONTROVERSY       I/ 

question  of  right  of  search  in  connection  with  the 
suppression  of  the  slave-trade — each  one  of  these 
had  been  discussed  by  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States  in  such  a  manner  as  to  arouse  the  bad  feeling 
that  might  end  in  war.  The  truculent  attitude  of 
Lord  Palmerston  and  the  large  number  of  British 
troops  despatched  to  Canada  aggravated  the  unfriendly, 
if  not  hostile,  demeanor  of  the  American  people.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  English  were  embittered  by  their  losses 
in  American  securities  through  repudiation  and  bank 
ruptcy,  and  were  disgusted  by  the  sundry  descriptions 
of  American  manners  and  domestic  institutions  which 
travelers  such  as  Mrs.  Trollope  and  Miss  Martineau 
had  printed.  American 'society  was  represented  to  be 
a  compound  of  vulgarity,  brutality,  and  dishonesty  in 
which  the  evils  of  slavery,  rampant  speculation,  bank 
ruptcy,  and  repudiation  filled  a  large  place.  Added  to 
these  elements  of  discord  was  the  jealousy  with  which 
the  growing  power  and  importance  of  the  United 
States  were  looked  upon.  The  temper  of  both  peoples 
was  irritable  and,  without  a  decided  change  in  diplo- 
matic  manners,  might  have  led  to  war. 

The  case  of  McLeod  and  that  of  the  Caroline  were 
closely  connected  and  grew  out  of  the  Canada  upris 
ing  of  1837.  The  circumstances  of  each,  so  important 
constitutionally  as  well  as  diplomatically,  in  which 
Seward  as  well  as  Webster  played  an  important  part, 
remain  to  be  reviewed.  The  Caroline,  an  American 
steamer,  had  been  used  in  aid  of  the  Canadian  rebel 
lion.  An  expedition  from  Canada  crossed  the  river,  cut 
the  vessel  loose  from  her  moorings  on  the  American 
side,  fired  her,  and  sent  her  down  over  Niagara  Falls. 
During  the  disturbance  an  American  citizen  named 


1 8  DIPLOMACY    UNDER    TYLER    AND    POLK 

Durfree  was  killed.  Some  time  afterward  a  British 
subject,  Alexander  McLeod,  was  arrested  in  New  York 
by  the  authorities  of  that  state  for  the  murder  of  Dur 
free.  The  seizure  of  the  Caroline  took  place  late  in  De 
cember,  1837.  McLeod  was  not  arrested  until  Novem 
ber,  1840.  The  position  which  Great  Britain,  at  first 
vaguely,  and  afterward  distinctly,  assumed  was  that 
the  seizure  of  the  Caroline  in  American  waters  was 
an  act  of  public  force,  which  it  avowed  and  justified 
as  a  proper  and  necessary  measure  of  self-defense.  If 
this  position  (and  it  was  one  which  could  not  be  de 
nied  by  the  United  States)  was  as  correct  as  it  was 
bold,  the  arrest  and  detention  of  McLeod  by  civil  or 
criminal  powers  were  in  violation  of  international 
rights  and  usages.  The  immediate  release  of  McLeod 
was  demanded  by  Fox,  the  British  minister  at  Wash 
ington,  upon  the  ground  that  the  prisoner,  while  en 
gaged  in  the  Caroline  affair,  was  performing  an  act 
of  public  duty  for  which  he  could  not  be  made  per 
sonally  and  individually  answerable  to  the  laws  and 
tribunals  of  any  country.*0  That  the  seizure  of  the 
Caroline  was  an  invasion  and  a  violation  of  the  terri 
tory  of  the  United  States  had  been  the  position  of 
Forsyth  from  the  time  of  the  occurrence,  but  nothing 
looking  toward  satisfaction  for  the  act  had  been  accom 
plished.  The  arrest  of  McLeod,  nearly  three  years 
after  the  Caroline  was  burned,  aroused  the  British 
ministry  to  such  an  extent  that  they  overlooked  the 
affront  to  the  United  States  by  the  violation  of  its 
territory.  Avowing  responsibility  for  the  former  act, 

*°Fox  to  Webster,   March   12,   1841;    Webster,  Diplomatic 
and  Official  Papers,  120-21. 


THE    NORTHEASTERN    BOUNDARY    CONTROVERSY      IQ 

Fox  formally  and  peremptorily  demanded  McLeod's 
release.  The  method  of  Fox's  negotiation  and  the 
language  which  he  employed  were  not  calculated  to 
aid  in  harmonious  intercourse,  and  his  usefulness  at 
Washington  was  really  at  an  end. 

The  arrest  of  McLeod  upon  a  charge  of  murder 
awakened  all  the  dormant  distrust  with  which  England 
regarded  the  United  States,  and  the  danger  of  war 
was  imminent.  Webster  was  informed  by  a  prominent 
Englishman  that  there  was  but  one  feeling  on  the  sub 
ject  among  all  parties  and  all  ranks ;  if  McLeod  should 
be  condemned  it  would  be  such  an  outrage  upon  inter 
national  justice  that  the  scabbard  must  be  thrown 
away  at  once.81  Cass,  the  American  minister  at  Paris, 
then,  as  always,  an  Anglophobe,  wrote :  "I  suppose  you 
are  aware  of  the  instructions  given  by  the  British 
ministry  to  their  minister  at  Washington.  The  subject 
is  no  secret  here,  and  was  freely  spoken  of  to  me  by 
one  who  knew.  If  McLeod  is  executed,  the  minister 
is  to  leave  the  United  States.  It  is  the  casus  belli. 
But  any  sentence  short  of  this  is  not  to  lead  to  this 
result."  "  Again  he  wrote :  "We  must  not  shut  our 
eyes  to  the  fact  that  a  war  with  us  would  meet  with 
almost  universal  support  in  England." '  Palmerston 
informed  Stevenson  that  McLeod's  execution  would  be 
the  signal  for  war." 

81  Vernon  Harcourt  to  Webster,  March  12,  1841 ;  Curtis, 
Life  of  Webster,  II.,  62,  note. 

"  Cass  to  Webster,  March  5,  1841 ;  Curtis,  Webster,  II.,  62. 

88  Cass   to   Webster,   March    15,    1841 ;   ibid.,  64. 

"Bulwer,  Palmerston,  III.,  46,  49.  Quoted  by  Walpole, 
V.,  332. 


20  DIPLOMACY    UND^R    TYLER    AND    POLK 

The  temper  in  Washington,  which  Fox's  note  to 
Forsyth  aroused,  boded  trouble.  A  hostile  report  was 
made  in  the  House  by  the  committee  on  foreign  rela 
tions,  which  suggested  the  advisability  of  arming  the 
country.  This  report  was  referred  to  the  committee 
on  military  affairs,  where  it  fortunately  slept  while 
the  Van  Buren  administration  went  out  of  office  and 
the  Whigs  came  into  power. 

The  diplomatic  misunderstanding  was  not  confined 
to  this  side  of  the  Atlantic  or  to  the  somewhat  arro 
gant  manner  of  Fox.  The  United  States  minister  at 
the  Court  of  St.  James  was  Andrew  Stevenson.  After 
twelve  years'  service  in  Congress,  seven  of  which  were 
as  speaker  of  the  House,  he  was  appointed  minister  to 
England  by  Jackson  and  was  continued  in  that 
capacity  until  Van  Buren's  term  ended.  During  the 
last  part  of  his  mission  he  was  engaged  in  a  discussion 
with  Lords  Palmerston  and  Aberdeen  upon  the  African 
slave-trade  and  the  right  of  visitation  and  search. 
These  were  allied  questions  which  the  United  States 
met  with  growing  sensitiveness,  a  sensitiveness  which 
was  the  keener  from  the  realization  that  this  country, 
while  committed  to  the  suppression  of  the  slave-trade 
by  a  long  series  of  official  expressions,  found  itself 
disinclined,  on  account  of  its  domestic  institution  of 
slavery,  to  cooperate  with  the  other  nations  of  Christ 
endom  for  the  effectual  abolition  of  the  trade.35  The 
European  view,  first  adopted  by  Great  Britain,  was  that 
the  trade  could  not  be  wiped  out  without  some  con 
cession  involving  a  mutual  right,  if  not  of  search,  at 

85  Du   Bois,    The  Suppression   of  the  African  Slave-Trade, 
passim. 


THE    NORTHEASTERN    BOUNDARY    CONTROVERSY      21 

least  of  visitation,  of  merchant  vessels  suspected  of 
being  slavers.  As  stated  by  Du  Bois :  "If  a  fully 
equipped  slaver  sailed  from  New  York,  Havana,  Rio 
Janeiro,  or  Liverpool,  she  had  only  to  hoist  the  Stars 
and  Stripes  in  order  to  proceed  unmolested  on  her 
piratical  voyage ;  for  there  was  seldom  a  United  States 
cruiser  to  be  met  with,  and  there  were,  on  the  other 
hand,  diplomats  at  Washington  so  jealous  of  the  honor 
of  the  flag  that  they  would  prostitute  it  to  crime  rather 
than  allow  an  English  or  a  French  cruiser  in  any  way 
to  interfere." '  Without  doubt,  the  contention  of  the 
United  States  as  to  England's  pretensions  to  a  right 
of  visit  was  technically  correct.  This  was  a  position 
taken  by  authorities  in  international  law  with  almost 
perfect  unanimity.  Nevertheless,  it  was  clear  that  if 
the  slave-trade  was  to  be  suppressed,  each  nation  must 
zealously  keep  her  flag  from  fraudulent  use  or,  as  a 
labor-saving  device,  must  depute  this  duty  to  others 
for  limited  places  and  in  special  circumstances. 

In  connection  with  his  protest  against  any  visitation 
of  vessels  flying  the  American  flag,  even  though  they 
might  be  known  to  be  slavers  and  pirates  under  federal 
law,  Stevenson  told  Palmerston  in  1841  "that  there 
is  no  shadow  of  pretense  for  excusing,  much  less  justi-« 
fying,  any  such  right.  That  it  is  wholly  immaterial 
whether  the  vessels  be  equipped  for,  or  actually  en 
gaged  in,  slave  traffic,  or  not,  and  consequently  the 
right  to  search  or  detain  even  slave  vessels  must  be 
confined  to  the  ships  or  vessels  of  those  nations  with 
whom  it  may  have  treaties  on  the  subject."  "  That  the 

"Ibid.,  143. 

87  H.  Ex.  Doc.  34,  27  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  5-6,  quoted  by  Du  Bois, 
145- 


22  DIPLOMACY    UNDER    TYI^R    AND 

United  States  would  not  be  included  among  nations 
of  this  last  class  was  evident  from  Forsyth's  statement 
that  this  country  had  determined  not  to  become  a  party 
to  any  convention  on  the  subject  of  the  slave-trade.18 

Such  was  the  unsatisfactory  condition  of  affairs  with 
Great  Britain  with  which  Webster  had  to  deal4  upon 
his  entering  into  the  office  of  secretary  of  state.  Har 
rison  had  intended  offering  the  state  portfolio  to  Clay 
and  that  of  the  treasury  to  Webster.  Clay  declined 
any  position  whatever  in  the  Whig  administration. 
Webster's  own  inclination  was  not  to  accept  an  ap 
pointment  from  Harrison,  unless  it  might  be  the  post 
of  minister  at  the  Court  of  St.  James,  but  upon  the 
tender  by  the  President  of  either  the  state  department 
or  the  treasury,39  Webster  chose  the  former.  Soon 
after  his  acceptance  of  the  position  Webster  began 
the  consideration  of  the  problems  which  were  to  be 
attacked  as  soon  as  he  came  into  office.  He  undertook 
the  preliminaries  for  the  adjustment  of  the  boundary 
question,  as  he  had  outlined  them  to  Forsyth  three 
years  before,  by  sounding  the  authorities  of  Maine  and 
Massachusetts  upon  the  possibility  of  their  acceptance 
of  a  conventional  line.40 

*  At  the  time  of  Harrison's  inauguration,  however, 
the  McLeod  case  was  pressing  for  attention.  A  week 

88  Br.  and  For.  State  Papers,  1834-5,  T36,  quoted  by  Du 
Bois,  142. 

39  Harrison  to  Webster,  December  i,  1840,  Webster  to  Har 
rison,  December  n,  1840;  Curtis,  Webster,  II.,  48,  50. 

40  Webster  to  Theophilus   Parsons,  January  28,    1841,   same 
to    C.    F.    Adams,    January   30,    1841 ;    Van    Tyne,    Letters    of 
Daniel    Webster,   227-30.      Gov.    Kent    to    Webster,    February 
17,    1841 ;   Curtis,    Webster,   II.,   59.     Webster  to  Kent,  ibid., 
II.,  60. 


THE    NORTHEASTERN    BOUNDARY    CONTROVERSY      23 

after  Webster  assumed  the  secretaryship  he  received 
the  letter  from  Fox  mentioned  above,  in  which  the 
British  minister  demanded  the  immediate  release  of 
McLeod.  Fox  declined  to  notice  the  peculiar  relations 
of  the  various  states  with  the  federal  government,  and 
refused  to  admit  that  the  separate  state  was  an  inde 
pendent  body  over  which  the  federal  government  had 
no  control.  He  looked  to  the  federal  government  to 
right  the  wrong,  as  that  government  was  the  only  one 
with  which  foreign  powers  had  to  deal.  Fox  pro 
ceeded  to  state  that  the  British  government  demanded 
McLeod's  release  upon  the  assumption  that  he  was  one 
of  the  persons  engaged  in  the  capture  of  the  steamboat 
Caroline,  although  it  believed  that  he  was  not,  in  fact, 
engaged  in  that  transaction.  Whether  McLeod  was, 
or  was  not,  a  party  to  the  Caroline  affair  made  no 
difference.  He  was  held  under  arrest  for  trial  for 
his  alleged  connection  with  a  transaction  which  the 
British  government  avowed  to  be  of  a  public  character, 
for  which  the  persons  engaged  in  it  could  not  incur 
private  or  personal  responsibility.41  It  is  questionable 
if  the  position  assumed  by  Fox,  which  his  government 
endorsed,  could  be  sustained  by  the  law  of  nations  if 
pressed  to  its  logical  end.  His  underlying  thesis  was 
that  the  United  States  as  a  nation  could  not  subject  to 
its  own  municipal  laws  an  alien  who  had  violated  such 
laws  if  in  such  violation  the  alien  had  express  di 
rection  and  authority  for  so  doing.  The  British  de 
mand  for  the  surrender  of  McLeod  can  only  be  justified 
on  the  ground  that  the  attack  on  the  Caroline  was 

41  Fox  to  Webster,  March  12,  1841 ;  Webster,  Diplomatic  and 
Official  Papers,   122-23. 


24  DIPLOMACY     UNDE)R    TY^R    AND     POLK 

excusable  on  the  plea  of  necessity.42  This  was  the  view 
held  by  Calhoun  in  the  Senate  debate  upon  the  sub 
ject,  and  he  was  supported  in  it  by  Lieber  and  Law 
rence.48  That  the  destruction  of  the  Caroline  was  due 
to  necessity  Fox  did  not  claim.  Webster  expressly 
denied  it,  although  Ashburton  made  that  plea.  Fox 
put  McLeod's  alleged  action  upon  the  basis  of  public 
duty  and  not  upon  the  ground  of  necessity.  Upon 
consultation  with  the  President,  Webster  decided  to 
accept  Fox's  view  of  the  case,  that  as  the  British  gov 
ernment  had  avowed  the  act  of  the  destruction  of  the 
Caroline  to  be  a  public  act,  then  McLeod,  if  engaged 
in  the  enterprise,  was  acting  under  the  authority  of 
his  sovereign,  and  was,  therefore,  not  amenable  to  the 
criminal  process  of  the  state  in  which  he  was  arrested. 
Unfortunately  for  the  carrying  through  of  the  policy 
based  upon  this  view  of  the  case,  the  federal  govern 
ment  was  without  power  under  the  law  to  discharge 
McLeod,  otherwise  Webster  would  have  made  merely 
a  demand  for  redress  on  account  of  the  violation  of 
United  States  territory,  which  the  seizure  and  destruc 
tion  of  the  Caroline  clearly  were.  McLeod  was  in  the 
hands  of  the  state  authorities  of  New  York  and  his  case 
had  been  set  for  trial  in  the  May  following.  Upon 
the  receipt  of  Fox's  note,  Webster  instructed  the  attor 
ney  general  to  furnish  McLeod's  counsel  with  authentic 
evidence  that  the  destruction  of  the  Caroline  had  been 
avowed  by  the  British  government  as  an  act  of  force 
done  by  national  authority.  "You  will  see,"  said 
Webster,  "that  McLeod  has  skilful  and  eminent  coun- 

42  Calhoun,  Works,  III.,  618. 

43  Wharton,  Digest  of  International  Law,  Art.  21. 


THE:    NORTHEASTERN    BOUNDARY    CONTROVERSY      25 

sel,  and  .  .  .  that  it  is  the  wish  of  this  Govern 
ment  that,  in  case  his  defense  be  overruled  by  the  court, 
in  which  he  shall  be  tried,  proper  steps  be  taken  imme 
diately  for  removing  the  cause,  by  writ  of  error,  to 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States."  44 

Thus  began  what  might  have  furnished  the  Supreme 
Court  with  an  important  constitutional  question  for 
its  decision,  but  the  course  of  the  courts  led  in  a  dif 
ferent  direction.  Governor  Seward  denied  that  he  in 
tended  to  order  a  nolle  prosequi  in  the  case.  The 
government's  assistance  in  McLeod's  defense  was  as 
sailed  as  an  unwarrantable  interference  by  Webster  in 
the  internal  affairs  of  the  State  of  New  York. 

Before  Fox's  note  could  be  answered  Harrison  died, 
and  Tyler  took  up  the  consideration  of  the  McLeod 
case  as  it  had  been  outlined  by  Webster.  The  new 
president  approved  Webster's  plan,  which,  to  restate 
it,  was  (i)  to  stand  upon  the  avowal  by  Great  Britain 
of  the  destruction  of  the  Caroline  as  a  public  act ;  and 
(2)  to  assist  McLeod  in  making  the  defense  that  in 
taking  part  in  the  Caroline  imbroglio  he  was  acting 
under  authority,  and  hence  was  not  amenable  to  the 
municipal  laws  of  the  State  of  New  York,  a  plea  which 
Webster  believed  to  be  good  in  law.  From  this  policy 
he  hoped  to  have  two  results,  (i)  the  conciliation  of 
Great  Britain,  by  not  taking  issue  on  the  question  of 
public  responsibility;  and  (2)  the  avoidance  of  a  clash 
with  the  state  authorities  on  a  question  of  jurisdiction. 
Webster  proceeded  to  answer  Fox's  note  in  a  manner 
which,  while  it  delayed  the  final  issue  between  them 

44  Curtis,   Webster,  II.,  67. 


26  DIPLOMACY    UNDER    TYI^R    AND    POLK 

until  the  trial  of  McLeod  was  had,  produced  a  quieting 
effect  upon  Lord  Palmerston  and  the  British  people.45 

Webster's  answer  emphasized  the  importance  with 
which  the  United  States  regarded  Fox's  explicit 
avowal.  "After  this  avowal,  individuals  in  it  might 
not,  by  the  principles  of  public  law,  be  holden  person 
ally  responsible  in  the  ordinary  tribunals  of  law  for 
their  participation  in  it."  Webster  then  informed  Fox 
that  authentic  evidence  of  the  avowal  by  the  British 
government  had  been  furnished  McLeod's  counsel  by 
the  President's  direction.  "It  is  now  competent  for 
McLeod,  by  the  ordinary  process  of  habeas  corpus,  to 
bring  his  case  for  hearing  before  the  supreme  court 
of  New  York.  The  undersigned  hardly  needs  to 
assure  Mr.  Fox,  that  a  tribunal  so  eminently  distin 
guished  for  ability  and  learning  as  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  State  of  New  York,  may  be  safely  relied  upon 
for  the  just  and  impartial  administration  of  the  law 
in  this  as  well  as  in  other  cases."  "  Much  to  Webster's 
disgust,  however,  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  was  denied 
and  McLeod  was  remanded  for  trial.  The  supreme 
court  of  the  State  of  New  York,  in  an  opinion  which 
was  severely  criticised,  denied  the  doctrine  that  an  in 
dividual  alien  can  escape  personal  responsibility  for 
an  act  if  the  sovereign  of  that  alien  avows  the  act  as 
a  public  one.  McLeod's  counsel  dropped  Webster's 
defense  and  in  October  proceeded  to  trial,  resting  upon 
an  alibi.  Perhaps  never  has  this  much  abused  defense 
done  better  service.  The  alibi  was  proved,  McLeod 
was  acquitted,  and  the  casus  belli  removed  as  far  as 

"John  Quincy  Adams,  Memoirs,  XL,  21. 
"Webster  to  Fox,  April  24,  1841;  Webster,  Diplomatic  and 
Official  Papers,  127. 


THE)    NORTHEASTERN    BOUNDARY    CONTROVERSY      2.J 

McLeod  was  concerned.  The  grievance  of  the  United 
States  against  Great  Britain  for  the  violation  of  its 
territory  by  the  seizure  of  the  Caroline  remained  to 
be  adjusted.  In  order  to  prevent  future  arrests  by 
state  authorities  of  aliens  accused  of  acts  for  which 
their  sovereign  accepted  responsibility,  Webster  drafted 
a  law  which  was  passed  by  Congress  in  August,  1842. 
This  statute  gave  the  federal  courts  power  to  grant 
writs  of  habeas  corpus  in  all  cases  where  aliens  were 
confined  in  jail  on  account  of  any  act  done  under  the 
authority  of  a  foreign  state,  the  validity  of  which 
would  depend  upon  the  law  of  nations.41 

John  Quincy  Adams  noted  in  his  diary  that  the  end 
of  the  McLeod  case  relieved  the  United  States  from  all 
immediate  danger  of  hostile  collision  with  Great 
Britain,  but  left  the  negotiations  with  that  country 
"upon  the  Maine  boundary,  the  South  Sea  boundary, 
the  slave-trade  and  the  seizure  of  our  ships  on  the 
coast  of  Africa  thorns  to  be  extracted  by  purer  and 
more  skilful  hands  than  are  to  be  found  in  the  Admin 
istration  of  John  Tyler."  *  The  fall  of  the  Melbourne 
ministry,  of  which  Lord  Palmerston  had  been  the  for 
eign  secretary,  and  the  formation  of  a  cabinet  under 
the  premiership  of  Sir  Robert  Peel,  with  Lord  Aber 
deen  as  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  laid  the  foundation 
for  a  better  feeling  between  the  two  countries.  Out 
of  it  came  the  special  mission  of  Lord  Ashburton,  to 
whom,  with  Tyler  and  Webster,  the  credit  is  due  for 
the  removal  of  the  thorns  which  John  Quincy  Adams 
believed  could  not  be  removed. 


"United  States  Compiled  Statutes   (1901),  Section  763. 
41  John  Quincy  Adams,  Memoirs,  XL,  27. 


CHAPTER  H 

THE  ASHBURTON  TREATY 

The  valedictories  of  Palmerston  as  foreign  secre 
tary  tinder  Melbourne  and  of  Stevenson  as  Van 
Buren's  envoy  were  not  calculated  to  make  the  prob 
lems  which  confronted  their  successors  any  easier  of 
solution.  Following  immediately  upon  the  writing  of 
Palmerston's  note  to  Stevenson,  in  which  he  upbraided' 
the  United  States  for  its  practical,  if  not  intentional, 
double-dealing  in  reference  to  the  suppression  of  the 
slave-trade,  the  Liberals  were  defeated  in  Parliament  * 
and  Sir  Robert  Peel  was  sent  for  by  the  Queen  to 
undertake  the  formation  of  a  new  government.  In  it 
Lord  Aberdeen,  who  had  held  the  same  position  from 
1828  to  1830,  was  made  foreign  secretary.  A  brilliant 
historian  of  our  own  day  has  thus  contrasted  the  fall 
from  power  of  the  Whigs  under  Melbourne  with  the 
earlier  government  of  Grey:  "The  heroic  measures 
which  the  Whigs  promoted  under  Grey  lost  them  the 
support  of  their  more  timid  followers.  The  constant 
concessions  which  emasculated  their  policy  under  Mel 
bourne  estranged  from  them  earnest  reformers.  The 
•  '  • 

1  Palmerston  to  Stevenson,  August  27,  1841.  This  was  an 
swered  by  Stevenson  in  a  note  addressed  to  Aberdeen,  Octo 
ber  10,  1841,  the  day  Stevenson  left  London.  Everett's  intro 
duction  to  Webster's  Diplomatic  and  Official  Papers,  VII. 
Edward  Everett  was  appointed  in  Stevenson's  place  July  24, 
1841,  but  was  not  presented  until  the  following  December. 
Webster  to  Cass,  April  5,  1842;  Curtis,  Webster,  II.,  184. 


THE)  ASHBURTON  TREATY  2Q 

history  of  the  Whigs  under  Grey  thus  becomes  a  chron 
icle  of  great  successes ;  their  history  under  Melbourne 
is  a  story  of  compromises.  There  are  few  things  more 
exhilarating  in  history  than  the  annals  of  the  Whigs 
under  the  one  minister;  there  are  few  things  more 
disheartening  than  the  story  of  their  decline  and  fall 
under  the  other.  Under  Grey  the  Whigs  lost  their 
popularity,  but  they  retained  their  credit.  Under  Mel 
bourne  they  lost  their  credit  without  recovering  their 
popularity."  ::  As  to  Palmerston's  foreign  policy,  how 
ever,  a  decided  exception  is  made.  Palmerston's  policy, 
fortiter  in  re  but  not  suaviter  in  modo,  was  undeniably 
popular  in  England.  Much  of  what  in  later  days  has 
been  called  jingoism  was  a  large  ingredient  in  the 
foreign  policy  of  the  Whig  statesman.  That  it  added 
to  the  already  unpleasant  feeling  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  robbed  it  of  no  popularity 
in  England.  None  of  the  questions  at  issue  between 
the  two  countries  was  of  transcendant  importance  to 
the  British  mind.  "A  policy  which  had  foiled  the 
French,  and  produced  a  fresh  naval  victory  [i.  e., 
Napier's  over  Miguel,  off  Cape  Saint  Vincent,  July  2, 
1833]  was  seen  to  be  popular,"  says  the  same  writer, 
Walpole.  "The  consistency,  moreover,  which  Palmer- 
ston  had  displayed  from  first  to  last,  the  firmness  with 
which  he  maintained  his  opinions,  the  promptitude 
with  which  he  had  acted  on  them  was  calculated  to 
make  a  profound  impression  upon  the  public  mind. 
Every  one  knew  the  difficulties  which  he  had  success 
fully  surmounted,  the  faint  support  which  the  ministry 
was  receiving  from  Parliament,  and  the  rabid  oppo- 

a  Walpole,  History  of  England,  IV.,  226. 


30  DIPLOMACY    UNDER    TYLER    AND    POLK 

sition  of  the  French  nation.  It  was  natural  in  these 
circumstances  that  the  fame  of  the  British  foreign 
minister  should  be  raised  to  an  extraordinary  height 
by  the  skill  of  his  plans  and  the  vigor  of  his  blow. 
Throughout  Europe,  throughout  the  East,  throughout 
Britain  itself,  the  name  of  Palmerston  was  on  every 
lip.  He  had  raised  the  honor  of  Great  Britain  to  a 
level  which  it  had  not  reached  since  the  days  of  Water 
loo.  Other  statesmen  had  won  unanimity  by  conces 
sion  ;  he  alone  had  won  unanimity  by  success." 
Stripped  of  the  phrase  of  panegyric,  all  this  means 
that  under  Palmerston,  as  under  later  statesmen  on 
both  sides  of  the  Atlantic,  jingoism  was  popular. 

Palmerston's  attitude  had  resulted  in  the  rabid  oppo 
sition  of  the  French  to  the  English  nation,  as  Disraeli 
noted,  and  it  was  one  of  Peel's  first  duties  to  overcome 
this  feeling.  Although  it  had  been  said  that  Aberdeen 
was  less  liberal  in  his  foreign  policy  than  his  prede 
cessor,"  his  first  endeavor  was  to  smooth  away  all  the 
bad  temper  to  which  Palmerston's  aggressive  asperities 
had  given  rise.  Under  Palmerston  everything  was 
directed  toward  diplomatic  victories  for  England; 
Aberdeen's  policy  was  to  lay  the  foundations  for  a 
better  understanding  on  the  part  of  England  and  other 
nations.  The  fruits  of  this  policy  were  soon  seen  in 
the  negotiation  which  resulted  in  the  signing  of  the 
quintuple  treaty  by  Great  Britain,  France,  Prussia, 
Austria,  and  Russia,  December  20,  1841. 

By  this  treaty  the  four  continental  powers  agreed 
to  adopt  the  British  laws  relating  to  the  slave-trade 
and  gave  to  each  other  a  partial  right  of  search.  "It 


rf.,  IV.,  334- 


THE)  ASHBURTON  TREATY  31 

was,"  said  Aberdeen  to  Everett,  "in  truth  a  holy  alli 
ance,  in  which  he  would  have  rejoiced  to  see  the 
United  States  assume  their  proper  place  among  the 
great  powers  of  Christendom  foremost  in  power, 
wealth,  and  civilization  and  connected  together  in  the 
cause  of  mercy  and  peace." '  This  was  as  much  of  an 
overture  as  was  made  to  have  the  United  States  join 
the  five  European  powers  in  a  combined  effort  to  put 
down  the  slave-trade.  The  tone  of  this  letter  of  Aber 
deen  was  conciliatory  in  the  extreme.  It  purported 
to  be  an  answer  to  Stevenson's  letter  of  October  21, 
and  as  it  was  the  first  expression  of  the  new  govern 
ment  upon  the  question  of  search,  it  is  of  great  im 
portance.  Written  upon  the  same  day  upon  which  the 
quintuple  treaty  was  signed,  it  shows  strikingly  how 
the  policy  of  Aberdeen  differed  from  that  of  Palmer- 
ston.  At  the  outset  he  abandoned  the  position  of  his 
predecessor,  and  renounced  the  idea  that  the  right  of 
search  was,  except  under  positive  treaty  stipulations, 
anything  but  a  belligerent  right.  Basing  his  position 
upon  the  fact  that  slavers  were  usually  provided  with 
two  sets  of  papers,  one  of  which  was  frequently  Ameri 
can,  he  stated  that  the  sole  purpose  of  British  cruisers 
was  to  ascertain  whether  vessels  met  with  were  really 
American,  or  whether  they  were  of  another  nationality 
fraudulently  provided  with  a  set  of  American  papers. 
It  was  notorious  that  the  practice  of  sailing  with  double 
sets  was  a  growing  one.  Trist,  the  American  consul 
at  Havana,  was  charged  with  making  a  regular  business 
of  providing  Brazilian  and  other  slavers  with  false 

4  Aberdeen  to  Everett,  December  20,  1841 ;  Webster,  Diplo 
matic  and  Official  Papers,  145. 


32  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER  AND  POLK 

American  papers,  and  upon  investigation  he  was  re 
moved.  It  is  undeniable  that  the  American  flag  was 
a  cloak  for  the  slavers,  and  the  sensitiveness  of  the 
American  government  over  any  exercise  of  the  right 
of  visitation  or  search  gave  slavers  practical  freedom. 
There  was  no  chance  of  being  interfered  with  unless 
by  a  vessel  of  the  American  navy,  and  these  were  few 
and  far  between.  It  was  a  question  whether  the 
United  States  cared  more  for  the  rigid  maintenance 
of  freedom  from  visitation  and  search  than  it  did  for 
the  suppression  of  the  slave-trade.  Memories  of  the 
War  of  1812  and  its  causes  were  responsible  for  much 
of  the  excitability  upon  the  subject,  but,  strangely 
enough,  the  government  was  much  more  sensitive  than 
it  had  been  twenty  years  before,  when,  except  for 
Great  Britain's  stubbornness,  a  mutual  right  of  search 
might  have  been  agreed  upon. 

It  was  for  the  purpose  of  putting  a  stop  to  the  use 
of  fraudulent  papers  that  Aberdeen  rested  his  case. 
"The  right  asserted  has,  in  truth,  no  resemblance  to 
the  right  of  search,  either  in  principle  or  in  practice. 
It  is  simply  a  right  to  satisfy  the  party  who  has  a 
legitimate  interest  in  knowing  the  truth,  that  the  vessel 
actually  is  what  her  colors  announce.  This  right  we 
concede  as  freely  as  we  exercise  it.  The  British 
cruisers  are  not  instructed  to  detain  American  vessels 
under  any  circumstances  whatever;  on  the  contrary 
they  are  ordered  to  abstain  from  all  interference  with 
them,  be  they  slavers  or  otherwise."  !  Stevenson  had 
stated  that  the  flag  of  the  United  States  could  protect 

6  Aberdeen  to  Everett,  December  20,  1841  ;  Webster,  Diplo 
matic  and  Official  Papers,  145. 


TH£  ASHBURTON   TREATY  33 

only  those  vessels  that  were  bona  fide  American. 
Aberdeen  submitted  that  all  Great  Britain  desired  was 
to  stop  those  slavers  that  were  strongly  suspected  of 
fraudulently  flying  the  Stars  and  Stripes,  in  order  to 
take  such  means  as  were  indispensably  necessary  for 
ascertaining  the  truth.  In  short,  the  position  of  Ste 
venson  had  been  that  upon  the  high  seas  the  fact  that 
a  vessel  (even  if  known  to  be  a  slaver)  flew  the  flag 
of  the  United  States  was  conclusive  of  its  American 
nationality.  Aberdeen's  view  was  that  it  was  only  pre 
sumptive  proof  of  its  nationality;  but  owing  to  the 
notoriously  fraudulent  use  of  the  flag,  when  there  was 
strong  suspicion  of  fraud  the  flag  was  not  conclusive. 
''The  undersigned  begs  to  repeat,"  wrote  Aberdeen  to 
Everett,  "that  with  American  vessels,  whatever  be  their 
destination,  British  cruisers  have  no  pretensions,  in 
any  manner,  to  interfere.  Such  vessels  must  be  per 
mitted,  if  engaged  in  it  to  enjoy  a  monopoly  of  this  un 
hallowed  trade ;  but  the  British  government  will  never 
endure  that  the  fraudulent  use  of  the  American  flag 
shall  extend  the  iniquity  to  other  nations  by  whom  it 
is  abhorred  and  who  have  entered  into  solemn  treaties 
for  its  entire  suppression." '  Upon  the  receipt  of  this 
note,  Webster  merely  acknowledged  its  dispassionate 
tone  and  forbore  any  reference  to  the  biting  justice  of 
Aberdeen's  statement.  The  strong  tone  of  Tyler's  mes 
sage  to  Congress  at  the  opening  of  Congress  in  De 
cember,  in  referring  to  the  Stevenson-Palmerston 
correspondence  is  said  not  to  have  been  the  occasion 
of  Aberdeen's  pronouncement. 

Cass,  the  American  minister  at  Paris,  claimed  to  be, 
and  doubtless  was,  informed  as  to  the  current  of  poli- 

';  Ibid. 


34  DIPLOMACY    UNDER    TYLER    AND    POLK 

tics,  English  as  well  as  continental.  His  long  endur 
ing  hatred  of  Great  Britain,  however,  made  him  sus 
picious  of  her  every  motive.  Why,  he  thought,  should 
Great  Britain  enter  into  a  treaty  for  the  suppression 
of  the  slave-trade  with  four  continental  powers  of 
Europe,  none  of  which,  save  France,  had  important 
maritime  interests  or  the  remotest  connection  with  the 
slave-trade?  It  could  only  be  the  purpose  of  Great 
Britain  to  arrogate  to  herself  the  right  to  police  the 
high  seas,  and  so  to  menace  the  freedom  of  the  United 
States  upon  the  ocean.  He,  therefore,  upon  his  own 
responsibility,  addressed  a  communication  to  Guizot, 
Louis  Philippe's  prime  minister,  protesting  against  the 
ratification  by  France  of  the  quintuple  treaty  in  terms 
as  vigorous  as  they  were  presumptuous.  Cass's  letter 
to  Guizot  quoted  Tyler's  message  to  Congress  in  which 
it  was  stated  that  however  desirous  the  United  States 
might  be  for  the  suppression  of  the  slave-trade,  it 
could  not  consent  to  such  interpolations  into  the  mari 
time  code  at  the  mere  will  and  pleasure  of  other  gov 
ernments.  "We  deny/'  said  the  President,  "the  right 
of  any  such  interpolation  to  any  one  or  all  the  nations 
of  the  earth  without  our  consent.  We  claim  to  have  a 
voice  in  all  amendments  or  alterations  of  that  code, 
and  when  we  are  given  to  understand  [as  by  Palmer- 
ston]  that  the  treaties  of  a  foreign  government  with 
other  nations  cannot  be  executed  without  the  establish 
ment  and  enforcement  of  new  principles  of  maritime 
police,  to  be  applied  without  our  consent,  we  must  em 
ploy  a  language  neither  of  equivocal  import  or  suscep 
tible  of  misconstruction." ' 

7  Tyler's    First    Annual    Message,    Richardson's    Messages, 
IV.,  77. 


THE  ASHBURTON  TREATY  35 

That  such  was  the  pretension  of  Great  Britain  Cass 
proceeded  to  point  out,  and  that  as  a  consequence  of  the 
quintuple  treaty,  France  might  be  forced  against  her 
will  to  assume  like  ground.  "Certainly  the  American 
government,"  Guizot  was  told,  "does  not  believe  that 
the  high  powers,  contracting  parties  to  this  treaty,  have 
any  wish  to  compel  the  United  States  by  force  to  adopt 
their  measures  to  its  provisions,  or  to  adopt  its  stipula 
tions.  They  have  too  much  confidence  in  their  sense 
of  justice  to  fear  any  such  result;  and  they  will  see 
with  pleasure  the  prompt  disavowal  made  by  yourself, 
sir,  in  the  name  of  your  country  at  the  tribune  of  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies,  of  any  intentions  of  this  nature." 
Then  follows  a  threat,  made  all  the  more  amazing  by 
Cass's  admission  that  he  was  acting  without  instruc 
tions  and  upon  his  own  responsibility.  "Were  it  other 
wise  and  were  it  possible  the  United  States  might  be 
deceived  in  this  confident  expectation,  that  would  not 
alter  in  one  tittle  their  course  of  action.  Their  duty 
would  be  the  same  and  the  same  would  be  their  deter 
mination  to  fulfill  it.  They  would  prepare  themselves 
with  apprehension,  indeed,  but  without  dismay,  with 
regret,  but  with  firmness,  for  one  of  those  desperate 
struggles  which  have  sometimes  occurred  in  the  his 
tory  of  the  world,  but  where  a  just  cause  and  the  favor 
of  Providence  have  given  strength  to  comparative 
weakness  and  enabled  it  to  break  down  the  pride  of 
power." ' 

Such  was  the  belligerent  answer  given  to  Europe 
upon  the  question  of  the  suppression  of  that  slave- 
trade  which  the  United  States  had  been  the  first  to 


8  Cass  to  Guizot,  February  13,  1842 ;  Webster's  Diplomatic 
and  Official  Papers,  177. 


36  DIPLOMACY    UNDSR    TYI^R    AND    POLK 

condemn  as  piracy.  Cass  had  preceded  his  fiery  note 
with  the  publication  of  a  pamphlet,  afterwards  famous, 
upon  the  right  of  search.  This  pamphlet,  published  in 
French  anonymously,  was  given  wide  publicity,  and 
Niles,  naming  the  author,  printed  it  in  full  in  his 
Register.  Wheaton,  at  Berlin,  afterwards  printed  a 
fuller  examination  of  the  right  of  search,  both  taking 
the  position,  not  denied  by  England,  that  the  right  was 
only  that  of  a  belligerent.9  There  can  be  no  doubt  that 
Cass's  pamphlet  did  a  great  deal  toward  arousing 
French  sentiment  against  the  quintuple  treaty.  Cass 
was  given  the  credit  for  defeating  the  ratification  of 
it  by  France,  but  it  may  be  said  that  this  is  an  over 
statement.  On  the  day  of  the  assembling  of  the  French 
Chambers  an  amendment  to  the  reply  to  the  King's 
speech  was  adopted  unanimously.  This  read:  "We 
have  also  the  confidence  that  in  granting  its  concur 
rence  to  the  suppression  of  a  criminal  traffic,  your 
government  will  know  how  to  preserve  from  every 
attack  the  interest  of  our  commerce  and  the  independ 
ence  of  our  flag."  This  amendment  was  adopted 
prior  to  the  publication  of  Cass's  pamphlet  and  also 
before  his  note  of  protest  to  Guizot  was  written.  It 
was  such  a  rebuff  to  Guizot  that  the  ratification  of  the 
treaty  would  have  been  impossible  even  if  Cass  had 
had  no  hand  in  the  matter.  The  vote  of  the  Chambers 
was  the  result  of  a  desire  to  retaliate  upon  Great 
Britain  for  Palmerston's  policy  toward  France,  a  de 
sire  which  the  friendly  feeling  of  Guizot  toward  Peel 
could  not  overcome. 

8  Cf.,  however,  Sir  Wni.  Gore  Ouseley's  Reply  to  an  Ameri 
can's  Examination  of  the  Right  of  Search,  ....  Lon 
don,  1842. 


THK  ASH  BURTON  TREATY  37 

Tyler  said  in  reading  the  newspaper  accounts  of 
Cass's  action  that  he  approved  the  course  taken,  based, 
as  it  was,  upon  his  annual  message.10  Webster  there 
upon  wrote  Cass  of  the  President's  approval  of  his 
letter  and  "warm  commendation  of  the  motives  which 
animated  him  in  presenting  it."  Cass  was  informed 
that  "without  intending  to  intimate  what  modes  of 
settling  this  point  of  difference  with  England  will  be 
proposed,  he  might  receive  two  propositions  as  cer 
tain  :  ( i )  that  in  the  absence  of  treaty  stipulations, 
the  United  States  would  maintain  the  immunity  of 
merchant  vessels  on  the  seas  to  the  fullest  extent  which 
the  law  of  nations  authorized;  and  (2)  that  if  the 
United  States  entered  into  a  treaty  for  the  suppression 
of  the  trade,  the  stipulations  would  be  for  that  single 
object  without  embarrassing  innocent  commerce  or 
being  unequal  in  practical  operation."  : 

This  letter  was  shown  to  Guizot  and  the  latter  made 
use  of  it  in  framing  his  answer,  which  was  not  written 
for  three  months  after  Cass's  note.  There  was  no 
reason  whatever  to  think  that  the  obligations  of  the 
quintuple  treaty  would  be  forcibly  extended  to  any 
nation  not  a  party  to  that  instrument.  "I  have  the 
less  hesitation  in  here  giving  the  formal,  and  in  my 
opinion  entirely  superfluous,  assurance  that  the  King's 
Government  on  its  part  places  the  fullest  confidence 
in  the  firm  resolution  so  often  proclaimed  by  the 
Federal  Government  to  aid,  by  its  most  sincere  en 
deavors,  in  the  definitive  abolition  of  the  trade.  The 


10  Tyler's  Tylers,  II.,  233. 

"Webster  to  Cass,  April  5,   1842;  Diplomatic  and  Official 
Papers,  181. 


38  DIPLOMACY    UNDER    TYI^R    AND    POLK 

dispatch  of  Mr.  Webster  is  of  such  a  nature  as  to  in 
crease  this  confidence.  It  seems  to  show,  in  fact,  that 
the  Cabinet  of  Washington  foresees  the  probability 
of  concluding  with  the  states  which  have  adhered  to 
the  right  of  reciprocal  search  for  the  suppression  of  the 
slave-trade,  arrangements  proper  to  attain  the  end 
which  they  propose.  We  should  attach  the  more  value 
to  this  concurrence  of  views  from  the  circumstance 
that,  while  it  would  hasten  the  entire  destruction  of  the 
slave-trade,  it  would  have  the  effect  of  placing  all  gov 
ernments  in  the  same  situation  as  regards  the  measures 
adopted  for  its  suppression." : 

At  about  the  time  of  McLeod's  acquittal,  by  which 
fortunate  circumstance  a  bad  matter  was  mended,  with 
Tyler's  authority  Webster  told  Fox,  the  British  minis 
ter,  that  he  was  prepared  to  consider  the  negotiation  of 
a  conventional  line  for  the  settlement  of  the  long 
standing  northeastern  boundary  difficulty.  Palmerston 
had  previously  instructed  Fox  that  he  considered  the 
counter-pro  jet,  as  prepared  by  Forsyth,  to  be  unreason 
able,  undeserving  of  answer,  and  as  withdrawn  from 
consideration.  Fox  was  thereupon  directed  to  submit 
Palmerston's  original  projet  to  Webster  and  to  per 
suade  the  new  secretary  of  state  that  it  was  reasonable. 
But,  in  Webster's  own  words,  "Mr.  Webster  was  not 
to  be  so  persuaded;  that  is  to  say,  he  was  not  to  be 
persuaded  that  it  was  reasonable,  or  wise,  or  prudent, 
to  pursue  the  negotiations  in  this  form  further.  He 
hoped  to  live  long  enough  to  see  the  northeastern 
boundary  settled;  but  that  hope  was  faint,  unless  he 
could  rescue  the  question  from  the  labyrinth  of  pro- 

"Guizot  to  Cass,  May  26,  1842;  ibid.,  186. 


ASHBURTON  TREATY  39 

jects  and  counter-projects,   explorations  and  arbitra 
tions,  in  which  it  was  involved/' ] 

Webster's  overture  was  not  heeded  by  Palmerston, 
and  that  secretary  went  out  of  office  without  an  effort 
to  improve  the  relations  between  his  country  and  the 
United  States.  It  may  be  suspected  that  such  a  propo 
sition  was  not  altogether  to  Palmerston's  taste.  The 
adjustment  of  a  boundary  dispute  of  sixty  years'  stand 
ing,  by  means  of  a  conventional  or  artificial  line,  could 
be  done  only  by  compromise  and  mutual  concession, 
such  as  might  and  probably  would  not  be  hailed  as  a 
diplomatic  victory.  Not  until  after  Stevenson's  de 
parture  and  Everett's  presentation  was  Webster's  over 
ture  considered.  On  the  2Oth  of  December,  1841,  the 
date  of  the  quintuple  treaty,  Everett  was  invited  by 
Lord  Aberdeen  to  an  interview  in  which  the  foreign 
secretary  outlined  his  plan  for  the  betterment  of  rela 
tions  between  the  two  countries.  Aberdeen  said  that 
in  offering  to  send  a  special  minister  to  Washington 
more  than  an  overture  to  the  United  States  was  made, 
because  the  minister  would  go  with  full  powers  to 
make  a  definitive  settlement  on  every  point  in  discus 
sion  between  the  two  countries.  "In  the  choice  of  the 
individual  for  the  mission,"  the  secretary  added,  "he 
had  been  mainly  influenced  by  a  desire  to  select  a  per 
son  who  would  be  peculiarly  acceptable  to  the  United 
States  as  well  as  eminently  qualified  for  the  trust."  3 
''*The  selection  of  Lord  Ashburton  as  the  special  envoy 
was  an  admirable  one.  During  a  long  life  Alexander 
Baring,  as  one  of  the  great  banking  house  of  Baring 

"  Webster's  Works,  V.,  97. 

14  Everett  to  Webster,  December  31,   1841 ;   Webster's  Dip 
lomatic  and  Official  Papers,  33. 


4O  DIPLOMACY    UND£R    TYI^R    AND    POLK 

Brothers,  and  as  a  member  of  Parliament,  and  finally 
as  the  first  Lord  Ashburton,  had  consistently  striven 
for  the  maintenance  of  a  good  understanding  between 
the  sections  of  the  English-speaking  people  on  either 
side  of  the  Atlantic.  In  a  private  letter  to  Webster, 
written  soon  after  the  appointment  was  announced, 
Ashburton  said:  "The  principal  aim  and  object  of  that 
part  of  my  life  devoted  to  public  objects  during  the 
35  years  that  I  have  had  a  seat  in  one  or  the 
other  House  of  Parliament,  has  been  to  impress  on 
others  the  necessity  of,  and  to  promote  myself,  peace 
and  harmony  between  our  countries;  and  although 
the  prevailing  good  sense  of  both  prevented  my  enter 
taining  any  serious  apprehensions  on  the  subject,  I  am 
one  of  those  who  have  always  watched  with  anxietv 
at  all  times  any  threatening  circumstances,  any  clouds 
which  however  small  may  through  the  neglect  of 
some  or  the  malevolence  of  others  end  in  a  storm 
the  disastrous  consequences  of  which  defy  exaggera 
tion."  ]  Lady  Ashburton,  who  was  the  daughter  of 
William  Bingham,  a  member  of  the  Continental  Con 
gress  and  afterwards  a  senator  from  Pennsylvania 
from  1795  to  1801,  wrote  to  Webster  that  the  honors 
which  had  been  thrust  upon  her  husband  came  from 
his  being  the  person  most  zealous  in  the  cause  of 
America  and  most  sanguine  as  to  the  possibility  of 
settling  the  pending  differences  between  the  two 
countries.16 

At  first  Peel's   selection   was   applauded,   but  upon 
second  thought  popular  approval  was  withheld.    "Peo- 

15  Ashburton  to  Webster,  January  I,  1842;  Van  Tyne's  Let 
ters  of  Daniel  Webster,  253. 

16  Lady  Ashburton  to  Webster,  January  2,  1842;  ibid.,  254. 


THE;  ASHBURTON  TREATY  41 

pie  reflect  on  his  vacillation  and  irresolution,"  wrote 
Greville  in  his  journal,  "and  think  age  [Ashburton 
was  then  sixty-seven]  and  absence  from  affairs  are 
not  likely  to  have  cured  the  defects  of  his  character."17 
But  all  gave  him  credit  for  his  sacrifice. 

Upon  the  receipt  of  Everett's  letter  containing  Aber 
deen's  proposal,  Webster  wrote  to  Reuel  Williams, 
one  of  the  senators  from  Maine,  a  Democrat,  request 
ing  him  to  sound  the  governor,  Fairfield,  upon  his  plan 
of  having  the  government  of  that  state,  preferably 
through  commissioners  selected  by  the  legislature  for 
the  purpose,  become  a  party  to  the  discussions  and  con 
clusions  which  might  be  had  between  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States  in  the  proposed  negotiation. 
''It  is  our  purpose,"  Webster  wrote  to  Williams,  "to 
put  the  question  in  the  fairest  manner  to  Maine, 
whether  she  will  consent  to  be  satisfied  with  a  conven 
tional  line  and  all  the  other  terms  and  conditions  which 
commissioners  of  her  own  appointment  shall  have  ap 
proved.  No  negotiations  for  such  a  line  will  be  ap 
proved  or  entered  upon  without  an  express  previous 
consent  upon  the  part  of  Maine,  to  acquiesce  in  any 
line  with  all  its  terms,  conditions  and  compensations 
which  shall  have  been  thus  previously  approved."  3 

Williams  replied  that  although  Maine  relied  upon 
her  claim  as  just  and  had,  therefore,  no  desire  to  change 
the  line  of  1783,  he  believed  that  she  would  release  to 
Great  Britain  such  portion  of  her  territory  in  contro 
versy  as  the  convenience  of  the  latter  might  require, 

"Greville's  Journal  of  the  Reign  of  Queen  Victoria,  II.,  71. 

18  Webster  to  Reuel  Williams,  February  2,  1842 ;  Van  Tyne's 
Letters  of  Daniel  Webster,  256.  See  also  Webster  to  John 
Davis,  July  (?)  15  (February  15),  1842;  ibid.,  270. 


42  DIPLOMACY    UNDER    TYLER    AND    POLK 

on  an  offer  of  other  territory  in  exchange  or  other 
suitable  equivalent,  provided  it  was  definitely  known 
before  Maine  gave  any  instructions  to  her  commis 
sioners  that  Ashburton  would  be  authorized  to  treat 
for  a  conventional  line.18  Webster  could  only  give 
Williams  assurance  that  he  believed  Ashburton  would 
be  so  authorized.  On  this  account,  therefore,  no  defi 
nite  action  could  be  taken  until  the  precise  nature  of 
Aberdeen's  instructions  was  known.  The  legislature 
of  Maine  adjourned  without  taking  any  action  on  the 
subject. 

Lord  Ashburton  arrived  in  Washington  early  in 
April,  1842,  and  his  definite  authority  to  treat  for  a 
conventional  line  was  officially  demonstrated.  Web 
ster  then  wrote  to  Governor  Fairfield  urging  the  ap 
pointment  of  commissioners  to  act  as  had  been  sug 
gested  to  Senator  Williams.20  The  importance  of  quick 
action  was  insisted  upon,  and  he  urged  that  the  gover 
nor  call  a  special  session  of  the  legislature  for  the  pur 
pose.  A  similar  communication  was  sent  to  the  gover 
nor  of  Massachusetts,21  which  was  equally  interested 
with  Maine  in  the  public  lands  in  the  disputed  territory, 
although  the  territorial  sovereignty  belonged  to  the 
latter  state.  The  Maine  legislature  was  called  in  special 
session  and  four  commissioners  were  selected.  Massa 
chusetts  waived  the  official  information  as  to  Ashbur- 
ton's  authority,  and  its  legislature  empowered  the  gov- 

19 Williams  to  Webster;  ibid.,  258. 

20  Webster  to  Fairfield,  April  n,  1842;  Webster's  Diplomatic 
and  Official  Papers,  36. 

21  Webster  to  Davis,  February  15,  1842 ;  Van  Tyne's  Letters 
of  Daniel  Webster,  270. 


THE)  ASHBURTON  TREATY  43 

ernor  and  council  to  adopt  any  measures  which  might 
aid  in  settling  the  controversy.22 

It  was  Webster's  hope  that  the  commissioners  would 
be  left  free  to  act  without  specific  instructions,  and  he 
sent  Jared  Sparks  to  Maine  to  assist  in  persuading  the 
legislature  to  forego  instructions.  In  this  errand 
Sparks  was  unsuccessful,  and  the  commissioners  were 
directed  to  assent  to  no  concession  to  Great  Britain  of 
any  lands  lying  within  the  part  claimed  by  Maine  as 
an  equivalent  for  lands  ceded  by  that  state.23  Governor 
Davis  of  Massachusetts  was  also  inclined  to  hold  fast 
to  the  state's  claim,  saying  to  Webster  that  Massa 
chusetts  would,  "on  honorable  terms,  concede  some 
thing  to  the  convenience  and  necessity  of  Great  Britain, 
but  nothing,  not  a  rood  of  barren  heath  or  rock,  to  un 
founded  claims."  : 

Such  was  the  unsatisfactory  basis  upon  which  Web 
ster  had  to  act  when  the  commissioners  met  him  in 
Washington  on  June  13.  Until  that  date  no  official 
communication  had  passed  between  him  and  the  special 
envoy.  Ashburton's  note  was  unfortunate.  He  opened 
the  way  for  controversy,  and  thus  increased  the  sus 
picions  of  the  state  commissioners,  by  an  elaborate 
statement  of  the  position  of  Great  Britain.  This  was 
done,  he  stated,  in  order  to  correct  a  certain  false  im 
pression  as  to  Great  Britain's  motives,  which  was  that 
his  government's  claim  dated  only  from  1814,  when  the 
course  of  the  War  of  1812  had  demonstrated  the  neces- 


22  Joint  Resolution  of  Massachusetts  Legislature,  March  3, 
1842 ;  Congressional  Globe,  27  Cong.,  3  Sess.,  12. 

23  Curtis's  Webster,  II.,  102.     Cf.  Adams's  Sparks,  passim. 

24  Davis  to  Webster,  April   17,    1842;    Congressional  Globe, 
27  Cong.,  3  Sess.,  12. 


44  DIPLOMACY    UNDER    TYI^R    AND    POUC 

sity  of  overland  communication  between  New  Bruns 
wick  and  Quebec.25 

Webster  did  not  rejoin  at  once  with  counter-argu 
ment,  but  proceeded  to  the  consideration  of  a  conven 
tional  line.  Contrary  to  the  usual  rule,  no  minutes 
were  kept  of  the  meetings  and  no  protocols  were  pre 
pared  for  the  drafting  of  the  treaty.  All  the  letters 
were  written  after  agreement,  and  those  of  Webster  to 
Ashburton  were  submitted  to  Tyler  and  each  received 
his  corrections.26  During  the  Senate  debates  upon  the 
ratification  the  lack  of  protocols  was  objected  to  by 
Benton  as  a  departure  from  precedent  not  to  be  toler 
ated.  "Never  since  diplomacy  began  and  the  art  of 
writing  was  invented,  was  a  negotiation  of  such  mo 
ment,  or  of  any  moment,  so  tracklessly  conducted/' 
said  Benton.  The  lack  of  protocols  was  deliberate. 
It  was  Webster's  idea  that  agreement  for  a  conven 
tional  line  must  be  approached  through  informality. 
Written  records  meant  the  argument  of  contesting 
claims,  the  opposite  of  compromise  and  concession. 
Webster's  note  to  Ashburton,  dated  June  17,  said 
merely  that  he  was  authorized  and  prepared  to  treat 
for  a  conventional  line.27  Ashburton's  reply  of  the 
same  date  proposed  a  conference  upon  the  subject  for 
the  following  day.28  "Long  will  this  day,"  said  Ben- 
ton  to  the  Senate,  "this  Friday,  June  17,  1842,  be  re 
membered  and  noted  in  the  annals  of  this  confederacy. 

25  Ashburton  to  Webster,  June  13,  1842 ;  ibid.,  4. 

26  John    Tyler   to    Robert   Tyler,    August   29,    1858;    Tyler's 
Tylers,  II.,  242. 

27  Webster    to    Ashburton,    June    17,    1842;    Congressional 
Globe,  27  Cong.,  3  Sess.,  5. 

^Ashburton  to  Webster,  June  17,  1842;  ibid. 


THE  ASHBURTON  TREATY  45 

In  the  Roman  calendar,  it  would  have  had  a  place 
among  their  unlucky  days.  Its  memory  would  have 
been  perpetuated  by  a  black  monument  and  most  ap 
propriate  will  it  be  for  us  to  mark  all  the  new  boun 
daries  of  Maine  with  black  stones,  and  veil  with  black 
the  statue  of  the  god  Terminus,  degraded  from  the 
mountain  which  overlooked  Quebec,  to  the  humble 
valley  which  grows  potatoes."  : 

Perhaps  this  delicious  bit  of  bombast  might  better 
have  remained  embalmed  in  the  pages  of  the  Globe, 
yet  it  is  a  fair  sample  of  the  attack  made  upon  Web 
ster's  negotiation.  Upon  that  "black  Friday,"  as  Ben- 
ton  persisted  in  calling  it,  the  question  of  boundary 
was  not  settled ;  the  negotiation  was  but  begun.  It 
marked  the  agreement  of  the  two  governments  for  a 
conventional  line.  At  the  conference  of  the  following 
day  Webster  asked  Ashburton  to  state  his  views  of 
the  boundary  case  and  the  expectations  of  his  govern 
ment.  This  was  in  accordance  with  Webster's  plan 
as  outlined  to  Forsyth  in  1839:  that  as  soon  as  pos 
sible  a  place  should  be  found  in  the  correspondence  for 
a  clear  and  concise  statement  of  the  case,  so  that  Great 
Britain  would  be  forced  to  take  a  definite  position.80 
Ashburton  then  prepared  and  delivered  to  Webster  the 
British  statement.81  Their  duty  was,  he  stated,  to 
trace  a  new  boundary  between  Maine  and  New  Bruns 
wick.  Great  Britain  undertook  this  without  any  wish 
of  aggrandizement.  Her  aim  was  to  make  a  con- 


w  Ibid.,  appendix,  14. 

80 Webster's  plan;  Van  Tyne's  Letters  of  Daniel  Webster. 
216. 

81  Ashburton  to  Webster,  June  21,  1842;  Congressional  Globe, 
27  Cong.,  3  Sess.,  5. 


46  DIPLOMACY    UNDKR    TYI^R    AND    POLK 

venient  boundary  and  not  to  drive  a  bargain.  He  then 
proposed  the  following  line:  the  river  St.  John  from 
where  the  north  line  of  the  St.  Croix  strikes  it,  up  to 
some  one  of  its  sources,  with  an  exception  so  as  to 
throw  the  Madawaska  settlements  (which  he  claimed 
were  loyal  to  Great  Britain),  scattered  along  both 
banks  of  the  river  St.  John,  into  the  British  territory. 
The  point  where  the  line  was  to  leave  the  St.  John  was 
to  be  decided  later  with  Webster.  As  a  concession 
to  the  United  States,  he  offered  to  accept  the  line 
surveyed  prior  to  1774  as  the  line  of  forty-five 
degrees.  This  line  had  been  shown  by  later  and 
more  accurate  surveys  to  be  forty-two  seconds  of 
latitude  too  far  to  the  north.  The  true  line  of  forty- 
five  degrees  would  have  thrown  Rouse's  Point  into 
Canada.  This  fortunate  accident  gave  Ashburton 
something  to  use  as  a  quid  pro  quo,  as,  according  to 
strictly  accurate  surveys,  Rouse's  Point  belonged  to 
Great  Britain.  A  further  concession  was  Ashburton's 
offer  of  the  free  navigation  of  the  St.  John.  In  clos 
ing  his  letter,  Ashburton  said :  "It  would  have  been 
useless  for  me  to  ask  what  I  knew  could  not  be  yielded, 
and  I  can  unfeignedly  say  that,  even  if  your  vigilance 
did  not  forbid  me  to  expect  to  gain  any  undue  advan 
tage  over  you,  I  should  have  no  wish  to  do  so." 

With  the  receipt  of  Ashburton's  note,  the  negotia 
tion  came  perilously  near  ending,  first,  on  account  of 
the  attitude  of  the  Maine  commissioners,  second, 
through  the  unwillingness  of  Ashburton  to  prolong 
his  stay  in  the  United  States,  and  third,  on  account  of 
the  unpleasant  turn  taken  to  the  discussion  of  the 
Creole  case,  which  had  claimed  attention  since  the  past 
winter.  After  the  publication  of  Ashburton's  letter 


THE  ASHBURTON  TREATY  47 

of  June  21,  the  Maine  commissioners  prepared  a  long 
statement  of  the  position  of  their  state,  which  they  pre 
sented  to  Webster.  In  it  they  said  that  if  Ashburton's 
claim  of  the  south  and  west  of  the  St.  John  was  a  sine 
qua  non,  they  would  have  nothing  further  to  do  with 
the  negotiation.  The  statement,  the  tone  of  which  was 
altogether  uncompromising,  was  probably  prepared  by 
Preble,  one  of  the  commissioners.32  Ashburton  was  so 
much  "discouraged  by  it  that  it  required  great  tact  to 
keep  him  from  throwing  over  the  business.  Webster 
gave  Tyler  all  the  credit  for  persuading  Ashburton  to 
continue  it.33  Ashburton  then  appeared  to  be  hampered 
by  fresh  instructions,  of  the  precise  nature  of  which 
Webster  was  not  informed.  On  the  28th  of  June  Web 
ster  reported  to  Everett  that  the  movement  in  the  ne 
gotiation,  if  any  had  been  made,  was  backward  rather 
than  forward.34 

The  case  of  the  Creole  added  to  Ashburton's  em 
barrassment.  The  facts  in  reference  to  the  Creole  in 
cident  were  imperfectly  known,  but  all  accounts  of  the 
affair  were  such  as  to  anger  the  slaveholding  states  as 
much  as  the  arrest  of  McLeod  had  incensed  the  peo 
ple  of  Great  Britain.  The  American  bark,  Creole, 
was  en  route  from  Richmond,  Virginia,  to  New  Or 
leans  with  a  cargo  of  merchandise  and  slaves.  These 
slaves  revolted,  imprisoned  the  officers  and  crew,  and 
seized  the  vessel.  They  then  entered  the  port  of 
Nassau,  where  they  were  given  freedom  and  assistance, 
while  the  officers  and  crew  were  left  to  take  care  of 
themselves.  Up  to  the  time  of  Ashburton's  departure 

82  Webster's  Diplomatic  and  Official  Papers,  49. 

"Curtis's  Webster,  II.,  105,  note.     Tyler's  Tylers,  II.,  218. 

"Webster  to  Everett;  Curtis's  Webster,  II,  104. 


48  DIPLOMACY    UNDER    TYI^R    AND    POLK 

Everett  had  made  no  complaint  of  the  matter,  and 
the  subject  of  the  Creole,  therefore,  was  not  one  of  the 
immediate  objects  of  the  special  mission.83  Webster 
instructed  Everett  to  make  a  protest  to  Aberdeen  about 
the  liberation  of  the  slaves  who  had  captured  the 
Creole.  His  position  in  the  matter  was  doubtless  in 
fluenced  by  Story,  for  whose  opinion  Webster  had  in 
formally  asked.88 

"We  insist,"  wrote  Webster  to  Everett,  "that  in 
cases  of  vessels  carried  into  British  ports  by  violence 
or  stress  of  weather,  there  shall  be  no  interference 
from  the  land  with  the  relation  or  personal  condition 
of  those  on  board,  according  to  the  laws  of  their  own 
country." ''  Webster,  however,  could  claim  no  posi 
tive  right  under  the  law  of  nations,  and  it  was  not  to 
be  expected  that  Aberdeen  would  in  any  wise  circum 
scribe  the  broad  principle  that  a  slave  became  free 
when  he  stepped  upon  British  ground.  Everett  was 
told  that  the  United  States  should  protect  herself  from 
such  occurrences  by  convoying  her  coasting  of  such  a 
character.  Webster  replied  to  Everett  in  a  despondent 
tone.  If  the  boundary  question  were  again  to  run  a 
course  of  surveys  and  arbitrations,  and  if  the  United 
States  were  to  understand  that  its  coasting  trade  could 
not  enjoy  ordinary  safety  unless  put  under  convoy,  the 
Ashburton  mission  would  end  by  leaving  things  much 
worse  than  it  found  them.  "I  hardly  see  how  this 

35  Ashburton  to  Webster,  August  6,  1842;  Webster's  Diplo 
matic  and  Official  Papers,  91. 

86  Story  to  Webster,  March  26,  1842;  Van  Tyne's  Letters 
of  Daniel  V/ebster,  263.  Pierce's  Sumner,  II.,  200;  Moore, 
Int.  Arbitrations,  L,  410-12,  417. 

"Webster  to  Everett,  June  28,  1842;  Curtis's  Webster,  II., 
106. 


THE)  ASHBURTON  TREATY  49 

bad  result  is  to  be  prevented  unless  we  can  succeed  in 
beseeching  Lord  Ashburton  to  delay  his  return  another 
month  in  the  hope  that  the  cloud  on  his  brow  may  be 
dissipated  by  the  next  communication  from  home." ' 

It  was  Webster's  desire  that  the  Creole  case  might 
be  used  as  a  peg  upon  which  to  hang  a  stipulation  for 
extradition  in  the  treaty  in  which  he  hoped  the  Ash- 
burton  negotiation  might  result.  The  discussion  of  a 
case  of  this  nature  was  dangerous.  In  any  question  in 
which  the  domestic  institution  of  the  United  States 
was  involved  might  be  found  a  text  for  antislavery 
discussion  by  Aberdeen.  Until  Ashburton  had  specific 
instructions  upon  the  general  subject,  Webster  could 
not  introduce  it  to  him.  With  this  pause  in  the  prose 
cution  of  the  special  negotiation,  Webster  drafted  an 
answer  to  Ashburton's  letter  on  the  boundary  question. 

It  must  be  confessed  that  Webster's  reply  to  Ash- 
burton's  well-meant  and  friendly  letter  was  hardly  in 
genuous.  Ashburton  had  taken  Webster  at  his  word 
and  avoided  a  long  statement  of  the  British  case  based 
upon  the  length  of  time  the  various  parts  of  the  con 
tested  territory  were  occupied.  Waiving  all  con 
troversial  topics  except  the  position  of  the  Mada- 
waska  settlements,  he  then  proposed  the  line  of  the' 
St.  John,  with  a  deviation  therefrom  to  be  agreed  upon, 
with  concessions  as  to  Rouse's  Point  and  the  naviga 
tion  of  the  St.  John.  Webster's  rejoinder  was  an 
elaborate  argument,  supporting  the  proposition  that  a 
boundary  line  might  be  ascertained,  run,  and  delineated 
with  precision  according  to  the  words  of  the  treaty  of 
1783,  and  he  proceeded  to  demonstrate  this  by  the  stock 
arguments  of  many  years.  With  this  by  way  of  pre- 


Ibid. 


5<3  DIPLOMACY    UNDER    TYLER    AND    POLK 

face,  all  doubtless  intended  as  a  vindication  of  the 
position  assumed  by  the  Maine  commissioners  in  a 
communication  addressed  to  Webster  and  by  him  en 
closed  with  his  note  to  Ashburton,39  Webster  then  an 
swered  Ashburton's  proposal  for  a  conventional  line.- 
The  United  States,  he  said,  would  never  relinquish 
any  territory  west  of  the  north  line  of  the  St.  Croix 
and  south  of  the  St.  John,  in  which  were  the  Mada- 
waska  settlements.  He  further  objected  to  following 
the  St.  John,  as  the  course  of  the  main  stream  turned 
back  to  the  south  and  west  toward  the  Penobscot. 
"The  United  States,  therefore,  would  not  object,  upon 
the  adjustment  of  proper  equivalents,  to  a  line  of  boun 
dary  which  should  begin  at  the  middle  of  the  main 
channel  of  the  St.  John,  where  that  river  is  intersected 
by  a  due  north  line  extended  from  the  source  of  the 
St.  Croix ;  thence  proceeding  westwardly  by  the  middle 
of  the  main  channel  to  a  point  three  miles  west  of  the 
mouth  of  the  Madawaska;  thence  by  a  straight 
line  to  the  outlet  of  Long  Lake  and  thence  to 
the  highlands  which  divide  the  waters  of  the 
Riviere  Duloup  from  those  falling  into  the  St. 
Francis."  This  last  division  was  to  take  the  place 
of  the  indefinite  description  in  the  treaty  of 
1783  of  the  Highlands  which  divide  the  waters  falling 
into  the  St.  Lawrence  from  those  falling  into  the 
Atlantic  Ocean.  The  manner  of  following  the  line  of 
the  Highlands  to  the  northwesternmost  source  of  the 
Connecticut,  Webster  left  for  a  later  conference.  The 
line  including  Rouse's  Point  he  admitted  to  be  a  valu 
able  concession,  as  was  the  navigation  of  the  St.  John. 

39  The   Maine   Commissioners   to   Webster,   June   29,    1842; 
Congressional  Globe,  27  Cong.,  3  Sess.,  14. 


THE  ASHBURTON  TREATY  51 

The  apparently  inflexible  attitude  was  perhaps  in 
tended  for  home  consumption,  and  his  aggressive  re 
iteration  of  the  old  arguments  may  have  been  mere 
brutum  fulmen.  At  any  rate,  the  character  of  the 
correspondence  was  at  once  changed.  Ashburton  re 
plied  to  Webster  with  no  more  argumentation  than 
was  necessary  to  preserve  his  dignity  and  to  keep  his 
case  from  appearing  to  go  by  default,  closing  his  letter 
with  this  friendly  appeal :  "The  position  in  which  this 
negotiation  now  stands,  seems  to  prove  what  I  have 
before  volunteered  to  advance, — that  it  would  have  a 
better  chance  of  success  by  conference  than  by  corres-  % 
pondence;  at  all  events,  that  we  should  sooner  arrive 
at  ascertaining  what  we  can  or  cannot  do.  Slow,  un 
necessarily  slow,  our  progress  has  hitherto  been;  and 
the  public  seem,  somehow  or  other,  to  have  become  in 
formed  that  there  are  differences.  I  hope,  when  we 
come  to  discuss  them,  they  will  prove  less  serious  than 
they  are  supposed  to  be;  but  it  is  very  desirable  that 
doubts  and  distrusts  should  be  set  at  rest,  and  that 
public  credit  and  the  transactions  of  commerce  should 
suffer  the  least  possible  disturbance."  ** 

During  the  four  days  following  the  receipt  of  Ash- 
burton's  letter  he  and  Webster  had  frequent  confer 
ences  upon  the  subject  of  the  boundary.  They  agreed 
upon  the  line  as  described  in  the  final  treaty.  On 
the  1 5th  Webster  submitted  the  decision  to  the  com 
missioners  of  Maine  and  Massachusetts.  For  the  con 
cessions  of  public  lands  which  these  two  states  would 
have  to  make,  in  case  the  compromise  line  was  agreed 


"Ashburton  to  Webster,  July  n,  1842;  Congressional  Globe, 
27  Cong.,  3  Sess.,  9. 


52  DIPLOMACY    UNDER    TYW)R    AND    POLK 

to,  he  offered  the  sum  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  thou 
sand  dollars  to  be  paid  by  the  United  States  to  Maine 
and  Massachusetts  in  equal  parts.  The  proposed  line, 
Webster  stated,  was  not  all  that  might  have  been  hoped 
for,  but  he  believed  that  no  more  advantageous  ar 
rangement  could  be  made  and  he  asked  assent  to  it. 
Of  the  twelve  thousand  square  miles  in  dispute  the 
new  line  gave  to  the  United  States  seven  thousand,  or 
about  six  hundred  less  than  under  the  Netherlands 
award.  The  line  followed  the  St.  John  to  the  St. 
Francis  and  up  that  river  to  Lake  Pohenagamook. 
•Thence,  instead  of  following  the  "Highlands,"  the 
boundary  followed  an  arbitrary  line  southwest  for  a 
distance  of  some  hundred  miles  to  a  point  near  the 
southwest  branch  of  the  St.  John.  The  crest  of  hills 
was  then  followed  to  the  northwest  source  of  the  Con 
necticut  River,  known  as  Hall's  Stream,  and  along  the 
old  line  of  forty-five  degrees  to  the  St.  Lawrence. 

The  treaty  of  peace  of  1783  had  proceeded  upon  the 
erroneous  assumption  that  there  was  a  communication 
between  Lake  Superior  and  the  Lake  of  the  Woods. 
Ashburton  and  Webster  agreed  upon  a  description 
based  upon  recent  geographical  information,  but  did 
not  consider  the  line  beyond  the  Rocky  Mountains ;  and 
unfortunately  the  failure  to  include  the  northwestern 
boundary  with  the  northeastern  led  the  two  countries 
to  more  warlike  expressions  than  had  the  troublesome 
boundary  on  the  northeast. 

The  Massachusetts  commissioners  accepted  the  pro 
position  to  release  the  state's  claims  :for  the  sum 
named/1  and  so,  finally,  did  the  commissioners  from 

41  The  Massachusetts  Commissioners  to  Webster,  July  20, 
1842;  ibid.,  19. 


THE  ASHBURTON  TREATY  53 

Maine,  though  not  without  a  final  protest  against  the 
injustice  of  it.  "The  commissioners  of  Maine,  invok 
ing  the  spirit  of  attachment  and  patriotic  devotion  of 
their  state  to  the  Union,  would  interpose  no  objection 
to  an  adjustment' which  the  general  judgment  of  the 
nation  shall  pronounce  as  honorable  and  expedient, 
even  if  that  judgment  shall  lead  to  the  surrender  of  a 
portion  of  the  birthright  of  the  people  of  their  state." ' 

The  vexed  question  of  the  northeastern  boundary 
was  thus  settled  according  to  the  plan  which  Webster 
had  so  long  favored.  Without  the  determination  of 
Ashburton  that  the  negotiation  should  be  kept  out  of 
formal  and  written  argument  his  mission  would  have 
been  a  failure,  but  to  Tyler  belongs  the  credit  of  per 
suading  Ashburton  to  continue  when  his  tastes  and 
inclinations  would  have  led  him  to  give  up  in  despair. 
Webster's  part  was,  perhaps,  the  most  difficult  of  all. 
That  acquiescence  on  the  part  of  the  Maine  commis 
sioners  was  secured  was  due  to  his  patient  and  tactful 
methods. 

The  northeastern  boundary  question  thus  disposed 
of  by  compromise,  Ashburton  and  Webster  addressed 
themselves  to  the  task  of  settling  the  non-territorial 
questions  in  dispute. 

The  first  of  these  was  in  reference  to  the  sup 
pression  of  the  slave-trade.  The  opposition  of 
the  United  States  to  conceding  to  Great  Britain 
any  right  of  visitation  or  search  was  too  deep- 
rooted  to  permit  discussion,  much  as  Aberdeen  de 
sired  it.  Indeed,  the  general  subject  of  the  right  of 
search  was  not  entered  into  by  Webster  and  Ashbur- 

4*  The  Maine  Commissioners  to  Webster;  ibid.,  19. 


54  DIPLOMACY    UND£R    TYL^R    AND    POLK 

ton.  Webster  had  stated  to  Cass  that  any  agreement 
upon  the  slave-trade  must  deal  with  that  question  alone 
without  drawing  into  it  the  ulterior  matter  of  search 
and  visitation.  The  plan  of  putting  into  operation  a 
practicable  scheme  for  the  suppression  of  the  trade 
was  Tyler's,  who  had  told  Webster  that  the  refusal  of 
France  to  ratify  the  quintuple  treaty  would  give  greater 
freedom  in  dealing  with  Lord  Ashburton.  The  agree 
ment  of  1840  between  the  American  and  British  com 
manders  for  joint  cruising  in  African  waters,  an  agree 
ment  which  had  been  disavowed  by  Van  Buren's 
administration,  gave  Tyler  the  idea  of  a  method  of 
policing  the  slave-trade  without  introducing  the  dan 
ger  of  search  or  visitation.  Webster  presented  the 
plan  to  Ashburton,  who  accepted  it,  and  it  formed  the 
eighth  article  of  the  treaty.  By  it  each  of  the  parties 
agreed  to  keep  on  the  coast  of  Africa  a  naval  force  of 
not  less  than  eighty  guns  for  the  suppression  of  the 
trade;  each  squadron  was  to  be  independent  of  the 
other,  but  the  government  of  each  was  to  give  such 
orders  as  to  enable  the  officers  of  the  respective  fleets 
to  act  in  concert  and  to  cooperate  upon  mutual  con 
sultation  as  exigencies  might  arise.  Such  an  agreement 
was,  of  course,  in  the  nature  of  a  compromise.  Aber 
deen  was  assured  of  the  maintenance  of  a  fleet  which 
would  act  in  concert  with  a  British  force.  Tyler  and 
Webster  held  to  their  position  of  not  conceding  a  right 
of  search.  Had  the  United  States  maintained  the  fleet 
as  agreed,  the  article  might  have  solved  the  difficulty. 
As  time  went  on,  the  support  of  the  United  States 
waned  and  the  slavers  continued  to  make  more  and 
more  use  of  the  American  flag.  The  agreement  upon 
the  subject  was  of  great  importance  in  its  results 
abroad.  France  and  Great  Britain  made  a  similar 


THE  ASHBURTON  TREATY  55 

agreement  to  take  the  place  of  the  unratified  treaty. 
Wheaton  wrote  from  Berlin  that  for  the  first  time  in 
our  history  could  it  be  said  that  the  American  govern 
ment  had  exerted  an  influence  on  the  policy  of  Europe. 
It  was  in  regard  to  the  eighth  article  of  the  Ashburton 
treaty  that  this  remark  was  made,  and  not,  as  fre 
quently  stated,  on  account  of  Cass's  protest  to  Guizot. 

The  Ashburton  treaty  also  contained  an  important 
article  providing  for  the  extradition  of  criminals.  Not 
since  Jay's  treaty  had  such  a  provision  been  inserted 
in  any  treaty  negotiated  by  the  United  States,  and  the 
article  in  that  treaty  expired  by  limitation  in  1806.  By 
the  Ashburton  treaty  extradition  was  conceded  to  either 
party,  the  number  of  crimes  increased  over  those  in 
the  Jay  treaty,  and  the  time  of  duration  of  the  article 
made  perpetual. 

The  question  of  maritime  right  (as  presented  by  the 
Creole)  and  that  of  violation  of  territory  (in  the  case 
of  the  Caroline)  were  not  settled  by  the  treaty.  In 
stead  Ashburton  and  Webster  exchanged  official  notes 
upon  these  two  subjects.  In  reference  to  the  former, 
Ashburton  pleaded  lack  of  instructions.  Webster  then 
asked  that  Ashburton  engage  that  instructions  be  given 
to  the  colonial  authorities  in  the  West  Indies  which 
should  lead  them  to  regulate  their  conduct  in  con 
formity  with  the  rights  of  citizens  of  the  United  States. 
To  this  Ashburton  agreed  that  the  laws  of  the  British 
colonies  should  be  executed  with  careful  attention  to 
the  wish  of  Great  Britain  to  obtain  good  neighborhood, 
and  that  there  should  be  no  officious  interference  with 
American  vessels  driven  by  accident  or  by  violence 
into  West  Indian  ports.43  As  to  the  Caroline  affair, 

**  Ashburton  to  Webster,  August  6,  1842;  Webster's  Diplo 
matic  and  Official  Papers,  93. 


56  DIPLOMACY    UNDER    TYLER    AND    POLK 

Ashburton  was  reluctant  to  place  himself  on  record. 
After  a  week  of  conference  he  agreed  to  write  a  letter 
deprecating  the  occurrence,  finally  saying  that  no  af 
front  to  the  sovereign  authority  of  the  United  States 
had  been  intended.  "Looking  back  at  what,  passed  at 
this  distance  of  time,"  he  wrote,  "what  is,  perhaps, 
most  to  be  regretted  is,  that  some  explanation  and 
apology  for  this  occurrence  was  not  immediately 
made." '  Webster  afterwards  said  that  it  took  him 
two  days  to  get  Lord  Ashburton  to  consent  to  use  this 
word  "apology." ' 

So  far  the  Ashburton  mission  had  been  a  success. 
The  treaty  was  signed  August  9  and  sent  to  the  Senate 
August  n.  The  committee  on  foreign  relations  re 
ported  it  without  amendment,  and  after  debate  it  was 
ratified  by  a  vote  of  thirty-nine  to  nine,  the  opponents 
being  Allen  of  Ohio,  Bagby  of  Alabama,  Benton  and 
Linn  of  Missouri,  Buchanan  and  Sturgeon  of  Pennsyl 
vania,  Conrad  of  Louisiana,  Smith  of  Connecticut,  and 
Williams  of  Maine,  all  Democrats  except  Conrad. 

Much  has  been  written  in  connection  with  the  Ash 
burton  treaty  regarding  the  so-called  "battle  of  the 
maps."  The  subject  properly  belongs  to  the  discussion 
of  the  ratification  of  the  treaty.46  It  would  have  been 
foreign  to  the  spirit  of  the  plan  for  the  adoption  of  a 
conventional  line  had  Ashburton  and  Webster  intro 
duced  arguments  based  upon  the  old  maps.  Notwith 
standing  the  amount  of  attention  paid  these  documents 
during  the  Senate  debates  prior  to  ratification,  it  may 

"Ashburton  to  Webster,  July  28,  1842;  ibid.,  112. 

45  Curtis's  Webster,  II.,  121,  note. 

"Foster's  Century  of  American  Diplomacy,  284  et  seq, 


THE  ASHBURTON  TREATY  57 

safely  be  said  that  the  matter  had  no  place  in  the  ne 
gotiation  of  the  treaty.  These  Senate  debates  belong 
rather  to  the  political  than  to  the  diplomatic  history  of 
the  time,  and  the  opposition  to  the  treaty  was  due 
largely  to  the  isolation  of  Tyler  and  to  the  anomalous 

o       J  J 

position  of  Webster. 


CHAPTER  III 

RELATIONS  BETWEEN  MEXICO  AND  THE  UNITED 
STATES  CONCERNING  TEXAS,  1825-1840 

The  Mexican  War  and  the  conquest  of  California 
formed  a  distinct  episode,  completely  disassociated 
from  the  annexation  of  Texas.  The  Mexican  War  was 
not  caused  by  the  annexation  of  Texas  to  the  United 
States.  That  controlling  event  in  Folk's  administra 
tion  is  fully  separated  from  the  earlier  question  of 
Texas  with  which  Tyler's  name  is  associated.  As  his 
torical  episodes  they  have  -no  connection,  but  on  the 
other  hand  they  are  rightly  viewed  as  two  distinct 
phases  of  southwestern  expansion.  Both  were  at  the 
expense  of  Mexico.  Both  evidenced  the  expansionist 
desire  of  the  American  nation,  a  desire  which  each 
generation  has  been  able  to  make  effective.  The  suc 
cessive  accessions  to  national  territory  in  1803,  1819, 
1845,  and  1848,  as  well  as  in  1867  and  1898,  mark  the 
impress  upon  the  national  consciousness  of  each  gen 
eration's  desire  for  novelty,  for  adventure,  and  for 
new  opportunities.  No  one  fact,  either  economic,  or 
social,  or  even  political,  can  account  for  it.  Perhaps 
a  national  idealism — call  it  manifest  destiny  or  what 
you  will — has  had  more  to  do  with  this  expansion 
movement  than  anything  else. 

In  its  essentials  the  expansion  of  the  United  States 
to  the  southwest  is  not  radically  different  from  its  ex 
pansion  to  the  west  over  the  Mississippi  Valley,  to  the 


MEXICO    AND    TEXAS,     1825-1840  59 

northwest  into  Oregon,  and  on  across  the  Pacific  to 
Hawaii  and  the  Philippines.     That  this  southwestern 
expansion  was  an 'extension  of  the  slave-area  does  not  . 
thereby  mark  it  as  different  in  principle  from  expan 
sion  in  other  directions.    This  proposition  is  not  made 
blindly  and  without  reference  to  the  economic  principle 
that  the  system  of  slavery  was  extensive  and  not  inten 
sive  in  its  methods,  and  that  the  perpetuation  of  slavery 
required  frequent  and  constant  additions  to  the  slave- 
area.     Doubtless  this  principle  of  the  expansive  neces 
sities  of  slavery  has  had  adequate  treatment.     It  is 
submitted,  however,  that  instead  of  slavery's  assisting^, 
in    the    expansion    of    national    territory     it    delayed' 
and  almost  defeated  it.       John  Quincy  Adams,  who 
alone  of  Monroe's  cabinet  insisted  upon  the  retention 
of  Texas  in  1819,  opposed  the  annexation  of  Texas  in 
1845.    Between  the  two  dates  slavery  had  grown  to  be 
a  national  question  of  paramount  political  importance 
through  the  debates  upon  the  right  of  petition.1    With-    » 
out  the  introduction  of  the  slavery  question  opposition   y* 
to  the  annexation  of  Texas  would  probably  never  have   ' 
been  the  political  question  which  it  was  in  1844.       It 
cannot    be   maintained    that    the    acquisition    of    East 
Florida  under  Monroe  was  for  the  purpose  of  extend-       £ 
ing  the  slave-area,  but  that  charge  has  frequently  been 
made  as  to  the  annexation  of  Texas  and  the  conquest 
of  New  Mexico  and  California.     Viewed  superficially, 
as  isolated  events  in  the  administrations  of  two  south 
ern  and  pro-slavery  presidents,  these  steps  in  south 
western  expansion  might  be  considered  as  territorial 

1  Professor  George  P.  Garrison  in  the  American  Historical  \ 
Review,  October,   1904. 


6o  DIPLOMACY    UNDER   TYI^R   AND   POLK 

additions  designed  solely  to  increase  the  slave-area.  If, 
however,  it  can  be  shown  that  from  the  time  the 
,  Florida  treaty  of  1819  was  ratified  there  was  a  series 
of  attempts  to  win  back  what  had  been  surrendered — 
to  state  it  strongly — or  to  gain  for  the  United  States  a 
desirable  addition  to  its  territory — to  speak  more  cau 
tiously — then  the  charge  of  premeditated  expansion  by 
the  United  States  for  the  purposes  of  extending  slavery 
falls  to  the  ground.  This  does  not  mean  that  neither 
Tyler  nor  Polk  was  influenced  by  the  fact  that  south 
western  expansion  was  eminently  favorable  to  the  pe 
culiar  institution  of  the  South.  It  would  be  too  much 
to  assert  this.  Tyler's  pro-slavery  views  added  to  his 
annexation  enthusiasm  in  that  he  feared  that  if  Texas 
were  to  abolish  slavery  it  would  endanger  the  slave 
institutions  of  all  the  southern  states.  In  consider 
ing  the  question  of  the  annexation  of  Texas,  New 
Mexico,  and  California,  therefore,  it  will  be  necessary 
to  keep  in  mind  that  the  first  step  in  that  direction  was 
not  the  negotiation  for  the  annexation  of  Texas  under 
Tyler,  but  the  series  of  abortive  attempts  at  south 
western  extension  which  began  early  in  the  adminis 
tration  of  John  Quincy  Adams.  Adams,  two  years 
before  when  secretary  of  state  under  Monroe,  had 
offered  the  position  of  minister  to  Mexico  to  Andrew 
Jackson  without  previously  sounding  Jackson  as  to 
whether  or  not  he  would  accept.  The  appointment 
was  declined  in  terms  not  wholly  gracious.2  After 
Ninian  Edwards  had  been  appointed  and  had  resigned, 

2  Jackson  to  Adams,  March  15,  1823;  MS.,  Archives,  De 
partment  of  State.  In  subsequent  notes  these  manuscripts  will 
be  referred  to  as  "MS.,  Archives." 


MEXICO    AND    TEXAS,     1825-1840  6l 

Monroe's  term  ended.  Not  until  the  administration 
of  Adams  were  diplomatic  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  Mexico  really  established. 

The  first  instructions  issued  by  Henry  Clay,  as  sec 
retary  of  state  under  Adams,  to  Joel  R.  Poinsett,  min 
ister  to  the  United  Mexican  States,  dated  March  25, 
1825,  discussed  the  advisability  of  extending  the  south 
western  boundary  so  as  to  include  Texas.  After  de 
claring  that  the  principles  upon  which  the  American 
policy  toward  Mexico  was  based  were  those  set  forth 
in  Monroe's  famous  message  of  December  2,  1823, 
Clay  proceeded  to  the  matter  of  boundaries  between 
Mexico  and  the  United  States.  "Some  difficulties,'^ 
Clay  said,  "may  hereafter  arise  between  the  two  coun 
tries  from  the  line  [of  1819]  against  which  it  would 
be  desirable  now  to  guard  if  practicable ;  and,  as  the 
government  of  Mexico  may  be  supposed  not  to  have 
any  disinclination  to  the  fixation  of  a  new  line,  .  .  . 
the  President  wishes  you  to  sound  it  on  that  subject, 
or  to  avail  yourself  of  a  favorable  disposition,  if  you 
should  find  it,  to  effect  that  object.  The  line  of  the 
Sabine  approaches  our  great  western  mart  nearer  than 
could  be  wished.  Perhaps  the  Mexican  government 
may  not  be  unwilling  to  establish  that  of  the  Rio 
Brassos  de  Dios,  or  the  Rio  Colorado,  or  the  Snow 
Mountains,  or  the  Rio  del  Norte  in  lieu  of  it."  !  This 
was  intended  to  be  a  mere  rectification  of  the  frontier 
line  without  any  further  consideration  to  be  paid  for 
the  cession  of  territory  than  that  the  United  States 
and  not  Mexico  would  be  forced  to  take  care  of  the 
warlike  Indian  tribes  infesting  the  plains  of  Texas.  At 

'Clay  to  Poinsett,  March  25,  1825;  MS.,  Archives. 


62  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

that  early  date,  however,  Mexico  was  suspicious  of 
the  United  States.  Poinsett  protested  against  any 
treaty  that  Mexico  might  make  with  any  other 
Spanish-American  state  in  which  more  favorable  terms 
were  given  than  might  be  granted  to  the  United 
States.  He  then  proposed  to  the  Mexican  government 
that  a  new  treaty  of  limits  be  entered  into,  laying  aside 
altogether  the  treaty  of  1819. 

Thus  at  the  outset  of  our  relations  with  Mexico 
grave  suspicions  were  aroused  as  to  the  intentions  of 
Mexico's  growing  and  powerful  neighbor  on  the  north. 
"It  is  manifest,"  Poinsett  reported  July  22,  1825,  "that 
the  [Mexican]  government  regards  all  our  movements 
towards  Texas  and  New  Mexico  with  jealous  appre 
hension."  4  "I  find  that  there  exists  great  apprehension 
in  the  minds  of  the  people  of  this  country  that  the  gov 
ernment  of  the  United  States  contemplates  renewing 
their  claim  to  the  territory  north  of  the  Rio  Bravo 
del  Norte,  and  it  may  be  of  some  importance  to  con 
sider  their  great  sensibilities  on  this  subject.  It  ap 
pears  to  me  that  it  will  be  important  to  gain  time  if 
we  wish  to  extend  our  territory  beyond  the  boundary 
agreed  upon  by  the  treaty  of  1819.  Most  of  the  good 
land  from  the  Colorado  to  the  Sabine  has  been  granted 
by  the  state  of  Texas  and  is  rapidly  peopling  with 
either  grantees  or  squatters  from  the  United  States, 
a  population  they  will  find  difficult  to  govern,  and 
perhaps  after  a  short  period  they  may  not  be  so  averse 
to  part  with  that  portion  of  their  territory  as  they  are 
at  present." ' 

Poinsett  did  not  persist  in  the  advocacy  of  a  policy 

*  Poinsett  to  Clay,  July  24,  1825 ;  MS.,  Archives. 

B  Poinsett  to  Clay,  in  cipher,  July  27,  1825;  MS.,  Archives. 


MEXICO    AND    TEXAS,     1825-1840  63 

of  delay  toward  Mexico.  He  reported  that  he  was 
very  anxious  about  the  boundary  line  and  that,  while 
he  thought  it  politic  not  to  justify  the  jealous  fears 
of  Mexico  by  extravagant  pretensions  as  to  Texas, 
he  felt  it  of  the  highest  importance  that  the  United 
States  should  extend  its  territory  toward  the  Del 
Norte,  either  to  the  Colorado,  or  at  least  to  the 
Brazos.6 

The  negotiation  that  followed  hinged  upon  the 
question  as  to  whether  the  treaty  of  1819  should  be 
adopted  as  to  boundary  or  a  new  treaty  entered  into. 
For  two  years  the  matter  never  went  beyond  the  stage 
of  preliminary  discussion.  During  all  this  time  Texas 
was  being  colonized  by  settlers  from  the  southern  part 
of  the  United  States.  Clay  adopted  the  idea  expressed 
in  Poinsett's  early  letter,  that  Mexico  would  be  less 
loath  to  part  with  Texas  when  it  was  seen  that  that 
country  was  being  peopled  with  settlers , of  a  different 
race,  speaking  a  different  language  and  importing 
strange  institutions — a  mistaken  judgment  as  the  sequel 
showed.  Clay's  instructions  proceeded  upon  that  theory. 
Instead  of  depending  upon  mere  argument  as  to  the 
desirability  to  both  parties  of  a  new  boundary  line, 
Poinsett  was  authorized  to  pay  a  million  dollars  for 
a  line  from  the  Del  Norte  to  the  forty-second  parallel 
and  thence  west  to  the  Pacific.  If  this  cession  was 
found  to  be  impossible,  he  was  authorized  to  offer 
half  that  sum  for  a  Ime  beginning  at  the  Colorado, 
thence  north  and  west  as  before.  Any  treaty  so  nego 
tiated  might  confirm  all  land  grants  made  prior  to  its 
execution  and  also  included  stipulation  similar  to  the 

'  Poinsett  to  Clay,  August  5,  1825 ;  MS.,  Archives. 


64  DIPLOMACY    UNDER   TYLER   AND   POLK 

one  in  the  Louisiana  treaty  providing  for  the  incor 
poration  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  ceded  lands  into 
the  Union.7  Poinsett  reported  that  he  feared  the  sum 
authorized  was  much  too  small.  "The  expenses  of  the 
government  are  so  great  that  they  do  not  regard  so 
insignificant  a  sum  as  a  million  as  of  much  use  to 
them." '  No  effort  was  made  to  communicate  Clay's 
offer  to  Mexico,  as  Poinsett  believed  the  overture 
would  have  no  other  effect  than  to  aggravate  the  irri 
tation  between  the  two  countries.9  Feeling  that  any 
attempt  to  alter  the  former  treaty  of  limits  (that  with 
Spain  in  1819)  would  prove  ineffective  and  only  pro 
vocative  of  unfriendly  feelings,  he  thereupon  accepted 
the  proposal  of  the  Mexican  government  and  renewed, 
the  old  treaty  of  iSig.10  This  treaty  adopted  the  boun 
dary  line  as  set  forth  in  the  Spanish  treaty,  and  for  the 
second  time  Texas  was  left  outside  of  the  boundaries 
of  the  United  States. 

Such   was   the   state   of  the   relations   between   the 
United  States  and  Mexico  when  Jackson  succeeded  to 
the  presidency.     He   found  a  treaty  signed  but  not 
ratified  which  left  the  Sabine  as  the  western  boundary. 
Haste  was  not  to  be  expected  of  the  Mexican  govern 
ment,  and  Jackson's  administration  made  no  effort  to 
hurry    ratification.      Van    Bure '    instructed    Poinsett, 
<pon  much  the  same  grey    1s  A  those  taken  by  Clay, 
j  open  a  negotiation  for       •  purchase  of  Texas    or 

•  .i 

'Clay  to   Poinsett,   March  1827;    MS.,   Archives;    Joh. 

Quincy  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI      239,  240;  Von  Hoist,  II.,  554. 

8  Poinsett  to  Clay,  May  10    1827;  MS.,  Archives. 

'Niles'  Register,  LXVL,   .52. 

"Poinsett  to  Clay,  January  8,  1828;  MS.,  Archives. 


MEXICO    AND    TSXAS,     1825-1840  65 

for  as  much  of  it  as  he  could  get.11  It  is  at  this  point 
that  Von  Hoist  perceives  a  decided  change  in  the  atti 
tude  of  the  United  States  toward  Texas  and  Mexico. 
With  the  accession  of  Jackson  he  sees  the  first  play 
in  the  conspiracy  of  the  slaveholding  South  to  extend 
slave  territory.  Just  how  Van  Buren's  instructions 
to  Poinsett  differ  from  Clay's  is  not  clear,  except  that 
the  amount  to  be  offered  is  increased  from  one  million 
to  five — a  necessary  increase,  as  Poinsett  had  pointed 
out. 


"Van  Buren  to  Poinsett,  August  25,  1829;  S.  Ex.  Doc. 
351,  25  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  315.  MS.,  Archives,  Volume  I.,  num 
ber  30.  These  instructions  were  drafted  by  Jackson  as 
follows : 

"August  I3th,  1829 — 

"The  inducements  to  be  presented  to  the  Mexican  govern 
ment  for  the  cession  of  Texas  to  the  United  States. 

"ist.  The  advantage  of  having  a  Natural  boundary  over 
the  one  which  is  now  imaginary  and  unsettled. 

"2d.  The  aid  which  the  consideration  she  will  receive  for 
it,  will  give  her  in  repelling  such  attempts  upon  her 
Sovereignety  as  that  recently  organized  at  Havanna;  in  pro 
viding  a  Navy,  and  the  means  of  vigorous  defence. 

"3d.  The  removal  of  those  collisions  which  must  grow 
out  of  the  intercourse  of  her  citizens  with  ours,  seperated  as 
they  will  be  from  the  efficient  control  of  their  respective 
governments :  and  liable  to  all  the  excitements  natural  to 
the  neighbourhood  of  conflicting  laws,  habits  and  interests. 

"4th.     Its  real  necessity  to  us  as  a  guard  for  our  western 
border    and    the    prote' "Dn '  of    New    Orleans — furnishing    a 
motive  for  the  cession -Viich     -  '1  be  honorable  to  the  repul 
lican    character    of    Mexir          TI    worthy    of    that    reciproc- 
"T  irit    of    friendship    which'       ^uld    forever    characterise    th 
eelings  of  the  two  governn  toward  each  other. 

"5th.     The    Probability   o.  being   settled   chiefly  by   the 

citizens  of  the  United  Statev  ho  under  a  different  system 
of  Govt.  may  become  tui  1ent  and  dificult  of  Con- 
troul,  and  taking  advantage  of  heir  distance  from  Mexican 
authority  might  endeavour  to  eskalish  one  independant  of  it — 


66  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

During  all  the  years  of  Poinsett's  residence  in 
Mexico  as  minister  a  stream  of  colonists  from  the 
United  States  had  gone  into  Texas.  Most  of  them, 
it  is  true,  were  southerners  and  slaveholders.  Some  of 
them  were  from  the  North,  even  from  Connecticut 
and  New  York.  The  only  differences  in  the  situation 
of  1829  from  that  of  1825  were  that  more  Americans 
were  in  Texas,  more  lands  had  been  taken  up,  specu 
lations  in  lands  had  been  begun,  and  public  attention 
had  been  directed  thither. 


an  event  that  will  be  sure  to  make  this  Govt.  the 
object  of  Jealousy,  and  in  conjunction  with  other  causes 
unavoidable  on  an  imaginary  line  of  boundary  of  manny  hun 
dred  of  miles  might  seriously  weaken  those  bonds  of  amity 
and  good  understanding  which  it  is  the  interest  and  duty 
of  both  Republics  to  cherish. 

"Objects  of  the  United  States  in  obtaining  it. 

"ist.  The  safety  of  New  Orleans.  The  present  boundary 
would  enable  an  enemy  of  the  Sabine,  Red  &  Arkansas 
rivers,  to  organise  a  force  which  by  a  coup  de  man  might 
reach  the  Mississippi  and  thereby  prevent  the  interposition 
of  one  by  us  sufficient  for  its  protection.  This  disadvantage 
can  only  be  overcome  by  having  within  our  possession  all 
the  Territory  washed  by  the  branches  of  the  Mississippi. 

"2d.  The  acquisition  of  additional  territory  for  the  pur 
pose  of  concentrating  the  Indians,  adopting  a  more  effective 
system  for  their  Government,  and  relieving  the  states  of  the 
inconveniences  which  the  residence  within  their  limits  at 
present  afford. 

"3d.  The  procurement  of  a  natural  boundery — one  that 
cannot  become  the  subject  of  dispute  hereafter,  and  near  to 
which  a  dense  population  on  either  side  can  never  be  settled. 

"These  purposes  will  be  accomplished  by  obtaining  a  ces 
sion  to  the  Grand  Prairie  or  desert  west  of  the  Nucees,  be 
ginning  at  the  Gulf,  and  following  the  courses  of  the  centre 
of  that  desert,  North  to  its  termination  on  the  mountain, 
thence  with  a  central  line  on  the  mountain,  dividing  the  waters 
of  the  Rio  del  Nort  from  those  that  run  Eastward  of  them 
in  the  Gulf,  to  the  42d.  degree  of  North  latitude  until  it 


MEXICO    AND    TEXAS,     1825-1840  67 

Before  Poinsett  had  really  opened  the  question  he 
was  recalled.  Jackson's  and  Van  Buren's  ideas  as  to 
a  suitable  boundary  are  to  be  gained  from  Poinsett's 
last  instructions :  he  was  authorized  to  offer  five  mil 
lions  for  a  line  beginning  in  the  centre  of  the  desert 
between  the  Del  Norte  and  the  Nueces,  north  to  the 
forty-second  parallel  and  west  to  the  Pacific,  but  for 
proportionately  less  sums.  If  the  first  line  was  im 
possible,  he  was  to  try  to  fix  the  boundary  at  Mata- 
gorda  Bay  or  even  at  the  Brazos. 


strikes  our  present  boundery  on  that  parallel.  This  line  is 
a  natural  seperation  of  the  resources  of  the  two  nations. 
It  is  the  centre  of  a  country  uninhabitable  on  the  Gulf,  and 
on  the  mountain  so  difficult  of  access  and  so  poor  as  to 
furnish  no  inducement  for  a  land  intercourse,  and  of  course 
no  theatre  for  those  causes  of  difference  that  belong  to  a 
neighbourhood  of  commercial  interests.  An  advantage  which 
would  be  lost  if  we  were  to  stop  short  of  it,  either  at  the 
Brasses  or  the  Trinity.  Beyond  either  of  these  rivers  and 
this  line  on  the  Gulf  is  a  section  of  fine  land. 

"For  these  reasons  I  wish  Mr.  Poinsett  to  be  instructed 
to  open  a  Negotiation  for  the  purchase  of  this  Territory,  and 
be  authorised  to  offer  as  high  as  five  millions  subject  to  the 
conditions  mentioned  in  my  former  note. 

"Andrew    Jackson. 

"Note — The  condition  alluded  is,  that  he  shall  consider 
five  Million  as  the  Maximum,  and  in  the  event  of  success  to 
obtain  first  the  ratification  of  their  constituted  authorities, 
before  it  is  submitted  for  ratification  to  this  Govt. — 
and  to  get  it  as  low  as  possible — and  if  the  limits  cannot  be 
obtained — To  obtain  to  the  Brasses  or  to  the  Trinity  agreably 
to  the  ratio  of  the  Maximum  stated — and  if  Cash  should  be 
preferred  to  payment  by  instalments  (and  cash  I  suppose 
would  be  a  great  inducement,)  let  cash  be  stipulated  to  be 
paid  after  ratification  by  our  government,  as  we  can  in  a 
few  days  raise  it  by  creating  stock. 

"A.    J." 

MS.,  Jackson  Papers,  Library  of  Congress. 


68  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYI^R   AND   POLK 

These  instructions  from  Jackson  were  sent  to  Poin-- 
sett  by  one  Colonel  Anthony  Butler,  an  old  comrade 
m  arms  of  Jackson.  Butler  lacked  moral  character 
and  fitness  for  any  position  of  trust.  No  worse  selec 
tion  for  a  diplomatic  position  could  have  been  made. 
Poinsett,  who  had  been  extremely  cautious  about  mak 
ing  overtures  for  the  cession  of  Texas,  fearing  to 
arouse  the  jealous  and  suspicious  national  character  of 
Mexico,  which  was  continually  harassed  by  internal  dis 
sensions,  was  recalled  to  make  room  for  Butler,  who 
was  charged  with  being  a  speculator  in  Texas  lands, 
a  gambler,  a  drunkard,  and  a  liar.  But  this  last 
epithet  came  from  Jackson  himself  some  years  after 
wards,  when  his  shortness  of  memory  afforded  him  an 
easy  escape  from  the  entanglements  of  fact.  It  is  safe 
to  say  that  Butler's  mission,  discreditable  and  even  dis 
graceful,  had  much  to  do  with  the  unsatisfactory  course 
of  our  diplomatic  relations  with  Mexico  which  ended 
in  war. 

When  Butler  appears  for  the  first  time  upon  the 
stage  of  diplomacy,  he  had  recently  been  in  Texas  and 
professed  to  be  familiar  with  the  proposed  river  boun 
daries.  Sent  to  Mexico  as  a  bearer  of  despatches  to 
Poinsett,  he  went  overland,  again  through  Texas,  and 
secretly.  Upon  this  mission  he  was  given  authority 
to  confer  with  the  Mexican  officials  upon  the  subject 
of  limits.  Upon  Poinsett's  recall,  he  was  made 
charge.12  From  1829  to  1836,  during  practically  all  of 

12  Jackson's  reasons  for  recalling  Poinsett  were  as  follows  : 
"From  the  best  consideration  I  have  been  able  to  give  to 

this  subject,  I  have  come  to  the  following  result. 

"Mr.  Poinsett's  situation  at  Mexico  must  be  very  unpleasant 

&  mortifying — The  secretary  of  Foreign  relations  his  enemy 


MEXICO    AND    TEXAS,     1825-1840  69 

Jackson's  term,  Anthony  Butler  represented,  or  rather 
misrepresented,  the  United  States  in  Mexico.  It  was 
a  seven  years'  period  of  cheap  trickery  in  which,  on 
the  one  hand,  Mexico  was  led  to  believe  that  the  United 
States  government  would  descend  to  any  level  to  ac 
complish  the  cession  of  Texas,  and  on  the  other, 
Jackson  was  encouraged  by  hopes  of  a  cession  which 
came  to  nothing. 

In  the  spring  of  1843  John  Quincy  Adams,  then  a 
member  of  the  lower  house,  spent  many  hours  in 
going  over  the  correspondence  of  Butler.  His  mission, 

and  at  the  head  of  the  strong  minority  who  he  wields  to  his 
purposes  &  in  hostility  to  Mr.  P.  by  which  he  overaws  the 
Executive  of  Mexico  who  is  friendly  to  our  Government,  &  to 
our  Minister — under  these  circumstances  we  cannot  reason 
ably  to  expect  through  Mr.  Poinsett  to  effect  either,  a  com 
mercial  Treaty,  or  the  Settlement  of  our  limits,  or  cession 
of  Territory  in  Texas.  In  proof  of  this  we  find,  that  the 
President  failed,  (after  being  requested  by  Mr.  Poinsett)  to 
notify  the  Congress  when  he  convened  them  that  one  object 
would  be  to  ratify  the  commercial  treaty  that  had  been  re 
turned  by  this  Government,  and  not  being  thus  notified,  the 
Congress  could  not  act  on  it — This  to  my  mind  is  sufficient 
proof  that  the  executive  of  Mexico  is  overawed  by  the  Minor 
ity  with  the  Secretary  of  Foreign  relations  at  their  head — • 
Therefore  let  Mr.  Poinsett  with  his  secretary  be  invited  home, 
(recalled)  in  such  a  way  as  will  preserve  his  feelings  and  give 
no  cause  for  exultation  by  this  Minority  or  his  enemies.  In 
a  firm  but  decorous  language,  breathing  the  best  feelings 
to  the  Mexican  Government,  But  observing  that  this  govern 
ment  cannot  but  be  alive  to  the  insult  offered  to  our  govern 
ment  by  the  insult  intended  by  the  public  act  of  the  Legisla 
ture  of  one  of  the  States  of  Mexico,  by  their  resolution 
passed  by  that  body  calling  upon  their  Chief  Executive  to 
banish  from  Mexico  our  Minister,  without  making  to  this 
government  any  representation  of  his  improperly  interfering 
with  the  interior  concerns  of  their  government,  as  well  as 
the  deep  rooted  Jealousy  &  hostility  expressed  in  their  public 
acts  published  to  the  World  against  our  Government, — 


7O  DIPLOMACY    UNDER   TYLER   AND   POLK 

Adams  records  in  his  diary,  was  "chiefly  to  obtain  the 
cession  of  Texas."  :  Butler's  instructions  were  those 
sent  by  Van  Buren  to  Poinsett  during  the  previous 
summer.  "The  three-fold  and  double-dealing  line  of 
negotiations  :  I — for  a  commercial  treaty  ;  2 — indem 
nity  for  all  sorts  of  claims,  and  3 — to  strip  Mexico  of 
Texas,  Santa  Fe  and  California,  runs  into  the  most 
curious  details  of  Jackson  and  Tyler  duplicity." : 
Such  was  Adams's  judgment  after  a  careful  review 
of  Butler's  correspondence.  It  became  evident  that 
Mexico  would  enter  into  no  new  treaty  of  limits,  norw 
would  she,  indeed,  ratify  the  treaty  signed  by  Poinsett 
in  which  the  line  of  1819  was  adopted,  until  the  United 
States  was  willing  to  enter  into  a  commercial  treaty. 
In  this  Butler  acquiesced,  and  a  commercial  treaty 
upon  a  favored-nation  basis  was  signed  in  April,  1831. 
Jackson  was  informed  that  the  question  of  Texas 
would  be  opened  at  once.  Butler  did  nothing  for  a 


whilst  all  the  acts  of  ours,  displayed  the  most  sincere  friend 
ship  &  good  will  to  thiers,  &  our  instructions  to  our  Minis 
ter  was  to  give  every  assurance  of  our  friendship  &  good 
will  for  the  republics  of  the  South,  and  particularly  Mexico — • 
But  to  preserve  our  Minister  from  those  continued  insults 
of  the  Minority  &  to  foster,  &  continue  our  friendship  a 
good  understanding  with  the  Republic  of  Mexico,  we  have 
withdrawn  our  Minister  &  his  secretary,  &  has  charged  Col 
Butler  to  represent  our  Government  at  Mexico,  as  charge  de 
affairs  with  full  powers  to  carry  into  effect  any  commercial 
regulations,  and  the  settlement  of  our  boundary  &c  &c  &c  and 
to  cultivate  the  most  friendly  relations  with  that  Govern 
ment — With  the  assurance  that  whenever  Mexico,  thinks 
proper  to  send  a  Minister  we  will  receive  &c  &c 

"Andrew  Jackson  " 

MS.,  Jackson  Papers,  Library  of  Congress. 

13  John  Quincy  Adams,  Memoirs,  XL,  343. 

"Ibid. 


MEXICO    AND    TEXAS,     1825-1840  ?I 

year  thereafter  further  than  to  keep  up  the  hopes  of 
the  administration,  yet  excusing  himself  for  the  delay 
by  doubts  expressed  as  to  the  sincerity  of  Alaman,  the 
Mexican  minister  of  foreign  relations.15 

In  July,  1832,  Butler  had  a  conference  with  Alaman 
in  which  he  urged  the  cession  of  Texas  to  the  United 
States  because  he  believed  that  at  no  distant  time  such 
a  serious  revolt  would  occur  there  that  the  Mexican 
government  would  not  be  able  to  suppress  it.  "The 
revolt  once  commenced,"  he  said,  "Texas  is  lost  to 
Mexico  forever;  upon  this  subject  my  government 
feels  the  greatest  anxiety."  ]  This  expression  of  re 
markable  prescience  on  Butler's  part  failed  in  its  effect. 
Instead  of  filling  Alaman's  mind  with  fears  for  the 
future  of  Texas,  the  Mexican  secretary  replied  with 
a  query  as  to  the  territorial  desires  of  the  United 
States.  These  Butler  gave  him,  and  the  conference 
ended.  Its  significance  was  this :  "Unless  you  sell 
Texas  to  us,  Texas  will  soon  be  independent,  and  she 
will  be  lost  to  Mexico  in  any  event." 

Butler's  direct  avowal  to  Alaman  of  his  desire  for 
Texas  gave  way  to  a  plan  by  which  the  United  States 
should  make  a  loan  to  Mexico  with  Texas  as  security. 
Jackson  was  appealed  to  by  his  charge  for  definite 
instructions  upon  this  plan.17  Butler's  letter  was  re 
ferred  by  Jackson  to  Livingston  with  the  following 

15  Butler  to  Jackson,  May  25,  1831;  MS.,  Archives;  John 
Quincy  Adams,  Memoirs,  XL,  362. 

18  Butler  to  Livingston,  July  16,  1832  (received  October  5, 
1832),  MS.,  Archives.  Writing  to  Jackson,  August  12,  1832, 
Butler  despaired  of  accomplishing  his  purpose.  MS.,  Jackson 
Papers,  Library  of  Congress. 

17  Butler  to  Jackson,  February  10,  1833;  MS.,  Archives. 


72  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

endorsement:  "The  president,  with  his  respects  to  E. 
L/ivingston,  Esq.,  Sec.  of  State,  encloses  a  letter  just 
received  from  Col.  A.  Butler  with  a  request  that  he 
prepare  a  reply,  consistent  with  the  endorsement  made 
on  the  letter,  adding  anything  that  your  own  judgt. 
may  suggest  on  this  subject.  Instruct  Col.  Butler  to 
bring  the  negotiations  to  a  close.  The  Convention  in 
Texas  meets  the  1st  of  next  April  to  form  a  constitu 
tion  for  themselves.  When  this  is  done,  Mexico  can 
never  annex  it  to  her  jurisdiction  again,  or  control  its 
legislature.  It  will  be  useless  after  this  act  to  enter 
into  a  treaty  of  boundary  with  Mexico."  ] 

Jackson's  forecast  of  the  time  of  the  Texas  consti 
tutional  convention  was  correct  although  it  was  not 
remarkable,  as  this  date  had  been  publicly  announced. 
As  to  the  results  of  the  work  of  the  convention,  how 
ever,  his  enthusiasm  outran  his  judgment.  The  con 
stitution  which  the  convention  adopted,  while  repub 
lican  in  form,  was  in  no  sense  a  declaration  of  inde 
pendence.  It  was  put  forth  in  the  attempt  to  make 
Texas  a  self-governing  member  of  the  Mexican  con 
federation.  While  the  convention  deliberated,  Santa 
Anna,  who  had  overthrown  Bustamente  in  the  govern 
ment  of  Mexico,  was  entrenching  himself  in  power. 
Austin,  one  of  the  bearers  of  the  Texan  constitution 
to  Mexico,  was  imprisoned.  The  spirit  of  rebellion, 
long  suppressed,  broke  into  one  of  independence. 
"L,ike  the  American  Revolution,  that  in  Texas  was  well 
under  way  before  the  colonists  were  willing  to  take 

"Jackson's  endorsement,  dated  March  15,  1833,  MS., 
Archives.  September  26,  1833,  Butler  advised  Jackson  to 
take  possession  of  Texas,  as  he  saw  no  hope  of  negotiation. 
MS.,  Jackson  Papers,  Library  of  Congress. 


MEXICO    AND    T^XAS,     1825-1840  73 

the  decisive  steps  erf  declaring  themselves  independent. 
The  revolution  passes,  therefore,  through  two  main 
phases :  at  first  it  was  a  struggle  for  the  constitutional 
principles  on  which  the  Mexican  Federal  Republic 
had  been  organized  [the  Constitution  of  1824]  ;  and 
when  this  failed  because  of  the  complete  triumph  of 
Santa  Anna  in  the  Mexican  states  up  to  the  Rio 
Grande,  it  became  necessarily  a  struggle  for  inde 
pendence."  : 

The  treaty  of  limits  negotiated  by  Poinsett  in  1828 
and  ratified  in  1832  provided  for  commissioners  to 
mark  the  boundary  of  1819.  The  time  for  the  appoint 
ment  of  these  had  expired,  and  Butler  now  signed  an 
additional  article  extending  the  time  for  the  perform 
ance  of  the  treaty.20  This  he  brought  to  Washington 
in  June,  1835.  While  there  he  made  an  extended  re 
port  to  Forsyth  in  which  he  outlined  a  new  plan  for 
the  acquisition  of  Texas  through  the  bribery  of  Her 
nandez,  a  priest  in  Santa  Anna's  household,  "known," 
he  affirmed,  "to  be  the  manager  of  all  the  recent  ne 
gotiations  of  the  Palace."  Butler  stated  that  if  his 
plan  were  adopted,  the  treaty  which  would  give  us 
Texas  "would  only  be  the  first  of  a  series  which  must 
at  last  give  us  dominion  over  the  whole  of  that  tract 
of  territory  known  as  New  Mexico,  and  the  higher  and 
lower  California,  an  empire  in  itself,  a  paradise  in 
climate  .  .  .  rich  in  minerals  and  affording  a 
water  route  to  the  Pacific  through  the  Arkansas  and 
Colorado  rivers."  :  Butler  elaborated  at  length  upon 

"Garrison's  Texas,  189. 

20  Butler   to   Forsyth,   June   9,    1835 ;   H.   Ex.   Doc.   256,  24 
Cong.,  i  Scss.,  5. 
*  Butler   to    Forsyth,  June  17,  1835;  MS.,  Archives. 


74  DIPLOMACY    UNDER   TYLER   AND   POLK 

the  grandeur  of  his  country's  destiny,  to  be  achieved 
so  easily.  His  argument  was  backed  by  alleged  copies 
of  his  correspondence  with  Hernandez.  Santa  Anna's 
agent  was  asked  to  state  definitely  what  would  ac 
complish  the  transfer  of  Texas.  Upon  the  assumption 
that  five  millions  would  be  the  consideration,  Hernan 
dez  replied:  "Five  hundred  thousand  judiciously  ap 
plied  will  conclude  the  affair,  and  when  you  think 
proper  to  authorize  me  to  enter  into  the  arrangement, 
depend  on  my  closing  it  to  your  satisfaction."  : 

Upon  the  back  of  this  report  is  the  following  en 
dorsement  in  Jackson's  own  hand:  "Mexico-Texas — 
Nothing  will  be  countenanced  by  the  executive  to  bring 
the  government  under  the  remotest  imputation  of  being 
engaged  in  corruption  or  bribery.  We  have  no  con 
cern  in  the  application  of  the  consideration  to  be  given. 
The  public  functionary  of  Mexico  may  apply  it  as  they 
deem  proper  to  extinguish  private  claims  and  give  us 
the  cession  clear  of  all  incumberence  [sic]  except  the 
grants  which  have  been  complyed  with.  A.  J.  June 

22-35."  - 

Butler  should  have  been  dismissed  from  the  service 
at  once.  Five  years  had  been  wasted  in  attempts  to 
win  over  Mexico  to  a  decision  to  sell  Texas,  and  the 
only  fruit  of  Butler's  negotiations  was  a  cheap  and  low 
plan  of  bribery  with  a  priest  as  a  go-between.  It  was 
the  beginning  of  the  strange  infatuation  which  the 
government  of  the  United  States  had,  that  through 
Santa  Anna's  greed  and  military  necessities  Mexi- 

22  Hernandez    to    Butler,    March    21,    1835.      Copy    enclosed 
in  Butler's  letter  to  Forsyth,  as  above. 

23  Endorsement  of  Jackson  upon  Butler's  letter  as  above. 


MEXICO    AND    TEXAS,     1825-1840  75 

can  territory  might  be  purchased,  an  infatuation 
which  lasted  well  through  the  Mexican  War. 
In  1843,  when  Butler  had  been  charged  by  the 
Whigs  with  having  attempted  to  use  dishonest 
methods  toward  Mexico,  he  appealed  to  Jackson 
to  vindicate  him.  In  his  letter  he  claimed  that  Jack 
son  had  sanctioned  and  then  angrily  denounced  the 
proposed  bribery,  and  afterwards  in  conversation  had 
signified  his  willingness,  provided  the  affair  was  man 
aged  without  his  own  cognizance.2*  Jackson  replied 
to  Butler  that  he  was  a  scamp  and  a  liar.  As  to  what 
took  place  in  the  interview  is  a  question  of  fact 
between  Jackson  and  Butler.  Jackson's  own  words, 
however,  do  not  convey  the  impression  that  he  disap 
proved  of  Butler's  plan,  except  so  far  as  bribery  was 
connected  with  it.  Instead  of  dismissing  the  charge, 
he  was  sent  back  to  Mexico  to  renew  his  efforts  for 
the  cession  of  Texas.  Adams,  upon  examining  But 
ler's  correspondence,  wrote  that  the  letter  of  June  17, 
1835  (in  which  the  bribery  method  was  suggested), 
was  the  passe-partout  of  the  whole  system  pursued 
with  inflexible  perseverance  down  to  the  time  of  Tyler. 
But  even  Jackson  at  last  became  convinced  of  Butler's 
worthlessness,  and  he  was  finally  recalled  after  he  had 
been  instructed  to  press  for  a  cession  of  Texas  and 
California  as  far  north  as  San  Francisco.  Jackson  was 
anxious  that  if  Butler  succeeded  it  should  be  before 
Congress  met  in  December,  1835.  Following  a  long 
silence  on  the  part  of  the  charge,  he  was  removed  and 
Powhatan  Ellis  of  Mississippi  appointed. 

24  Cf.   Dr.  James  Schouler  in  the  Atlantic  Monthly,  February, 
1905,  220. 


76  DIPLOMACY    UNDER   TYI^R    AND    PO^K 

At  this  point  the  course  of  the  relations  with  Mexico 
takes  a  decided  turn.  Nothing  further  is  heard  of  the 
proposal  to  buy  Texas,  for  the  events  which  Jackson 
had  prematurely  foretold  in  1833  were  at  last  at  hand. 
Instead  there  was  assumed  a  bold  and  determined  posi 
tion  upon  the  subject  of  the  claims  of  sundry  American 
citizens  upon  Mexico.  That  these  were  many  and 
aggravated  there  is  no  doubt.  That  in  every  case 
Mexico  had  delayed  or  refused  settlement  is  equally 
true.  But  the  moment  at  which  Mexico  was  hard 
pressed  in  its  effort  to  put  down  the  Texan  war  for 
independence  was  chosen  by  Jackson  to  push  the  claims.' 
Ellis  was  given  a  memorandum  of  these  and  directed 
to  press  for  immediate  settlement.  In  July,  1836,  he 
was  told  that  unless  he  received  satisfactory  assurances 
from  Mexico  within  a  fortnight  thereafter  that  the 
claims  would  be  adjusted,  he  should  demand  his  pass 
ports.25  Ellis  did  as  instructed,  but  not  until  the  fol 
lowing  December.  No  satisfactory  answer  having  then 
been  received  from  Mexico,  he  broke  off  relations 
with  that  government  and  returned  home.26  For  three 
years  thereafter  the  United  States  had  no  minister  at 
the  City  of  Mexico. 

During  Ellis's  unsatisfactory  effort  the  question  of 
the  recognition  of  Texan  belligerency  and  independ 
ence  arose.  Toward  it  Jackson  was  'as  timid  as  he  had 
been  bold  in  pushing  the  collection  of  the  claims. 
Early  in  November,  1835,  Forsyth  outlined  to  Castillo, 

^Forsyth  to  Ellis,  July  30,  1836;  H.  Ex.  Doc.  105,  24 
Cong.,  2  Sess.,  20. 

26  Jackson's  message,  February  6,  1837;  Richardson's 
Messages,  III.,  278;  $.  Ex.  Doc.  160;  H.  Ex.  Doc.  139,  24 
Cong.,  2  Sess. 


MEXICO    AND    TEXAS,     1825-1840  77 

the  Mexican  minister  at  Washington,  the  policy  of 
the  administration  toward  the  contest  in  Texas  as  one 
of  .strict  neutrality ;  the  Mexican  government  was  in 
formed  that  "the  President  looked  with  regret  upon 
the  existing  state  of  affairs  in  Texas,  and  that  in  the 
probable  event  of  a  protracted  war  in  Texas  itself, 
neither  party  could  be  permitted  to  encroach  upon  the 
territorial  limits  of  the  United  States."  3T  At  the  time 
this  note  was  sent  the  Texans  had  little  chance  of 
immediate  success  in  achieving  their  independence. 
Diplomatically  hesitating  to  call  a  spade  a  spade,  For- 
syth  referred  to  the  "existing  state  of  things"  as  a 
"contest"  which  might  ultimately  be  protracted  into  a 
war.  The  victory  of  the  Texans  over  the  Mexican  army 
at  San  Jacinto  and  the  capture  of  Santa  Anna  gave 
a  very  different  status  to  what  Forsyth  had  called  "the 
state  of  things."  On  March  2,  1836,  Texas  formally 
declared  its  independence,  and  a  fortnight  later  a  con 
stitution  was  drawn  up  and  a  government  organized. 
Two  days  after  the  signing  of  the  Texan  declaration 
of  independence,  commissioners  were  sent  to  Washing 
ton,  and  they  left  Texas  before  the  battle  of  San 
Jacinto.  The  news  of  the  victory  reached  Washington 
at  about  the  same  time  as  did  the  Texan  commission 
ers,  George  C.  Childress  and  Robert  Hamilton.  They 
were  welcomed  as  fellow-citizens  rather  than  as  en 
voys  from  a  revolutionary  government.  The  commis 
sioners  at  once  asked  for  recognition  and  for  relations 
with  the  United  States  of  the  most  friendly  character. 
Favorable  to  the  Texan  cause  as  Jackson  was  known 


"Forsyth  to  Butler,  November  9,   1835;  H.  Bx.  Doc.  256, 
24  Cong.,  i  Sess.f  3 


78  DIPLOMACY    UNDER   TYLER   AND   POLK 

to  be,  he  was  very  cautious  about  the  reception,  and 
the  consequent  recognition,  of  Childress  and  Hamilton. 
The  Senate  held  that  under  the  federal  constitution 
there  were  four  ways  of  recognizing  a  power  as  inde 
pendent:  (i)  by  treaty;  (2)  by  the  passage  of  a  law 
regulating  commercial  intercourse;  (3)  by  sending  a 
diplomatic  agent,  properly  accredited,  to  the  new  power ; 
and  (4)  by  the  reception  by  the  President  of  a  diplo 
matic  agent  from  the  new  power.28  Jackson  cautiously 
threw  the  responsibility  of  recognition  upon  Congress, 
> which  took  no  action  until  December,  1836.  When 
Congress  met  it  was  informed  that  the  President  was 
forced  to  pause  in  expressing  the  opinion  that  Texas 
was  capable  of  performing  the  obligations  of  an  in 
dependent  nation.  " Foreign  policy,  the  conventional 
faith  of  nations,  or  the  efforts  of  Mexico,  might  detain 
Texas  lingering  in  her  embryo  state  for  many  years," 
so  Jackson's  confidential  agent  in  Texas,  Henry  M. 
Morfit,  had  reported.  The  glowing  accounts  that  Jack 
son  must  have  hoped  for  were  lacking.  Jackson  in 
formed  Congress  that  "prudence  seemed  to  dictate  i 
that  we  stand  aloof  and  maintain  our  present  attitude,"  ! 
if  not  until  Mexico  itself  or  one  of  the  great  foreign 
powers  should  recognize  the  independence  of  the  new 
government,  at  least  until  the  lapse  of  time  or  the 
course  of  events  should  have  proved  "the  ability  of 
Texas  to  maintain  its  separate  sovereignty."  :  Con- 

28  Clay's  Report  as  Chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations   of  the   Senate,  June    18,    1836;   Senate  Report  406, 
24  Cong.,  i  Sess. 

29  Jackson's     message,     December     21,     1836;     Richardson's 
Messages,  III.,  265.    Extracts  from  Morfit's  report  upon  Texas 
accompanied   the   message. 


MEXICO    AND    TEXAS,     1825-1840  79 

gress,  however,  was  unwilling  to  delay  the  matter. 
An  item  in  the  appropriation  bill  providing  for  the 
salary  of  a  charge  to  Texas  was  passed  on  the  last 
day  of  Jackson's  term.  Jackson's  last  official  act  was 
the  appointment  of  Alcee  La  Branche  of  Louisiana  as 
charge  to  Texas.30  Soon  afterward  the  Texan  com 
missioner  in  Washington  was  received  by  Van  Buren 
and  the  recognition  of  Texan  independence  was  com 
plete. 

From  the  Mexican  legation  at  Washington  came 
a  series  of  complaints  that  the  United  States  had  vio 
lated  its  professed  neutrality  in  permitting  troops  to ' 
be  raised  for  Texan  service  and  in  authorizing  General 
Gaines's  forces  not  only  to  assemble  on  the  line  be 
tween  Louisiana  and  Texas  but  also  to  encroach  upon 
Texan  territory  by  crossing  the  Sabine.31  In  October, 
1836,  Gorostiza,  the  Mexican  minister,  presented  a 
pamphlet  reviewing  the  causes  of  his  protests,  and  de 
manded  his  passports.  "Mexico,"  he  said,  "has  but 
little  to  expect  from  the  United  States,  seeing  that  its 
most  sacred  rights,  as  well  as  its  dearest  and  most  posi 
tive  interests,  are  now  being  sacrificed  to  the  shadow 
of  a  danger  hitherto  imaginary.  Mexico  is  outraged 
and  ruined  from  motives  of  mere  precaution.  (Se 
injuria  a  Mexico  y  se  le  dana  por  mera  precaution.)" 
He  therefore  declared  his  mission  at  an  end.82  Thus 
diplomatic  relations  between  the  United  States  and 
Mexico  were  suspended,  in  Mexico  by  Ellis's  uncom- 

30  Jackson's  message,  March  3,  1837;  ibid.,  III.,  281. 

31 H.  Ex.  Docs.  256,  24  Cong.,  I  Scss.,  and  190,  25  Cong., 
2  Sess. 

32  Gorostiza  to  Dickins,  October  15,  1836;  H.  Ex.  Doc.  190, 
25  Cong.,  2  Sess. 


80  DIPLOMACY  UNDER  TYLER  AND  POLK 

promising  position  upon  the  subject  of  American 
claims,  and  at  Washington  by  Gorostiza's  protests 
against  violations  of  neutrality  by  the  United  States. 
The  United  States  was  thus  led  to  adopt  a  policy  in 
reference  to  Texan  annexation  the  reverse  of  its  course 
since  i825.33  It  was  one  thing  to  scheme  for  the  an 
nexation  of  Texas  while  that  province  was  admittedly 
a  part  of  Mexico.  It  was  quite  another  to  annex  a 
province  in  rebellion,  thereby  precipitating  a  war  with 
Mexico. 

It  is  impossible  to  say  how  much  the  fear  of  war 
"with  Mexico  cooled  Jackson's  ardor  for  annexation. 
Certainly  the  force  of  it  cannot  be  overlooked.34  Nor 
on  the  other  hand  must  one  neglect  the  important  bear 
ing  of  the  slavery  question  upon  the  subject.  As  has 
been  said,  expansion  to  the  southwest  was  hindered  by 
the  question  of  slavery,  which  was  commingled  with  it. 
/The  battle  of  San  Jacinto  resulted  in  the  capture  of 
Santa  Anna,  who  while  in  captivity  agreed  that  the 
war  against  Texas  should  cease,  that  the  Mexican 
troops  should  retire  beyond  the  Rio  Grande,  and  that 
he  would  favor  the  recognition  of  Texas.  In  pur 
suance  of  this  agreement  the  Mexican  army  was  with 
drawn,  but  the  Mexican  government  gave  notice  that 
any  agreement  with  Texas  made  by  Santa  Anna  while 
a  prisoner  was  null  and  void.  Santa  Anna's  appeal 
to  Jackson  for  aid  in  ending  the  contest  between  Mex 
ico  and  Texas  had  the  appearance  of  honesty,85  but 

33  Von   Hoist,   II.,   573-85 :    "A  more   shameless   comedy  of 
neutrality  was  never  played." 

34  Cf.     Garrison   in  American   Historical  Review,   October, 
1904,  81. 

35  Santa    Anna    to    Jackson,    July    4,     1836 ;     Richardson's 
Messages,  III.,  274. 


MEXICO    AND    TEXAS,     1825-1840  8l 

Jackson  declined  to  consider  it  on  account  of  Mexico's 
repudiation  of  Santa  Anna's  act.  "Good  faith  to 
Mexico,"  he  said,  "makes  it  impossible  for  me  to  take 
such  a  step."  !  At  the  time  Jackson's  reply  was  sent, 
the  Texan  commissioners  were  in  Washington  vainly 
attempting  to  hasten  recognition. 

With  recognition  was  inseparably  bound  annexation 
to  the  United  States.  While  the  first  was  delayed,  the 
people  of  Texas  voted  almost  unanimously  for  annex-  * 
ation."  The  Texan  commissioners  reported  that  Jack 
son  was  undoubtedly  in  favor  of  annexation  and  that 
his  administration  would  carry  the  measure  through." 
Jackson's  refusal  to  take  the  initiative  as  to  recognition 
was  a  wet  blanket  to  the  hopes  of  the  commissioners. 
They  did  not  expect  so  "cold-blooded  a  policy  from 
him."  From  Texas  the  commissioners  received  urgent 
instructions  to  push  annexation.  The  terms  of  the 
measure  were  relatively  unimportant,  if  the  result 
could  be  accomplished.  Henderson,  the  Texan  secre 
tary  of  state,  wrote  to  Memucan  Hunt,  who  had  been 
appointed  minister  from  Texas  in  December,  1836, 

38  Jackson  to  Santa  Anna,  September  4,  1836;  ibid.,  275; 
Bancroft's  Texas,  II.,  268  sqq;  Yoakum,  Texas,  II.,  154  sqq. 
Santa  Anna  in  his  autobiography  ("Mi  Historia  Militar  y 
Politica,  1810-1874"  Mexico,  1905,  page  41)  gives  an  account 
of  his  reception  by  Jackson  in  November,  1836,  at  Washing 
ton  :  "El  Presidents  Jackson  manifesto  vivo  empeno  por  el 
termino  de  la  guerra.  Repetia :  'Mexico  reconociendo  la 
independencia  de  Texas  sera  indemnizado  con  seis  millones 
de  pesos.'  Yo  le  contestaba:  al  Congreso  mexicano  pertenece 
unicamente  decidir  esa  cuestion." 

37  There  were  3277  for  and  91  against.  Garrison,  in  article 
cited,  74. 

88  Collingsworth  and  Grayson  to  Burnet,  July  16,  1836 ; 
Catlett  to  Austin,  January  u,  1837;  quoted  by  Garrison. 


82  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND  POLK 

suggesting  that  annexation  be  effected  by  act  of  Con 
gress  instead  of  by  treaty  in  case  he  should  find  that 
a  treaty  of  annexation  might  lack  the  necessary  vote 
in  the  Senate  upon  the  ratification.  This  is  doubtless 
the  first  suggestion  of  the  method  of  annexation  by 
joint  resolution  that  was  afterwards  adopted  when- 
the  Senate  rejected  Calhoun's  treaty  in  June,  1844." 
Hunt,  however,  who  had  to  wait  for  recognition,  was 
forced  to  remain  silent  upon  the  ulterior  question  of 
annexation,  and  when  Jackson  went  out  of  office  the 
annexation  of  Texas  appeared  to  be  indefinitely  post 
poned. 

With  the  accession  of  Van  Buren  began  the  play 
of  diplomacy  that  continued  until  annexation  was 
finally  effected.  This  was  to  force  the  question  of 
annexation  forward  by  arousing  in  the  United  States 
the  fear  that  Great  Britain,  by  recognition  of,  or  by 
commercial  treaties  and  even  alliance  with,  Texas, 
would  control  the  destinies  of  the  Lone  Star  Republic. 
In  the  instructions  in  which  annexation  by  joint  reso 
lution  was  suggested  to  Hunt,  Henderson  stated  that 
"in  the  event  of  [a  refusal  of]  that  government  to 
receive  [Texas]  .  .  .  into  the  Union,  either  as  a 
State  or  as  a  Territory,  it  may  become  necessary  for 
Texas  to  form  a  Treaty  of  Amity  and  Commerce  with 
England  or  some  other  European  power  which  would 
forever  and  entirely  preclude  the  people  of  the  United 
States  from  enjoying  any  of  the  benefits  resulting  to 
Texas." 4  The  negotiation  of  a  commercial  treaty 

"Garrison,  in  article  cited,  78. 

40  Henderson  to  Hunt,  December  31,  1836.     Quoted  by  Gar 
rison,  ibid.,  78. 


MEXICO    AND    TEXAS,     1825-1840  83 

with  Great  Britain,  *  however,  depended  necessarily 
upon  recognition,  and  that  did  not  occur  until  1839, 
during  the  presidency  of  Lamar,  who  was  opposed  to 
annexation  to  the  United  States. 

In  August,  1837,  the  well-known  anxiety  of  the 
Texan  people  for  annexation  was  officially  expressed 
by  Hunt,  who,  after  reviewing  the  history  of  Texas 
and  the  desirability  to  both  the  United  States  and  it 
self  of  its  incorporation  into  the  American  Union, 
urged  the  immediate  discussion  and  negotiation  of  a 
treaty  of  annexation.41  Forsyth  answered  Hunt's  let 
ter  promptly  and  reminded  him  that  the  questions  of 
recognition  and  of  annexation  were  quite  distinct.  As 
to  recognition,  the  United  States  decided  upon  the 
question  of  fact,  and  not  upon  right.  Annexation, 
however,  proceeded  upon  a  different  theory.  "The 
question  of  the  annexation  of  a  foreign  independent 
State  to  the  United  States  had  never  before  been  pre 
sented  to  the  government.  .  .  .  Whether  the  con 
stitution  of  the  United  States  contemplated  the  annex 
ation  of  such  [an  independent]  State  and  if  so,  in  what 
manner  that  object  is  to  be  effected,  are  questions  in 
the  opinion  of  the  President,  it  would  be  inexpedient, 
under  existing  circumstances,  to  agitate.  So  long  as 
Texas  shall  remain  at  war,  while  the  United  States 
are  at  peace  with  her  adversary,  the  proposition  of  the 
Texan  minister  plenipotentiary  necessarily  involves  the 
question  of  war  with  that  adversary.  The  United 
States  are  bound  to  Mexico  by  a  treaty  of  amity  and 
commerce,  which  will  be  scrupulously  observed  on 


41  Hunt  to   Forsyth,   August  4,    1837;   H.   Ex.   Doc.   40,  25 
Cong.,  i  Sets.,  9. 


84  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

their  part,  so  long  as  it  can  be  reasonably  hoped  that 
Mexico  will  perform  her  duties  and  respect  our  rights 
under  it."  " 

Thus  Forsyth  not  only  refused  Hunt's  proposal  for 
annexation,  but  he  declined  holding  out  hopes  of  any 
reversal  of  this  decision.  "The  United  States  might 
justly  be  suspected  of  a  disregard  of  the  friendly  pur 
poses  of  the  compact,  if  the  overture  of  General  Hunt 
were  to  be  even  reserved  for  future  consideration. 
.  The  inducements  .  .  .  [for  annexation] 
powerful  and  mighty  as  certainly  they  are,  are  light 
when  opposed  in  the  scale  of  reason  to  treaty  obliga 
tions  and  respect  for  that  integrity  of  character  by 
which  the  United  States  have  sought  to  distinguish 
themselves."  * 

There  could  be  no  mistake  as  to  the  meaning  of 
Forsyth's  reply;  it  was  a  definite  and  final  refusal  of 
Texan  annexation,  based  upon  the  duties  of  the  United 
States  toward  Mexico.  Ansoh  Jones,  who  succeeded 
Hunt  as  minister  to  the  United  States  the  next  year, 
was  instructed  formally  to  withdraw  the  offer  of  an 
nexation.  Lamar,  an  active  opponent  of  annexation, 
became  president  of  Texas  in  1838,  and  the  Texan 
Congress  ratified  the  withdrawal  of  the  annexation 
proposition.44 

In  Von  Hoist's  history  is  elaborated  an  argument 
to  show  that  it^was  Jackson's  policy,  followed  by  Van 
Buren,  to  provoke  a  war  with  Mexico  upon  the  sub 
ject  of  the  claims,  and  as  a  result  of  this  war  to  annex 


43  Forsyth  to  Hunt,  August  25;*  1837  ;  ibid.,  12. 

"Ibid.,  13. 

"Garrison,  in  article  cited,  96. 


MEXICO    AND    TEXAS,     1825-1840  85 

Texas.  This  idea  had  its  origin  with  John  Quincy 
Adams,  who  gave  utterance  to  it  in  his  long  speech 
delivered  in  the  House  during  the  summer  of  1838. 
Von  Hoist  called  Jackson's  attempt  to  press  the 
payment  of  the  claims  an  "unworthy  hypocritical 
comedy,"  *  as  he  had  characterized  the  administration's 
neutrality  policy  as  a  "shameless  comedy." '  Such 
words  are  obviously  unfair.  Considering  the  public 
sentiment  in  favor  of  the  South  American  revolutions 
of  twenty  years  before  and  that  shown  during  the 
recent  Cuban  insurrection,  Jackson's  attitude  toward 
the  Texan  revolution  appears  to  good  advantage,  for 
which  he  deserves  the  more  credit  because  his  own 
sympathies  and  those  of  a  great  portion  of  the  Ameri 
can  people  were  with  the  Texans.  When  one  considers 
the  speed  with  which  the  United  States  recognized  the 
Republic  of  Panama,  Jackson's  position  becomes  not 
only  creditable  but  commendable.  He  cannot  be 
blamed  for  refusing  to  risk  a  war  with  Mexico.  This 
is  rather  to  his  credit.  If  his  plan  had  been  to  push 
Mexico  into  war  on  account  of  the  claims,  there  was 
nothing  to  hinder  him  from  carrying  it  into  execution. 
Policies  are  like  the  men  who  create  them :  they  are 
neither  wholly  good  nor  wholly  bad.  Jackson's  and 
Van  Buren's  attitude  toward  Texan  annexation  was 
cautious,  prudent,  and  founded  upon  just  principles. 
That  the  tone  adopted  toward  Mexico  upon  the  sub 
ject  of  claims  was  severe  does  not  thereby  convict 
Jackson  and  Van  Buren  of  duplicity,  or  of  hypocrisy, 
or  of  shamelessness.  It  was  hardly  different  from  the 
one  Jackson  adopted  toward  France  upon  the  sub- 

46  Von  Hoist,  II,  597. 
"Ibid.,  II.,  583- 


86  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

ject  of  claims.  For  that  no  criticism  was  made.  That 
many  of  the  claims  urged  against  Mexico  were  ex 
orbitant  and  some  of  them  fraudulent  does  not  change 
the  case.  Some  of  the  claims  were  just  and  of  long 
standing.  It  is  as  much  the  fault  of  the  historian  to 
underestimate  their  importance  as  it  was  the  fault  of 
the  administration  to  overestimate  them.  To  any  one 
who  has  the  slightest  knowledge  of  Spanish-American 
character  it  is  well  known  that  the  traditional  policy 
of  the  Spanish-American  states  is  to  delay  the  admis 
sion  of  any  claims,  and  when,  at  last,  a  claim  is  ad 
mitted,  to  procrastinate  in  payment  as  long  as  patience 
will  permit.  Instead  of  using  the  Mexican  claims  as 
a  cloak  for  war  by  which  annexation  might  be  accom 
plished,  the  reverse  may  be  stated  as  the  truth.  The 
open  refusal  of  the  United  States  to  accept  the  Texan 
offer  of  annexation  put  the  United  States  in  a  position 
where  demand  for  payment  of  its  claims  upon  Mexico 
could  be  made  without  any  suspicion  of  ulterior  motive. 
Ellis  had  demanded  his  passports  in  1836  and 
Gorostiza  left  Washington  soon  after.47  Mexico  then 
made  an  overture  to  the  United  States  for  the  reopen 
ing  of  diplomatic  relations,  and  sent  a  minister,  Mar 
tinez,  to  Washington  who  was  instructed  to  enter  into 
a  treaty  arrangement  for  the  reference  of  the  claims 
to  arbitration.  Mexico's  advance  was  met  by  the  United 
States.  Forsyth  and  Martinez  agreed  to  arbitrate  the 
claims  in  a  treaty  concluded  in  the  spring  of  i839.48 
Jackson's  policy  was  justified  by  its  result. 

47  Robert  Greenhow  was  appointed  bearer  of  despatches  in 
May,  1837.    Martinez  was  in  Washington,  August  13,  1838. 

48  Treaties  and  Conventions  between  the  United  States  and 
Foreign  Powers,  676;  H.  Ex.  Doc.  252,  25  Cong.,  3  Sess. 


MEXICO    AND    TEXAS,     1825-1840  8/ 

The  term  of  Ellis  as  minister  from  the  United  States 
to  Mexico  covered  the  administration  of  Van  Buren 
and  a  part  of  that  of  Tyler,  when  he  was  replaced  by 
Waddy  Thompson  of  South  Carolina.  Ellis's  instruc 
tions  were  to  continue  to  observe  the  neutral  policy 
adopted  by  Jackson.  He  was  to  be  ready  to  interpose 
his  good  offices  between  Mexico  and  Texas,  but  not 
until  Mexico  should  ask  for  them.49 

On  the  part  of  Texas,  the  election  of  Lamar  and  the 
formal  withdrawal  of  the  annexation  proposal  led  into 
new  channels  of  diplomacy.  Hunt  had  warned  For- 
syth  that  it  Texas  were  cast  off  by  the  United  States, 
she  would  turn  for  aid  to  the  powers  of  Europe,  notably 
to  France  and  England,  who,  he  had  no  doubt,  would 
be  glad  to  avail  themselves  of  the  great  advantages 
which  a  generous  commercial  treaty  would  give  them. 
"The  crowned  heads  of  England  and  France,  and  their 
majesties'  ministers,"  he  said,  "will  not  be  altogether 
insensible  to  feelings  of  sympathy  and  regard  for  a 
people  whose  government  is  headed  by  individuals 
boasting  their  descent  from  the  distinguished  races  over 
which  their  majesties  preside." '  Commercial  advan 
tages  were  more  to  be  reckoned  with  than  the  English 
lineage  of  Sam  Houston  or  the  French  ancestry  of 
Mirabeau  B.  Lamar.  The  years  1838  and  1839  saw 
commercial  treaties  ratified  with  both  France  and 
Great  Britain.  At  the  beginning  of  1840  Texas  had 
been  recognized  as  an  independent  nation  by  the  United 
States,  Great  Britain,  France,  Holland  and  Belgium. 
It  was  no  longer  independent  only  in  the  eyes  of  the 

"Forsyth  to  Ellis,  May  3,  1839;  MS.,  Archives. 
50  Hunt  to  Forsyth,   September   12,   1837;  H.  Ex.  Doc.  40, 
25  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  15. 


88  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYI^R   AND   POLK 

United  States.51  Texas  had,  therefore,  a  very  different 
position  from  what  she  had  when  Jackson  went  out  of 
office.  Mexico  refused  to  recognize  Texas,  Spain  had 
refused  for  many  years  to  recognize  Mexico.  It 
is  a  characteristic  of  Spanish  diplomatic  methods, 
as  it  is  a  part  of  the  Spanish  humor,  to  be  oblivious 
of  the  awkward  conditions  of  the  present  and  to  refuse 
to  accept  the  inevitable.  For  four  years  Texas  had 
maintained  her  independence  by  establishing  relations 
with  the  great  powers.  That  Mexico  harassed  her  with 
threatened  invasions  and  guerilla  warfare  added  to 
the  financial  and  political  troubles  of  Texas,  but  it  did 
not  convince  the  world  that  Texas  was  still  de  jure 
any  more  than  she  was  de  facto  an  integral  part  of 
Mexico. 


61  See  the  interesting  and  comprehensive  article  by  J.  L. 
Worley  upon  "The  Diplomatic  Relations  of  England  and  the 
Republic  of  Texas,"  in  the  Quarterly  of  the  Texas  State  His 
torical  Association  for  July,  1905,  especially  pages  1-15  for 
the  events  leading  to  the  recognition  of  Texas  by  Great 
Britain. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND 

MEXICO  DURING  THE  SECRETARYSHIP  OF 

DANIEL  WEBSTER,   1841-1843 

The  desire  for  Texas  was  not  a  mere  creation  of  the 
Tyler  administration.  We  know  that  at  least  a  part 
of  Texas  was,  and  West  Florida  was  not,  a  part  of 
Louisiana,  and  that  Monroe  feared  that  Texas  would 
prove  an  undesirable  addition  to  the  Union,  its  dis 
tance  from  the  center  of  population  tending  to  weak 
ness  rather  than  strength.  Adams's  opposition  to  the 
exclusion  of  Texas  was  expressed  in  his  endeavor  to 
purchase  that  province  from  Mexico.  Jackson,  who 
had  not  only  acquiesced  in  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of 
1819,  but  approved  them,  followed  Adams's  policy 
until  the  revolution  in  Texas  changed  the  whole  com 
plexion  of  the  question  of  annexation.  Mexico  had 
refused  to  sell  Texas.  When  that  state  became  inde 
pendent,  Mexico  gave  notice  that  if  the  United  States 
annexed  it  she  would  declare  war.  Jackson  thereupon 
held  aloof  and  so  did  Van  Buren.  The  stability  of  the 
Texan  government  was  on  trial.  Texas  must  prove 
able  to  maintain  itself.  During  the  years  in  which 
Texas  was  allowed  to  rest,  pending  its  successful  as 
sertion  of  independence,  slavery  had  pushed  to  the 
front  as  the  absorbing  national  issue  through  the  de 
bates  in  Congress  upon  the  right  of  petition  with  which 
the  name  of  John  Quincy  Adams  is  forever  connected. 
The  bitterness  with  which  these  debates  were  con- 


9O  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

ducted  threw  the  pro-slavery  interests  upon  the  de 
fensive.  They  so  remained  until  after  the  defeat  of 
the  Wilmot  Proviso.  Expansion  to  the  southwest  be 
came  iridissolubly  associated  with  slavery  extension. 
The  speeches  of  Adams  and  the  brilliant  although  ar 
gumentative  review  of  the  subject  by  William  Jay  be 
came  the  basis  upon  which  Von  Hoist  built  his  narra 
tive  of  the  Texas  question.  No  one  can  read  Von 
Hoist's  detailed  presentation  of  the  subject  of  annex 
ation  without  being  impressed  by  its  plausibility, 
backed  as  it  is  by  a  mass  of  authorities,  speeches  in 
Congress,  public  documents,  and  extracts  from  party 
newspapers.  At  the  same  time  one  cannot  fail  to  see 
Von  Hoist's  reliance  upon  Adams,  the  most  uncom 
promising  as  well  as  the  most  suspicious  of  antislavery 
statesmen.  That  stupendous  human  document,  the 
diary  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  a  source  of  primary  im 
portance  during  the  whole  period  of  Adams's  political 
life,  becomes  after  1829  a  repository  of  Adams's  caus 
tic  criticism.  No  one  who  differed  from  him  was  given 
the  credit  of  honesty.  Those  who,  like  Webster,  put 
the  Union  above  abolition  and  believed  that  the  carry 
ing  out  of  the  compromises  of  the  Constitution  em 
bodied  the  whole  duty  of  the  American  statesman, 
were  characterized  as  panderers  to  the  vices  of  slavery. 
Thus  Calhoun  was  "the  high  priest  of  Moloch;" 
Tyler,  "the  Virginian  slave  breeder;"  and  Webster 
"the  man  with  a  gigantic  intellect,  an  envious  temper, 
a  ravening  ambition,  and  a  rotten  heart."  3  All  this 
is  interesting,  but  it  is  not  history,  nor  is  it  a  safe 
source  from  which  to  construct  an  historical  narrative. 

xjohn  Quincy  Adams,  Memoirs,  XL,  284. 


WEBSTER  AND   MEXICO,    1841-1843  QI 

Owing  to  the  peculiar  position  in  which  Tyler  found 
himself  as  a  president  without  a  party,  every  act  of 
his  became  food  for  suspicion.  Even  the  negotiations 
of  which  the  Ashburton  treaty  was  the  successful  out 
come,  unquestionably  pursued  in  good  faith,  were  said 
to  have  been  conducted  for  the  purpose  of  clearing  the 
ground  for  pro-slavery  expansion.2 

As  early  as  October,  1841,  upon  the  reorganization 
of  his  cabinet,  Tyler  expressed  to  Webster  his  views 
upon  the  annexation  of  Texas.  "I  gave  you  a  hint 
as  to  the  possibility  of  acquiring  Texas  by  treaty.  I 
verily  believe  it  could  be  done,  could  the  North  be 
reconciled  to  it ;  would  anything,"  he  asked,  "throw 
so  bright  a  lustre  around  us?  It  seems  to  me  that  the 
great  interests  of  the  north  would  be  incalculably 
advanc'd  by  such  an  acquisition.  Slavery — I  know 
that  is  the  objection,  and  it  would  be  well  founded  if 
it  did  not  already  exist,  among  us,  but  my  belief  is 
that  a  rigid  enforcement  of  the  laws  against  the  slave 
trade,  would  in  time  make  as  many  free  States  south 
as  the  acquisition  of  Texas  would  add  of  slave  states, 
and  then  the  future,  (distant  it  might  be),  would  pre 
sent  wonderful  results."  :  Webster's  opposition  to  an 
nexation,  however,  was  well  known,4  and  during  his 
period  of  service  under  Tyler  no  attempt  was  made  by 
the  President  to  force  his  pro-annexation  views  upon 
his  secretary  of  state.5  How  much  Tyler's  inaction 

J  William  Jay,  A  Review  of  the  Causes  and  Consequences 
of  the  Mexican  War,  87. 

3  Tyler  to  Webster,  October  n,  1841;  Van  Tyne's  Letters 
of  Daniel  Webster,  240. 

4Ctirtis's  Webster,  I,  560-70. 

•Ibid.,  II.,  227. 


92  DIPLOMACY   UNDE)R  TYLER   AND   POLK 

was  due  to  deference  for  Webster,  who  was  engaged 
with  England  at  first  over  the  McLeod  case  and 
finally  in  the  Ashburton  negotiation,  it  is  difficult  to 
say.  Delay  was,  however,  prudent  for  several  rea 
sons  :  the  importance  of  the  pending  negotiation  with 
England;  the  objection  in  the  North  to  southern  ex 
pansion,  which  Tyler  recognized ;  the  opposition  to  an 
nexation  on  the  part  of  the  Texan  executive,  Lamar ; 
and  the  fear  that  annexation  would  be  followed  by  a 
declaration  of  war  by  Mexico  against  the  United 
States.  As  Tyler's  term  proceeded  these  causes  for 
delay  disappeared  one  by  one. 

Mexico  had  been  quiescent  toward  Texas  for  four 
years  and  more.  The  war  between  Mexico  and  her 
revolted  province  resembled  that  between  Spain  and  the 
Spanish-American  states  in  the  twenties.  War  existed, 
but  it  was  not  prosecuted.  Technically  there  was  a 
state  of  war;  actually  there  was  nothing  more  than  a 
succession  of  threats.  Texas,  although  financially  de 
pressed  and  burdened  with  debt,  had  managed  to  main 
tain  herself  for  five  years  and  had  won  not  only  recog 
nition  but  a  position  of  commercial  importance  in  the 
eyes  of  the  United  States  an  i  Europe.  Her  independ- 
en  e  was  a  fact  a  In.i'^vi  by  1  the  world  save  Mexico. 
S  'i  being  the  cab  *.  he  re  ons  between  Texas  and 
tl  Jnited  States  L.O  Id  not  legally  concern  Mexico. 
]\  co  might  protest  against  annexation, }  she  n\.  ght 
(  are  war  against  the  United  States  werq-j annex  ,  k);L 
(  tnsummated,  but  the  moral  basis  of  a  beviVerentj  ., 

ade  that  she  had  justly  in  1836  was  lot,  afte*  .e 
fi-vt  years  of  Texan  independence  and  her  impotent 
Attempt  at  the  subjugation  of  her  revoked  province. 

'he   fears   of   war,   whicr1^   Jackson   and   Van   Buren 


WEBSTER  AND   MEXICO,    1841-1843  93 

rightly  measured,  ceased  to  be  a  controlling  factor  after 
so  long  a  period  of  waiting.  The  administration  of 
Lamar  ended  and  Houston,  who  had  proposed  annex 
ation  in  1837,  was  again  president  of  Texas.  Thus 
another  cause  for  inaction  was  removed.  With  the 
ratification  of  the  Ashburton  treaty  and  the  resigna 
tion  of  Webster  as  secretary  of  state  another  hindrance 
disappeared.  There  remained  but  to  win  over  the 
Senate  to  the  policy  of  annexation  and  Tyler  would 
have  the  credit  of  doing  what  Adams  and  Jackson 
had  failed  to  do.  It  was  upon  the  support  of  the 
Senate,  that  annexation  was  to  hang.  Perhaps  it  was 
due  to  the  accident  upon  the  Princeton  (in  which  the 
secretary  of  state  and  other  officers  of  the  government 
were  killed)  and  the  appointment  of  Calhoun  in  the 
place  of  Upshur  that  the  Texan  treaty  of  annexation 
failed  in  the  Senate.  Tyler's  plans  were  not  based 
upon  such  an  unforeseen  and  disastrous  accident.  This, 
however,  is  somewhat  in  advance  of  the  story.  Be 
fore  Webster  resigned  and  the  annexation  question 
was  pushed  to  the  fore,  there  were  certain  incidents 
of  considerable  importance  in  the  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  Mexif,.pr  r  r  ,.jrp  ^ 

The  first  was  the  ns  itiaciw^  .fv^r  the  release  •.  ',  a 
number  of  American  ci(  .ens,  i!  .embers  of  the  ill-'  id 
Sai  :a  Fe  expedition  of  1841,  who  had  been  cap'  ;d 
r?'  were  'ield  as  prisoners  of  war.  The  ^econdhuts 
•  eopei  ;  g  of  the  question  of  claims,  into  which  tbit 
c  .  tne  ac  lisition  of  California  was  interjected.  TJ  <e 
third  was  closely  connected  with  the  second:  the  vio 
lation  of  Mexican  territory  by  the  capture  of  Montere" 

-p 

In  Upper  California  by  Co  nmodore  Jones. 


94  DIPLOMACY    UNDER  TYI^R   AND   POLK 

While  Texas  had  ever  since  its  independence  laid 
claim  as  far  as  the  Rio  Grande,  no  authority  had  been 
exercised  over  the  territory  west  of  the  Nueces.  Under 
President  Lamar  the  Texan  army  had  been  disbanded 
for  lack  of  funds  with  which  to  maintain  it.  By  an 
irregular  proceeding  Lamar  authorized  members  of 
the  Texan  army  to  organize  an  expedition  to  go  over- 
land  to  Santa  Fe  for  the  purpose  of  winning  New 
Mexico  for  Texas  and  of  extending  the  authority  of 
Texas  west  of  the  Nueces.  The  expedition,  consist 
ing  of  about  three  hundred  men,  enrolled  in  addition 
to  those  who  had  taken  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  Texas- 
a  number  of  Americans  and  subjects  of  European 
powers.  The  expedition  fared  disastrously.  Six  mem 
bers  were  taken  prisoners  and  driven  overland  some 
two  thousand  miles  to  the  City  of  Mexico,  there  to  be 
held  as  prisoners  of  war.  Among  them  was  George 
M.  Kendall,  editor  of  the  New  Orleans  Picayune, 
whose  narrative  of  the  expedition  is  of  fascinating 
interest  as  a  graphic  account  of  border  adventure.' 
Kendall  and  the  other  Americans  insisted  that  they 
were  not  in  any  sense  identified  with  the  expedition 
in  so  far  as  it  had  any  hostile  purpose  toward  Mexico. 
They  claimed  to  be  traveling  for  pleasure,  or  else  that 
they  were  only  traders.  As  soon  as  the  capture  of 
these  men  was  reported  to  Ellis,  the  American  minister 
at  Mexico,  he  demanded  their  freedom,  claiming  that 
they  should  not  be  held  as  prisoners  of  war  as  they 
were  non-combatants  and  had  no  connection  with  the 
alleged  political  purposes  of  the  expedition.  Ellis  de- 

'  Kendall's  Santa  Fe  Expedition;  Yoakum's  Texas,  II.,  321- 
31;  Bancroft's  North  Mexican  States  and  Texas,  II.,  334-37; 
Waddy  Thompson's  Recollections,  passim. 


WEBSTER  AND   MEXICO,    1841-1843  95 

manded  the  release  of  the  prisoners  as  a  right.  Santa 
Anna's  government  availed  itself  of  the  opportunity 
for  delay  that  the  discussion  of  the  alleged  right 
afforded.  Mexico  claimed  that  even  if  the  prisoners 
were  non-combatants  they  had  violated  a  law  of  Mex 
ico  which  forbade  any  entrance  into  the  province  of 
New  Mexico  from  Texas,  and  that  the  Americans 
were  like  Old  Dog  Tray,  in  bad  company,  on  account 
of  which  they  should  rightly  suffer.  The  discussion 
was  prolonged  until  Ellis  received  word  that  Tyler 
had  appointed  Waddy  Thompson  in  his  place.  What 
Santa  Anna  had  refused  as  a  right  he  conceded  as 
a  matter  of  courtesy.  Ellis's  departure  was  the  occa 
sion  for  Santa  Anna's  promise  that  Kendall  and  his 
companions  would  be  freed.  Soon  after  Thompson's 
arrival  the  prisoners  were  set  at  liberty.  All  this  was 
effected  by  Ellis,  who  was  content  to  drop  the  argu 
ment  if  the  object  of  it  was  attained.7  Before  the  news 
of  the  prisoners'  release  reached  Washington,  Webster 
had  penned  a  long  protest  in  which  he  argued  that 
Kendall  and  his  friends  were  held  in  violation  of  all 
justice ;  that  the  manner  of  their  incarceration  was  con 
trary  to  the  common  dictates  of  humanity;  and  that 
unless  the  release  of  tfie  prisoners  was  made  within 
ten  days  after  it  was  demanded,  all  intercourse  with 
Mexico  would  be  suspended.  This  letter  of  Webster's 
finds  a  place  in  his  published  works.  Its  contents 
were  not  made  known  to  the  Mexican  government, 
the  prisoners  being  at  liberty  before  Webster's  caustic 
letter  was  received  at  Mexico. 

It  will  be   remembered  that  through   Forsyth  and 

TH.  Hx.  Doc.  271,  and  5*.  Ex.  Doc.  325,  27  Cong.,  2  Sess. 


96  DIPLOMACY  UND£R  TYI^R  AND  POLK 

Martinez  a  convention  had  been  arranged  for  the  set 
tlement  of  the  claims  of  American  citizens  against 
Mexico  through  the  arbitration  commission.  When 
this  treaty  had  finally  been  ratified,  April  7,  1840,  and 
the  necessary  acts  of  Congress  passed  to  carry  it  into 
effect,  the  year  1841  was  almost  ended.  Much  time 
was  lost  in  discussion  of  the  methods  to  be  pursued 
by  the  commission,  and  the  period  during  which  it  was 
to  sit  expired  with  many  claims  still  uriconsidered.8 
Webster  proceeded  to  urge  the  settlement  of  these 
passed  claims,  together  with  a  large  number  of  addi 
tional  ones  which  had  never  been  presented  for  arbi 
tration.  It  should  be  stated  that  the  really  valid  claims 
were  admitted  by  the  commission.  Much  doubt  may 
be  cast  upon  those  that  were  rejected  and  also  upon 
those  presented  too  late  for  consideration.  Before 
anything  had  come  of  the  matter,  Mexico  blazed  up 
with  threats  of  the  subjugation  of  Texas  and  the  vigor 
ous  prosecution  of  the  war.  Having  at  this  time  no 
minister  in  residence  at  Washington,  the  Mexican  sec 
retary  for  foreign  affairs  sent  through  an  unaccredited 
person  in  New  York  9  a  protest  against  the  assistance 
that  citizens  of  the  United  States  had  been  allowed 
to  give  Texas  through  the  failure  to  enforce  the  neu 
trality  laws.  The  government  of  the  Mexican  Repub 
lic  protests  "solemnly  against  the  aggressions  which 
the  citizens  of  those  states  are  constantly  repeating 
upon  the  Mexican  territory,"  and  declares  that  "it 
considers  as  a  violation  of  the  treaty  of  amity  the 

*  H.  Ex.  Doc.  291;  H.  Report  1096;  S.  Ex.  Docs.  320  and 
411,  27  Cong.,  2  Sess. 

9Joaquin  Velazquez  de  Leon  to  Webster,  June  24,  1842; 
Webster's  Diplomatic  and  Official  Papers,  301. 


WEBSTER  AND   MEXICO,    1841-1843  97 

toleration  of  a  course  of  conduct  which  produces  an 
incomprehensible  state  of  things,  a  state  neither  of 
peace  nor  war,  but  inflicting  upon  Mexico  the  same 
injuries  and  inconveniences  as  if  war  had  been  de 
clared  between  the  two  nations."  3  Tyler  characterized 
Bocanegra's  note  as  impudent  and  deserving  of  a 
severe  answer.11  Webster  answered  it  through  Thomp 
son,  who  had  succeeded  Ellis  as  minister  to  Mexico. 
After  a  long  review  of  the  history  of  the  struggle  be 
tween  Texas  and  Mexico,  Webster  denied  that  the 
United  States  had  permitted  any  breaches  of  neutral 
ity.  Then  he  used  a  direct  threat,  the  harshness  of  the 
tone  of  which  comes  out  in  strong  relief  when  it  is 
recalled  that  at  the  time  he  was  writing  it  he  had  in 
contemplation  a  plan  for  the  acquisition  of  California 
by  pressure  on  Mexico  through  the  claims.  "Mr.  de 
Bocanegra,"  he  wrote  Thompson,  "is  pleased  to  say 
that,  if  war  existed  between  the  two  countries,  proceed 
ings  more  hostile,  on  the  part  of  the  United  States 
could  not  have  taken  place.  .  .  .  This  opinion, 
however  hazardous  to  the  discernment  and  just 
estimate  of  things  of  those  who  avow  it,  is 
yet  abstract  and  theoretical,  and  so  far  harmless. 
The  efficiency  of  American  hostility  to  Mexico 
has  never  been  tried;  the  government  has  no 
desire  to  try  it.  It  would  not  disturb  the  peace  for 
the  sake  of  showing  how  erroneously  Mr.  de  Bocane 
gra  has  reasoned;  while  on  the  other  hand  it  trusts 
that  a  just  hope  may  be  entertained  that  Mexico  will 
not  inconsiderately  and  needlessly  hasten  into  an  ex 
periment  by  which  the  truth  or  fallacy  of  his  sentiments 

"Bocanegra  to  Webster,  May  12,   1842;  ibid.,  302. 
"Tyler  to  Webster;  Tyler's  Tylers,  II.,  258. 


98  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYI^R   AND   POLK 

may  be  brought  to  an  actual  ascertainment. 
The  United  States  desires  peace.  It  would  be 
with  infinite  pain  that  they  should  find  them 
selves  in  hostile  relations  with  any  of  the  new 
governments  on  this  Continent.  But  their  Gov 
ernment  is  regulated,  limited,  full  of  the  spirit 
of  liberty,  but  surrounded  nevertheless  with  just  re 
straints;  and  greatly  and  fervently  as  it  desires  peace 
with  all  states,  and  especially  with  its  more  immediate 
neighbors,  yet  no  fear  of  a  different  state  of  things 
can  be  allowed  to  interrupt  its  course  of  equal  and 
exact  justice  to  all  nations,  nor  to  jostle  it  out  of  the 
constitutional  orbit  in  which  it  revolves." "  This 
reply  was  but  a  threat.  Webster  said  in  effect: 
"Mexico  thinks  she  has  suffered  as  much  as  she  would 
have  done  had  war  actually  occurred  between  her  and 
the  United  States.  Let  her  take  care  to  act  in  such 
a  fashion  that  she  will  never  have  to  learn  how  erro 
neous  that  opinion  is."  Before  Webster's  reply  reached 
Mexico,  Bocanegra  issued  a  circular  note  to  the  diplo 
matic  corps  residing  in  Mexico  in  which  he  protested 
against  the  violations  of  neutrality  that  the  United 
States  had  tolerated,  and  announced  that  Mexico, 
though  not  willing  "to  disturb  the  relations  which  she 
still  preserves  with  the  United  States,  will  assert  and 
maintain  the  justice  of  her  cause,  which  she  considers 
to  be  based  on  the  law  of  nations,  by  doing  all  that 
is  imperiously  required  for  her  honor  and  dignity."  ] 

12  Webster  to  Thompson,  July  8,  1842 ;  Webster's  Diplomatic 
and  Official  Papers,  304-15. 

18  Bocanegra  to  the  Diplomatic  Corps  residing  in  Mexico, 
May  31,  1842;  H.  Ex.  Doc.  266,  27  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  19.  Thomp 
son  to  the  Diplomatic  Corps;  ibid.,  21. 


WEBSTER  AND   MEXICO,    1841-1843  99 

The  purpose  that  animated  Santa  Anna  in  author 
izing  this  bold  manifesto  is  not  clear,  but  it  is  probable 
that  the  circular  was  intended  to  offset  the  force  of 
the  understanding  between  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  that  the  Ashburton-Webster  negotia 
tions  seemed  to  imply.  Thompson  believed  that  certain 
members  of  the  diplomatic  corps  had  instigated  Bo- 
canegra's  action.  The  Mexican  notes  to  Webster  and 
the  circular  to  the  diplomatic  corps,  which  stated  in 
substance  that  if  the  United  States  continued  to  tolerate 
what  Mexico  viewed  as  violations  of  neutrality  Mexico 
would  declare  war,  created  a  great  sensation  in  the 
United  States.  Newspapers  in  all  sections  of  the 
country  declared  that  war  with  Mexico  was  inevitable, 
that  Santa  Anna  had  declared  conditional  war.  There 
is  no  evidence  that  Tyler  or  Webster  believed  that 
Santa  Anna's  threat  would  be  carried  out.  Thomp 
son's  reports  made  light  of  the  danger,  and  no  more 
was  heard  of  the  question  until  Commodore  Jones, 
stationed  with  his  small  squadron  off  the  coast  of 
Chile,  read  about  Mexico's  conditional  declaration  of 
war  in  months-old  newspapers  which  foretold  imme 
diate  hostilities  with  Mexico.  Meanwhile  that  country 
had  recovered  from  its  bad  temper,  and  in  the  fall  of 
1842  sent  a  minister  to  Washington,  General  Almonte, 
the  first  to  hold  such  a  position  since  Gorostiza  had 
demanded  his  passports  in  1837. 

These  details  of  diplomacy  are  rendered  necessary 
because  the  charge  has  been  made  that  Tyler's  admin 
istration  desired  to  push  Mexico  into  a  declaration  of 
war.  The  same  charge  was  made  against  Jackson. 
During  Webster's  term  as  secretary  of  state  every 
effort  was  directed  to  the  prevention  of  war.  Mexico 


IOO  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

was  told  that  "the  war  against  Texas  was  not  only 
useless,  but  hopeless,  without  attainable  object,  injuri 
ous  to  both  parties,  and  likely  to  be  in  its  continuance, 
annoying  and  vexatious  to  other  commercial  nations."  ' 
All  of  this  was  true,  but  further  he  did  not  go  save 
once  in  the  threat  made  through  Thompson.  When 
Almonte  arrived  in  Washington  the  relations  between 
the  two  countries  were  in  better  condition,  with  less 
open  friction,  than  they  had  been  since  the  battle  of 
San  Jacinto. 

The  method  of  publishing  diplomatic  correspondence 
in  vogue  at  that  day  was  by  a  communication  to  Con 
gress  upon  the  call  of  either  house.  How  much  should 
be  printed  rested  usually  in  the  discretion  of  the  Execu 
tive.  Extracts  were  frequently  printed,  when  the 
whole  letter,  if  known  to  the  world,  might  have  had 
an  embarrassing  effect.  It  was  usual,  however,  but 
by  no  means  the  rule,  to  indicate  what  parts  of  the  cor 
respondence  sent  to  Congress  were  extracts  and  what 
were  full  letters.  The  first  despatch  from  Thompson, 
dated  April  29,  1842,  was  read  by  Webster  May  30, 
not  long  before  Bocanegra's  note  as  above  quoted  was 
received.  Upon  a  call  of  the  Senate  Tyler  sent  the 
parts  of  Thompson's  letter  upon  the  subject  of  the 
Santa  Fe  prisoners.  Nothing  in  it  showed  that  a  part 
had  been  left  out,  yet  a  long  argument  by  Thompson  for 
the  acquisition  of  California  was  omitted.  "I  believe," 
wrote  Thompson,  "that  this  government  would  cede  to 
us  Texas  and  the  Californias,  and  I  am  thoroughly 
satisfied  that  this  is  all  we  shall  ever  get  for  the  claims 
of  our  merchants  in  this  country.  As  to  Texas,  I  re- 

14  Webster   to   Thompson,    June   22,    1842;    MS.,   Archives. 


WEBSTER  AtfD  MEXICO,    1841-1843  IOI 

gard  it  as  of  but  little  value  compared  with  California, 
the  richest,  the  most  beautiful,  and  the  healthiest  coun 
try  in  the  world.  Our  Atlantic  border  secures  us  a 
commercial  ascendency  there.  With  the  acquisition  of 
Upper  California,  we  should  have  the  same  ascendency 
on  the  Pacific.  The  Harbor  of  San  Francisco  is  ca 
pacious  enough  to  receive  the  navies  of  the  world.  In 
addition  to  which  California  is  destined  to  be  the  gran 
ary  of  the  Pacific.  It  is  a  country  in  which  slavery 
is  not  necessary  and  therefore,  if  that  is  made  an  ob 
jection,  let  there  be  another  compromise.  France  and 
England  both  have  had  their  eyes  upon  it.  The  latter 
has  yet.  I  am  profoundly  satisfied  that  in  its  bearing 
upon  all  the  interests  of  our  country,  the  importance 
of  the  acquisition  of  California  cannot  be  overesti 
mated."  :  Writing  privately  to  Tyler  soon  afterwards, 
Thompson  begged  for  special  instructions  both  as  to 
moving  in  the  matter  and  as  to  the  extent  to  which  he 
was  to  go  in  the  negotiation  and  the  amount  to  be  paid. 
The  acquisition  of  California,  he  said,  would  reconcile 
the  northern  people,  as  they  had  large  fishing  and 
commercial  interests  in  the  Pacific,  and  we  had  liter 
ally  no  port  there.16  Webster  received  Thompson's 
plea  for  the  annexation  of  California  favorably.  "In 
seeking  acquisitions  to  be  governed  as  territories,  and 
lying  at  great  distance  from  the  United  States,"  he 
wrote,  "we  ought  to  be  governed  by  our  pruaence  and 
caution,  and  a  still  higher  degree  of  tbese  qualities 
should  be  exercised  when  large  territorial  acquisitions' 
are  looked  for,  with  a  view  to  annexation.  Neverthe- 

15  Thompson   to    Webster,   April   29,    1842;    MS., 
See  Waddy  Thompson's  Recollections. 
14  Thompson  to  Tyler,  May  9,  1842;   MS.,  Archives. 


IO2  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYI^R  AND   POI,K 

less,  the  benefits  of  a  good  harbour  on  the  Pacific  are 
so  obvious,  that  to  that  extent  at  least  the  President 
strongly  inclines  to  favor  the  idea  of  a  treaty  with 
Mexico."  ]  Webster  thereupon  suggested  connecting 
the  claims  with  the  negotiation  for  California  (a  plan 
which  Polk  afterward  pursued),  or  at  least  for  the  port 
of  San  Francisco.  England,  he  believed,  would  not 
hinder  the  United  States.  "You  will  proceed  in  this 
matter  very  cautiously  and  quite  informally,  seeking 
rather  to  lead  the  Mexican  Secretary  to  talk  on  the 
subject,  than  to  lead  directly  to  it  yourself.  You  will 
be  particularly  careful  not  to  suffer  the  Mexican  Gov 
ernment  to  suppose  that  it  is  an  object  upon  which 
we  have  set  our  hearts,  or  for  the  sake  of  which  we 
should  be  willing  to  make  large  remuneration.  The 
cession  must  be  spoken  of  rather  as  a  convenience  to 
Mexico,  or  a  mode  of  discharging  her  debts." 

Tyler's  inclination  for  California  led  no  further  than 
the  writing  of  Webster's  letter  to  Thompson  and  the 
sounding  of  Great  Britain  upon  the  question  of  the 
acquisition  of  California  by  the  United  States.  Web 
ster  instructed  Everett  to  make  informal  overtures  to 
Her  Majesty's  government  "for  the  settlement  of  the 
Oregon  question,  and  the  matters  in  dispute  between 
Mexico  and  the  United  States  by  a  tripartite  arrange 
ment  which  should,  as  one  provision,  embrace  a  ces 
sion 'to  the  United  States  of  the  port  of  San  Francisco 
on  the,  coast  of  California."  Lord  Aberdeen  informed 
Everett  that  "though  the  Queen's  Government  would 
not  deem  it  expedient  to  become  a  party  to  any  such 

17  Webster  to  Thompson,  June  27,  1842 ;  Van  Tyne's  Letters 
of  Daniel  Webster,  269. 


WEBSTER  AND   MEXICO,    1841-1843  IO3 

arrangement,  they  had  not  the  slightest  objection  to 
our  making  an  acquisition  of  territory  in  that  direc 
tion."  ]  The  government  at  Washington  learned  early 
in  1843  that  Commodore  Jones  (who  two  years  before 
had  been  placed  in  command  of  the  Pacific  squadron) 
had  seized  Monterey  in  California  under  the  false 
impression  that  war  existed  between  the  United  States 
and  Mexico.  This  Montery  incident,  partaking  much 
of  the  character  of  opera  bouffe,  has  doubtless  had  more 
attention  paid  to  it  than  its  intrinsic  importance  de 
mands.  Adams  told  Webster  that  he  believed  it  to 
be,  along  with  the  question  of  the  right  of  search, 
the  bill  for  the  occupation  of  Oregon,  and  all  the 
movements  for  the  annexation  of  Texas,  part  of  one 
great  system  looking  for  a  war  for  conquest  and  plun 
der  from  Mexico,  and  a  war  with  England  and  an  alli 
ance  with  France.1"  The  Monterey  question  was  no 
part  of  any  preconceived  plan,  for  it  effectually  put 
a  stop  to  Thompson's  negotiation  for  the  acquisition 
of  California  in  exchange  for  the  claims  against 
Mexico. 

Jones's  orders,  which  had  been  issued  in  December, 
1841,  can  by  no  possible  argument  be  construed  as 
giving  authority  for  any  aggressive  measures  toward 

18  Everett  to  Calhoun,  March  28,  1845 ;  MS.,  Archives.   Web 
ster's   instructions   to   which   Everett   referred   do   not   appear 
in  the  State  Department  files.     Everett  believed  that  Mexico 
might  sell  California  because  Bunsen  told  him  that  Mexico 
had  previously  offered  it  to  Prussia. 

19  John  Quincy  Adams,  Memoirs,  XL,  346.     Webster  denied 
it.      Certainly    Aberdeen's    attitude    toward    the    purchase    of 
California  by  the  United  States  gave  no  basis  for  the  belief 
that  Webster  looked  for  war  with  England.     Von  Hoist  (II., 
615)   quotes  Adams's  charge  but  omits  Webster's  denial. 


IO4  DIPLOMACY    UND£R   TYI^R   AND   POLK 

Mexico.  On  the  contrary,  while  he  was  instructed  to 
cruise  along  the  coast  of  California  and  to  explore 
its  bays  and  harbors,  he  was  cautioned  to  exercise 
great  prudence  and  discretion  "in  avoiding  all  occa 
sions  of  exciting  the  jealousy  of  either  of  the  Powers 
having  possessions  or  claims  in  that  quarter,  with 
whom  the  United  States  are,  and  desire  to  continue, 
at  peace."  : 

In  September,  1842,  Jones's  squadron  was  at  Callao. 
A  British  fleet  left  that  port  under  sealed  orders. 
Jones  believed  that  it  had  sailed  for  California.  "The 
Creole  affair,  the  question  of  the  right  of  search,  the 
mission  of  Lord  Ashburton,  the  sailing  of  a  strong 
squadron  from  France  under  sealed  orders,  for  the 
military  occupation,  as  it  now  appears,  of  the  Mar 
quesas  and  Washington  Islands ;  new  difficulties  be 
tween  the  United  States  and  Mexico,  the  well-founded 
rumor  of  a  cession  of  the  Californias  [to  England] 
and  lastly  the  secret  movements  of  the  English  naval 
force  in  this  quarter,  have  all  occurred  since  the  date 
of  your  last  order  to  me.  Consequently  I  am  without 
instructions,  or  the  slightest  intimation  as  to  your 
views  and  wishes  upon  what  I  consider  as  a  vital 
question  to  the  United  States — the  occupation  of  Cali 
fornia  by  Great  Britain  under  a  secret  treaty  with 
Mexico."  *  At  first  sight  Jones's  action  was  an  inde 
fensible  outrage  which  had  its  incentive  in  his  desire 
as  a  southerner  to  conquer  California  and  to  extend 
the  area  of  slavery.  A  reading  of  his  correspondence, 
however,  tempers  one's  judgment  of  the  man  and  of  his 

20  H.  Ex.  Doc.  166,  27  Cong.,  3  Sets.,  46,  48. 

21  Jones  to  Upshur,  September  13,  1842;  ibid.,  68. 


AND   MEXICO,    1841-1843  IO5 

deeds.  Rumors  of  a  secret  cession  of  California  to 
England  were  of  long  standing.22  It  was  openly  stated 
that  Mexico  had  mortgaged  California  to  secure  a 
large  loan.  Such  indeed  was  not  the  case,  but  the 
repeated  rumor  was  calculated  to  operate  upon  Jones's 
judgment.  The  account  of  Bocanegra's  circular  to  the 
diplomatic  corps,  as  given  in  American  newspapers, 
reached  Jones  months  after  the  incident  had  closed. 
At  such  a  distance  from  home  and  without  instructions, 
Jones  decided  to  crowd  all  sail  to  California,  to  frus 
trate  the  British  fleet  and,  believing  that  war  would 
be  the  inevitable  result  of  Bocanegra's  circular,  to  take 
possession  of  Monterey,  the  capital  of  Mexico's  pro 
vince.  Jones's  judgment  was,  as  the  sequel  showed, 
faulty,  but  had  he  been  right  in  his  conjecture  he 
might  have  been  a  precursor  of  Dewey :  the  conqueror 
of  California  and  a  hero  in  our  naval  history.  The 
commodore  appeared  off  Monterey  October  19.  He 
found  no  British  vessels  in  the  harbor.  The  dilapidated 
"castle,"  mounting  a  few  old  guns,  made  no  hostile 
front.  Jones  demanded  the  surrender  of  the  town  and 
province.  Without  the  firing  of  a  shot,  the  Mexican 
flag  was  lowered  and  the  American  flag  raised.  That 
night  Larkin,  a  merchant  of  Monterey,  and  afterwards 
American  consul  (and  an  active  agent  in  the  final 
conquest  of  California),  showed  Jones  that  more  re 
cent  advices  demonstrated  that  the  United  States  and 
Mexico  were  still  at  peace.  Jones  acted  promptly, 
lowered  the  American  flag,  raised  and  saluted  that  of 
Mexico,  and  departed.  He  was  now  aware  of  the  risk 

"Ashburton  wrote  to  Webster,  April  28,  1844,  that  he  be 
lieved  Great  Britain  never  dreamed  of  acquiring  California. 
Webster's  Private  Correspondence,  II.,  192. 


IO6  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND 

he  had  assumed.  In  his  report  upon  the  affair  he 
said :  "I  may  be  wrong  in  all  my  deductions  and  con 
clusions.  If  so,  I  may  forfeit  my  commission  and  all 
that  I  have  acquired  in  seven  and  thirty  years'  devotion 
to  my  country's  service.  Terrible  as  such  a  conse 
quence  would  be  to  me  and  my  family,  it  was  not  suf 
ficient  to  deter  me  from  doing  what  I  believed  to  be 
my  duty,  when  a  concatenation  of  unforeseen  and 
unforeseeable  events  rendered  prompt  and  energetic 
action  necessary  for  the  honor  and  interest  of  my 
country  v  Come  what  will,  I  have  the  proud  satisfac 
tion  of  believing,  that  however  severely  my  judgment 
may  be  condemned,  no  one  will  question  the  motives 
which  impelled  me  to  action."  : 

Upon  the  receipt  of  the  news  of  Jones's  ill-advised 
action,  the  secretary  of  the  navy  recalled  him  from  his 
command.  He  returned  to  Washington  for  an  inquiry 
and  was  temporarily  suspended  from  the  service. 

Thompson  at  Mexico,  without  waiting  for  instruc 
tions  upon  the  subject,  disavowed  Jones's  act  and 
promised  complete  reparation  for  all  injuries  done. 
After  some  correspondence  between  Thompson  and 
Bocanegra  at  Mexico  and  between  Webster  and  Al 
monte  at  Washington,  the  matter  was  adjusted.  Al 
monte  demanded  Jones's  punishment  for  the  "inaudito 
atentado"  against  Mexico.24  Webster  apologized  for 
the  affront  to  the  dignity  of  Mexico,  and  expressed  the 
great  regret  of  the  President  at  what  had  happened 
and  the  conviction  that  "no  such  unfortunate  and  un- 

23  Jones   to   the   Secretary   of  the   Navy,   October   24,    1842; 
H.  Ex.  Doc.  166,  27  Cong.,  3  Sess.,  70. 

24  Almonte  to  Webster,  January  24,  1843;  ibid.,  3- 


WEBSTER  AND  MEXICO,   1841-1843  IO7 

authorized  occurrence  ought  in  any  degree  to  impair 
the  amicable  relations  subsisting  between  the  two 
countries  so  evidently  to  the  advantage  of  both."  : 

The  Monterey  incident  peaceably  disposed  of,  atten 
tion  was  again  directed  to  the  question  of  claims,  which 
was  never  allowed  to  lie  idle  for  any  length  of  time. 
In  January,  1843,  Thompson  made  an  agreement  with 
the  Mexican  government  extending  the  time  for  pay 
ment  of  the  claims  under  the  arbitration  award.  As 
to  the  claims  not  adjusted,  which  he  was  instructed  to 
press  for  settlement,  Thompson  was  not  enthusiastic. 
In  a  communication  to  Congress  Tyler  reported  a  let 
ter  from  Thompson  in  which  he  complained  that 
"claims  of  the  most  manifest  and  admitted  justice  were 
postponed  from  day  to  day  and  from  year  to  year." 
A  further  comment  of  Thompson's  was  omitted. 
Among  the  pending  claims  was  one  of  William  S. . 
Parrott  for  six  hundred  and  ninety  thousand  dol 
lars,  which  was  based  largely  upon  the  seizure  of 
a  lot  of  bottled  porter.  "These  claims,"  Thompson 
reported,  "are  not  of  such  a  character  as  to  justify 
menace  and  the  execution  of  that  menace  if  compliance 
is  refused.  I  am  constrained  to  say  that  if  they  were 
referred  to  me  as  a  judge,  I  could  not  admit  them, 
nay  more,  I  cannot  with  a  clear  conscience  assist  them." 
Parrott's  claim  was  exaggerated,  he  said,  to  a  disgust 
ing  degree.  "To  assist  such  a  claim  would  subject 
both  me  and  the  Government  to  ridicule,  if  nothing 
worse." '  Nevertheless  he  followed  his  instructions 
and  saw  some  prospects  of  success.  "When  I  came 

25  Webster  to  Almonte,  January  30,  1843 ;  ibid.,  5 

2*  Thompson  to  Webster,  November  30,  1842 ;  MS.,  Archives. 


I08  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYUiR   AND 

here/'  he  said,  "the  claims  were  not  worth  twenty  cents 
on  the  dollar.     I  regard  them  now  as  worth  par."  2T 

Nothing  was  accomplished  further  than  this  upon 
the  claims  while  Webster  was  in  office.  The  pressure 
which  had  been  exerted  upon  him  to  resign  had  never 
lost,  but  had  gained  force.  His  reasons  for  continuing 
as  secretary  of  state  had  no  longer  any  binding  strength. 
The  Ashburton  treaty  had  been  concluded  and  ratified 
by  a  larger  vote  in  the  Senate  than  Webster  had  hoped 
for.28  The  peace  had  been  kept  with  Mexico  notwith 
standing  a  series  of  vexatious  incidents  which  might 
easily  have  led  to  a  breach.  Webster's  diplomatic 
activities  during  his  two  years  as  secretary  had  been 
fruitful  in  other  directions,  particularly  by  the  opening 
of  diplomatic  relations  with  China  and  of  consular  re 
lations  with  Hawaii.29  The  subjects  of  the  Danish 
Sound  dues  and  of  the  change  in  our  commercial  re 
lations  with  the  German  states  by  the  formation  of  the 
Zoll-Verein,  a  complete  discussion  of  which  belongs 
to  a  later  period,  also  claimed  Webster's  attention.30 
But  with  the  Ashburton  treaty  ratified  and  in  force, 
Webster  had  no  further  desire  to  remain  in  Tyler's 
official  family.  Fortunately,  before  he  left  the  cabinet 
he  was  able  to  straighten  out  a  misunderstanding  over 
the  article  in  the  treaty  of  Washington  providing  for 
joint  cruising  against  the  slave-trade.31 

"Thompson  to  Webster,  January  31,  1843;   MS.,  Archives. 

28  Webster  to  Jeremiah  Mason,  August  21,  1842;  Webster's 
Private  Correspondence,  II.,  146. 

29  John    W.    Foster's    American   Diplomacy    in    the    Orient; 
J.   M.   Callahan's  American  Relations  in  the  Pacific  and   the 
Far  Hast. 

80  Webster's  Diplomatic  and  Official  Papers,  382-92. 

81  Ibid. 


WEBSTER  AND   MEXICO,    1841-1843  IOO, 

In  his  message  at  the  opening  of  Congress  in  1842 
Tyler  approved  the  course  of  Cass  in  protesting 
against  the  quintuple  treaty.  He  praised  the  joint- 
cruising  article  of  the  Ashburton  treaty  as  an  indica-*, 
tion  of  the  American  position  as  to  the  right  of  search. 
The  message  reached  England  and  gave  rise  to  a 
spirited  debate  in  Parliament  and  a  letter  of  inquiry 
from  Aberdeen  as  to  Webster's  construction  of  the 
article.  Ashburton  wrote  Webster  that  the  question  of 
the  right  of  search  had  never  been  discussed  between 
them,  and  that  the  joint-cruising  convention  had  been 
adopted  as  a  practical  measure  for  the  accomplishment 
of  a  specific  purpose.  In  this  view  he  was  correct.  As 
has  been  said,  it  was  a  plan  suggested  by  Tyler  and 
agreed  to  by  Ashburton.  Webster  wrote  to  Everett 
that  the  right  of  search  had  had  no  place  in  his  nego 
tiation  with  Ashburton ;  that  no  concession  was  asked 
of,  or  given  by,  Great  Britain.  Following  this  up,  he 
elaborated  upon  the  falsity  of  the  distinction  made  be 
tween  right  of  visitation  and  right  of  search. 
Aberdeen,  upon  reading  it,  told  Everett  that  he  con 
curred  in  every  word  of  the  despatch  and  that  he  agreed 
that  there  was  no  distinction  between  the  right  of 
search  and  that  of  visitation.  It  was  an  amiable  re 
ception  of  what  proved  to  be  Webster's  valedictpry. 
The  attack  upon  Ashburton  for  having  signed  a  "capit 
ulation"  was  changed  into  a  vote  of  thanks  by  Parlia 
ment,  as  Webster's  so-called  "surrender"  had  been 
ratified  by  the  overwhelming  vote  of  the  Senate. 

The  settlement  of  the  northeastern  boundary,  the 
adoption  of  a  practical  method  for  the  extinction  of  the 
slave-trade  by  preventing  a  fraudulent  use  of  the 


IIO  DIPLOMACY   UNDER   TYLER   AND   POLK 

American  flag,  and  the  incorporation  into  public  law 
of  the  principle  of  extradition  were  diplomatic  honors 
enough.  After  a  short  time  no  one  of  common  sense 
cared,  as  Ashburton  said,  about  the  precise  position 
of  Lake  Pohenagamook.32  "The  merit  of  the  settle 
ment  was  that  it  would  not  stand  the  description  of  a 
sharp  bargain." 

The  quarrels  between  Tyler  and  Congress  and  the 
divisions  of  the  Whig  party  are  not  within  the  scope 
of  the  present  inquiry.  The  reasons  that  led  Web 
ster  to  resign  from  Tyler's  cabinet,  in  so  far  as  they 
were  political,  do  not  belong  to  the  diplomatic  history 
of  the  period.  As  has  been  stated,  the  Oregon  ques 
tion  had  been  omitted  from  the  Ashburton  negotiation, 
and  Webster  hoped  to  settle  this  himself  by  a  special 
.mission.  During  the  winter  of  1843  such  a  special 
mission  was  contemplated  and  the  consideration  of  it 
reluctantly  dropped  by  Tyler.33 

The  business  to  be  undertaken  by  Webster  in  this 
special  mission  was  intricate  and  delicate.  The  settle 
ment  of  the  Oregon  question  was  of  course  the  first 
and  most  important.  Although  Ashburton  had  not 
entered  into  that  matter,  he  was  reported  to  have 
stated  to  Webster  that  he  thought  England  would 
make  no  objection  if  Mexico  would  concede  some 
thing  south  of  our  boundary  of  forty-two  degrees 
across  the  continent,  so  as  to  include  the  ports  of  San 
Francisco  and  Monterey.34 

"Ashburton  to  Webster,  January  2,  1843;  Webster's  Pri 
vate  Correspondence,  II.,  162. 

33  Webster  to  Everett,  January  29,   1843;   Curtis's   Webster, 
II.,   176. 

34  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  XL,  347;  Tyler's  Tylers,  II.,  260. 


WEBSTER  AND   MEXICO,    1841-1843  III 

Then  the  President  suggested  sending  Everett  from 
the  Court  of  St.  James  to  China  as  a  special  commis 
sioner  to  open  diplomatic  relations  with  the  empire 
of  the  Far  East.  The  position  of  minister  to  Great 
Britain  was  to  be  the  door  by  which  Webster  might 
gracefully  let  himself  out  of  the  cabinet.35  In  Sep 
tember,  1841,  one  of  Tyler's  Virginia  friends,  Wise, 
had  suggested  this  :  "in  no  way  can  we  jilt  Webster  ex 
cept  by  sending  him  to  England."  :  Upshur  was  to 
take  Webster's  place  as  Tyler's  secretary  of  state. 
The  position  of  commissioner  to  China  did  not  tempt 
Everett,  who  preferred  to  remain  where  he  was.  Ash- 
burton,  upon  hearing  that  Everett  might  leave  England 
for  the  "Celestial  Empire,"  said  that  he  would  be  much 
too  fine  an  instrument  for  such  a  purpose.  "It  would 
be  cutting  blocks  with  a  razor."3'  It  is  no  mere  coin 
cidence  that  Webster's  resignation  was  placed  in 
Tyler's  hands  May  8,  1843,  the  same  day  upon  which 
Everett's  positive  declination  was  received.  Everett 
could  not  be  recalled  to  make  room  for  Webster. 
Every  consideration  of  friendship,  of  loyalty,  and  even 
of  political  expediency  prevented  that.  After  the 
China  mission  had  been  suggested  to  Everett  and  de 
clined  by  him,  no  course  was  left  to  Webster  but  to 
resign.  With  Webster's  place  to  fill,  Tyler's  break 
with  the  past  was  complete.  Hugh  S.  Legare,  the 
attorney  general,  was  made  secretary  of  state  ad  in- 

35  Tyler's   Tylers,  II.,  263,  note.     Cf.    Webster  to  Everett, 
January   29,    1843,    ut   sup.     John    Quincy   Adams,   Memoirs, 
XL,   347- 

36  Tyler's  Tylers,  II.,  120. 

"Ashburton  to  Everett,  April  28,  1844  (1843);  Webster's 
Private  Correspondence,  II.,  192. 


H2          DIPLOMACY  UND£R  TYI^R  AND  POLK 

terim.  A  week  after  his  retirement  Webster  wrote 
that  in  his  judgment  Upshur,  the  secretary  of  the  navy, 
would  be  appointed.  "The  President's  range  for  choice 
is  limited,"  he  said.  "Mr.  Upshur  is  an  accomplished 
lawyer,  with  some  experience  abroad,  of  gentlemanly 
manners  and  character,  and  not  at  all  disposed  to  create, 
or  to  foment  foreign  difficulties.  How  much  of  gen 
eral  comprehensiveness  and  practical  ability  he  pos 
sesses  is  yet  to  be  evinced.  I  think  the  President  could 
not  at  present  have  done  better."  ! 

At  this  time,  however,  Webster  was  not  as  fully  in 
Tyler's  confidences  as  might  be  supposed.  Calhoun 
seems  to  have  known,  two  months  before  Webster's 
resignation  was  in  the  President's  hands,  that  there 
would  be  a  change  in  the  state  department,  and  that 
Upshur  would  be  Webster's  successor.  The  choice  of 
Upshur  was  entirely  satisfactory  to  Calhoun  and  his 
friends.  "It  would  give  him  [Upshur],"  so  Calhoun 
wrote  to  Duff  Green,  "a  commanding  position1  in 
which  he  might  exert  a  very  salutary  influence  over 
the  important  questions  that  are  likely  to  grow  out 
of  our  foreign  relations  the  next  few  years."  ! 

Thus  ended  the  first  half  of  Tyler's  administration, 
and  with  the  resignation  of  Webster  the  opponent  of 
the  annexation  of  Texas  left  the  President's  councils. 
In  his  place  came  Upshur,  who  put  into  execution 
Tyler's  long  deferred  plan.  Thenceforth  during  the 
remainder  of  Tyler's  administration  every  effort  was 
made  to  recover  what  Tyler  claimed  Monroe's  admin- 

38  Webster    to    Everett,    May    12,    1843;    Webster's    Private 
Correspondence,  II.,  173. 

39  Calhoun    to    Duff    Green,    February    (March)     19,    1843; 
Report  of  the  American  Historical  Association,  1899,  II.,  526. 


WEBSTER  AND'  MEXICO,    1841-1843  113 

istration  had  suffered  to  be  lost.  The  reannexation  of 
Texas  was  the  policy  of  Tyler.  His  new  secretary  of 
state  lost  no  time  in  planning  a  campaign  that  might 
make  the  policy  effective  and  Texas  a  part  of  the 
American  Union. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  NEGOTIATIONS  FOR  TEXAS  UNDER  UPSHUR 
1843-1844 

After  the  departure  of  Webster  from  the  cabinet 
of  Tyler  the  long-suppressed  inclination  of  the  Presi 
dent  for  the  annexation  of  Texas  manifested  itself. 
With  the  appointment  to  the  head  of  the  state  depart 
ment  of  Upshur,  whom  Tyler's  Virginia  friends  had 
been  urging  for  the  place  since  the  first  reconstruction 
of  the  cabinet  in  September,  1841,  the  question  of 
Texas  pushed  to  the  fore  to  the  exclusion  of  every 
other  matter  of  foreign  affairs.  How  long  before 
Webster's  resignation  the  cabinet  had  been  in  a  fer 
ment  over  annexation  it  is  scarcely  possible  to  state 
definitely. 

In  December,  1841,  John  Quincy  Adams  was  told 
that  the  proffer  of  annexation,  withdrawn  by  Texas 
in  1838,  would  soon  be  renewed,  but  he  confessed  that 
the  developments  of  the  project  were  not  yet  suffi 
ciently  clear  and  explicit  to  know  how  to  meet  and 
counteract  it.1  Newspapers  south  and  north  discussed 
annexation  pro  and  con,  but  no  one  believed  that  there 
could  be  found  a  majority  of  either  house  of  Congress 
favorable  to  the  measure  upon  any  former  terms.  Until 
Lamar's  retirement  from  the  presidency  of  Texas,  late 
in  1841,  no  action  was  taken  reversing  the  decision 
made  three  years  earlier,  which  finally  withdrew  the 

proposal  of  Texas  to  the  United  States. 

* 

1John  Quincy  Adams,  Memoirs,  XL,  41. 


UPSHUR   AND   TEXAS,    1843-1844  115 

From  the  inauguration  of  Lamar's  successor  the 
policy  of  Texas  swung  back  to  what  it  had  been  dur 
ing  Houston's  former  term,  when  through  him  over 
tures  for  annexation  had  been  made  to  Van  Buren  and 
finally  declined.  There  was  no  mistaking  the  temper 
of  the  people  of  Texas  upon  the  question,  for  they 
could  imagine  no  other  outcome  than  the  incorporation 
of  their  nation  with  the  United  States.  As  to  the 
officers  of  the  government  of  Texas,  it  is  not  so  easy 
to  speak.  Houston's  sincerity  in  his  favorable  attitude 
to  annexation  has  been  questioned  and  denied.  Some 
have  thought  that  in  his  heart  he  really  preferred  the 
independence  of  Texas,  if  that  could  be  maintained, 
even  with  the  aid  of  Great  Britain  and  France.  Others 
have  believed  that  during  the  years  from  1841  to  1844 
he  was  merely  "coquetting"  with  Great  Britain  in 
order  to  force  the  hand  of  the  United  States;  and 
further  that  he  gave  all  the  prominence  possible  to  the 
alleged  intrigues  of  Great  Britain  with  Texas  in  order 
to  develop  in  the  United  States  a  sentiment  for  an 
nexation  as  a  measure  of  defense  against  the  encroach 
ments  of  the  former  country.2  There  is  much  that 
points  to  such  an  explanation  of  the  sinuous  course 
that  Houston  adopted,  but  proof  is  lacking  that  any 
definite  understanding  existed  between  the  executives 
of  the  United  States  and  Texas.  Indeed,  the  evidence 
points  away  from  any  understanding  whatever.  The 
truth  seems  to  be  that  Houston  made  up  his  mind  that 
the  United  States  could  be  forced  into  a  positive  atti 
tude  upon  annexation;  that  Texas  and  not  the  United 
States  should  appear  to  be  in  a  receptive  attitude;  that 

2Worley   in   the    Quarterly   of   the    Texas  State   Historical 
Association,  July,  1905,  40. 


Il6  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER  AND   POLK 

the  United  States  and  not  Texas  should  be  the  one  to 
press  the  proposal  for  annexation.  Houston's  idea 
seems  to  have  been  to  put  the  United  States  into  an 
aggressive  position,  in  which  Texas  might  drive  as 
good  a  bargain  as  possible.3  It  is  significant  that  the 
negotiations  for  the  annexation  of  Texas  were  con 
ducted  at  Washington.  It  is  even  more  significant 
that  the  American  charge  in  Texas,  William  S.  Mur 
phy,  was  kept  uninformed  for  two  months  that  his 
government  had  proposed  annexation.  Early  in  his 
second  administration  Houston  made  an  overture  for 
annexation  only  to  withdraw  it.  Then  the  United 
States  reopened  the  question.  Houston  declined  to 
consider  it.  The  Texan  Congress  overruled  the  presi 
dent's  declination,  but  it  availed  nothing  until  Houston 
had  managed  to  obtain  from  the  United  States  assur 
ances  of  protection  pending  any  negotiation.  These 
had,  Houston  agreed  to  annexation.  This  much  in  out 
line  is  set  forth  here,  in  advance  of  the  proper  and 
orderly  presentation  of  the  narrative,  for  the  purpose 
of  emphasizing  what  is  believed  to  be  the  key  to 
Houston's  diplomacy  during  Tyler's  administration. 
During  the  negotiation  with  Texas  the  scene  shifts 
from  Washington  to  Texas,  thence-  to  London  and 
back  again.  All  lines  of  the  narrative  must  be  kept  in 
mind.  The  events  in  Texas  as  well  as  those  at  Wash 
ington  and  at  London  are  important  for  a  correct  ap 
preciation  of  the  development  of  the  policies  of  Hous 
ton  and  Tyler. 

'Anson  Jones  (Official  Correspondence,  passim)  impugns 
Houston's  motives  and  claims  to  have  been  alone  steadfast 
for  annexation,  although  he  admits  that  there  was  a  game 
played  toward  France  and  England. 


UPSHUR   AND   TSXAS,    1843-1844 

Before  Houston  had  been  in  office  five  months  he 
despatched  a  new  representative  to  Washington,  James 
Reily,  whom  he  authorized  to  renew  the  proposal  for 
annexation."  Reily  frankly  confessed  that  the  time 
was  not  ripe  for  the  United  States  to  act.5  Tyler  he 
found  enthusiastic  and  "sincerely  desirous  of  consum 
mating-  annexation  immediately.  .  .  .  The  President 
would  act  in  a  moment  if  the  Senate  would  assent." ' 
Tyler's  enthusiasm  was  shared  by  others.  "Although 
annexation  was  spoken  of  by  the  few  warm  and  ardent 
friends  of  the  measure,  including  the  President,  R.  J. 
Walker,  Upshur  and  Gilmer,  Dr.  Gwin  of  Mississippi, 
and  others  useless  to  mention,  yet  at  no  time  [during 
Reily's  short  residence  at  Washington]  was  it  discussed 
as  a  probable  event.  All  parties  were  satisfied  that  no 
treaty  of  annexation  would  be  ratified  by  the  Senate, 
and  there  was  not  even  a  majority  in  favor  of  the 
policy  in  the  lower  House." '  So  Reily  reported  upon 
the  state  of  feeling  during  the  summer  of  1842.  There 
were  manifold  reasons  why  the  question  could  not  then 
be  brought  forward.  The  Ashburton  negotiation  was 
in  itself  enough  to  engage  the  entire  attention  of  Tyler. 
Webster  was  opposed  to  the  measure.  The  character 

4  Jones,  Official  Correspondence,  38. 

6  Reily  to  Jones,  March  25,  1842 :  "I  would  rather  die  than 
remain  here.  .  .  .  Nothing  can  be  done  here  in  the  way 
of  negotiations  for  Texas."  Ibid.,  178. 

'Reily  to  Jones,  July  n,  1842;  Yoakum's  Texas,  II.,  347. 
Houston  to  Jones,  August  2,  1842:  "In  Reily's  place  I  have 
sent  Van  Zandt  to  Washington.  He  will  be  prudent  and  will 
not  jump  high  enough  to  endanger  his  safety."  Jones,  Official 
Correspondence,  186. 

1  Miles'  Register,  LXXIIL,  147,  quoted  by  Tyler,  Tylers, 
II.,  256. 


Il8  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

that  the  Texans  had  shown  in  their  Santa  Fe  ex 
peditions — the  first,  which  Kendall  accompanied,  and 
the  second,  known  as  Sniveley's  expedition — was  not 
such  as  to  gain  them  additional  moral  support.  Pos 
sibly  the  former  and  certainly  the  latter  of  these  ex 
peditions  was  a  mere  freebooting  enterprise.  The 
members  of  the  first  had  been  captured  by  the  Mexi 
cans  and  liberated  only  through  the  determined  efforts 
of  the  representatives  of  the  United  States.  Sniveley's 
command  had  been  disarmed  by  a  detachment  of  United 
States  troops  near  the  border.  "The  first  step,"  wrote, 
Jackson  to  Houston,  "that  led  to  the  injury  of  the 
fame  of  Texas,  was  that  foolish  campaign  to  Santa 
Fe;  the  next  the  foolish  attempt  to  invade  Mexico, 
without  means  or  men  sufficient  for  the  occasion/' ' 
Texan  military  enterprise  came  to  be  looked  upon  in 
the  United  States,  even  by  the  friends  of  Texas,  as 
guerilla  warfare,  unredeemed  by  the  appearance  of  a 
defensive  undertaking.  Thus  the  character  of  Texas  as 
an  independent  nation  had  sunk  in  the  estimation  of \  the 
American  people.  A  further  reason  why  Tyler  de 
ferred  any  action  was  that  the  Mexican  claims  were 
under  discussion.  Finally,  the  United  States  and  Mex 
ico  were  upon  a  more  friendly  footing,  so  that  there 
were  reasons  enough  for  Tyler's  declination  of  Hous 
ton's  offer  delivered  through  Reily  in  July,  1842.  It 
would  have  been  a  waste  of  time  to  hazard  the  question 
of  annexation.  All  that  Houston's  agent  accomplished 
was  an  agreement  with  Webster  for  a  commercial 
treaty.  This  the  Senate  rejected  upon  the  ground  that 

8  Jackson   to   Houston,   August  31,    1843;    Yoakum,    Texas, 
IL,  406. 


UPSHUR   AND   TEXAS,    1843-1844  119 

such  a  treaty  with  Texas  would  interfere  with 
the  prosecution  of  the  claims  against  Mexico. 
In  the  fall  of  1842  Houston  sent  another  agent, 
Isaac  Van  Zandt,  who  repeated  the  offer  made 
by  Reily.  Tyler  again  declined  the  proposal. 
So  far  Houston  had  met  with  failure  in  every 
attempt  looking  toward  an  understanding  with  the 
United  States.  The  experience  with  Jackson  and  Van 
Buren  was  being  repeated. 

With  this  rejection  of  the  offer  as  proposed  by  Van 
Zandt,  Houston  began  upon  a  new  theory.  This  was 
to  cultivate  by  every  means  possible  the  jealousy  with 
which  the  United  States  regarded  Great  Britain.  The 
first  step  in  this  policy  was  to  reconsider  the  offer  made 
by  Van  Zandt  and  declined  by  Tyler.  Houston  in 
structed  Van  Zandt  to  say  to  the  authorities  of  the 
United  States  that  it  would  now  be  necessary  for  the 
United  States  to  make  an  advance  so  decided  as  to 
open  wide  the  door  of  negotiation  to  Texas.  Should 
that  be  done  Texas  would  renew  the  proposal  for  an 
nexation.9 

Houston  was  not  compelled  to  wait  long  for  the 
sentiment  in  the  United  States  to  assume  an  aggressive 
character.  Gilmer  of  Virginia,  who  with  Upshur  was 
in  closest  contact  with  Tyler  and  in  his  confidence, 
published  a  letter  in  which  he  put  forward  the  "re- 
annexation"  of  Texas  to  the  United  States  as  the  im 
mediate  duty  of  the  government.  This  letter  of  Gilmer 
was,  according  to  Benton,  the  first  step  in  a  great 
conspiracy  which  had  for  its  object  not  only  the  an- 

8  Jones  to  Van  Zandt,  February  10,  1843 ;  Yoakum's  Texas, 
•II.,  407- 


I2O  DIPLOMACY   UNDER   TYI^R   AND   POLK 

nexation  of  Texas  (no  great  wrong  in  itself  in  Benton's 
eyes),  but  the  promotion  of  the  candidacy  of  Calhoun, 
who  avowedly  aspired  to  be  Tyler's  successor.  This 
meant  the  defeat  of  Martin  Van  Buren  for  the  Demo 
cratic  nomination  in  1844.  The  most  detailed  treat 
ment  of  the  subject  is  that  of  Von  Hoist,  who  in  fol 
lowing  Benton's  view  of  an  intrigue  in  the  interests 
of  Calhoun  makes  his  narrative  revolve  about  the 
political  situation  that  resulted  in  the  defeat  of  Van 
Buren  in  the  Democratic  convention  of  1844.  The 
charge  of  Benton — that  Tyler's  enthusiasm  for  Texan 
annexation  was  but  a  part  of  an  intrigue  to  fasten 
Calhoun  upon  the  Democratic  party — does  not  seem  to 
be  well  sustained.  If  such  an  intrigue  existed,  Tyler 
was  obviously  ignorant  of  it.  He  was  from  the  be 
ginning  of  his  term  enthusiastic  for  Texas.  We  have 
seen  the  forces  that  hindered  his  enthusiasm  from 
becoming  effective.  Gilmer's  public  letter  advocating 
immediate  annexation  was  claimed  to  be  the  first  direct 
act  of  the  Calhoun  intriguers.  The  tone  of  this  letter 
is  sufficiently  explained  by  the  status  of  the  relations 
with  Texas.  That  the  letter  appeared  soon  after  Cal 
houn  had  resigned  from  the  United  States  Senate  is 
probably  coincidental.  There  is  nothing  In  Calhottn's 
correspondence  to  show  that  there  was  any  connection 
between  his  resignation  from  the  Senate  and  his  presi 
dential  candidacy  on  the  one  side,  and  the  annexation 
of  Texas  on  the  other.  It  is  difficult  to  see  how 
the  advocacy  of  annexation  would  at  that  time  have 
furthered  Calhoun's  political  chances.  Perhaps  this 
was  merely  a  ruse.  It  is  difficult  to  frame  a  theory  of 
the  Tyler-Texas-Calhoun  propaganda  with  which  all 
the  facts  fit  perfectly.  Calhoun  was,  and  had  been  for 


UPSHUR   AND   TEXAS,    1843-1844  121 

a  long  time,  favorable  to  Texan  annexation.  So  was 
Tyler.  So  was  Jackson  until  the  responsibility  of 
office  and  his  regard  for  Van  Buren  as  his  successor 
made  him  cautious.  Tyler,  without  a  party,  believed 
the  time  ripe  for  annexation.  He  was  surrounded  by 
Calhoun's  friends,  Upshur  and  Gilmer  among  the  num 
ber.  Calhoun  resigned  from  the  Senate  and  was  nomi 
nated  by  South  Carolina  for  the  presidency  two  years 
before  the  national  convention  was  to  meet.  The  pur 
pose  was,  of  course,  to  defeat  Van  Buren.  Calhoun 
emphasized  his  position  upon  the  tariff,  upon  which  he 
was  in  opposition  to  Van  Buren's  friends.  Upon  the 
tariff,  he  believed,  Van  Buren  was  prostrated  in  the 
south,10  and  Texas  came  after  the  tariff  as  a  subject 
upon  which  the  South  could  unite.  Calhoun  favored  it. 
Van  Buren  finally  opposed  it.  Tyler  was  the  instru 
ment  by  which  annexation  was  brought  forward  by 
Calhoun's  friends,  but.  in  the  end  neither  Calhoun,  nor 
Van  Buren,  nor  Tyler  made  political  capital  out  of  the 
Texas  question.  It  resulted,  however,  in  throwing 
Van  Buren  overboard,  which  many  southern  Demo 
crats  had  determined  upon  as  early  as  1841.  Annexa 
tion  was  not  broached  through  Calhoun,  but  through 
Calhoun's  old  enemy,  Jackson.  Gilmer's  letter  to 
the  public  was  sent  to  Jackson  by  a  member  of  the 
House  from  Tennessee.  It  was  no  coincidence  that 
Houston  wrote  Jackson  at  the  same  time.  The  reply 
from  the  Hermitage  was  couched  in  as  strong  terms 
as  the  increasing  body  of  annexationists  could  desire. 
The  suspicions  of  John  Quincy  Adams  took  fire  at 
the  aggressive  attitude  of  the  annexationists.  Early 

10  Calhoun  to  Duff  Green,  August  31,  1842;  Report  of  Am. 
Hist.  Association,  1899,  II.,  516. 


122  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

in  March,  1843,  he  joined  with  twelve  colleagues  of 
the  lower  house  in  an  address  to  the  people  of  the 
United  States,  warning  them  against  the  machina 
tions  of  the  administration  to  secure  the  extension 
of  slavery  by  adding  Texas  to  the  Union,  pointing 
out  the  gross  violations  of  our  neutral  obligations  to 
ward  Mexico,  and  calling  upon  the  free  states  for  re 
newed  and  increased  activity  to  avert  the  calamity 
with  which  the  country  was  threatened.  At  the  time 
Adams's  address  was  published  there  was  no  propo 
sition  for  annexation  pending,  so  far  as  the  records 
show.  The  month  before  Van  Zandt  had  determined 
to  let  the  matter  rest  while  the  United  States  made  the 
move.11 

At  this  juncture  Houston  had  the  advantage  of  a 
series  of  events  which,  better  tfem  any  he  could  have 
devised,  served  to  awaken  the  jealousy  of  the  United 
States  toward  Great  Britain.  Santa  Anna  had  threat 
ened  to  renew  the  war  against  Texas,  so  Houston 
asked  that  the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  and  France, 
acting  jointly,  mediate  between  his  country  and  Mex 
ico.  Great  Britain  declined  to  join  with  the  other 
powers  in  mediation,  but  promised  by  acting  alone  to 
interpose  her  good  offices  for  the  termination  of  the 
war.  Santa  Anna  was  prevailed  upon  by  Doyle,  the 
British  charge  in  Mexico,  to  submit  an  armistice  to 
Houston.  Doyle,  in  Mexico,  and  Elliott,  the  British 
charge  in  Texas,  were  occupied  during  the  spring  and 
summer  of  1843  with  the  arrangement  of  this  armis 
tice.  Whether  or  not  Houston  was  sincere  in  his  de- 

11  The  petitions  for  and  against  annexation  presented  to 
both  houses  of  Congress  from  now  on  displayed  the  increas 
ing  importance  of  the  subject. 


UPSHUR    AND   TEXAS,    1843-1844  123 

sire  for  an  armistice  with  Santa  Anna  is  not  to  be 
decided.  Doubtless  the  armistice  was  an  effective 
method  of  delaying  hostile  aggressions  by  Santa  Anna, 
and  Houston  made  the  greatest  possible  use  of  it  to 
arouse  the  jealousies  of  the  United  States  by  throwing 
into  prominence  the  activity  of  the  British  agents  who 
arranged  the  truce. 

Although  advised  by  Elliott  that  he  had  no  doubt  of 
Mexico's  ultimate  refusal  to  treat  with  Texas  unless 
the  sovereignty  of  Mexico  were  acknowledged,  Hous 
ton  proclaimed  the  armistice  and  sent  commissioners 
to  meet  those  selected  by  Santa  Anna.12  No  time  was 
lost  in  putting  the  correspondence  with  Elliott  upon 
the  subject  of  the  truce  into  the  hands  of  the  United 
States  government.  The  reply  of  Anson  Jones  to 
Elliott  accepting  Santa  Anna's  proposition  was  im 
mediately  sent  to  Van  Zandt  at  Washington."  While 
Elliott  was  busy  in  transmitting  the  correspondence 
between  Texas  and  Mexico,  the  American  charge, 
General  William  S.  Murphy,  who  had  but  just  arrived 
in  Texas,  observed  the  proceedings  with  growing  in 
dignation.  He  was  forced  to  sit  by  and  see  Texas  fall 
into  the  power  of  England,  as  he  believed,  through  the 
exertions  of  Houston.  Not  a  word  was  said  to  him 
about  the  armistice  (although  it  was  fully  reported  to 
Van  Zandt  for  the  information  of  the  administration  at 
Washington),  and  he  was  allowed  to  be  as  fully  im 
pressed  by  the  activity  of  the  British  agent  as  was 
possible.  Finally,  under  professions  of  great  secrecy, 
Jones  gave  Murphy  copies  of  the  correspondence,  with 

"Houston's  proclamation  was  dated  June   13,   1843. 
13  Jones  to  Van  Zandt,  June  5,  1843;  Yoakum,  Texas,  II., 
409. 


124  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYI<ER  AND   POI^K 

the  injunction  that  Houston  must  never  know  that  the 
secret  had  been  let  out.  Jones's  ruse  was  successful.1* 
Murphy  wrote  home  that  England's  power  over  Hous 
ton  was  complete;  that  the  executive  of  Texas  was 
determined  to  take  a  position  in  opposition  to  the 
wishes  of  the  people  of  Texas,  which  were  well  known 
to  be  favorable  to  annexation.  "The  armistice  has 
been  accepted  by  this  Government,"  he  wrote,  "and 
proclaimed  to  the  world,  but  what  steps  are  now  in 
progress,  I  know  not,  nor  can  I  know  until  they  should 
disclose  themselves  to  the  world.  England  may  at  this 
time  be  setting  on  foot  a  negotiation  of  vast  conse 
quence  to  the  United  States,  and  in  all  probability  such 
is  the  case."  15 

At  about  the  time  that  Murphy's  report  of  the 
armistice  was  received,  Tyler's  attorney  general  and 
acting  secretary  of  state,  Legare,  died.  Upshur,  the 
secretary  of  the  navy,  was  transferred  to  the  state  de 
partment.  At  this  point  also  appears  a  new  character 
upon  the  scene,  who  on  account  of  his  close  friendship 
and  intimacy  with  Calhoun  added  force  to  the  charge 
that  the  Tyler  pro-annexation  policy  was  really  a  part 
of  the  Calhoun  propaganda.  This  new  factor  in  the 
Texas  question  was  General  Duff  Green,  whose 
daughter  had  married  Calhoun's  son.  Green's  son, 
moreover,  Benjamin  E.  Green,  was  the  American  charge 
in  Mexico.  In  the  summer  of  1843  Duff  Green  was  in 
England  endeavoring  to  sound  the  public  men  of  Peel's 

14  Murphy  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  enclosing  copies  of  the 
correspondence  of  Elliott  and  Jones.     MS.,  Archives. 

15  Murphy  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  June  5,  1843,  received 
July  8;  MS.,  Archives.     Murphy  was  not  presented  to  Hous 
ton  until  June  17,  1843.    Jones,  Official  Correspondence,  38. 


UPSHUR   AND   TEXAS,    1843-1844  125 

cabinet  as  well  as  those  of  the  opposition  upon  the 
subject  of  reciprocal  free  trade.  Soon  after  his  de 
parture  Calhoun  wrote  him :  "I  must  say,  that  I  have 
not  much  hope,  that  anything  satisfactory  can  be  done 
in  the  form  of  an  arrangement,  although  I  do  not  doubt 
the  sincerity  of  the  Government  on  either  side.  The 
difficulties  are  great,  but  if  an  equal  and  fair  arrange 
ment  can  be  made,  I  do  not  doubt  its  expediency.  I 
am  for  free  trade;  free  trade  on  both  sides  if  it  can 
be  had ;  but  if  not,  on  one  side."  ]  Green  soon  found 
that  he  could  do  nothing  with  Peel's  administration. 
He  then  placed  his  hopes  in  the  Whig  opposition.  He 
reported  that  Lord  John  Russell  told  him  that  the 
ministry  would  be  assailed  in  their  American  policy; 
that  if  Palmerston  returned  to  power,  his  party  would 
"go  for  free  trade  with  America  and  an  imme 
diate  adjustment  of  the  Oregon  question,  for  the  ad 
mission  of  slave-grown  produce,  and  non-interference 
in  the  domestic  policy  of  other  nations ;  that  they  will 
denounce  the  attempt  to  emancipate  the  slaves  of 
Cuba,  Brazil,  the  States  and  Texas  as  illegal  and 
unwise  interference."  :  Green's  advice  was  that  the 
United  States  should  assume  an  aggressive  position 
toward  Texas.  He  believed  that  the  antislavery  party 
in  England  was  losing  influence.  "If  our  government 
can  be  induced  to  take  strong  ground  on  the  question 
of  Texas,  the  free  trade  party  here  will  rally  for  us 
against  the  fanatics,  and  the  Whigs  will  make  the  re 
fusal  of  ministers  to  meet  the  proposition  of  our 
Government  a  matter  of  serious  assaults."  : 

"Calhoun   to   Green,   June   7,    1843;   Report   of  Am.   Hist. 
Association,  1899,  II.,  537. 

"Green  to  Calhoun,  August  2,  1842  (1843?)  ;  ibid.,  846. 
"  Green  to  Calhoun,  September  2,  1843 ;  ibid.,  871. 


126  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

While  Green  was  thus  sounding  the  opposition  upon 
its  attitude  toward  the  United  States,  Ashbel  Smith, 
the  Texan  charge  at  London  and  Paris,  succeeded  in 
obtaining  from  Lord  Aberdeen  the  views  of  the  British' 
ministry  toward  Texas.19  Great  Britain  had  but  re 
cently  recognized  the  independence  of  Texas  and  was 
then  active,  as  has  been  seen,  in  arranging  an  armis 
tice  between  Texas  and  Mexico.  Public  sentiment  in 
England  was  outspoken  in  favor  of  the  abolition  of 
slavery.  Stephen  P.  Andrews,  noted  as  an  antislavery 
agitator,  now  appeared  in  London  as  an  agent  of  the 
abolitionists  of  Texas,  with  a  proposition  that  Great 
Britain  should  advance  a  loan  to  Texas  to  be  applied 
to  the  purchase  and  emancipation  of  Texas  slaves. 
Smith  repudiated  Andrews  to  Lord  Aberdeen,  saying 
that  his  visit  to  London  was  his  individual  act,  unauthor 
ized  by  the  government  or  citizens  of  Texas.  The  charge 
reported  to  Jones,  the  Texan  secretary  of  state,  the 
substance  of  his  interview  with  Aberdeen  upon  the 
subject  of  Andrews's  visit  and  upon  the  more  general 
topic  of  Great  Britain's  attitude  toward  Texas.  He  told 
Aberdeen  that  he  had  reason  to  think  no  disposition 
to  agitate  the  subject  of  slavery  existed  on  the  part 
either  of  the  government  or  of  any  respectable  portion 
of  the  citizens  of  Texas.  "I  also  stated  to  Lord  Aber 
deen  that  I  was  informed  representations  would  be 
sent  out  to  Texas,  based  on  statements  made  by  mem 
bers  of  the  Antislavery  convention  [recently  held  in 
London],  who  had  recently  called  on  his  Lordship 
touching  this  matter,  to  the  effect  that  Her  Majesty's 
Government  would  afford  in  some  way  the  means  for 

19  Smith  to  Jones,  Paris,  August  2,  1843 ;  Jones,  Official 
Correspondence,  236. 


UPSHUR   AND   TEXAS,    1843-1844  I2/ 

reimbursing  or  compensating  the  slaveholders,  provided 
slavery  were  abolished  in  our  country.  I  enquired 
what  grounds  there  was  for  these  assertions.  His 
Lordship  replied  in  effect :  That  it  is  the  well  known 
policy  and  wish  of  the  British  Government  to  abolish 
slavery  everywhere — that  its  abolition  in  Texas  is 
deemed  very  desirable.  .  .  .  He  added  that  there 
was  no  disposition  on  the  part  of  the  British  Govern 
ment  to  interfere  improperly  on  this  subject,  and  that 
they  would  not  give  the  Texian  Govt.  cause  to  complain. 
He  was  not  prepared  to  say  whether  the  British  Govt. 
would  consent  hereafter  to  make  such  compensation  to 
Texas  as  would  enable  the  slaveholders  to  abolish 
slavery.  The  object  is  deemed  so  important,  perhaps 
they  might,  though  he  would  not  say  certainly."  ::0  Such 
was  the  Texan  charge's  report  of  Lord  Aberdeen's  po 
sition  upon  the  subject  of  abolition  in  Texas.  It  was 
written  soon  after  the  event  and  there  is  no  reason  for 
believing  it  in  any  wise  incorrect. 

Green,  however,  disturbed  by  the  increasing  senti 
ment  for  abolition,  looked  upon  the  activities  of  An 
drews  as  a  menace  to  the  interests  of  the  United  States. 
He  wrote  that  Aberdeen  had  told  Smith  that  the  Brit 
ish  government  deemed  it  so  important  to  prevent  the 
annexation  of  Texas  to  the  United  States  that  they 
were  prepared  to  support  the  loan  if  it  should  be  re 
quired  to  prevent  annexation.21  Whether  Smith  im 
posed  upon  Green,  or  Green  colored  the  correct  state 
ment,  it  is  impossible  to  say.  The  true  account  oi 

20  Smith  to  Jones,  July  31,  1843;  Report  Am.  Hist.  Asso 
ciation,  1899,  II.,  867.  Cf.  Ashbel  Smith,  Reminiscences. 

21 5.  Ex.  Doc.  341,  28  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  i  8.  Quoted  by  Upshur 
to  Murphy,  August  8,  1843. 


128  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYI^R   AND   POLK 

Aberdeen's  interview  with  Smith  was  probably  not  in 
the  hands  of  the  state  department  at  Washington 
until  the  spring  of  1844.  Green's  reports  helped  to  fill 
Tyler  and  Upshur  with  as  much  jealousy  of  Great 
Britain's  power  over  Texas  as  Houston  could  possibly 
have  desired.  Through  the  agency  of  Duff  Green, 
therefore,  Tyler's  policy  toward  Texas  was  to  some 
extent  molded.  Texas  must  be  annexed  as  a  measure 
of  self -protection  to  the  United  States  against  the  en- 
encroachments  of  Great  Britain,  which,  by  obtaining  an 
influence  over  Texas,  might  dispute  with  the  United 
States  the  commercial  and  naval  supremacy  of  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico.  More  than  this,  Texas  must  be  annexed 
to  the  United  States  in  order  to  protect  the  slave  in 
terests  of  the  southern  states,  so  jeopardized  by  Great 
Britain's  advocacy  of  abolition  in  Texas. 

For  the  first  time  in  its  history  the  government  de 
liberately  assumed  a  position  to  the  world  that  in  in 
ternational  relations  the  United  States  stood  for 
slavery;  that  the  United  States  was  nationally  a  slave 
power  and  opposed  to  abolition  in  a  neighboring  state 
as  a  menace  to  its  own  interests.  Expansion  had  been 
postponed  until  1843  by  fears  of  a  war  with  Mexico 
and  by  the  opposition  that  the  antislavery  sentiment 
fostered  and  encouraged.  In  the  negotiation  for  Texas 
which  Upshur  and  Calhoun  conducted  the  extreme 
position  was  taken:  Texas  must  be  annexed,  lest  by 
remaining  independent  under  the  domination  of  Great 
Britain  she  might  abolish  slavery.  That  the  United 
States  should  press  for  annexation  as  a  means  of  neu 
tralizing  the  efforts  of  Great  Britain  to  obtain  an  as 
cendancy  over  Texas  was  a  legitimate  and  proper 
course,  if  the  government  sincerely  believed  that  such 


UPSHUR    AND   TSXAS,    1843-1844  129 

was  Great  Britain's  ambition.  That  Tyler's  adminis 
tration  based  its  opposition  to  Great  Britain's  ascend 
ancy  upon  the  ground  that  it  looked  toward  abolition 
in  the  independent  state  of  Texas  is  quite  another 
matter.  Tyler's  fear  of  the  influence  of  Great  Britain 
was  in  itself  not  surprising.  It  is  not,  however,  so 
easy  to  defend  the  ground  that  he  actually  assumed — 
that  anything  that  tended  toward  the  abolition  of 
slavery  in  America  was  a  menace  to  the  national 
interests  of  the  United  States.  The  assertion  that 
American  supremacy  demanded  Texan  annexation  was 
logical  and  natural.  The  weakness  of  Tyler's  method 
of  asserting  that  supremacy  lay  in  the  declaration  to 
the  world  that  the  interests  of  slavery  demanded  an 
nexation.  The  United  States  stood  before  the  world, 
not  as  a  defender  of  slavery  merely,  but  as  the  aggres 
sive  champion  of  it,  determined  that  where  slavery 
existed,  there  it  should  remain.  Duff  Green's  reports 
and  Upshur's  instructions  based  thereon  give,  there 
fore,  the  starting  point  to  the  negotiations  of  which 
the  rejected  treaty  of  annexation  was  the  result. 

"I  am  authorized  by  the  Texan  minister  to  say  to 
you,  that  Lord  Aberdeen  has  agreed  that  the  British 
government  will  guarantee  the  interest  [upon  a  loan] 
upon  condition  that  the  Texan  government  will  abolish 
slavery." :  So  wrote  Green  to  Upshur.  Upon  this 
information  incorrectly  stated  by  either  Green  or 
Smith  the  secretary  proceeded  to  act.  He  wrote  Mur- 

22  Quoted  by  Upshur  as  "a  private  letter  from  a  citizen  of 
Maryland,  then  in  London,"  in  Upshur's  instructions  to  Mur 
phy,  August  8,  1843;  H.  Ex.  Doc.  271,  28  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  18; 
S.  Ex.  Doc.  341,  28  Cong.,  i  Sess.;  Ashbel  Smith,  Reminis 
cences,  52-55. 


I3O  DIPLOMACY    UNDER  TYL^R   AND   POLK 

phy  in  Texas,  quoting  Green's  letter  without  naming 
the  writer.  A  movement  by  Great  Britain  of  the  sort 
described  could  not,  he  said,  "be  contemplated  by  us 
in  silence.  Such  an  attempt  upon  any  neighboring 
country  would  necessarily  be  viewed  by  this  Govern 
ment  with  very  deep  concern,  but  when  it  is  made  upon 
a  nation  whose  territories  join  the  slaveholding  States 
of  our  Union,  it  awakens  a  more  solemn  interest.  It 
cannot  be  permitted  to  succeed  without  the  most  strenu 
ous  efforts  on  our  part  to  arrest  a  calamity  so  serious 
to  every  part  of  our  country."  The  secretary  then 
proceeded  to  elaborate  his  argument  for  "arresting  the 
calamity."  If  the  movement  were  confined  to  the 
abolitionists  of  Texas,  he  would  find  little  concern,  for 
he  knew  they  were  few  in  numbers  and  weak  in  in 
fluence.  He  beheld  in  England's  action,  however,  a 
part  of  a  general  plan  for  the  abolition  of  slavery 
throughout  the  world,  as  a  means  of  holding  her  own 
commercial  supremacy  threatened  by  slave  labor.  "No 
other  adequate  motive  can  be  found  for  her  determined 
and  persevering  course  in  regard  to  domestic  slavery 
in  other  countries."  England's  attitude  toward  Texas 
was,  he  said,  based  upon  this  motive.  It  was  the  con 
trol  of  the  destinies  of  Texas  at  which  she  aimed. 
Abolition  of  slavery  was  but  a  handle  for  the  raising 
of  such  a  policy.  Important,  however,  as  England's 
supremacy  might  be,  he  further  stated,  "there  was  an 
other  view  of  the  subject  still  more  important  to  us 
and  scarcely  less  important  to  Texas  herself."  This 
was  the  existence  of  a  republic  without  slavery,  ad 
joining  the  slave  states  of  the  South.  He  dwelt 
upon  the  horrors  of  a  system  by  which  slaves  might 
escape  and  their  owners  have  no  recourse.  If  Texas 


UPSHUR   AND   TEXAS,    1843-1844  131 

were  to  be  free,  he  believed  that  quarrels  and  even 
war  would  soon  be  the  result.  "If  this  government 
should  make  itself  a  party  in  asserting  the  rights  of 
the  slaveholder,  the  result  could  not  fail  to  be  unfavor 
able  to  Texas."  With  regard  to  her,  the  question  would 
merely  be  whether  a  slave-owner  would  submit  to  in 
tolerable  and  ruinous  wrongs,  or  protect  himself  by 
force.  "Between  such  alternatives,  it  is  impossible  to 
suppose  that  he  would  hesitate  a  moment."  There  was 
no  analogy,  he  said,  between  Texas  and  Canada,  for. 
between  the  slave  states  and  the  British  province  there 
were  free  states  of  the  Union,  bound  to  return  the 
fugitive  slave.  Thus  Murphy  was  told  that  the  United 
States  would  not  permit  abolition  in  Texas.  This  is 
the  prevailing  idea  of  the  instruction.  It  is  equally 
noteworthy  for  what  it  omits,  as  there  is  not  one  word 
about  the  annexation  of  Texas.23  Murphy's  answer 
was  not  received  by  Upshur  until  after  annexation 
had  been  proposed  to  Van  Zandt  at  Washington. 
Murphy  was  inclined  to  make  light  of  Andrews  and 
his  abolitionist  plans  in  Texas.  "The  people  of 
Texas,"  he  wrote,  "love  their  constitution  and  form  of 
government;  and  ninety-nine  out  of  a  hundred  would 
die  for  their  preservation.  The  constitution  of  Texas 
secures  to  the  master  the  perpetual  right  to  his  slave 
and  prohibits  the  introduction  of  slaves  into  Texas 
from  any  other  quarter  than  the  United  States.  Take 
this  stand  on  the  side  of  the  constitution  and  the  laws, 
and  the  civil,  political,  and  religious  liberties  of  the 
people  of  Texas  (saying  nothing  about  abolition)  and 
all  the  world  will  be  with  you."  :  Houston's  apparent 

23  Upshur  to  Murphy,  August  8,  1843;  ut  sup. 

24  Murphy  to  Upshur,  September  24,  1843  (received  Novem 
ber  3)  ;  H.  Ex.  Doc.  271,  28  Cong.,  I  Sess.,  22. 


132  DIPLOMACY   UNDER   TYLER   AND   POLK 

pro-British  tendencies  concerned  Murphy  more  than 
Andrews's  abolitionist  schemes.  He  wrote:  "Let  the 
United  States  take  some  immediate  quick  step  in  this 
subject."25  Before  Murphy's  letter  had  been  read  by 
Upshur,  the  "quick  step"  had  been  taken.  Murphy 
was  told  that  as  far  as  the  government  of  the  United 
States  was  concerned,  it  would  come  to  the  aid  of 
Texas  immediately  if  that  were  possible,  but  he  feared 
that  the  government  would  not  have  the  support  of  the 
people  in  the  policy  of  assistance.  "No  negotiation  is 
now  pending  between  this  government  and  Texas,"  he 
added.28 

Upshur,  it  will  be  seen,  preferred  to  build  up  his 
policy  upon  the  unofficial  reports  of  Duff  Green.  Ob 
viously,  the  proper  source  of  information  as  to  British 
interference  in  Texas  was  Everett,  the  minister  to 
Great  Britain ;  but  Everett  was  not  in  touch  with,  nor 
was  he  in  the  confidence  of,  Tyler,  who  would  gladly 
have  got  rid  of  him  for  Webster.  From  Everett's 
reports  Upshur  could  gain  nothing  upon  which  to 
raise  fears  of  British  supremacy  in  Texas.  Everett 
was  then  told  that  the  movements  of  Great  Britain  rela 
tive  to  African  slavery  had  assumed  such  a  character 
as  to  demand  the  serious  attention  of  the  American 
government.  Taking  Brougham's  interpellation  of 
Aberdeen  in  the  House  of  Lords,  upon  the  general 
subject  of  Texas  and  slavery,  as  a  peg  upon  which  to 
hang  an  essay  in  defense  of  slavery  as  the  necessary 
condition  of  the  African  race,  Upshur  repeated  the 

"Murphy  to  Upshur,  September  23,  1843  (received  Nov. 
3)  ;  ibid.,  24. 

26  Upshur  to  Murphy,  September  22,  1843.  In  part  printed 
as  above,  but  this  quotation  was  omitted. 


UPSHUR   AND   TEXAS,    1843-1844  133 

arguments  made  to  Murphy  upon  the  danger  of  abo 
lition  in  Texas.27  "A  leading  and  fundamental  insti 
tution,  interwoven  with  the  interests  of  nearly  one-half 
of  the  States  of  our  Union,  is  threatened  by  the  policy 
of  a  foreign  Power.  We  must  be  infatuated  indeed, 
if  we  can  quietly  submit  to  any  policy  of  a  foreign 
nation  designed  or  calculated  to  bring  it  into  danger."  : 
Everett's  report,  if  Upshur  gave  it  any  credit  at  all,  must 
have  shown  the  secretary  that  he  had  been  deluded  by 
a  hoax,  carefully  prepared  for  him  by  Duff  Green. 
Houston's  and  Jones's  ruse  of  scaring  the  United 
States,  played  through  Murphy  in  Texas  and  Van 
Zandt  at  Washington,  was  entirely  successful.  Ever 
ett's  reply  to  Upshur  stated  that  both  Aberdeen  and 
Ashbel  Smith  had  distinctly  denied  that  any  proposi 
tion  had  been  made  by  Texas  in  which  abolition  was 
mentioned.29 

"Upshur  to  Everett,  No.  61,  September  28,  1843;  S.  Ex. 
Doc.  341,  28  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  27. 

28  Upshur  to  Everett,  confidential,  September  28,  1843;  ibid., 
37- 

"Everett  to  Upshur,  November  16,  1843;  ibid.,  40. 

"The  subject  of  domestic  slavery  was  never  so  much  as 
mentioned  or  alluded  to  by  the  British  minister  to  the  gov 
ernment  of  Texas,  except  to  disclaim  in  most  emphatic  terms 
any  intention  on  the  part  of  England  to  interfere  with  it  here. 
Indeed,  that  constituted  no  part  of  the  policy  of  that  far 
reaching  nation.  She  might  be  willing  to  tickle  the  abo 
litionists  (a  somewhat  venomous  but  not  very  respectable  or 
influential  class  of  her  citizens)  but  had  no  idea  of  going  in 
a  crusade  with  them  to  abolish  slavery  in  Texas,  or  anywhere 
else.  Her  Texas  policy  was  to  build  up  a  power  independent 
of  the  United  States  who  could  raise  cotton  enough  to  supply 
the  world;  of  which  power  slavery  would  be  a  necessary 
element.  And  this  not  primarily  to  injure  the  United  States, 
but  to  benefit  herself,  not  from  enmity  to  Brother  Jonathan, 
but  love  to  John  Bull,  and  so  with  France."  Anson  Jones, 
Official  Correspondence,  82. 


134  DIPLOMACY   UNDER   TYIJSR   AND 

But  Upshur  had  been  too  powerfully  played  upon 
by  fears  of  Great  Britain  to  wait  for  Everett's  report. 
What  he  had  promised  to  do  for  Texas  in  general 
terms  was  now  put  forth  specifically.  "Recent  occur 
rences  in  Europe,"  he  said,  "have  imparted  to  the  sub 
ject  a  fresh  interest  and  presented  it  in  new  and  im 
portant  aspects."  He  therefore  proposed  to  Van 
Zandt  that  he  ask  for  instructions  favorable  to  a  treaty 
of  annexation.  He  could  not  guarantee  the  Senate's 
ratification  of  an  annexation  treaty,  but  he  engaged  that 
the  President  would  urge  the  measure  upon  the  "con 
sideration  of  Congress." ' 

Van  Zandt  immediately  asked  for  instructions  to 
proceed  according  to  Upshur.'s  proposal.  He  wrote 
to  his  government  that  he  hoped  they  would  accept 
annexation,  as  he  believed  it  the  best  move  possible. 
"My  secret  opinion  is  that  Santa  Anna  won't  acknowl 
edge  our  independence  now,  but  we  must  keep  trying — 
the  longer  the  armistice  the  better." ''  Upshur's  over 
ture  came  as  a  surprise  to  Houston.  Murphy  had  not 
been  instructed  to  offer  annexation  and  he  was  not 
informed  by  Upshur  of  the  proposal  to  Van  Zandt.'2 
All  that  Upshur  vouchsafed  to  say  to  Murphy  was  that 
the  administration  desired  annexation  but  it  was  doubt 
ful  if  it  could  be  effected.33 


80  Upshur  to  Van  Zandt,  October  16,  1843 ;  ibid.,  37- 

31  Van  Zandt  to  Jones,  October  22,  1843 ;  Jones,  Official  Cor 
respondence,  2$g 

32  Upshur  to  Murphy,  January  16,   1844;   S.  Ex.  Doc.  341, 
28  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  43.     Upshur's  letters  to  Murphy  of  October 
18  and  October  20  (MS.,  Archives)  say  nothing  about  annex 
ation. 

33  Upshur  to  Murphy,  November  21,  1843,  was  in  reference 
to  the  armistice.     Extracts  printed  in  H.  Ex.  Doc.  271,  28 
Cong.,  i  Sess.,  43. 


UPSHUR   AND   TDXAS,    1843-1844  135 

In  Houston's  message  to  the  Texan  Congress  in 
December,  1843,  ne  la*d  stress  upon  the  friendliness 
of  Great  Britain  and  contrasted  the  efforts  made  by  her 
to  secure  peace  for  Texas  with  the  do-nothing  and 
selfish  policy  of  the  United  States.  Soon  afterwards 
Upshur's  overture  was  received.  Houston  instructed 
Jones  to  decline  the  proposal  for  annexation.14  Thus 
the  policy  determined  upon  and  carefully  worked  out, 
to  force  the  United  States  to  action  through  fears  of 
British  domination,  was  carried  forward  another  step. 
Houston's  declination  of  Upshur's  overture  was  not 
counter  to  this  policy  but  was  strictly  in  accord  with 
it.  Annexation  was  refused  because  Upshur  could  not 
promise  the  ratification  of  the  treaty.84  The  Texan 
government  was  unwilling  "to  risk  everything  in  a 
single  throw  of  an  uncertain  die."  Upon  the  receipt  of 
Houston's  refusal,  Upshur  bestirred  himself  upon  the 
question  of  ratification.  How  much  he  depended  upon 
definite  promises  from  members  of  the  Senate  and  how 
much  upon  hearsay  it  is  impossible  to  state.  He  re 
peated  to  Murphy  that  "measures  have  been  taken  to 
ascertain  the  opinions  and  views  of  Senators  upon  the 
subject  and  it  is  found  that  a  clear  constitutional 
majority  of  two-thirds  are  in  favor  of  the  measure." ' 
This  information  Murphy  gave  to  Houston.  Relying 
upon  the  correctness  of  Upshur's  statement  (of  which 
he  doubtless  had  independent  corroboration  "),  Hous- 

MJones's  Memorandum,  December  17,  1843;  Official  Cor 
respondence,  39. 

"Ibid.,  261. 

MUpshur  to  Murphy,  January  16,  1844;  H.  Ex.  Doc.  271, 
28  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  47. 

"  C.  H.  Raymond,  Secretary  of  the  Texan  Legation  at 
Washington,  to  Jones,  February  17,  1844;  Jones,  Official  Cor 
respondence,  314. 


136  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

ton  and  his  cabinet  agreed  to  accept  Upshur's  proposal 
and  to  send  a  commission  to  the  United  States  with 
full  powers  for  the  negotiation  of  a  treaty  of  annexa 
tion.  Houston,  however,  took  the  precaution  to  in 
trench  himself  against  any  unforeseen  obstacle  to  the 
consummation  of  the  treaty.  He  asked  Murphy  for  a 
definite  tender  of  protection  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States  during  the  process  of  negotiation.38  Murphy 
assured  Houston  that  the  United  States,  having  invited 
Texas  to  this  negotiation,  would  at  once,  arid  before 
any  negotiation  was  begun,  place  a  sufficient  naval 
force  in  the  Gulf  to  protect  the  coast  of  Texas,  and 
would  hold  a  sufficient  force  of  troops  near  the  south 
western  border  of  the  United  States  in  readiness  to 
protect  Texas  pending  the  proposed  negotiation  for 
annexation.39 

Van  Zandt  at  Washington  had  made  a  similar  re 
quest  to  Upshur  for  protection,40  but  the  secretary 
of  state  gave  no  answer  to  it.  Houston  was  able  to 
extract  assurances  from  the  incautious  Murphy  that 
Upshur,  although  enthusiastic  for  annexation,  hesi 
tated  to  give. 

Feeling  secure  in  the  assurances  that  the  treaty 
would  be  ratified  and  that  the  United  States  would 
protect  Texas  during  the  negotiation,  Houston  des- 

38  Murphy   to    Upshur,    February    15,    1844;    MS.,    Archives. 
Houston  determined  to  send  Henderson  to  Washington  Feb 
ruary  14.    Jones  said  that  guarantees  were  demanded  because 
it    was    believed    that   n,o    annexation    treaty    could    pass    the 
United    States    Senate.      Official    Correspondence,    381.      But 
this  was  written  after  the  treaty  had  been  rejected. 

39  Murphy  to  Upshur,  February  15,  1844;  H.  Ex.  Doc.  271, 
28  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  92. 

40  Van  Zandt  to  Upshur,  January  17,  1844;  ibid.,  88. 


UPSHUR   AND   TEXAS,    1843-1844  137 

patched  General  J.  P.  Henderson  to  Washington  to 
act  in  conjunction  with  Van  Zandt  for  the  accomplish 
ment  of  annexation. 

Before  Houston's  special  commissioner  arrived  at 
Washington,  Upshur,  the  active  friend  of  annexation, 
and  Gilmer,  his  strongest  aide,  with  others  of  Tyler's 
closest  friends,  were  no  longer  among  the  living.  The 
Princeton  tragedy,  which  threw  the  capital  and  nation 
into  mourning,  had  a  profound  bearing  upon  the  ques 
tion  of  Texas  so  soon  to  be  presented  for  final  action. 
Another  reconstruction  of  Tyler's  cabinet  was  made 
necessary.  Calhoun,  the  aggressive  champion  of 
slavery  and  but  recently  an  avowed  candidate  for  the 
presidency,  was  selected  for  the  place  of  Upshur.  By 
him  was  the  negotiation  conducted  with  Van  Zandt 
and  Henderson.  The  death  of  Upshur  delayed  the 
negotiation  until  the  time  for  the  national  political 
conventions  was  almost  at  hand.  Calhoun's  abilities 
were  exerted  earnestly  for  the  signing  and  ratification 
of  the  treaty.  In  no  public  matter  of  his  life  were  his 
peculiar  talents  put  to  more  strenuous  use.  Reasoning 
from  his  predilections  with  merciless  logic,  he  robbed 
the  question  of  Texan  annexation  of  all  its  national 
advantages.  He  put  it  before  the  Senate  and  people 
of  the  United  States  as  a  sectional  question,  necessary 
to  the  salvation  of  the  South  and  of  its  peculiar  insti 
tution.  Again  was  expansion  halted  and  not  furthered 
by  slavery.  The  annexation  treaty  was  rejected  by 
the  Senate. 


CHAPTER  VI 

CALHOUN  AND  THE:  ATTEMPTED  ANNEXATION  OF 
TSXAS  BY  TREATY 

There  is  a  note  of  uncertainty  in  the  proffer  of  the 
state  portfolio  by  Tyler  to  Calhoun.  After  the  death 
of  Upshur,  Tyler  was  in  desperate  straits.  A  new  and 
untried  man  would  not  have  been  able  to  push  forward 
the  delicate  negotiation  which  Upshur  had  been  carry 
ing  on  for  the  annexation  of  Texas.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  appointment  of  a  man  like  Calhoun,  but  re 
cently  an  avowed  aspirant  for  the  presidency,  might 
make  the  agent  greater  than  the  principal.  The  an 
nexation  of  Texas,  if  accomplished,  might  be  credited 
to  Calhoun,  and  not  to  Tyler.  The  measure,  if  suc 
cessful,  might  be  the  victory  about  which  those  Demo 
crats,  totally  estranged  from  Van  Buren,  might  rally. 

The  events  of  Calhoun's  career  immediately  preced 
ing  his  acceptance  of  Tyler's  offer  of  the  state  de 
partment  form  a  curious  narrative  of  political  intrigue. 
Calhoun  had  resigned  from  the  Senate  in  1842  and 
was  immediately  nominated  for  the  presidency  by  the 
legislature  of  South  Carolina.  When  the  House  of  Rep 
resentatives  organized  in  December,  1843,  Calhoun's 
friends  agreed  to  support  for  speaker  a  northern  Demo 
crat,  Wilkins  of  Pennsylvania.  In  return  for  this,  mem- 
mers  of  the  Pennsylvania  delegation  and  others  pledged 
their  support  to  Calhoun  as  against  Van  Buren.  The 
deal  was  discovered  before  the  party  contest  took  place. 
Ingersoll  and  Buchanan  drove  the  Pennsylvania 


CALHOUN   AND  THE)  TEXAS  TREATY  139 

Democrats  from  this  agreement  and  Wilkins  was  de 
feated  in  the  caucus.1  Soon  thereafter  Calhoun  an 
nounced  to  his  friends  his  determination  to  issue  an 
address  formally  withdrawing  from  the  coming  presi 
dential  contest.2  Calhoun's  public  expression  upon  the 
Texas  question  came  at  the  same  time.1  Gilmer,  who 
had  stirred  up  the  Texas  matter  before,  now  appealed 
to  Calhoun  for  his  opinion  as  to  annexation,  possibly 
for  the  purpose  of  strengthening  Upshur's  hand  in  the 
Senate  in  favor  of  the  treaty,  with  the  ulterior  purpose 
of  drawing  credit  away  from  Tyler  to  Calhoun.  Cal 
houn  was  told  in  strictest  confidence  that  "negotiations 
had  been  commenced  the  object  of  which  was  to  annex 
Texas  to  the  Union."  Gilmer  stated  that  he  was  not 
at  liberty  to  disclose,  nor  was  he  informed  of,  the  pre 
cise  state  of  the  negotiation  at  present.  "As  a  Candi 
date  for  public  favor,"  he  wrote,  "I  would  not  have 
you  or  any  other  to  be  committed  upon  this  question  in 
advance.  I  do  not  therefore  approach  you  as  one  of 
those  now  in  the  public  eye  as. candidates  for  the  chief 

*Rhett  to  Calhoun,  December  8,  1843;  Report  of  Am.  Hist. 
Association,  1899,  II.,  898. 

2  Calhoun  to  Duff  Green,  February  10,  1844 ;  ibid.,  568. 
"Both    of   the   great   parties    have    degenerated    from    their 

original  standard  so  far  that  they  have  ceased  to  represent 
their  original  principles.  .  .  .  The  Democrats  are  the  old 
Republican  party  turned  spoilsmen." 

3  Writing  to  McDuffie,  December  4,  1843,  ibid.,  555,  Calhoun 
said:  "I  see  the  subject  of  Texas  4s  destined  to  be  one  of  the 
first  magnitude.     The  interference  there  by  Great'  Britain  in 
order  to  act  on  our  Southern  institutions  has  presented  it  in 
a   new   and   most   important   aspect,   and   so   changed   it,   that 
those  who  were  formerly  opposed  to  the  annexation,  may  well 
support  it  now.     I  think  no  alternative  is  left  us,  and  that  if 
the  Executive  should  take  a  stand  for  it,  he  ought  to  be  unani 
mously  and  decidedly  supported  by  the  South." 


I4O  DIPLOMACY   UNDER   TYI^R   AND   POLK 

magistracy,  but  as  an  illustrious  citizen  whose  opinions 
would  derive  no  additional  force  from  any  station,  as 
I  believe  they  would  not  be  influenced  by  a  desire  to 
obtain  it." ''  Gilmer  wrote  from  Washington  and  must 
have  known  how  Calhoun's  plans  had  miscarried  in  the 
Democratic  caucus. 

Calhoun  had  already  learned  from  Virgil  Maxcy 
(another  victim  of  the  Princeton  disaster)  the  precise 
state  of  the  Texas  negotiation :  "Mr.  Upshur  informs 
me — in  the  strictest  confidence  however  except  to  you 
— that  the  terms  of  a  treaty  between  him  and  the  Texan 
Minister  have  already  been  agreed  on  and  written  out, 
and  that  the  latter  only  waits  for  instructions  from 
President  Houston,  which  are  expected  in  two  or  three 
weeks.  .  .  .  The  President  is  resolved  that  he  will 
communicate  such  a  treaty  to  the  Congress,  and  if  the 
Minister  has  not  firmness  to  sign  he  will  adopt  some 
other  mode  of  bringing  the  mattter  before  Congress. 
Mr.  Upshur  is  of  opinion  that  this  is  the  only  matter 
that  will  take  sufficient  hold  of  the  feelings  of  the 
South,  to  rally  it  on  a  southern  candidate  and  weaken 
Clay  and  Van  Buren  so  much  there  as  to  bring  the 
election  into  the  House,  where  the  Southern  States 
would  not  dare  to  vote  for  Mr.  V.  B.  and  C. 
.  ..  .  The  President  has  some  hopes  that  he  may 
become  that  Southern  Candidate.  But  Mr.  U. 
considers  you  as  the  only  one  that  can  be  taken  up 
and  with  a  view  to  your  availing  yourself  of  the  first 
moment,  after  the  Executive  communication  to  Con 
gress  on  Texas,  to  place  before  the  public  your  views 
on  the  question,  that  all  who  concur  with  you,  may 

4  Gilmer  to  Calhoun,  December  13,  1843;  ibid.,  904. 


CALHOUN   AND  THE  TEXAS  TREATY  14! 

at  once  rally  upon  you." '  Thus  in  a  confidential  way 
Maxcy  disclosed  what  a  few  days  later  Gilmer  hinted 
at.  If  one  may  trust  Maxcy's  accuracy  in  reporting 
Upshur,  the  so-called  "Calhoun  intrigue"  appears  in  a 
somewhat  different  light  from  that  in  which  Benton 
placed  it.  That  Calhoun's  name  was  connected  with 
Texas  from  the  time  Upshur  succeeded  Webster  and 
the  active  Texas  campaign  began  (as  a  part  of  a  plan 
for  furthering  the  South  Carolinian's  prospects  for  the 
presidency)  cannot  be  shown.  Indeed,  Calhoun's  de 
termination  to  withdraw  after  the  congressional  caucus 
fiasco  seems  to  argue  against  such  a  theory.  But  on 
the  other  hand  it  is  plain  that  Calhoun's  friends  who 
were  in  the  cabinet  of  Tyler  were  raising  the  Texas 
question  to  advance  not  Tyler  but  Calhoun.  The  de 
vious  paths  of  diplomacy  are  lost  in  the  tangled  maze 
of  political  intrigue.  Upshur,  with  disloyalty  to  his 
chief,  was  engaged  in  pushing  the  Texas  question  in  an 
effort  to  strengthen  the  prospects  of  Calhoun,  who  like 
Tyler  courted  political  success  in  1844.  Such  intrigues 
explain  Upshur's  aggressiveness.  Tyler,  however,  be 
lieved  in  his  secretary's  loyalty  to  him.  As  the  course 
of  events  proved,  Upshur's  insincerity  was  never 
known  to  Tyler.  The  accident  upon  the  Princeton 
lost  two  friends  to  Calhoun,  as  well  as  two  members 
of  the  cabinet  and  active  workers  for  annexation.  Only 
four  days  before  Upshur  and  Gilmer  were  killed, 
Huger,  a  senator  from  South  Carolina,  offered  to  re 
sign  his  seat  in  Calhoun's  favor,  in  order  that  his  state 
might  be  represented  again  by  her  favorite  son.6  Cal 
houn's  reentrance  into  public  life  was  by  another  chan- 

5  Maxcy  to  Calhoun,  December  10,  1843 ;  ibid.,  903. 
'Calhoun  to  Hammond,  March  5,  1844;  ibid.,  571. 


142  DIPLOMACY   UNDI^R  TYLER   AND   POLK 

nel.  On  the  reconstruction  of  the  cabinet,  the  last  of 
a  series  of  such  events  in  the  administration  of  the  un 
fortunate  Tyler,  Calhoun's  friends  were  again  active. 
Luckily  Calhoun's  withdrawal  from  the  presidential 
contest  had  just  been  made  public. 

Tyler's  biographer  admits  that  the  President  did  not 
want  Calhoun  in  his  cabinet,  fearing,  among  other 
things,  that  the  senatorial  support  which  Upshur  had 
gained  for  the  ratification  of  a  treaty  of  annexation 
might  be  lost  if  Calhoun  took  up  Upshur's  labors. 
Tyler  accepted  Calhoun,  it  was  said,  as  a  choice  of 
evils.  Indeed,  it  was  asserted  that  it  was  not  in  respect 
to  Texas  at  all,  a  negotiation  which  Upshur  had  uvir-  | 
tually  closed,"  but  on  account  of  the  Oregon  question 
that  President  Tyler  contemplated  any  good  results 
from  the  appointment  of  Calhoun.  This  statement  does 
not  bear  the  test  of  investigation,  for  Tyler  insisted 
to  Calhoun  that  "the  negotiation  for  Texas  was  in  the 
act  of  competition  (sicJ^arih  would  admit  of  no  delay."  T 

Tyler  was  drawn  into  the  appointment  of  Calhoun 
by  the  importunities  of  Calhoun's  friends,  and  those 
friends  were  not  slow  to  claim  credit  for  the  appoint 
ment.8  He  offered  the  state  portfolio  to  Calhoun  on  the 
6th  of  March  after  a  "free  and  frank  conversation 
with  our  friends,  Governor  McDuffie  and  Mr.  Holmes 
of  South  Carolina."  "We  have  reached  a  great  crisis 
in  the  condition  of  public  affairs,"  he  wrote  in  making 
the  offer,  "which,  I  trust,  will  assume  the  place  of  a 
commanding  epoch  in  our  Country's  history.  The  an- 


7  Tyler's  Tylers,  II.,  294.    Tyler  to  Calhoun,  March  6,  1844 ; 
Am.  Hist.  Association  Report,   1899,   II.,  939. 

8  Cf.    Schouler's  History,  IV.,  455. 


CALHOUN   AND  THE  TEXAS  TREATY  143 

nexation  of  Texas  to  the  Union,  and  the  settlement  of 
the  Oregon  question  on  a  satisfactory  basis,  are  the 
great  ends  to  be  accomplished.  The  first  is  in  the  act 
of  competition  and  will  admit  of  no  delay.  The  last  had 
but  barely  opened,  when  death  snatched  from  me  my 
lamented  friend.'"  Tyler  did  not  wait  to  hear  from 
Calhoun  but  sent  his  name  without  delay  to  the  Senate, 
which  confirmed  the  appointment  immediately.  Ten 
days  later  Calhoun  accepted  the  appointment,  stating 
to  the  President  that  he  did  so  with  great  reluqtance. 
"Nothing  short  of  the  magnitude  of  the  crisis,  occa 
sioned  by  the  pending  negotiations,  could  induce  me 
to  leave  my  retirement."  His  acceptance  was  con 
ditional  :  when  the  negotiations  were  completed  he 
should  be  at  liberty  to  retire.10 

Tyler's  new  secretary  of  state  arrived  in  Washington 
late  in  March.  The  President  had  said  nothing  about 
annexation  in  his  message  to  Congress  in  December, 
further  than  to  make  a  decided  statement  that  the 
war  between  Texas  and  Mexico  must  cease.  But  as 
has  been  seen,  Calhoun  already  knew  from  reliable 
sources  how  far  the  Texan  negotiation  had  been  car 
ried.  Tyler  was  waiting  for  the  Texas  emissaries  to 
arrive  in  Washington  to  frame  a  treaty  upon  the  lines 
laid  down  by  Upshur. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  Houston  refused  to  send 
Henderson  to  Washington  until  Murphy  had  guaran 
teed  that  the  forces  of  the  United  States  would  protect 
Texas  pending  the  negotiation.  Nelson,  who  was 
secretary  of  state  ad  interim  until  Calhoun  arrived, 

'Tyler  to  Calhoun,  March  6,  1844;  ut  sup. 
10  Calhoun  to  Tyler,  March  16,  1844 ;  ibid.,  577. 


144  DIPLOMACY    UND^R   TYI^R   AND    POLK 

repudiated  Murphy's  guarantee  to  Houston.  Murphy 
was  told  that  he  had  allowed  his  zeal  for  annexation 
to  carry  him  beyond  the  line  of  his  instructions,  there 
by  committing  the  President  to  measures  for  which  he 
had  no  constitutional  authority  to  stipulate.11  "The  em 
ployment  of  the  army  or  navy  against  a  foreign  power 
with  which  the  United  States  are  at  peace  is  not  within 
the  competency  of  the  President,  and  whilst  he  is  not 
indisposed,  as  a  measure  of  prudent  precaution,  and  as 
preliminary  to  the  proposed  negotiation,  to  concentrate 
in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  on  the  southern  borders  of 
the  United  States,  a  naval  and  military  force  to  be  di 
rected  to  the  defence  of  the  inhabitants  and  territory  of 
Texas  at  a  proper  time,  he  cannot  permit  the  authori 
ties  of  that  government  or  yourself  to  labor  under  the 
misapprehension  that  he  has  power  to  employ  them 
at  the  period  indicated  by  your  stipulations."  Although 
Tyler  then  knew  that  the  armistice  between  Texas  and 
Mexico  had  been  broken,  he  professed  to  believe  that 
hostilities  would  not  be  resumed  and  that  "annexation 
would  be  speedily  and  peacefully  accomplished."  : 

The  Texan  commissioners,  Van  Zandt  and  Hender 
son,  who  now  appeared  in  Washington,  were  not  to  be 
satisfied  by  such  optimistic  expressions.  They  insisted 
that  guarantees  in  the  line  of  those  given  by  Murphy 
to  Houston  be  renewed  before  further  negotiation. 
Calhoun  prevailed  upon  Tyler  to  make  an  about-face. 
The  Texan  commissioners  were  informed  that  orders 
had  been  issued  to  concentrate  a  strong  naval  force 
in  the  Gulf  and  to  place  troops  upon  the  southwestern 

"Nelson  to   Murphy,   March   n,    1844;   H.   Ex.   Doc.   271, 
28  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  95. 
12  Ibid. 


CALHOUN  AND  THE  TEXAS  TREATY  145 

frontier  to  meet  any  emergency.  After  the  treaty  had 
been  signed  and  while  ratification  by  the  Senate  was 
pending,  the  President  would  deem  it  his  duty  to  use 
all  the  means  placed  within  his  power  by  the  Constitu 
tion  to  protect  Texas  from  all  foreign  invasion.18  Prior 
to  this  assurance  from  Calhoun,  Henderson  wrote  home 
that  he  had  maintained  a  bold  front  upon  the  subject 
of  his  negotiation.  Every  one,  even  the  British  min 
ister,  knew  the  object  of  his  mission  and  he  made  no 
secret  of  it.  In  conversation  with  members  of  both 
houses  of  Congress  he  found  that  all  of  the 
Whigs  and  some  of  the  Democrats  were  anxious 
to  postpone  the  subject  until  after  the  fall  elections. 
"I  have  said  that  this  is  the  third  time  that 
Texas  has  urged  this  measure  upon  the  United 
States ;  that  it  is  now  brought  up  at  the  instance 
of  the  United  States  government,  and  that  it  cannot 
be  postponed  without  finally  and  forever  defeating 
it;  that  the  situation  of  Texas  is  such  that  she  must 
now  seek  safety  in  some  quarter  by  annexation,  alliance, 
or  other  engagements,  which  will  secure  her  peace 
and  immediate  safety;  that  any  delay  at  this  time  on 
the  part  of  the  United  States  will  be  fatal  to  her  hope 
of  annexing  us  in  the  future  if  she  indulges  in  such 
hope."  While  some  of  the  Democrats  preferred  delay 
because  they  were  afraid  of  the  political  capital  that 
Tyler  or  Calhoun  might  obtain  from  the  measure,  Hen 
derson  was  assured  by  them  that  every  Democratic 
senator  would  vote  for  the  treaty,  and  he  hoped  for 
enough  Clay- Whig  votes  to  make  up  the  necessary 
two-thirds.  "Should  the  treaty  be  rejected,  a  bill  will 

13  Calhoun  to  Van  Zandt,  April  n,  1844;  ibid.,  96. 


146  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

be  ready  to  go  before  Congress  to  authorize  the  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States  to  take  possession  of  Texas, 
with  our  consent,  as  soon  as  it  is  expressed  in  a  legal 
way."  M 

Doubts  as  to  ratification  were  already  in  the  minds 
of  Houston  and  his  secretary  of  state.  Houston's 
policy  of  scaring  the  United  States  into  annexation  by 
fear  of  British  ascendancy  in  Texas  was  never  aban 
doned,  nor,  on  the  other  hand,  did  he  at  all  relax 
his  efforts  to  assure  Texan  independence  upon  the 
basis  of  stability  and  permanence  in  case  the  United 
States  should  again  reject  annexation. 

The  excitation  of  fears  upon  the  part  of  the  United 
States  toward  England,  as  a  strong  argument  for  an 
nexation,  and  the  use  of  every  means  by  which  the 
foundation  of  Texan  independence  might  be  laid, 
should  annexation  miscarry,  were  two  parallel  lines  of 
one  and  the  same  policy.  Houston's  insistence  that 
the  United  States  guarantee  protection  pending  ne 
gotiations  was  not  so  much  for  the  purpose  of  defend 
ing  Texas  against  Mexico  as  it  was  to  force  the  hand 
of  the  United  States  as  against  Great  Britain.15 

After  Murphy  had  withdrawn,  in  accordance  with 
Nelson's  instructions,  his  guarantees  of  naval  and  mili 
tary  aid,  Jones  remarked  that  the  United  States  were 
recovering  a  little  from  their  alarm.  "I  will  have  to 
give  them  another  scare.  One  or  two  doses  of  English 
calomel  and  French  quinine  have  to  be  administered, 
and  the  case  will  be  pretty  well  out  of  danger." ] 

14  Henderson  to  Jones,  March  30,  1844 ;  Jones,  Official  Cor 
respondence,  334. 

15  Murphy  to  Tyler,  April  8,  1844 ;  MS.,  Archives. 
"Jones,  Official  Correspondence,  335. 


CALHOUN   AND  THE  T£XAS   TREATY  147 

Elliott,  the  British  charge,  returned  to  Texas  from  the 
United  States  and  expressed  his  belief  that  no  treaty 
of  annexation  would  be  ratified  by  the  Senate  of  the 
United  States.17  The  close  relationship  of  Elliott  with 
Houston  and  Jones  continued.  Murphy  again  became 
alarmed  at  the  prospect  of  British  influence  in  Texas. 
He  wrote  to  Tyler  that  Houston  and  his  cabinet,  as 
well  as  all  of  his  leading  confidential  friends,  were  se 
cretly  opposed  to  annexation.  "The  number  of  British 
agents,  crowding  Galveston  and  Houston  would  as 
tonish  you.  Secret,  dark,  and  diligent  in  something 
or  other,  which  men  known  or  suspected  to  be  friendly 
to  annexation  cannot  find  out."  ] 

At  the  time  Murphy  was  thus  writing  to  Tyler, 
Elliott  was  asking  the  Texan  government  for  expla 
nations  as  to  its  position  toward  his  government,  which 
had  been  active  in  attempting  to  put  Texas  at  peace 
with  Mexico.19  Elliott  was  told  that  the  United  States 
had  done  what  other  friendly  nations  had  refused  to 
do,  namely,  given  a  promise  that  Texas  would  be  pro 
tected  against  invasion ;  that  the  proposition  for  annex 
ation  had  been  made  by  the  United  States;  and  for 
the  sake  of  peace  and  security,  Texas  had  accepted 
it.20  Hearing  that  the  French  and  British  charges 
had  united  in  a  protest  against  annexation,  Murphy 
asked  for  a  copy  of  the  paper.  Such  a  protest,  if  con- 

17  He   wrote   this   to   Jones   as   early   as   February   22,    1844. 
Murphy  to  Upshur,  February  22,  1844;  MS.,  Archives. 

18  Murphy  to  Tyler,  March   10,   1844;   MS.,  Archives. 
"Elliott  to  Jones,  Match  22,   1844;   Jones,   Official  Corres 
pondence,  329. 

20  Elliott  to   Houston,   March  8  and   22,    1844 ;    Houston   to 
Elliott,  March  — ,  1844;  Yoakum's  Texas,  II.,  427. 


148  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

templated,  was  never  made ;  for  no  more  certain  method 
of  insuring  annexation  by  the  United  States  could 
have  been  adopted.  However  much  Houston  and  Jones 
would  have  welcomed  such  a  protest,  the  representa 
tives  of  Great  Britain  and  France  were  too  wary  to 
proceed  as  if  in  possession  of  a  right  which  they  mani 
festly  did  not  have.21  Murphy  was  led  to  believe  that 
a  good  understanding  existed  between  Elliott  and 
Houston.  This  much  was  true:  Houston  and  Jones 
did  nothing  to  estrange  Elliott,  who  might  be  useful 
if  annexation  were  defeated. 

At  Washington,  Calhoun  had  little  trouble  in  agree 
ing  upon  the  terms  of  a  treaty  with  Van  Zandt  and 
Henderson,  after  he  had  reversed  Nelson's  earlier  de 
cision  and  promised  protection  to  Texas  pending  an 
nexation  by  treaty.  It  had  been  claimed  by  Calhoun's 
correspondent  that  Upshur  and  Van  Zandt  had  not 
only  agreed  upon  the  terms  of  the  treaty  in  December, 
1843,  but  that  the  agreement  had  been  reduced  to 
writing.  This  may  have  been  the  truth.  No  docu 
mentary  evidence  exists  to  prove  or  disprove  it.  At 
any  rate  Calhoun  found  little  difficulty  in  bringing  the 
Texan  commissioners  to  an  agreement,  for  the  treaty 
was  signed  as  soon  as  protection  had  been  promised 
to  Texas. 

This  annexation  treaty  was  very  brief.  After  reciting 
that  the  people  of  Texas  had  been,  from  the  time  of 
adopting  their  constitution,  and  still  were,  unanimous 
in  their  desire  for  annexation  to  the  United  States,  it 
said  that  they  had  determined  to  accomplish  this  object 

21  Murphy  to  Jones,  April  17,  1844 ;  Jones,  Official  Corres 
pondence,  338. 


CALHOUN   AND  THE  TEXAS  TREATY  149 

so  important  to  their  permanent  welfare.  After  for 
mally  ceding  the  sovereignty  of  the  Republic  of  Texas, 
together  with  all  its  territory,  it  was  stipulated  that 
the  "citizens  of  Texas  should  be  incorporated  into  the 
Union  and  admitted,  as  soon  as  consistent  with  the 
provisions  of  the  Federal  Constitution,  to  the  enjoy 
ment  of  all  the  rights,  privileges,  and  immunities  of 
citizens  of  the  United  States."  a  Thus  a  document  pro 
mulgated  by  the  exponent  of  the  most  extreme  states- 
rights  doctrines  proceeded  upon  the  theory  that  the 
Constitution  did  not  extend  ex  proprio  vigore  to  in 
habitants  of  acquired  territory,  even  though  such  in 
habitants  were  citizens  of  a  republic  annexed  to  the 
United  States.  This  treaty  as  drawn  by  Calhoun 
adopted  the  principle  of  constitutional  law  associated 
with  the  name  of  Chief  Justice  Marshall  and  first  found 
in  the  case  of  the  American  Insurance  Co.  vs.  Canter.23 

The  treaty  further  provided  that  all  the  public  lands 
of  Texas  should  be  ceded  to  the  federal  government 
in  consideration  of  the  assumption  by  the  United  States 
of  the  national  debt  of  Texas,  amounting  to  ten  mil 
lions  of  dollars. 

Not  a  word  was  said  about  the  boundaries  of  Texas. 
Van  Zandt  and  Henderson  had  been  instructed  to 
stipulate  that  Texas  might  be  divided  into  four  states 
for  admission  into  the  Union,  and  further  that  the 
boundaries  should  be  those  already  defined  by  the 
constitution  and  statutes  of  Texas.  The  former  stipu 
lation  was  obviously  beyond  the  treaty-making  power. 

22  S.  Ex.  Doc.  341,  28  Cong.,  i  Sess. 

23  Peters,  U.  S.  Reports,  I.,  511.     Compare  the  terms  of  the 
Louisiana  and  Florida  treaties. 


I5O  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

The  second  remained  a  matter  for  further  adjustment. 
Van  Zandt  and  Henderson  could  rest  assured  that  if 
annexation  became  an  accomplished  fact  the  United 
States  would  make  the  most  of  the  territorial  claims 
of  Texas. 

The  treaty  was  signed  April  12.  Not  until  the 
twenty-second  did  Tyler  send  it  to  the  Senate  with 
his  message  and  certain  documents  in  aid  of  the  case 
for  annexation.  It  must  be  remembered  that  Calhoun 
selected  from  the  mass  of  correspondence  upon  the 
subject,  heretofore  reviewed,  only  those  portions  that 
were  in  accord  with  his  theory,  namely,  that  annexation 
was  necessary  to  the  salvation  of  the  United  States, 
because  the  peculiar  institution  of  the  South  was  en 
dangered  owing  to  the  efforts  of  Great  Britain  looking 
toward  abolition  in  Texas.  That  institution  placed  in 
jeopardy,  the  national  interests  of  the  Union  were 
threatened.  As  a  foundation  for  his  case,  Calhoun 
selected  Upshur's  letter  to  Murphy  in  which  the  sinis 
ter  designs  of  Great  Britain  were  discussed  upon  the 
information  had  from  Duff  Green,  together  with  such 
extracts  from  Murphy's  correspondence  as  might  tend 
to  add  to  the  expressed  fear  of  Great  Britain's  motives. 
In  addition  to  this  correspondence  Calhoun  added  a 
letter  of  his  own.  If  Upshur  had  sounded  an  alarm, 
Calhoun  now  exerted  himself  to  raise  the  greatest  pos 
sible  excitement  over  the  fancied  menace.  He  did 
it  by  writing  a  letter  to  Pakenham,  the  British  minister 
at  Washington,  but  Calhoun  directed  it  over  Paken- 
ham's  shoulder  to  the  American  people.  Never  were 
the  tools  of  diplomacy  put  to  political  use  (always  a 
dangerous  practice)  with  more  disastrous  results  than 
by  Calhoun.  The  attempt  to  use  a  diplomatic  com- 


CALHOUN   AND  THE  TEXAS  TREATY  15! 

munication  as  a  political  manifesto  was  a  signal  failure. 
The  Senate  refused  to  ratify  the  treaty.  Again  was 
slavery  not  the  aid,  but  the  obstacle,  to  expansion. 
Calhoun's  correspondence  with  Pakenham  did  much 
to  make  it  so. 

Just  prior  to  Upshur's  death,  Pakenham  addressed 
a  note  to  the  secretary  of  state  in  which  he  enclosed 
a  letter  from  Aberdeen,  setting  forth'  definitely  and 
officially  the  attitude  of  Great  Britain  toward  Texas. 
Aberdeen  admitted  that  Great  Britain  took  an  interest 
in  the  welfare  of  the  new  republic  and  that  she  had  put 
herself  forward  in  pressing  upon  Mexico  the  claims  of 
Texas  for  independence.  He  denied  explicitly  that 
Great  Britain  had  any  "occult  design,"  either  with 
reference  to  any  peculiar  influence  over  Mexico  or 
Texas,  or  "even  with  reference  to  slavery  in  Texas." 
Had  Aberdeen  stopped  there,  the  disarming  of  the 
American  Anglophobes,  north  and  south,  would  have 
been  complete.  He  proceeded,  however,  to  avow  that 
he  wished  to  see  slavery  abolished  not  only  in  Texas, 
but  "throughout  the  world.  But  the  means  which 
she  has  adopted,"  he  continued,  "and  will  continue  to 
adopt,  for  this  humane  and  virtuous  purpose,  are  open 
and  undisguised.  She  will  do  nothing  secretly  or 
underhand.  She  desires  that  her  motives  may  be  gener 
ally  understood,  and  her  acts  seen  by  all."  Passing 
to  the  question  of  permanent  influence  in  Texas,  Aber 
deen  avowed  that  Great  Britain's  objects  were  purely 
commercial.  "She  has  no  thought  or  intention  of  seek 
ing  to  act  directly  or  indirectly,  in  a  political  sense,  on 
the  United  States  through  Texas." 

The  final  paragraph  of  the  note  was  in  questionable 
taste  and  unfortunate.  It  was  outside  the  issues  of  the 


152  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYI^R   AND   POLK 

case  to  incorporate  in  an  official  letter  to  be  handed 
to  the  representative  of  the  federal  government  any 
reference  to  the  free  and  slave  states  of  the  Union. 
The  paragraph,  though  doubtless  well-intentioned,  was 
officious.  "The  British  Government,  as  the  United 
States  well  know,  have  never  sought  in  any  way  to 
stir  up  disaffection  or  excitement  of  any  kind  in  the 
slaveholding  States  of  the  American  Union.  Much  as 
we  should  wish  to  see  those  States  placed  on  the  firm 
and  solid  footing  which  we  conscientiously  believe  is  to 
be  attained  by  general  freedom  alone,  we  have  never 
in  our  treatment  of  them  made  any  difference  between 
the  slaveholding  and  the  free  States  of  the  Union.  All 
are,  in  our  eyes,  entitled,  as  component  members  of 
the  Union,  to  equal  political  respect,  favor,  and  for 
bearance  on  our  part.  To  that  wise  and  just  policy 
we  shall  continue  to  adhere;  and  the  Governments  of 
the  slaveholding  States  may  be  assured  that,  although 
we  shall  not  desist  from  those  open  and  honest  efforts 
which  we  have  constantly  made  for  procuring  the  abo 
lition  of  slavery  throughout  the  world,  we  shall  neither 
openly  nor  secretly  resort  to  any  measures  which  can 
tend  to  disturb  their  internal  tranquillity,  or  thereby  to 
affect  the  prosperity  of  the  American  Union."  : 

Upshur,  of  course,  had  no  opportunity  of  answering 
Aberdeen's  note.  Not  until  after  the  Texas  treaty  had 
been  signed  did  Calhoun  reply.  This  letter  of  April 
1 8,  1844,  is  a  most  amazing  piece  of  diplomatic  litera 
ture,  and  all  of  Calhoun's  aptitude  for  dialectics  was 
brought  into  play  at  once.  Nowhere  did  the  man's 

24  Pakenham  to  Upshur,  February  26,  1844,  enclosing  Aber 
deen  to  Pakenham,  December  26,  1843.  S.  Ex.  Doc.  341, 
28  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  48. 


CALHOUN   AND  THE  TEXAS  TREATY  153 

logic  carry  him  to  a  reductio  ad  absurdum  more  clearly 
than  in  this  reply.  Calhoun  caught  at  certain  phrases 
of  Aberdeen's  note  and  rang  all  the  changes  possible 
upon  them.  The  President,  he  said,  was  glad  to  see 
that  Great  Britain  had  no  intention  of  taking  any 
measures  to  disturb  the  tranquillity  of  the  slaveholding 
states  of  the  Union.  At  the  same  time,  he  regarded 
"with  deep  concern  the  avowal,  for  the  first  time  made 
to  this  government,  that  'Great  Britain  desires  and  is 
constantly  exerting  herself  to  procure  the  general  abo 
lition  of  slavery  throughout  the  world.'  ...  So 
long  as  Great  Britain  confined  her  policy  to  the  abo 
lition  of  slavery  in  her  own  possessions  and  colonies, 

no  other  country  had  a  right  to  complain 

But  when  she  goes  beyond,  and  avows  it  to  be  her 
settled  policy,  and  the  object  of  her  constant  exertions, 
to  abolish  it  throughout  the  world,  she  makes  it  the 
duty  of  all  other  countries,  whose  safety  or  prosperity 
may  be  endangered  by  her  policy,  to  adopt  such  meas 
ures  as  they  may  deem  necessary  for  their  protection."  : 

The  reply  then  outlines  the  history  of  the  relations 
between  the  United  States  and  Texas.  While  since 
her  independence  Texas  had  ardently  wished  for  an 
nexation  to  the  United  States,  the  United  States  had 
declined  to  meet  her  wishes.  "The  time  has  now  ar 
rived  when  they  can  no  longer  refuse,  consistently  with 
their  own  security  and  peace,  and  the  sacred  obligation 
imposed  by  their  constitutional  compact  for  mutual 
defense  and  protection." 

Thus  England's  avowal  of  a  desire  for  abolition 
throughout  the  world  made  it  necessary  by  the  obli- 

K  Calhoun  to  Pakenham,  April  18,  1844 ;  ibid.,  50. 


154  DIPLOMACY   UNDER   TYLER   AND   POLK 

gations  of  the  Constitution  for  the  United  States  to 
annex  Texas  in  order  to  defend  the  institution  of 
slavery  from  future  injury.  Such  a  position  really 
defies  comment.  It  shows  how  far  Calhoun's  logic 
would  carry  him.  The  United  States  had  remained 
passive  as  long  as  Great  Britain's  policy  had  no  im 
mediate  bearing  upon  the  peace  and  safety  of  the 
United  States.  It  could  remain  so  no  longer.  Calhoun 
next  passed  to  the  consideration  of  the  general  sub 
ject  of  abolition.  He  condemned  it  as  hurtful  to  the 
white  and  degrading  to  the  black.  "It  may  safely  be 
affirmed,  that  could  she  [Great  Britain]  succeed  in 
accomplishing,  in  the  United  States,  what  she  avows 
to  be  her  desire  and  the  object  of  her  constant  exer 
tions  to  effect  throughout  the  world,  so  far  from  being 
wise  or  humane,  she  would  involve  in  the  greatest 
calamity  the  whole  country,  and  especially  the  race 
which  it  is  the  avowed  object  of  her  exertions  to 
benefit."  26 

This  letter  of  Calhoun's  has  been  quoted  at  some 
length,  for  the  importance  of  it  in  the  consideration  of 
the  rejected  treaty  of  annexation  cannot  be  overesti 
mated.  Upshur  had  begun  to  take  the  same  road,  but 
his  letters  were  not  made  public  until  Calhoun  made 
use  of  them  with  the  treaty.  The  reply  to  Pakenham, 
on  the  other  hand,  was  written  not  only  for  publication, 
but  with  the  purpose  of  creating  an  effect  upon  the 
American  people.  It  was  a  call  to  arms  for  the  slavery 
interests  to  unite  against  the  aggressions  of  Great 
Britain,  always  hated,  but  now  to  be  dreaded  as  the 
militant  champion  of  abolition  throughout  the  world. 

26  Calhoun  to  Pakenham,  April  18,  1844 ;  ibid.,  53- 


CALHOUN   AND  THE  TEXAS   TREATY  155 

It  attracted  not,  as  he  hoped,  the  slaveholding  interests, 
but  his  own  friends  only.  It  repelled  the  southern 
Whigs  and  the  northern  Democrats.  It  pressed  for 
ward  a  new  issue  upon  which  the  country  was  not  yet 
prepared  to  take  a  stand. 

Pakenham  rejoined  to  Calhoun's  reply  the  follow 
ing  day.27  Although  in  Tyler's  hands  when  the  treaty 
was  communicated,  it  was  not  referred  to  the  Senate 
for  another  ten  days,  and  then  with  another  reply  from 
Calhoun.  Pakenham  insisted  that  Calhoun  totally  mis 
construed  Aberdeen's  letter.  Calhoun  rejoined  that 
no  other  construction  could  be  given  it  than  that  the 
slave  interests,  now  the  national  interests  of  the  coun 
try,  were  menaced.  At  this  point  the  correspondence 
ended.  Its  effect  was,  no  doubt,  quite  different  from 
what  Aberdeen  might  have  anticipated.  It  delayed 
annexation  and  all  but  robbed  Calhoun  of  any  part  in 
the  final  success  of  the  measure. 

Tyler's  message  accompanying  the  treaty  proceeded 
upon  the  lines  of  Upshur's  and  of  Calhoun's  corres 
pondence,  but  the  President  softened  the  terms  and 
tried  to  show  annexation  in  its  best  light  as  a  national 
question.  He  could  not,  however,  neglect  to  remind 
the  Senate  of  the  danger  of  abolition  in  Texas,  "which 
would  operate  most  injuriously  upon  the  United  States 
and  might  most  seriously  threaten  the  existence  of  this 
happy  Union.  .  .  .  The  Executive  saw  Texas  in  a 
state  of  almost  helpless  exhaustion.  The  question  was 
narrowed  down  to  the  simple  proposition,  whether  the 
United  States  should  accept  the  boon  of  annexation 

27  Pakenham  to  Calhoun,  April  19,  1844 ;  Calhoun  to  Paken 
ham,  April  27,  1844;  ibid.,  63,  65. 


156  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYI^R   AND   POI.K 

upon  fair  and  even  liberal  terms,  or  by  refusing  it,  force 
Texas  to  seek  refuge  in  the  arms  of  some  other  power. 
This  might  be  either  through  a  treaty  of  defensive  and 
offensive  alliance,  or  by  the  adoption  of  some  other 
expedient,  which  might  virtually  make  her  tributary 
to  a  foreign  power  and  dependent  upon  it  for  all  future 
time.  The  Executive  has  full  reason  to  believe  that 
such  would  have  been  the  result,  without  its  interposi 
tion,  and  that  such  will  be  the  result,  in  the  event  either 
of  unnecessary  delay  in  the  ratification,  or  of  the  re 
jection  of  the  proposed  treaty."'  Such  were  Tyler's 
reasons  for  annexation  and  such  were  the  predictions 
of  the  dire  results  to  the  nation  if  the  Senate  did  not 
agree  with  him. 

Another  quarter  remained  to  be  heard  from  and  that 
was  Mexico.  What  would  that  nation  do,  after  the 
United  States  had  not  only  proposed  annexation  but 
had  guaranteed  to  defend  Texas  during  the  pendency 
of  the  treaty?  Calhoun  instructed  Green,  the  charge 
at  Mexico,  to  inform  the  Mexican  government  that  a 
treaty  of  annexation  between  Texas  and  the  United 
States  had  been  signed  and  sent  to  the  Senate ;  and 
that  this  had  been  done  without  any  feelings  of  disre 
spect  or  of  indifference  to  the  honor  or  dignity  of 
Mexico.  "The  step  was  forced  upon  the  Government 
of  the  United  States,"  he  asserted,  "in  self  defense,  in 
consequence  of  the  policy  adopted  by  Great  Britain  in 
reference  to  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  Texas.  The 
Government  has  been  compelled,  by  the  necessity  of 
the  case,  and  a  regard  to  its  constitutional  obligations, 

28  Tyler's  message,  April  22,  1844;  Richardson's  Messages, 
IV.,  307- 


CALHOUN   AND  THE)  TEXAS  TREATY  157 

to  take  the  step  it  has,  as  the  only  certain  and  effectual 
means  of  preventing  it."  :  This  note  added  to  the 
weight  which  the  already  overburdened  treaty  had  to 
bear.  The  position  which  the  United  States  had  right 
fully  taken  was  that  Texas  was  independent  de  facto. 
Why,  then,  did  Calhoun  give  Mexico  an  opportunity 
of  discussing  a  question  with  which  she  had  no  legal 
concern?  Texas  had  been  recognized  as  independent 
not  only  by  the  United  States  but  by  several  European 
powers.  With  the  question  of  the  future  relations  or 
status  of  Texas,  therefore,  Mexico  had  nothing  to  do. 
Tyler  was  already  aware  of  Mexico's  ultimatum  on 
the  subject  of  annexation.  Before  Upshur  made  his 
offer  to  Van  Zandt  he  was  in  possession  of  Bocanegra's 
statement  to  Thompson,  that  "the  passage  of  an  act 
for  the  incorporation  of  Texas  with  the  territory  of 
the  United  States  must  be  considered  by  Mexico  as 
equivalent  to  a  declaration  of  war."  ! 

It  was  a  strange  position  for  Calhoun  to  assume 
that  Mexico,  which  had  already  spoken  upon  the  sub 
ject,  would  be  appeased  by  the  declaration  that  the 
United  States  accepted  annexation  as  a  necessity,  made 
so  by  Great  Britain's  attitude  toward  abolition  in  Texas. 
Calhoun's  position  was  the  more  censurable  as  the 
world  knew  that  slavery  did  not  exist  in  Mexico. 

Weighted  down  by  Calhoun's  letters  to  Pakenham 
and  Green,  the  treaty  went  to  the  Senate  as  a  document 
already  discredited.  Tyler's  name  gave  it  no  prestige. 
Calhoun's  assistance  drove  from  him  even  those  ele 
ments  upon  which  the  President  might  have  relied. 
The  country  was  preparing  for  the  quadrennial  presi- 

29  Calhoun   to   Green,   April   19,    1844;   S.   Ex.   Doc.  341,  28 
Cong.,  I  Sess.,  53. 
80  Bocanegra  to  Thompson,  August  23,  1843 ;  ibid.,  89. 


158  DIPLOMACY    UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

dential  contest.  By  a  strange  coincidence,  for  it  was 
probably  nothing  more,31  the  two  men,  who  hoped 
to  be  nominated  for  the  presidency  by  their  respective 
parties,  came  out  upon  the  same  day,  late  in  April,  in 
opposition  to  annexation.  The  position  assumed  by 
both  Clay  and  Van  Buren  was  in  no  sense  surprising. 
Clay,  however,  had  the  support  of  his  party.  The 
Whig  convention  met  soon  after  the  letter  appeared 
and  Clay  was  the  unanimous  choice  of  the  convention. 
Not  so  Van  Buren.  His  star,  which  had  been  sinking 
ever  since  1841  (for  after  he  left  the  presidential 
chair  his  support  became  less  and  less  sincere), 
fell  rapidly  after  the  appearance  of  his  letter  upon 
Texas. 

The  Democratic  convention  was  to  meet  during  the 
last  week  in  May.  From  the  time  Van  Buren's  letter 
appeared,  the  Texas  treaty  was  not  considered  upon 
its  merits,  but  as  a  basis  for  political  manoeuvering  and 
intrigue.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  delegates 
in  the  national  conventions  of  those  days  were  chiefly 
the  senators  and  representatives  at  Washington.  The 
Whigs,  north  and  south,  would  have  nothing  to  do 
with  a  Tyler  measure.  The  Democrats  loyal  to  Van 
Buren  were  cautious.  Those  who  would  displace  him 
feared  the  political  capital  which  Tyler  might  gain  if 
the  treaty  were  ratified  before  the  convention  met. 
The  forty  votes  for  the  treaty,  which  Upshur  had 
claimed,32  dwindled  to  fifteen  in  the  face  of  the  presi 
dential  campaign.83 

31Schouler,  IV.,  465,  note. 

"McDuffie  to  Calhoun,  March  5,  1844;  Report  of  Am.  Hist. 
Association,  1899,  II.,  934. 

33  Raymond  to  Jones,  April  24,  1844 :  "I  have  now  scarcely 
any  hope  of  its  ratification  but  believe  delay  will  strengthen 
the  question."  Jones,  Official  Correspondence,  343. 


CALHOUN   AND  THE  TEXAS  TREATY  159 

A  motion  to  make  the  treaty  and  the  accompanying 
correspondence  public  came  to  a  vote  in  the  Senate  ten 
days  before  the  Democratic  convention.  The  oppo 
nents  of  Tyler  and  Calhoun  showed  their  strength.  By 
a  vote  of  twenty-six  to  seventeen  the  Senate  gave 
Calhoun's  and  Upshur's  pro-slavery  manifestoes  to  the 
country.  Of  the  seventeen  who  voted  against  putting 
the  treaty  before  the  people  was  one  Whig,  Archer  of 
Virginia,  the  friend  of  Tyler.  Of  the  Democrats  ten 
were  from  the  South,  six  from  the  North.  Even  Cal 
houn  had  not  succeeded  in  making  the  question  of 
Texas  a  sectional  question. 

The  correspondence  given  publicity,  no  action  was 
taken  upon  the  treaty  until  after  the  Democratic  con 
vention  had  adjourned.  Polk  was  taken  up  by  Van 
Buren's  friends  in  order  to  defeat  Cass.34  "The  imme 
diate  reannexation  of  Texas"  was  adopted  as  the 
Democratic  war-cry.  It  was  indeed  a  cry  to  rally  the 
South,  but  not  around  Tyler,  nor  indeed  around  Tyler's 
Mephistophelian  attendant,  Calhoun. 

The  Democratic  convention  adjourned  and  the  sena 
tors  returned  to  Washington  to  resume  consideration 
of  Tyler's  treaty.  Immediate  reannexation  of  Texas 
they  were  agreed  upon,  but  according  to  the  methods 
dictated  by  the  Democratic  party,  not  under  the  leader 
ship  of  a  president  who  stood  alone.  Seven  days  after 
the  convention  adjourned  the  Senate  rejected  the  treaty 
by  a  vote  of  thirty-six  to  fifteen.  Murphy,  who  had 
been  Tyler's  too  zealous  agent  in  Texas,  was  also  con 
demned  by  the  Senate,  which  refused  to  confirm  his 

34  "Letters  from  Pillow  to  Polk,"  American  Historical  Re 
view,  July,  1906. 


l6o  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYI^KR  AND   POLK 


appointment.  "The  treaty,"  Murphy  wrote  to  Hous 
ton,  "is  rejected  and  so  is  my  nomination.  The  tail 
went  with  the  hide."  M 

So  ended  the  negotiation  for  Texas  by  treaty. 
Against  his  own  will  Tyler  .had  made  annexation  a 
party  question.  Houston  wrote  to  Jackson,  when  Hen 
derson  was  sent  to  Washington,  that  Texas  was  pre 
sented  to  the  United  States  as  a  bride  adorned  for  her 
espousals.  "If  in  the  confident  hope  of  the  union  she 
should  be  rejected,  her  mortification  would  be  inde 
scribable.  She  has  been  sought  by  the  United  States, 
and  this  is  the  third  time  she  has  consented.  Were  she 
now  to  be  spurned,  it  would  forever  terminate  expec 
tation  on  her  part;  and  it  would  then  not  only  be  left 
for  the  United  States  to  expect  that  she  would  seek 
some  other  friend,  but  all  Christendom  would  justify 
her  in  a  course  dictated  by  necessity  and  sanctioned 
by  wisdom.  However  adverse  this  might  be  to  the 
wishes  or  the  interests  of  the  United  States,  she  could 
not  ponder  long."  " 

With  the  rejection  of  the  treaty,  an  outcome  which 
Houston  had  anticipated,  the  president  of  Texas, 
whether  actuated  by  sincere  motives  or  not,  planned 
for  the  permanent  and  secure  independence  of  his  coun 
try.  Again  he  turned  to  Great  Britain.  On  the  other 
hand  Tyler  determined  to  do  what  had  been  suggested 
when  annexation  was  first  discussed.  Two  days  after 
the  Senate  refused  to  ratify  the  treaty  he  announced 
his  determination  to  force  annexation  by  joint  reso 
lution.  "The  great  question  is,"  he  informed  the 

86  Murphy  to  Houston,  July  3,  1844  ;  Yoakum,  Texas,  II.,  432. 
"Houston  to  Jackson,  February  16,  1844;  H.  Ex.  Doc.  271, 
28  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  no. 


CALHOUN   AND  THE)  TEXAS  TREATY  l6l 

House,  "not  as  to  the  manner  in  which  it  shall  be  done, 
but  whether  it  shall  be  accomplished  or  not."  ST 

"Tyler's   message,   June    n,    1844,   and   correspondence   ac 
companying  it ;  ibid. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  ANNEXATION  OF  TEXAS  BY  JOINT  RESOLUTION 
1844-1845 

When  the  treaty  was  rejected,  Calhoun,  who  had 
staked  all  upon  the  issue  of  the  defense  of  slavery 
against  the  menace  of  Great  Britain's  abolitionist  in 
fluence,  felt  that  annexation  was  a  lost  cause.  Though 
he  said  that  the  United  States  had  reluctantly  taken 
a  position  favorable  to  annexation  because  it  was  seen 
that  not  only  the  interests  of  the  nation  but  the  Union 
itself  depended  upon  it,  he  now  professed  to  believe 
that  Texas  was  forever  lost  to  the  United  States.1 

Calhoun's  dejection  was,  however,  of  short  duration, 
Tyler  determined  upon  an  appeal  to  the  House  over  the 
head  of  the  Senate.  Calhoun  was  given  to  understand 
that  unless  he  actively  cooperated  with  Tyler,  his 
resignation  would  be  in  order.2  Henceforth  Calhoun 
pursued  the  subject  with  inflexible  determination, 
afterwards  claiming  the  credit  of  annexation.8  How 
much  Tyler  was  influenced  in  his  persistence  by  a 
desire  to  go  before  the  country  as  a  candidate  for  the 
presidency  upon  a  platform  of  "Tyler  and  Texas" 
cannot  be  definitely  stated.  A  handful  of  office 
holders  and  personal  friends  had  met  in  convention  in 
Baltimore  and  nominated  Tyler  for  the  presidency, 

"Tyler's  Tylers,  II.,  331. 

2  Ibid. 

3  Calhoun's  speech  in  the  Senate,  February  24,  1847 ;  Works, 
IV.,  362. 


THE    ANNEXATION    OF    TEXAS  163 

but  the  act  of  the  so-called  convention  excited  only 
derision.  Tyler  accepted  the  farcical  nomination  in  a 
letter  in  which  he  put  forward  his  claims  to  the  public 
confidence.  Upon  the  subject  of  Texas  he  was  out 
spoken:  "If  annexation  is  to  be  accomplished,  it  must 
be  done  immediately.  .  .  .  The  question  with  me 
is  between  Texas  and  the  presidency.  The  latter,  even 
if  within  my  grasp,  would  not  for  a  moment  be  per 
mitted  to  stand  in  the  way  of  the  first." ' 

The  presidency  was  plainly  far  from  being  within 
Tyler's  grasp.  The  regular  Democratic  convention, 
which  had  nominated  Polk  and  Dallas,  declared  for  the 
"reannexation"  of  Texas  and  the  "reoccupation"  of 
Oregon.  If  Tyler  was  to  be  an  agent  for  annexation 
he  must  be  such  during  the  nine  months  of  his  unex- 
pired  term.  Threats  of  impeachment,  for  having  given 
orders  to  the  army  and  navy  to  protect  Texas  pending 
the  consideration  of  the  treaty,  did  not  deter  the  Presi 
dent  from  appealing  beyond  the  treaty-making  power. 

It  has  been  seen  that  annexation  by  act  of  Congress 
instead  of  by  treaty  had  been  suggested  almost  as  soon 
as  Texas  was  recognized.  During  the  negotiation 
that  resulted  in  Calhoun's  treaty  the  project  of  an 
nexing  Texas  by  act  of  Congress  (under  that  pro 
vision  of  the  Constitution  which  gave  Congress  power 
to  admit  new  states)  had  been  put  before  the  people 
by  R.  J.  Walker,  a  senator  from  Mississippi.  When 
it  was  definitely  seen  that  the  treaty  would  fail, 
McDuffie,  a  close  friend  of  Calhoun,  introduced  a  reso 
lution  into  the  Senate  along  the  line  of  Walker's 
suggestion.5 

4  Tyler's  Tylers,  II.,  321. 
•Ibid.,  II.,  331- 


164  DIPLOMACY   UNDER   TYLER   AND   POLK 

The  first  session  of  the  twenty-eighth  Congress  was 
nearing  its  close.  As  is  usual  in  presidential  years, 
Congress  was  disinclined  to  put  itself  on  record 
upon  any  question  after  the  presidential  conventions 
had  met,  nominated,  and  adjourned.  Tyler,  however, 
was  not  willing  to  let  the  matter  of  Texas  rest  until 
Congress  met  in  regular  session  the  following  Decem 
ber.  By  that  time  the  presidential  contest  would  be 
decided.  Tyler  sent  a  message  to  the  lower  house 
recommending  the  passage  of  an  act  annexing  Texas. 
Writing  to  Howard,  the  American  charge  in  Texas, 
he  promised  to  call  a  special  session  for  the  purpose 
of  pushing  annexation  through  before  the  fall  elec 
tions.6  In  his  message  to  the  House  Tyler  said  that 
the  power  of  Congress  was  "fully  competent  in  some 
other  form  of  proceeding  to  accomplish  everything 
that  a  formal  ratification  of  the  treaty  could  have 
accomplished.  .  .  .  While  I  have  regarded  the 
annexation  to  be  accomplished  by  treaty  to  be  the 
most  suitable  form  in  which  it  could  be  effected, 
should  Congress  deem  it  proper  to  resort  to  any  other 
expedient  compatible  with  the  Constitution,  and  likely 
to  accomplish  the  object,  I  stand  prepared  to  yield  my 
most  prompt  and  active  cooperation.  The  great  ques 
tion  is,  not  as  to  the  manner  in  which  it  shall  be  done, 
but  whether  it  shall  be  accomplished  or  not.  The  re 
sponsibility  of  deciding  this  question  is  now  devolved 
upon  you."  1 

Congress  adjourned  a  week  after  Tyler  sent  his  mes 
sage  to  the  House.  Just  prior  to  adjournment  Tyler  was 

'Tyler  and  Calhoun  to  Howard,  June  18,  1844;  MS., 
Archives. 

7  Message  of  Tyler,  June  10,  1844,  with  correspondence ; 
H.  Ex.  Doc.  271,  28  Cong.,  i  Sess. 


THE:  ANN-EXATION  OF  TEXAS  165 

assured  in  writing  by  prominent  Democrats  in  the  House 
that  the  subject  of  annexation  should  not  be  permitted 
to  rest.8  The  campaign  for  annexation  by  act  of  Con 
gress  was  launched  even  before  Congress  adjourned.9 

Murphy's  nomination  as  charge  to  Texas  had  been 
rejected ;  Tyler  then  appointed  General  Tilghman  A. 
Howard  of  Indiana.  Howard  was  originally  from 
Tennessee  and  a  friend  of  Jackson.  But  more  im 
portant  in  the  present  case,  he  was  a  friend  of  the 
distrusted  Houston.  When  Houston  was  governor  of 
Tennessee,  Howard  was  in  close  official  relationship 
with  him.10  The  new  charge  left  Washington  for 
Texas  with  some  evidence  that  annexation  was  not 
finally  defeated.  The  pledge  of  congressmen  to  sup 
port  annexation,  which  Tyler  had,  was  accompanied 
by  a  memorandum  from  Calhoun  setting  forth  the  aid 
that  might  be  counted  upon  in  the  Senate.  Calhoun 
believed  the  Senate  committee  upon  foreign  affairs 
would  stand  five  to  four  for  annexation  and  that  four 
teen  Wrhig  senators  from  the  slave  states,  of  whom  all 
but  one  had  voted  against  the  treaty,  would  favor  an 
nexation  by  act  of  Congress.11 

The  necessity  for  such  assurances  was  plain.  How 
ard  would  have  been  in  a  most  uncomfortable  position 
if  he  had  been  forced  to  urge  Texas  to  stand  firm  for 

'Tyler  to  Howard,  June  18,  1844;  MS.,  Archives,  C.  H. 
Raymond  to  Jones,  June  5,  1844 ;  Jones,  Official  Corres 
pondence,  360. 

9  The  votes   upon  Tyler's  message  were :   to  lay  upon  the 
table,   for,  66;   against,   118;   to  suspend  the  rules  and  print, 
for,  108;  against,  79. 

10  Henderson   to  Jones,   June  2,    1844;   Jones,   Official  Cor 
respondence,  356. 

11 T.  A.  Howard's  memorandum;  MS.,  Archives. 


l66  DIPLOMACY    UND£R   TYIvDR   AND   POLK 

annexation  after  the  United  States  had  refused  to  con 
firm  its  own  offer.  It  was  Howard's  duty  to  impress 
upon  Houston's  government  that  annexation  would  be 
accomplished  without  delay.  Calhoun  felt  no  doubt 
of  the  continued  desire  of  the  people  of  Texas  for 
annexation,  but  he .  feared  that  there  might  be  a  re 
vulsion  of  feeling  there  on  account  of  the  rejection 
of  the  treaty,  and  that  this  might  be  played  upon  by 
those  who  were  unfriendly  to  the  United  States.  "The 
danger  is  that  the  revulsion  of  disappointed  hopes 
highly  excited  may  be  seized  upon  by  an  interested 
and  wily  diplomacy  and  made  the  means  of  seducing 
them  to  seek  and  form  another  alliance?  with  the 
Power,  which,  there  is  reason  to  fear,  has  been  eagerly 
watching  the  favorable  opportunity."  ! 

Shortly  before  the  Senate  finally  rejected  the  treaty, 
Rives  of  Virginia  introduced  a  resolution  laying  the 
treaty  upon  the  table  and  asking  the  President  to 
cause  an  additional  article  to  be  negotiated,  extending 
the  period  of  ratification,  so  as  to  give  further  time 
for  a  full  and  deliberate  expression  of  an  opinion  by 
the  American  people  on  the  subject  and  also  for  a 
reasonable  and  amicable  effort  to  obtain  the  concur 
rence  of  Mexico  in  a  "constitutional  arrangement  for 
ascertaining  and  establishing  the  boundaries  between 
that  country  and  Texas."  Nothing  came  of  the  reso 
lution.  Tyler  was  known  to  be  opposed  to  delay. 
Henderson,  one  of  the  Texas  commissioners,  objected 
to  it  upon  the  ground  that  he  had  no  authority  to  con 
sent  to  any  such  measure.  He  felt  sure  that  Houston 
would  regard  postponement  as  equivalent  to  rejec- 

12  Calhoun  to  Howard,  June  18,  1844;  MS.,  Archives. 


THE    ANNEXATION    OF    TEXAS  167 

tion."  When  the  news  of  the  Senate's  failure  to  ratify 
was  had,  Houston,  without  consulting  his  secretary  of 
state,  wrote  directly  to  Henderson  and  Van  Zandt 
ordering  them  home  immediately.1* 

Jones,  Houston's  secretary  of  state,  was  a  candidate 
for  the  presidency  of  Texas,  for  which  an  election 
was  to  be  held  in  the  following  September.  Between 
Jones  and  Houston  had  arisen  a  feeling  of  jealousy, 
which  afterwards  grew  into  open  enmity.  Each  ac 
cused  the  other  of  being  secretly  opposed  to  annexa 
tion.  How  far  Houston's  determination  to  scare  the 
United  States  into  annexation  carried  him  along  into 
opposition  to  annexation  one  can  hardly  determine. 
In  the  days  immediately  following  the  rejection  Hous 
ton  appeared  to  be  the  opponent  of  annexation.  The 
rejection  of  the  treaty  he  could  fairly  claim  to  be  the 
end  of  all  hopes  of  union.  Tyler  and  his  cabinet,  al 
though  fearing  that  Houston  had  followed  them  as 
far  as  his  dignity  would  permit,  now  endeavored  to 
hold  the  president  of  Texas  firm  to  annexation  by 
sending  one  of  Houston's  old  friends  and  an  admirer 
of  Jackson  as  charge. 

Jones,  on  the  other  hand,  believed  that  delay  would 
not  defeat  annexation.  He  proceeded  upon  the  theory 
that  Texas  must  have  peace,  and  this  might  be  had 
either  by  annexation,  in  which  case  the  United  States 
would  relieve  Texas  of  responsibility,  or  by  Mexico's 
recognition  of  Texan  independence.  Jones's  policy  was 
eminently  one  of  statesmanship.  He  was  accused  of 

"Resolution  of  June  6,  1844,  in  secret  session;  Henderson 
to  Jones,  June  7,  1844;  Jones,  Official  Correspondence,  364. 

14  Houston  to  Jones,  July  8,  1844 ;  Jones,  Official  Corres 
pondence,  371. 


1 68  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

being  an  opponent  of  union  with  the  United  States, 
but  the  accusation  was  unjust.  Although  favorable  to 
annexation,  he  proceeded  upon  the  theory  that  if  an 
nexation  were  impossible  (a  question  which  the  pend 
ing  political  contest  in  the  United  States  would  soon 
decide),  Texas  could  pursue  her  own  course  without 
any  fear  of  Mexican  invasion  or  menace.  While  wait 
ing  for  the  decision  of  the  people  of  the  United  States, 
his  efforts  were  directed  toward  the  establishment  of 
peace  with,  and  independence  of,  Mexico.  During  the 
summer  of  1844  Houston  seemed  to  be  impressed  with 
the  idea  that  annexation  was  an  impossibility;  Jones 
thought  delay  would  not  injure  the  cause  of  annexation, 
but  in  the  event  of  the  final  defeat  of  annexation 
his  country  must  be  upon  a  footing  of  assured  peate. 
Houston's  position  seems  to  have  been  one  of  emotion, 
of  disappointment  and  despair,  based  upon  the  rejec 
tion  of  the  treaty.  Jones's  position  was  one  of  calcu 
lating  shrewdness,  which  was  founded  upon  a  genuine 
desire  for  the  welfare  of  Texas. 

The  Texan  government  did  not  wait  long  for  a  re 
newal  of  Calhoun's  assurances  of  protection  pending 
annexation.  The  armistice  between  Texas  and  Mexico 
having  expired,  Woll,  commanding  the  Mexican  army 
at  Mier,  gave  notice  to  Houston  that  hostilities  would 
be  renewed.15  Howard,  the  new  charge,  was  informed 
of  Woll's  intentions  and  requested  "to  take  the  neces 
sary  steps  to  carry  into  effect  the  assurances  (already 
given)  and  to  extend  to  Texas  the  aid  which  the  emer 
gency  required."  " 

15  Woll  to  Houston,  June  19,  1844;  H.  Ex.  Doc.  2,  28  Cong., 
2  Sess.,  27. 

16  Jones  to  Howard,  August  6,  1844 ;  ibid.,  25. 


THE;    ANNEXATION    OF    TEXAS  169 

Howard's  answer,  which  Jones  characterized  as 
hair-splitting,  was  that  the  assurances  of  protection 
extended  only  during  the  pendency  of  the  treaty,  and 
that  he  had  no  instructions  beyond  that."  Tyler  de 
cided  that  the  obligation  to  protect  Texas  extended  not 
merely  during  the  consideration  of  the  treaty,  but 
also  while  the  question  of  annexation  was  pending. 
Such  a  position  was  a  dangerous  one.  "As  far  as  it 
relates  to  the  executive  department  he  (the  President) 
is  prepared  to  use  all  its  powers  for  that  purpose.  But 
the  government  of  Texas  is  fully  aware  that  they  are 
circumscribed  by  the  constitution  within  narrow  limits, 
which  it  would  not  be  possible  for  the  President  to 
transcend.  All  that  he  can  do  is  to  make  suitable 
representations  to  the  Mexican  government  against 
the  renewal  of  the  war  pending  the  question  of  annex 
ation,  and  the  savage  manner  in  which  it  is  proposed 
to  conduct  it,  and  to  recommend  to  Congress  to  adopt 
measures  to  repel  any  attack  which  may  be  made."  : 
After  all  of  Tyler's  brave  talk  of  protection,  he  fell  back 
to  the  position  that  Webster  had  taken :  to  remon 
strate  with  Mexico  against  the  continuance  of  the  war. 
Active  measures  of  protection  were  admitted  to  be 
within  the  power  of  Congress  only.  Wilson  Shannon 
of  Ohio,  who  had  been  tendered  and  had  accepted  the 
position  of  minister  to  Mexico  some  months  before,1' 
was  told  to  protest  against  the  renewal  of  the  war. 
Calhoun  wrote  that  Mexico's  object  was  plain:  "To 
defeat  the  annexation  of  Texas  to  the  United  States 
and  probably  to  drive  Texas  into  political  connections 

17  Howard  to  Jones,  August  6,  18.44  >  ibid.,  28. 

18  Calhoun  to  Howard,  September  10,  1844 ;  ibid.,  50. 

19  Shannon  to  Calhoun,  April  17,  1844;  MS.,  Archives. 


I7O  DIPLOMACY    UND£R  TYI^R   AND   POLK 

with  some  other  power  less  congenial  to  her  feelings 
and  favorable  to  her  independence,  and  more  threaten 
ing  to  her  and  our  permanent  welfare  and  safety." 
The  President,  therefore,  would  use  all  his  constitu 
tional  powers  to  stop  the  projected  renewal  of  war. 
"If  Mexico  has  thought  proper  to  take  offense  [at 
annexation]  it  is  we,  who  invited  a  renewal  of  the 
proposition,  and  not  she  [Texas]  which  accepted  it, 
that  ought  to  be  held  responsible.  .  .  .  Mexico 
would  make  a  great  mistake  if  she  should  suppose 
.that  the  President  would  regard  with  indifference  the 
renewal  of  the  war."  : 

Shannon  replied  that  although  efforts  were  making 
to  increase  the  army  and  to  rebuild  the  navy  in  conse 
quence  of  the  belligerent  utterances  of  Santa  Anna, 
he  believed  that  the  projected  invasion  for  the  sub 
jugation  of  Texas  would  come  to  nothing.  Santa 
Anna  and  the  Mexican  congress  were  mutually  an 
tagonistic.  If  the  congress  voted  means  to  support  an 
army,  it  would  result  in  the  prolongation  of  Santa 
Anna's  power.  If  the  congress  controlled  the  army  as 
well  as  the  funds,  Santa  Anna  would  be  driven  out. 
The  belligerent  manifesto  Shannon  believed  to  be 
brutum  fulmen.21 

Raymond,  who  continued  to  look  after  the  interests 
of  Texas  at  Washington  after  the  departure  of  Van 
Zandt  and  Henderson,  wrote  to  Jones :  "Mr.  Calhoun 
informed  me  on  yesterday  that  Gen.  Howard  would 
have  been  instructed  to  renew  the  assurance  given  to 
our  government  in  April  last,  relative  to  the  disposi- 

20  Calhoun  to  Shannon,  September  10,  1844 ;  H.  Ex.  Doc.  2, 
28  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  29. 

21  Shannon   to   Calhoun,   October  28,    1844 ;    MS.,   Archives. 


THE:    ANNEXATION    OF    TEXAS  \J\ 

tion  of  the  army  and  navy  of  the  United  States  for  our 
protection  during  the  pendency  of  annexation ;  and 
that  in  his  despatch  to  Gen.  Howard,  he  had  so  di 
rected  him ;  but  when  it  came  to  be  submitted  to  the 
Cabinet,  the  gentlemen  at  the  head  of  the  war  and  navy 
departments  preferred  its  being  omitted,  in  order  that 
the  return  of  the  naval  force  to  the  Gulf  and  Coast  of 
Texas,  which  they  had  only  left  on  account  of  the 
equinoctial  storms,  should  seem  as  a  mere  continuat^n 
(as  it  was  in  fact)  of  the  April  orders,  which  had  al 
ready  stood  the  test  of  the  most  rigid  scrutiny  of 
Congress.  I  was  assured  that  a  continuation  of  these 
orders  had  been  made  and  that  these  vessels  of  war 
would  be  on  the  spot  before  any  danger  could  ap 
proach  us.  I  believe  this  government  will  do  rather 
more  for  our  protection  and  support,  if  necessary,  than 
they  desire  should  appear.  They  don't  like  to  leave 
themselves  open  to  an  attack  by  Congress,  especially 
Wilkins,  Mason  and  Nelson.  Mr.  Calhoun  is  case- 
hardened.  When  he  thinks  he  is  right  he  will  go 
ahead,  no  matter  how  great  the  responsibility ;  and 
had  he  the  power,  the  army  would  doubtless  be  ordered 
right  into  Texas  to  repel  any  attack  upon  her."  : 

Tyler  and  Calhoun  were  more  afraid  of  the  action 
of  other  powers  than  of  Mexico.  It  was  under 
stood  that  the  British  interests  in  Mexico  had  repre 
sented  to  Santa  Anna  that  the  .independence  of  Texas 
would  be  of  advantage  to  Mexico  in  creating  a  buffer 
state  against  the  aggressions  of  the  northern  republic. 
In  June,  after  the  rejection  of  the  treaty,  Aberdeen 

22  Raymond  to  Jones,  September  13,  1844;  Jones,  Official 
Correspondence,  382. 


172  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

proposed  to  Ashbel  Smith,  who  continued  to  represent 
Texas  in  Great  Britain  and  France,  that  Texas  join 
in  a  diplomatic  act  with  Great  Britain,  France,  the 
United  States,  and  Mexico :  "The  basis  of  the  pro 
posed  diplomatic  act  was  peace  between  Texas  and 
Mexico,  and  the  permanent  separate  independence  of 
Texas — the  parties  to  the  act  to  be  its  guarantors."  : 
Aberdeen  further  told  Smith  that  while  the  United 
States  would  be  invited  to  join  with  the  other  powers, 
it  was  not  to  be  expected  that  it  would  accept.  "It 
was  believed  Mexico  would  participate,  but  in  case  of 
her  refusal,  England,  France,  and  Texas  having 
passed  the  act  as  between  themselves,  Mexico  would 
be  forced  to  abide  its  time.  The  act  if  passed  by  the 
three  powers  would  not  be  abandoned — it  would  be 
maintained."  Smith  asserted  that  he  and  Aberdeen 
agreed  definitely  upon  the  terms  of  the  arrangement. 
"The  two  European  powers  asked  no  privileges, 
hinted  at  none,  did  not  propose  to  touch  directly  or 
indirectly,  made  no  allusion  even,  to  any  institutions 
of  Texas,  or  to  its  domestic  or  foreign  policy  outside 
the  express  terms  of  the  act.  Those  were  limited  abso 
lutely  to  the  objects  on  the  face  of  it;  peace  and  per 
manent  independence."  :  The  assent  of  France  Smith 
claimed  to  have  definitely  obtained.  On  the  other  hand, 
Wise,  Tyler's  minister  at  the  Court  of  Louis  Philippe, 
reported  to  Calhoun  that  there  was  no  truth  in  the 
report  connecting  France  with  Great  Britain  in  an 
effort  to  persuade  Texas  to  withdraw  the  proposition 

23  Ashbel  Smith,  Reminiscences,  61.  Smith  was  opposed 
to  the  "diplomatic  act."  Worley  in  Quarterly  of  the  Texas 
State  Historical  Association,  IX.,  32. 

"Ibid. 


THE  ANNEXATION  OF  TEXAS  173 

to  annex  on  condition  that  Mexico  should  be  made  to 
acknowledge  her  independence.  King,  however,  did 
not  obtain  from  Guizot  any  definite  assurance  that 
France  would  not  join  in  obtaining  Mexico's  recog 
nition  of  Texan  independence.  Calhoun  authorized 
King  to  state  to  the  French  government  that  if  action 
were  taken  looking  toward  the  recognition  of  Texas  by 
Mexico  as  a  means  of  assistance  to  Mexico  against 
the  United  States,  it  was  a  mistaken  policy  because  the 
United  States  had  no  disposition  to  aggrandize  itself  at 
the  expense  of  Mexico.  "The  fact  is  the  very  reverse." 
Calhoun  then  dwelt  upon  the  dissimilarity  of  interests 
between  France  and  Great  Britain.  The  latter  had 
political,  the  former  merely  commercial,  motives  in 
treating  for  Texan  independence.  But  France  must 
know  that  her  commercial  interests  were  not  in  har 
mony  with  those  of  Great  Britain,  who  plainly  aimed 
to  monopolize  all  markets.  France  could  be  sure  of 
having  fair  treatment  from  the  United  States,  and  as 
for  her  commercial  interests  with  Texas,  they  would 
be  improved  if  annexation  took  place.  She  could  then 
purchase  cheaply  the  produce  raised  by  slave  labor. 
If  Texas  were  free  and  independent,  France  would 
have  to  pay  more  dearly  for  all  products  such  as  Texas 
raised.  King  was  instructed  to  urge  France  not  to 
join  Great  Britain  in  her  mistaken  propaganda  for 
abolition.  Calhoun  then  described  abolition  as  a  crime 
against  civilization.  "It  would  be  to  substitute  for  the 
existing  relation  a  deadly  strife  between  the  two  races, 
to  end  in  the  subjection,  expulsion,  or  extirpation  of 
one  or  the  other;  and  such  would  be  the  case  over  the 
greater  part  of  this  continent  where  negro  slavery 
exists.  It  would  not  end  there,  but  would  in  all  prob- 


1/4  DIPLOMACY    UND£R   TYL£R   AND   POLK 

ability  extend,  by  its  example,  the  war  of  races  all 
over  South  America,  including  Mexico,  and  extending 
to  the  Indian  as  well  as  to  the  African  race,  and  make 
the  whole  one  scene  of  blood  and  devastation.  Dis 
missing,  then,  the  stale  and  unfounded  plea  of  philan 
thropy,  can  it  be  that  France  and  the  other  great  con 
tinental  powers — seeing  what  must  be  the  result  of 
the  policy,  for  the  accomplishment  of  which  England 
is  constantly  exerting  herself,  and  that  the  defeat 
of  the  annexation  of  Texas  is  so  important  toward  its 
consummation — are  prepared  to  back  or  countenance 
her  in  her  efforts  to  effect  either  ?" 2  In  his  defense 
to  Pakenham,  Calhoun  had  taken  the  ground  that  an 
nexation  was  necessary  for  the  perpetuation  of  the 
Union,  which  abolition  menaced.  Now  he  claimed 
that  unless  annexation  took  place,  a  war  of  races 
would  drench  all  America  in  blood.  France  was  asked 
to  choose  the  state  of  things  which  annexation  would 
offer:  low  prices  for  the  products  of  slave  labor,  in 
stead  of  high  prices,  for  which  England  was  working ; 
to  prefer  peace,  the  outcome  of  annexation,  to  Texan 
independence  and  the  horrors  of  a  race  war. 

It  is  hard  to  comprehend  that  such  a  position  was 
ever  assumed  by  any  American  secretary  of  state. 
Had  Calhoun  stated  (and  this  was  the  traditional  doc 
trine)  that  Great  Britain  and  France  must  keep  hands 
off  Texas,  he  would  have  remained  upon  safe  ground. 
He  could  not,  however,  say  this  as  long  as  the  United 
States  had  determined  not  to  permit  Texas  to  remain 
independent.  To  draw  France  away  from  England 


25  Calhoun  to   King,   August   12,   1844;   H.   Ex.   Doc.  2,  28 
Cong.,  2  Sess.,  44. 


THE    ANNEXATION    OF    TEXAS  175 

upon  the  Texas  question  was  obviously  necessary.  If 
Great  Britain  and  France  had  jointly  guaranteed  the 
independence  of  Texas  with  the  condition  that  that 
independence  should  be  permanent,  the  United  States 
would  have  been  drawn  into  a  war,  provided  (and 
this  was  unlikely)  the  people  of  Texas  ratified  such  an 
arrangement.  Had  the  United  States  been  told  by 
Great  Britain  and  France  that  Texas  should  not  be 
annexed,  war  would  have  been  necessary  in  order  that 
the  United  States  should  vindicate  its  position.  If 
Texas  had  bound  herself  to  Great  Britain  and  France 
to  remain  independent,  Tyler  would  have  been  in  the 
predicament  of  having  placed  before  the  American 
people  an  issue  which  two  European  powers  forbade 
it  to  decide.  Houston  resolved  that  Texas  should  bind 
itself  by  just  that  promise. 

In  September  occurred  the  contest  for  the  Texan 
presidency.  Jones,  Houston's  secretary  of  state,  was 
elected.  The  date  set  for  his  inauguration  was  not 
until  December.  Houston  ordered  Jones  to  instruct 
Smith  to  conclude  the  diplomatic  act  upon  the  terms 
proposed  by  Aberdeen.  Houston's  order  to  Jones  was 
as  follows : M  "Let  dispatches  be  forthwith  sent  to  Dr. 
Smith,  to  the  care  of  Mr.  Rate27  at  London.  Let  the 
instructions  be  given  Mr.  Rate  to  forward  said  dis 
patches,  in  the  event  of  Dr.  Smith's  departure  home 
ward,  to  Colonel  Daingerfield,  at  the  Hague.  Let  full 
powers  and  letters  of  credence  be  also  transmitted  to 
Colonel  Daingerfield,  to  be  used  by  him  in  the  event 

2<  Houston  to  Jones,  September  23,  1844;  Niles'  Register, 
LXXIV.,  413- 

27  Mr.  Lachlin  Mclntosh  Rate,  a  London  merchant,  and  at 
the  same  time  an  agent  of  the  government  of  Texas. 


176  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

of  Dr.  Smith's  leaving  Europe,  in  conducting  the 
necessary  negotiations  with  the  Courts  of  England  and 
France.  Let  our  representatives  (Dr.  Smith  or  Colonel 
Daingerfield)  be  instructed  to  complete  the  proposed 
agreement  for  the  settlement  of  our  Mexican  difficul 
ties,  as  soon  as  possible — giving  the  necessary  pledges, 
as  suggested  in  the  late  dispatch  of  Dr.  Smith  on  this 
subject,  but  adhering  to  the  Rio  Grande  as  a  boun 
dary,  sine  qua  non.  Also  let  our  representatives  be 
instructed  at  once  to  enter  into  the  proper  arrange 
ments,  for  the  admission  of  our  products  into  the  ports 
of  England,  (and  France  if  possible),  upon  the  most 
favorable  terms — suggesting  to  the  European  parties 
that  now  is  the  most  favorable  time  for  such  an  ar 
rangement  with  this  country,  in  consequence  of  the 
absence  of  the  obstacles  which  a  treaty  with  the  United 
States  might  interpose." 

Jones,  the  secretary  of  state,  relying  upon  his  posi 
tion  as  president  elect,  disobeyed  Houston's  orders  and 
failed  to  issue  the  instructions.28  Smith  returned  to 
Texas  believing  that  Guizot  had  been  impressed  by 
King  with  the  idea  that  any  action  on  the  part  of 
France  toward  Texas  would  give  umbrage  to  the 
United  States.29  Aberdeen,  on  the  other  hand,  he 
thought,  still  relied  upon  the  cooperation  of  France 
and  would  act  provided  Texas  gave  satisfactory  as 
surances  of  its  determination  to  remain  independent. 

By  the  time  Smith  had  reached  Texas  and  become 
secretary  of  state  under  Jones,  the  elections  in  the 
United  States  had  been  won  for  Polk.  Thanks  to  the 

28  Jones,   Official  Correspondence,  43. 
"Smith  to  Jones,  December  24,  1844;  ibid. 


THE    ANNEXATION    OF    TEXAS  177 

Liberty  party  in  the  state  of  New  York,  the  annexa 
tion  of  Texas  seemed  to  have  been  endorsed  by  a 
popular  vote. 

Tyler's  message  to  Congress  in  December,  1844,  was 
a  call  for  action  based  upon  the  vote  of  the  people  upon 
annexation.  "Instructions  have  come  up  to  both 
branches  of  Congress  from  their  constituents  in  terms 
the  most  emphatic.  It  is  the  will  both  of  the  people 
and  the  States  that  Texas  shall  be  annexed  to  the  Union 
promptly  and  immediately."  !  All  of  the  arguments 
heard  in  the  treaty-message  of  the  past  May  were 
again  brought  forward.  As  far  as  the  wishes  of  Texas 
were  concerned,  he  believed  there  had  been  no  change. 
As  for  Mexico's  threat  of  war,  it  should  have  no  effect 
upon  the  action  of  the  United  States,  for  Mexico  had 
no  rightful  concern  in  the  ultimate  destiny  of  a  repub 
lic  which  was  de  facto  independent  of  her.  As  for 
other  nations,  Tyler  stated  that  he  apprehended  no 
serious  complaint  from  them.  "No  sufficient  ground 
exists  for  such  complaint.  We  should  interfere 
in  no  respect  with  the  rights  of  any  other  nation. 
There  cannot  be  gathered  from  the  act  any  design  on 
our  part  to  do  so  with  their  possessions  on  this  con 
tinent.  We  have  interposed  no  impediments  in  the 
way  of  such  acquisitions  of  territory,  large  and  ex 
tensive  as  many  of  them  are,  as  the  leading  powers 
of  Europe  have  made  from  time  to  time  in  every  part 
of  the  world.  We  seek  no  conquest  made  by  war.  No 
intrigue  will  have  been  resorted  to  or  acts  of  diplomacy 
essayed  to  accomplish  the  annexation  of  Texas.  Free 

80  Tyler's  Annual  Message,  December  3,  1844;  Richardson's 
Messages,  IV.,  344. 


178  DIPLOMACY   UNDER   TYLER   AND   POLK 

and  independent  herself,  she  asks  to  be  received  into 
our  Union.  It  is  a  question  for  our  own  decision 
whether  she  shall  be  received  or  not." 

In  all  this  there  is  an  absence  of  the  futile  assertion 
of  Calhoun  that  the  United  States  reluctantly  turned 
to  annexation  because  forced  to  do  so  by  the  intrigues 
of  Great  Britain  for  abolition  in  Texas.  Tyler  dropped 
the  pro-slavery  argument  and  stood  upon  the  question  * 
of  national  right,  a  position  thoroughly  tenable.  His 
reference  to  the  possessions  of  European  powers  in 
America  was  not  only  conciliatory,  it  was  milder  than 
the  facts  warranted.  Calhoun,  however,  still  feared 
that  Great  Britain  would  "consummate  her  grand 
scheme  of  commercial  monopoly,  disguised  under  the 
garb  of  abolition." ' 

General  Howard,  the  friend  of  Houston  and  Jack 
son,  died  in  Texas  in  August.  Tyler  offered  the  posi 
tion  of  charge  to  Andrew  Jackson  Donelson,  the  son- 
in-law  and  former  private  secretary  of  Jackson,  who 
had  taken  a  prominent  part  in  the  successful  manoeu- 
vers  that  won  the  presidential  nomination  for  Polk. 
This  appointment  was  designedly  made  .  to ,  bring  to 
bear  the  personal  influence  of  Jackson  upon  Houston.32 

31  Calhoun  to  King,  December  13,   1844;  Report  Am.  Hist. 
Association,  1899,  H.,  632. 

32  Calhoun    to    Donelson,    September    15,    1844;    ibid.,    614. 
Jackson  to  Van  Buren,  October  22,   1844;   MS.,   Van  Buren 
Papers,   Library   of    Congress : 

"Hermitage 

Octbr  22nd  j844 
"My  dear  Sir, 

"Major  A.  J.  Donelson  left  me  yesterday  for 
Texas,  as  charge  de  affairs,  to  fill  the  vacancy  occasioned 
by  the  lamented  death  of  Genl  Howard — The  Major  accepted 
this  appointment  by  the  great  solicitude  of  the  Government 


THE    ANNEXATION    OF    TEXAS  179 

Duff  Green,  who  had  been  such  a  willing  instrument 
for  annexation  under  Upshur,  was  sent  to  Galveston 
as  consul  with  a  further  duty  as  bearer  of  despatches 

&  his  political  friends,  and  at  a  great  sacrifice  of  his  private 
interest — but  such  is  the  great  national  importance  of  Texas 
to  the  whole  Union,  and  to  the  safety  of  the  South  &  West, 
&  the  great  interest  of  this  Union  so  considered  by  all  the 
democrats — that  public  duty  prevailed  over  his  private  in 
terest,  &  he  has  accepted  the  mission. 

"The  Major  has  fully  exposed  to  me  his  private  means — 
They  are  ample  to  meet  all  his  pecuniary  engagements  and 
to  make  his  family  comfortable  &  independent  as  I  believe. 
The  Major  requested  me  to  say  to  you,  that  as  he  passed 
thro'  Neworleans,  he  would  make  arrangements,  based  upon 
his  cotton  crop,  to  remit  to  his  N.  York  debt  six  thousand 
dollars,  which  thro  his  present  crop  of  cotton,  thinks  that 
he  can  do — His  crop  in  Mississippi,  is  promising  &  he  has 
a  fair  crop  here,  and  if  cotton  commands  seven  cents,  I  have 
no  doubt  thro  the  commission  Merchants,  he  will  be  able  to 
comply  with  what  he  has  authorized  me  to  say  to  you — at 
least  I  hope  he  may. 

"I  have  had  a  Hemorhage  a  few  days  ago — I  am  very 
feeble,  &  have  been  visitted  with  a  chill — The  lancet  to 
meet  the  first,  and  medicine  to  meet  the  last  which  has  very 
much  enfeeble  [d]  me — I  am  still  able  to  set  up  &  wield  the 
pen,  but  with  great  difficulty. 

"You  see  we  have  lost  the  election  in  Ohio — still  I  hope 
she  may  rally  and  on  the  first  of  Novbr  regain  her  democ 
racy — We  are  in  good  spirits  here  of  your  empire  state  that 
she  is,  &  will  prove  sound  to  the  core  for  democracy — But 
the  Whiggs  from  corruption,  fraud,  and  pipe  laying  claim 
that  they  will  carry  New  York  this  their  bost  here —  Please, 
on  the  receipt  of  this  give  me  your  opinion  of  the  result. 
Georgia  is  safe  for  the  Democracy — Polk  &  Dallas  I  think 
will  carry  Tennessee,  and  the  Democracy  of  Kentucky  are 
of  the  opinion  they  will  carry  that  state.  Our  friend  Col 
Benton  has  got  himself  in  hotwater  in  Missouri  I  hope  he 
may  be  able  to  regain  his  former  high  standing  with  the 
democracy  of  the  West — I  hope  he  may  be  again  elected — 
should  he  fail,  he  will  be  politically  lost  to  the  democracy — 
In  confidence,  I  can  say  to  you,  that  the  leading  democrats 


180  DIPLOMACY   UNDER   TYLER   AND   POLK 

to  Mexico.88  Just  what  Green's  duties  were  does  not 
appear,  but  he  was  sent  doubtless  to  aid  in  strength 
ening  the  desire  of  the  people  for  annexation,  even  to 
the  extent,  in  the  opinion  of  Jones,  of  fomenting  a 
revolution  in  Texas  if  the  government  of  Texas  openly 
favored  separate  independence.34 

Donelson  reported  the  conversations  had  with  Hous 
ton  and  Jones  and  his  conclusion  therefrom  that  the 
retiring  and  incoming  executives  of  Texas  were  in 
favor  of  annexation  notwithstanding  all  contrary  re 
ports.  Terrell,  a  well-known  advocate  of  indepen 
dence,  had  been  sent  as  minister  to  England  and 
France.  Donelson  feared  that  this  was  an  indication 
of  the  change  in  the  policy  of  Texas.  Houston  tried  to 
disabuse  his  mind  upon  this  point.  "Terrell,"  Hous 
ton  ,  said,  "was  not  authorized  to  conclude  a  treaty, 
that  he  had  sent  him  to  England  and  France  to  see 
what  bids  they  would  make,  what  boot  they  would 
give — that  he  was  not  authorized  to  commit  the  gov- 

of  both  Illinois  &  Indiana,  advise  me,  that  his  speeches  on 
the  Texan  question  has  been  by  thousand  published  by  the 
Whiggs  &  circulated  to  the  great  injury  of  the  democratic 
cause,  and  some  of  his  best  friends  in  Ohio  have  complained 
of  this,  and  has  confidently  assured  me,  that  the  Col  speeches, 
and  the  apathy  of  Allen  &  Tapan  on  the  Texan  question  has 
lost  Ohio  to  the  democrats — but  that  they  will  make  another 
struggle  on  the  first  of  nov^r  next. 

"My  whole  Household  Join  me  in  kind  salutations  to  you 
&  yours,  as  does  Major  Donelsons  family,  and  particularly 
yr  little  god  daughter,  Mary — very  respectfully" 

[Signature    cut    off] 

33  Calhoun  to  Tyler,  February   10,   1845;   Report  Am.   Hist. 
Assoc.,   1899,   II.,  643.     Shannon  to   Calhoun,   November   12, 
1844;  MS.,  Archives. 

34  Officers  of  the  Government  of  Texas  to  Jones,  December 
30,  1844 ;  Jones,  Official  Correspondence,  412. 


THE    ANNEXATION    OF    TEXAS  l8l 

ernment,  and  power  to  do  so  would  not  be  given 
to  him."  !i  Again  is  the  question  of  Houston's  sincerity 
raised.  Donelson  believed  he  had  in  him,  as  well  as 
in  Jones,  a  true  friend.  Jones,  whose  enmity  to 
Houston  soon  became  no  secret,  claimed  that  Houston 
opposed  annexation  from  the  time  the  Calhoun  treaty 
was  rejected.  The  question,  however,  is  not  important. 
Jones,  not  Houston,  was  to  occupy  the  center  of  the 
Texan  stage  after  the  ninth  of  December. 

The  new  charge  to  Texas  emphasized  the  necessity 
of  haste  on  the  part  of  Congress.  "Every  day's  delay 
is  adding  strength  to  the  hands  of  those  who  are 
playing  the  game  for  the  ascendency  of  British  influ 
ence  in  this  Republic.  Delay  will  increase  the  diffi 
culties  already  in  our  way,  if  it  does  not  make  them 
insurmountable." !  He  reported  that  Houston  as 
sured  him  that  he  would  be  proud  to  see  annexation 
accomplished  during  Donelson's  residence  in  Texas.37 

In  his  valedictory  message  to  the  Texan  congress, 
however,  Houston  did  not  give  utterance  to  those  pro- 
annexation  views  with  which  he  had  raised  Donelson's 
hopes.  He  dwelt  upon  the  splendid  prospects  which 
Texas  would  have  if  she  persevered  in  separate  inde 
pendence,  and  drew  attention  to  the  friendly  attitude 
of  European  nations  in  contrast  with  the  manifest 
coolness  of  the  United  States.  Jones's  inaugural  con 
tained  not  a  word  upon  the  subject  of  annexation.38 

"Donelson  to  Calhoun,  November  24,  1844;  Report  by  A. 
C.  McLaughlin,  Carnegie  Institution  Publications. 

"Donelson  to  Calhoun,  November  23,  1844  (received  De 
cember  28)  ;  MS.,  Archives. 

87  Donelson  to  Calhoun,  November  24,  1844  (received  De 
cember  28)  ;  MS.,  Archives. 

3sYoakum,  Texas,  II.,  443. 


1 82  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYI^R   AND   POLK 

The  question  was  what  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States  would  do. 

In  Mexico,  Shannon,  whose  temperament  seems  to 
have  been  totally  unfit  for  a  diplomatic  position,  was 
engaged  in  a  blustering  correspondence  with  Rejon 
upon  the  subject  of  annexation.  Santa  Anna's  down 
fall  was  plainly  indicated.  As  the  government  weak 
ened  and  a  revolution  became  more  and  more  immi 
nent,  Shannon's  tone  grew  less  and  less  conciliatory. 
Green,  always  a  mischief  maker,  whose  desires  now 
went  beyond  the  annexation  of  Texas  and  fastened 
themselves  upon  the  acquisition  of  California,  coun 
selled  Shannon  upon  the  necessity  of  humbling  Mex 
ico.  Green  reported  to  Calhoun  that  Mexico  would 
never  consent  to  the  annexation  of  Texas.  "The 
present  Government  may  therefore  temporise,  but  we 
have  nothing  to  hope  from  Mexico.  They  cannot 
reconquer  Texas  but  they  will  not  sell  Texas."  S9  "The 
Government  of  the  United  States  have  no  alternative, 
that  they  cannot  be  content  with  the  annexation  of 
Texas.  They  must  demand  a  withdrawal  of  the  in 
solent  charges  and  imputations  contained  in  Mr. 
Re jon's  notes,  and  an  immediate  adjustment  of  all  OUT: 
Claims  against  Mexico.  This  will  not  be  done  and  a 
war  must  be  the  consequence."  40  Shannon  wrote  that 
there  was  as  much  probability  of  the  Emperor  of 
China  declaring  war  against  the  United  States  as  that 
Mexico  would  do  so.  Without  any  authority  from 
Calhoun,  he  notified  the  Mexican  government  that 
owing  to  the  insolent  tone  of  Re  jon's  communications, 

88  Duff  Green  to  Calhoun,  October  28,  1844;  Report  of  Am. 
Hist.  Association,  1899,  II.,  980. 
40  Green  to  Calhoun,  November  12,  1844  5  ibid.,  993. 


THE    ANNEXATION    OF    TEXAS  183 

he  would  suspend  diplomatic  intercourse  with  it  until 
he  had  further  instructions  from  home.41  Coinciding 
with  Green's  opinion  that  the  United  States  "could  not 
have  peace  with  Mexico  without  a  war," '  Shannon 
declared  to  Calhoun  that  nothing  could  be  done  with 
Mexico  as  to  the  settlement  of  any  of  the  difficulties 
we  have  with  her,  "until  we  either  whip  her,  or  make 
her  believe  we  will  do  so."'48 

Having  assisted  Shannon  in  bringing  relations  with 
Mexico  to  an  impasse,  Green  left  to  take  up  the  duties 
of  his  consulate  at  Galveston.  A  quarrel  with  a  fellow- 
consul  soon  occurred,  and  after  an  altercation  with 
President  Jones  he  was  given  his  passports.44 

In  Mexico  the  storm  against  Santa  Anna,  which  had 
long  been  brewing,  finally  broke  out  into  revolution. 

41  Shannon  to  Rejon,  November  8,  1844;  MS.,  Archives. 
Niles'  Register,  LXVIL,  260-66. 

"Green  to  Calhoun,  November  12,  1844;  Report,  Am.  Hist. 
Association,  1899,  H.,  993. 

*8  Shannon  to  Calhoun,  November  12,  1844 ;  ibid.,  995. 

"The  source  of  the  Green  quarrel  was  this:  Green  at 
tempted  to  have  the  Texan  congress  pass  a  bill  in  aid  of  two 
companies,  the  Texas  Land  Company  and  the  Del  Norte 
Company.  These  companies  had  as  objects  the  conquest 
and  occupancy  in  behalf  of  Texas  of  the  Californias  and 
the  northern  provinces  of  Mexico  by  means  of  an  army  aided 
by  Indians  to  be  introduced  from  the  United  States  upon 
the  Texan  frontier.  Green  offered  stock  in  these  companies 
to  Jones  if  he  would'  aid  in  the  scheme.  Upon  Jones's  re 
fusal  Green  threatened  to  revolutionize  the  country  and 
overthrow  the  existing  government.  Jones  revoked  Green's 
exequatur  Dec.  31,  1844.  Officers  of  the  Government  of  Texas 
to  Jones,  December  30,  1844;  Jones,  Official  Correspondence, 
412.  Elliott  to  Jones,  January  14,  1845;  ibid.,  413.  Donelson 
to  Calhoun,  January  9,  1845,  enclosing  Secretary  of  State 
Allen  to  Donelson,  January  14,  1845 ;  MS.,  Archives.  Donel 
son  to  Calhoun,  January  25  (ibid.),  stated  that  the  trouble 
between  Jones  and  Green  had  been  settled. 


184  DIPLOMACY   UNDER   TYLER   AND   POLK 

It  culminated  in  the  overthrow  of  Santa  Anna  on  De 
cember  5,  1844.  T ne  council  of  state  appointed,  as  presi 
dent  ad  interim,  General  Herrera,  a  man  of  established 
probity  of  character,  whose  fault  was  timidity.  His 
tendencies  were  for  peace.  Thus  Mexico,  by  expelling 
the  turbulent  Santa  Anna  and  replacing  him  with 
Herrera,  took  a  long  step  toward  the  peaceful  adjust 
ment  of  relations  with  the  United  States  upon  the 
subject  of  Texas.  A  more  competent  diplomat  than 
Shannon  would  have  taken  advantage  of  the  change 
in  Mexico's  domestic  affairs.  Shannon,  however, 
whose  bad  feeling  dated  from  his  arrival  in  the  coun 
try,  wanted  Mexico  chastised. 

The  course  of  events  in  Washington  centered  about 
the  agitation  for  the  passage  through  Congress  of  the 
resolution  annexing  Texas.  Calhoun  felt  that  while 
the  House  would  favor  annexation,  the  action  of  the 
Senate  was  problematical.45  Ingersoll's  resolutions  as 
amended  by  Brown  of  Tennessee  passed -the  House 
on  January  25,  1845,  by  a  vote  of  one  hun 
dred  and  twenty  to  ninety-eight.  In  the  Senate 
Benton,  reversing  his  earlier  position,  in  which 
he  demanded  the  previous  consent  of  Mexico,  now 
came  forward  with  a  proposition  to  annex  Texas  by 
what  was  practically  the  negotiation  of  a  new  treaty. 
The  support  of  Benton  and  of  those  senators  who 
followed  him  was  necessary  for  the  success  of  any 
annexation  measure.  A  compromise,  which  gave  to  the 
President  the  power  of  selecting  the  alternative  means, 
was  offered  and  passed  by  a  small  majority.  The  joint 

45  Calhoun  to  R.  M.  T.  Hunter,  December  29,  1844 ;  Report, 
Am.  Hist.  Association,  1899,  II.,  636. 


THE    ANNEXATION    OF    TEXAS  185 

resolutions  went  to  President  Tyler  March  I,  many 
believing  that  he  would  leave  the  final  choice  of 
measures  to  his  successor,  Polk. 

Tyler's  name,  however,  was  to  be  inseparably  asso 
ciated  with  Texas.  Calhoun  had  not  been  invited  to 
continue  with  Polk.48  As  soon  as  the  resolutions 
reached  the  President,  he  and  Calhoun  determined  to 
act  at  once.  Selecting  the  method  suggested  by  the 
House  in  preference  to  that  which  Benton  claimed  was 
the  only  constitutional  mode,  Tyler,  on  the  day  before 
he  left  the  presidential  office,  despatched  a  special  mes 
senger  to  Texas  to  carry  the  joint  resolution  to 
Donelson,  who  was  instructed  to  insist  that  the  Texan 
government  accede  to  the  terms  of  the  joint  resolution. 
The  reason  for  the  deliberate  choice  of  the  House 
methods  was  stated  to  be  that  they  were  more  simple 
in  character  and  might  more  readily  be  carried  into 
effect.  "Nothing  more  is  necessary  than  that  the 
Congress  of  Texas  be  called  together,  its  consent  given 
to  the  provisions  contained  in  it,  and  the  adoption  of 
a  constitution  by  the  people  in  convention,  the  same 
to  be  submitted  to  the  Congress  of  the  United  States 
for  its  approval,  in  the  same  manner  as  when  one  of 
our  own  territories  is  admitted  as  a  state.  The  decisive 
objection  to  the  amendment  of  the  Senate  is  that  it 
would  endanger  the  ultimate  success  of  the  measure." ' 
It  contemplated  a  new  compact  which  must  be  ratified 
like  any  other  treaty.  Calhoun  urged  that  the  joint 
resolutions  be  adopted  by  the  Texan  congress  with 
out  amendment  and  immediately.  "The  last  hope  on 

"Calhoun  to  Mrs.  Calhoun,  March  n,  1845;  ibid.,  647. 
47  Calhoun  to  Donelson,  March  3,   1845 ;  S.  Ex.  Doc.  I,  29 
Cong.,  2  Sess.,  32.     Tyler's  Tylers,  II.,  364. 


l86  DIPLOMACY   UND£R  TYL£R   AND   POLK 

the  part  of  any  foreign  power,  which  may  feel  dis 
posed  to  defeat  annexation,  will  be  to  act  upon  the 
government  of  Texas,  and  it  can  scarcely  be  doubted 
from  the  feelings  expressed  on  the  part  of  one  of  the 
leading  European  powers  against  the  measure,  that 
no  effort  will  be  spared  to  induce  Texas  to  reject  the 
proposals  contained  in  the  Resolution." ' 

It  has  been  seen  that  Jones's  policy  as  president  of 
Texas  was  to  follow  two  parallel  lines  of  negotiation : 
the  first,  to  hold  the  door  open  for  annexation  as  long 
as  there  remained  any  reasonable  ground  for  hope  of 
getting  it,  the  second,  to  lay  the  foundation  for  the 
separate  independence  of  Texas  as  a  nation  in  case 
annexation  should  ultimately  fail.  "Annexation  or 
Unity,  Independence  and  Peace  with  all  the  world." ' 

Donelson  learned  of  the  passage  of  the  Texas  reso 
lution  while  he  was  at  New  Orleans.  He  turned  back 
to  Texas  with  the  important  news  only  to  find  the 
French  and  English  charges  closeted  with  Jones  and 
the  secretary  of  state,  Ashbel  Smith.  Although  ig 
norant  of  what  project  was  under  consideration,  he 
felt  sure  that  Jones  was  a  friend  of  annexation.  The 
result  of  the  conference  with  Elliott  and  Saligny,  the 
British  and  French  representatives,  was  a  memoran 
dum  of  a  treaty  which  included  the  conditions  that 
Mexico  acknowledge  the  independence  of  Texas,  and 
that  Texas  promise  that  she  would  not  annex  her 
self,  or  become  subject,  to  any  country  whatever.50 
Elliott,  without  Donelson's  knowledge,  left  Galveston 

"Ibid.     See  Donelson  to  Calhoun,  April  24,  1845;  Report 
Am.  Hist.  Association,  1899,  II.,  1029.    . 
"Jones;  Official  Correspondence,  473. 
00  Ibid.,    Memorandum   of   March  29,    1845. 


THE:    ANNEXATION    OF    TEXAS  187 

for  Mexico.  In  the  mean  time  Jones  temporized.  At 
no  time,  however,  did  Donelson  lose  faith  in  the  ulti 
mate  success  of  the  measure,  for  Jones  had  assured 
him  that  he  would  submit  the  question  to  the  people. 
As  soon  as  Elliott  had  left  for  Mexico  with  the  agree 
ment  for  independence,  Jones  sent  his  secretary  of 
state  to  Europe  for  the  purpose  of  placing  the  rela 
tions  of  Texas  with  Great  Britain  and  France  upon 
a  satisfactory  footing  should  annexation  fail.  In  case 
annexation  triumphed  Smith  was  to  take  leave  of  the 
two  governments  and  close  the  legations.61  The  Mexi 
can  government  accepted  the  proposals  of  Texas  and 
the  preliminary  treaty  was  ratified  by  the  Mexican 
congress.52  Elliott  returned  with  the  treaty  and  Jones 
proclaimed  peace  with  Mexico.  It  remained  for  the 
people  of  Texas  to  decide  which  path  Texas  should 
follow,  that  of  independence  or  of  union  with  the 
United  States.  A  convention  had  already  been  called 
to  consider  the  resolutions  for  annexation.  The 
Texan  congress  indicated  the  feeling  of  the  people  in 
unanimously  rejecting  the  Mexican  treaty  and  voting 
for  annexation.  Upon  the  Fourth  of  July  the  conven 
tion  of  the  Republic  of  Texas  passed  an  ordinance 
with  but  one  dissenting  voice,  agreeing  to  annexation 
with  the  United  States.  In  October  the  people  ratified 
the  acts  of  the  convention,  and  all  that  Texas  could  do 
toward  annexation  had  been  accomplished.  The  steps 
remaining  for  the  admission  of  Texas  as  a  state  of  the 
Union  were  to  be  taken  by  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States.  In  December  Polk  approved  the  joint  resolu- 

61  Smith  to  Jones,  April  9,  1845,  and  memorandum ;  Jones, 
Official  Correspondence,  446. 
52  Ashbel  Smith's  Reminiscences,  72. 


1 88  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYI^R   AND   POLK 

tion  of  Congress  admitting  Texas  as  a  state,  and  in 
February,  1848,  upon  the  surrender  of  authority  by 
President  Jones  to  Governor  Henderson,  Texas  as  a 
republic  legally  ceased  to  exist.63 

Tyler  gave  way  to  Polk  but  not  before  he  had 
signed  the  joint  resolutions  for  annexation  and  deter 
mined  which  method  of  annexation  should  be  followed. 
No  two  men  could  have  been  more  different  in  char 
acter  than  Calhoun  and  Buchanan.  As  far  as  Texas 
was  concerned,  Polk  did  not  reverse  the  decision  of 
his  predecessor.  The  incoming  President  proceeded 
to  carry  out  the  plans  that  Calhoun  had  decided  upon. 
As  soon  as  Tyler  had  signed  the  joint  resolution,  Al 
monte,  the  Mexican  minister  at  Washington,  departed, 
thus  breaking  off  relations  between  his  country  and 
the  United  States.  In  giving  notice  to  Buchanan  of 
the  termination  of  his  mission  Almonte  denounced  the 
action  of  Congress  as  "an  act  of  aggression,  the  most 
unjust  which  can  be  found  recorded  in  the  counsels 
of  modern  history — namely,  that  of  despoiling  a 
friendly  nation  like  Mexico  of  a  considerable  portion 
of  her  territory."  M 

As  Mexico  had  long  since  announced  that  annexa 
tion  would  be  regarded  by  her  as  equivalent  to  a  decla 
ration  of  war,  Almonte  was  forced  to  suspend  rela 
tions  to  preserve  his  self-respect.  He  could  do  no  less. 
Polk  was  justified  in  thinking  that  nothing  would 

"  In  the  summer  of  1845  Polk  refused  to  receive  a  charge 
from  Texas.  Had  he  then  regarded  Texas  as  a  foreign  state, 
he  would  have  exceeded  his  powers  in  sending  United  States 
troops  thither.  Folk's  Diary. 

"Almonte  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  March  6,  1845;  Brit, 
and  For.  State  Papers,  XXXIIL,  246-48. 


THE    ANNEXATION    OF    TEXAS  189 

come  of  Almonte's  protest.  As  the  administration  of 
the  peaceful  Herrera  was  admittedly  too  weak  to  sub 
jugate  Texas,  the  prosecution  of  a  war  against  the 
United  States  was  at  first  hardly  considered.  Almonte's 
protest  was  received  with  expressions  of  regret  that 
Mexico  should  have  taken  offense.  "The  President," 
Buchanan  wrote  Almonte,  "although  entering  upon  the 
duties  [of  his  office],  cheerfully  declares  in  advance 
that  his  most  strenuous  efforts  will  be  devoted  to  the 
amicable  adjustment  of  every  cause  of  complaint  be 
tween  the  two  governments  and  to  the  cultivation  of 
the  kindest  and  most  friendly  relations  between  the 
sister  Republics."  M 

With  the  departure  of  Almonte  really  ends  the  nar 
rative  of  Texas  annexation,  as  far  as  Mexico  was  con 
cerned.  It  is  commonly  said  that  the  Mexican  War  • 
was  the  result  of  the  annexation  of  Texas,  but  the  two 
were  separate  episodes  which  had  no  necessary  con 
nection.  If  Polk  had  had  no  ulterior  designs  upon 
Mexico,  the  Mexican  War  would  not  have  taken 
place.  Had  the  United  States  only  the  matter  of 
Texas  to  settle  with  Mexico  there  would  have  been 
no  difficulty.  But  Polk  had  greater  ambitions  than  to 
act  as  Tyler's  administrator  de  bonis  non  as  to  Texas: 
he  coveted  California  from  his  entrance  into  office. 
Tyler's  name  is  properly  connected  with  Texas ;  with 
Polk  belongs  the  glory,  if  glory  it  be,  of  the  Mexican 
War  and  of  the  conquest  of  California. 

55  Buchanan  to  Almonte,  March  10,  1845 ;  ibid. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE   NORTHWESTERN    BOUNDARY    CONTROVERSY 
1803-1818 

It  has  been  found  necessary  to  review  the  history 
of  the  northeastern  boundary  question  in  order  to 
present  with  sufficient  clearness  the  problem  that 
Ashburton  and  Webster  essayed  to  solve.  The  north 
eastern  boundary  question  was  essentially  one  of  geog 
raphy,  having  its  origin  in  the  inaccuracies  of  the 
eighteenth  century  maps  and  in  the  ignorance  of  those 
who  negotiated  the  peace  treaty  of  1783.  The  north 
western  boundary  difficulty,  solved  in  1846,  was  one 
of  totally  different  nature.  Interpretation  of  maps 
had  nothing  to  do  with  it.  It  was  a  boundary  ques 
tion,  which  grew  out  of  the  westward  expansion  of 
the  Anglo-Saxon  people  toward  the  Pacific.  It  was 
a  controversy  nearly  as  old  as  the  northeastern  ques 
tion,  but  the  succeeding  phases  of  it  had  no  resem 
blance  to  the  controversy  over  the  St.  Croix,  the  High 
lands,  and  the  Connecticut  River.  That  the  two  mat 
ters  culminated  in  angry  discussion  at  about  the  same 
time  was,  perhaps,  only  a  coincidence.  The  two 
branches  of  the  English-speaking  races  spread  west 
beyond  the  Rockies  and  came  in  close  contact,  after  a 
race  across  the  continent,  near  the  mouth  of  the 
Columbia. 

The  history  of  this  expansion  has  In  ft  much  of 
the  picturesque.  Gray  and  Vancouver  carried  on  the 
work  of  Drake,  while  the  exploits  of  Lewis  and  Clark 


THE)    NORTHWESTERN    BOUNDARY    QUESTION       IQI 

and  of  Mackenzie  nobly  followed  out  the  hazardous 
undertakings  of  Champlain  and  of  La  Salle. 

In  the  attempt  to  make  good  the  territorial  claims 
for  which  Gray  and  Lewis  and  Clark  upon  the  one 
hand,  and  Vancouver  and  Mackenzie  upon  the  other, 
furnished  the  opportunity,  both  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain  made  use  of  every  argument  upon  which 
color  of  title  could  be  founded.  Discovery,  settle 
ment,  effective  occupation,  contiguity,  and  treaty 
rights  were  all  made  to  do  duty  in  some  form.  All 
of  these  lumped  together  failed  to  give  either  party 
a  perfect  right  to  the  northwest  coast  of  America. 
The  result  was  a  compromise  no  doubt  just  and  equi 
table.  The  line  of  forty-nine  degrees  carried  across 
the  Rocky  Mountains  to  the  Pacific  gave  to  Great 
Britain  a  stretch  of  coast  that  guaranteed  to  her  for 
all  time  to  come  a  position  of  effective  commercial 
rivalry  with  the  United  States  for  the  transcontinental 
and  trans-Pacific  trade  of  the  world.  Had  the  United 
States  been  able  successfully  to  defend  against  Great 
Britain  her  claim  up  to  fifty-four  degrees,  forty  min 
utes  (and  a  war  would  no  doubt  have  resulted  in  the 
effort  to  enforce  such  a  claim),  the  position  of  Great 
Britain,  not  only  in  reference  to  the  North  American 
continent,  but  also  to  the  trade  of  the  world,  might 
have  become  secondary  in  importance.  Great  Britain 
was  secured  in  her  possession  of  a  transcontinental 
trade-route  long  Before  such  an  idea  was  believed  pos 
sible.  The  tortuous  path  of  Mackenzie  has  been 
straightened  into  the  line  of  the  Canadian  Pacific, 
whose  port  of  departure  to  the  Orient  bears  the  name 
of  Mackenzie's  compatriot,  the  sailor  Vancouver. 


192  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYI^R   AND   POI<K 

By  the  treaty  of  peace  of  1783  the  western  boun 
dary  of  the  United  States  was  the  Mississippi  River 
south  to  the  thirty-first  degree  of  latitude.  On  the 
northwest  the  limits  were  from  the  northwesternmost 
point  of  the  Lake  of  the  Woods  "thence  on  a  due  west 
course  to  the  River  Mississippi."  Such  a  boundary 
was  impossible,  because  a  line  due  west  from  the  north- 
westernmost  point  of  the  Lake  of  the  Woods  would 
have  struck  far  to  the  north  of  the  source  of  the  Mis 
sissippi.  It  is  to  be  noticed  that  this  line  of  the  treaty 
would  have  given  Great  Britain  access  to  the  Missis 
sippi. 

The  rectification  of  the  geographical  error  in  the 
^description  of  the  boundary  line,  together  with  the 
•question  as  to  whether  or  not  Great  Britain  had  access 
to  the  Mississippi,  is  the  genesis  of  the  northwestern 
boundary  question.  The  matter  seems  not  to  have  had 
serious  attention  until  the  King-Hawkesbury  nego 
tiations  of  igog.1  Calling  attention  to  the  error  of 
the  line  of  1783,  Madison  instructed  King  that  this 
might  be  remedied  by  agreeing  that  the  boundary 
should  run  from  that  source  of  the  Mississippi  nearest 
the  Lake  of  the  Woods,  "striking  it  westwardly  at  a 
tangent  and  from  the  point  touched  along  the  water 
mark  of  the  lake  to  its  most  northwestern  point,  at 
which  it  will  meet  the  line  running  through  the 
Lake."2  Depending  upon  Mackenzie's  report  that  the 
source  of  the  Mississippi  nearest  the  Lake  of  the 
Woods  was  about  twenty-nine  miles  to  the  westward 
of  the  Lake,  King  agreed  to  a  line  drawn  between 

*Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rel,  II.,  584-91. 
2  Madison  to  King,  June  8,   1802;  ibid.,  II.,  585.     Madison 
refers  to  Mackenzie's  map,  then  recently  published. 


NORTHWESTERN    BOUNDARY    QUESTION       193 

these  two  points,  and  the  convention,  signed  May  12, 
1803,  so  declared  the  boundary.  The  Louisiana 
treaty,  of  which  King  then  knew  nothing,8  upset  the 
agreement  that  had  been  reached  with  Hawkesbury. 
The  Senate  struck  out  the  fifth  article  relating  to 
boundaries  upon  the  recommendation  of  John  Quincy 
Adams,  then  chairman  of  the  committee  to  which  the 
treaty  was  referred.  The  Senate  feared  that,  as  the 
King  convention  antedated  the  Louisiana  treaty  by 
twelve  days,  it  might  be  held  to  operate  as  a  limitation 
of  the  claims  of  the  United  States  to  Louisiana.* 

Monroe,  who  had  been  sent  from  Paris  to  London 
after  the  execution  of  the  Louisiana  treaty,  was  in 
structed  by  Madison  to  secure  Great  Britain's  ratifica 
tion  of  the  King  treaty  with  the  fifth  article  omitted. 
Madison  believed  that  there  would  be  no  difficulty  in 
prevailing  upon  the  British  Government  thus  to  ac 
cept  the  treaty,  because,  "first,  it  would  be  unreason 
able  that  any  advantage  against  the  United  States 
should  be  constructively  authorized  by  the  posteriority 
of  the  dates  in  question ;  the  instructions  given  to  enter 
into  the  convention  and  the  understanding  of  the  par 
ties  at  the  time  of  signing  it,  having  no  reference  what 
ever  to  any  territorial  rights  of  the  United  States  ac 
quired  by  the  previous  convention  with  France,  but 
referring  merely  to  the  territorial  rights  as  under 
stood  at  the  date  of  the  instructions  for,  and 
signature  of,  the  British  convention.  .  .  .  Sec 
ondly,  if  the  fifth  article  be  expunged,  the  north  boun 
dary  of  Louisiana  will,  as  is  reasonable,  remain  the 
same  in  the  hands  of  the  United  States  as  it  was  in 

3  King  to  Madison,  December  3,  1803;  ibid.,  II.,  591. 

4  Adams  to  Madison,  December  16,  1803;  ibid.,  II.,  590. 


194  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

the  hands  of  France,  and  may  be  adjusted  and  estab 
lished  according  to  the  principles  and  authorities  which 
would  in  that  case  have  been  applicable.  Thirdly, 
there  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  boundary  between 
Louisiana  and  the  British  territories  north  of  it  was 
actually  fixed  by  commissioners  appointed  under  the 
treaty  of  Utrecht,  and  that  this  boundary  was  to  run 
from  the  Lake  of  the  Woods  westwardly  in  latitude 
forty-nine  degrees;  in  which  case  the  fifth  article 
would  be  nugatory,  as  the  line  from  the  Lake  of  the 
Woods  to  the  nearest  source  of  the  Mississippi  would 
run  through  territory  which  on  both  sides  of  the  line 
would  belong  to  the  United  States.  .  .  .  Fourthly, 
laying  aside,  however,  all  the  objections  to  the  fifth 
article,  the  proper  extension  of  a  dividing  line  in  that 
quarter  will  be  equally  open  for  friendly  negotiations 
after,  as,  ...  considering  the  remoteness  of  the  time 
at  which  such  a  line  will  become  actually  necessary, 
the  postponement  of  it  is  of  little  or  no  consequence."  ! 
These  instructions  are  of  importance  because  in  them 
is  the  first  suggestion  of  the  line  of  forty-nine  degrees 
as  a  boundary  between  the  United  States  and  the 
British  possessions  to  the  west  of  the  Lake  of  the 
Woods.  Madison  said  that  "there  was  reason  to  be 
lieve"  that  commissioners  under  the  treaty  of  Utrecht 
had  decided  upon  that  parallel  as  the  division  between 
French  and  British  territories.  In  support  of  this  as 
sertion,  Madison  enclosed  a  paper  setting  forth  the 
reasons  for  believing  that  the  Utrecht  commissioners 
had  decided  upon  the  line  of  forty-nine  degrees.  -What 
these  arguments  were  cannot  be  known  except  indi 
rectly,  as  the  paper  referred  to  is  not  extant.  Madi- 

5  Madison  to  Monroe,  February  14,  1804;  ibid.,  III.,  89. 


THE    NORTHWESTERN    BOUNDARY    QUESTION       IQ5 

son,  however,  confessed  to  Monroe  that  recourse  must 
be  had  to  the  "proceedings  of  the  commissioners,  as 
the  source  of  authentic  information."  At  about  the 
same  time  Madison  urged  Livingston  at  Paris  to  make 
a  thorough  search  in  support  of  the  line  of  forty-nine 
degrees.6  Madison  then  admitted  that  he  had  no  official 
information  upon  which  to  rest  the  claim  for  the  pro 
posed  boundary.  While  commissioners  were  ap 
pointed  under  the  treaty  of  Utrecht  after  1719,  there 
is  no  evidence  that  they  ever  marked  out  a  line.7  The 
line  of  forty-nine  degrees,  which  divides  British  North 
America  from  the  United  States  across  more  than  half 
the  continent,  rests  upon  a  mistaken  idea.  Salmon,  in 
his  Modern  Universal  History,  published  in  1738, 
stated  that  the  Utrecht  commissioners  had  chosen  as 
the  dividing  line  between  the  Hudson  Bay  territories 
and  Canada  one  drawn  from  the  coast  of  Labrador  in 
latitude  fifty-eight  degrees,  thirty  minutes,  "southwest 
of  Lake  Mistissin  and  thence  farther  southwest  to 
the  latitude  of  forty-nine  degrees."  The  Topographi 
cal  Description  of  Louisiana,  by  Hutchins,  published 
in  1784,  copied  this  assertion  "verbatim  without  addi 
tion  or  remark." ' 

'Madison  to  Livingston,  January  31,  1804;  ibid.,  II.,  574. 

7  At  least  beyond  the  Lake  of  the  Woods.     Cf.    Bancroft  to 
Fish,    September    i,    1873;    MS.,   Archives.     Quoted   by   J.    C. 
B.    Davis,    Notes,   etc.,    1324,    n.      Cf.     Von    Hoist,   History, 

HI,  33- 

8  Greenhow,    Oregon,   edition    of    1847,    p.    430.     Apparently 
the  first  denial  that  the  line  of  forty-nine  degrees  was  deter 
mined  by  the  Utrecht  commissioners  was  made  by  Greenhow 
in  the  Washington  Globe  of  January  15,  1840:  "Summary  of 
facts    respecting    the    Northwest    coast    of    America."      See 
his  memoir  of  the  Northwest  Coast  of  America,  216.      Upon 
the  British 'side,  Twiss,  The  Oregon  Question  Examined,  208- 
14,    agrees  with  Greenhow's  contention. 


196  DIPLOMACY    UNDER   TYLER   AND    POLK 

It  will  be  noticed  that  Salmon  brought  the  line  down 
to  the  forty-ninth  parallel.  Douglas's  Summary  of 
the  British  Settlements  in  North  America,  published 
in  1749  at  Boston,  stated  that  the  line  went  not  only 
to  the  forty-ninth  parallel,  but  also  extended  indefi 
nitely  westward  in  that  latitude.  Bolton's  map  of 
America  inserted  in  Postlethwayt's  Dictionary  of  Com 
merce  marked  the  line  of  forty-nine  degrees,  and  in  a 
note  a  statement  is  made  that  this  line  had  been  settled 
"by  commissaries,  after  the  peace  of  Utrecht,  making 
a  course  from  Davis's  Inlet,  on  the  Atlantic  Sea,  down 
to  the  forty-ninth  degree,  through  the  Lake  Abitibis, 
to  the  North-west  ocean."  Thus  in  unofficial  maps, 
dating  from  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century, 
the  forty-ninth  parallel  \vas  represented  as  the  dividing 
line  between  British  and  French  possessions  through 
to  the  Pacific  Ocean.  There  was  no  basis  in  fact  for 
such  an  idea.  Mitchell's  map,  as  used  by  the  nego 
tiators  of  1782,  which  had  been  the  source  of  so  much 
confusion  over  the  northeastern  boundary,  showed  no 
such  dividing  line  upon  the  northwest.  Upon  it  there 
is  no  reference  to  the  forty-ninth  parallel.  This  imag 
inary  line,  therefore,  was  immediately  after  the  pur 
chase  of  Louisiana  put  forth  by  the  United  States  as 
the  ancient  northern  boundary  of  the  newly  acquired 
possession.  It  was  an  American  and  not  a  British 
suggestion.8 

Monroe  found  that  it  was  not  so  easy  to  persuade 

9  See  excellent  maps  in  Channing's  Jeffersonian  System, 
pp.  6  and  70.  The  substitution  of  a  parallel  of  latitude  for 
a  natural  watershed  as  the  boundary  of  Louisiana  accounts 
in  some  measure  for  the  erroneous  idea,  subsequently  main 
tained,  that  Louisiana  extended  indefinitely  west. 


THE    NORTHWESTERN    BOUNDARY    QUESTION       IQ7 

Great  Britain  to  accept  the  King-Hawkesbury  con 
vention  without  the  fifth  article.  Addington  had  given 
way  to  Pitt,  and  Lord  Harrowby,  who  took  Hawkes- 
bury's  place,  strongly  reprobated  the  practice  of  rati 
fying  treaties  in  part  "as  one  unauthorized  and  un- 
sanctioned  by  public  law  and  usage."  Monroe  at 
tempted,  in  accordance  with  Madison's  instructions, 
to  explain  the  Senate's  action.  Harrowby  observed 
with  some  degree  of  severity  that  the  United  States 
was  not  disposed  to  ratify  the  fifth  article  when  it  was 
found  that  by  it  territory  was  ceded  with  which  the 
United  States  did  not  wish  to  part.  Monroe  resented 
"the  injustice  of  the  insinuation"  and  offered  to  leave 
the  ratification,  but  Harrowby  refused  to  receive  it. 
"The  conduct  of  Lord  Harrowby,"  Monroe  reported 
to  Madison,  "through  the  whole  of  this  conference 
was  calculated  to  wound  and  to  irritate,"  and  he  felt 
that  the  consideration  of  the  matter  was  indefinitely 
postponed.10  At  a  subsequent  interview  Monroe  stated 
that  it  was  not  contemplated  by  either  Great  Britain 
or  the  United  States  that  the  latter  should  convey  to 
the  former  any  right  to  the  territory  lying  westward 
of  the  line  between  the  Lake  of  the  Woods  and  the 
Mississippi,  "since  not  a  foot  of  it  belonged  to  her; 
it  was  intended  to  leave  it  to  Great  Britain  to  settle 
the  point  as  to  such  territory,  or  such  portion  of  it 
as  she  might  want,  with  Spain,  or  rather  with  France, 
to  whom  it  then  belonged."  The  stipulation  of  the  fifth 
article  had  become  by  the  Louisiana  treaty  nugatory, 
for,  "as  Great  Britain  holds  no  territory  south  of  the 

"Monroe    to    Madison,    June   3,    1804;    Am.   State   Papers, 
For.  Rel,  III.,  93. 


198  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER  AND   POLK 

forty-ninth  parallel  and  the  United  States  the  whole 
of  it,  the  line  proposed  by  that  article  would  run 
through  a  country  which  now  belongs  exclusively  to 
the  United  States."11  Thus  the  United  States  took 
the  position  that  the  parallel  of  forty-nine  degrees  was 
the  dividing  line  between  Louisiana  and  the  British 
possessions,  whereas  the  true  boundary  of  Louisiana 
upon  the  north  was  the  watershed  enclosing  the  ter 
ritory  drained  by  the  Mississippi-Missouri  rivers. 
Soon  after  this  second  interview  with  Lord  Harrowby, 
Monroe  went  to  Spain  upon  his  special  mission,  re 
turning  to  England  in  July,  1805."  Upon  his  return 
he  waited  for  some  months  for  Harrowby  to  resume 
the  consideration  of  the  northwestern  boundary.  Mon 
roe  was  disappointed  at  the  delay.  In  January,  1806, 
Pitt  died  and  Grenville  and  Fox  formed  a  new  minis 
try.  Monroe  hoped  that  Fox  would  inaugurate  a 
change  in  the  policy  of  Great  Britain  toward  the 
United  States.13  For  months  Monroe  was  unable  to 
draw  Fox's  attention  to  the  question  of  boundary. 
Jefferson,  holding  that  Jay's  treaty  had  expired,  then 
sent  William  Pinkney  to  act  jointly  with  Monroe  in 
the  negotiation  of  a  new  treaty.14  This  joint  commis 
sion  was  not  instructed  to  discuss  the  boundary  ques 
tion,  but  Monroe  was  separately  authorized  to  "bring 
that  business  to  a  conclusion.  If  any  repugnance 
should  be  shown  to  the  erasure  of  the  fifth  article  as 
proposed  by  the  Senate,  and  thereby  leaving  unsettled 

"Monroe  to   Madison,    September  8,    1804;   ibid.,   III.,   95. 
Monroe  to  Lord  Harrowby,  September  5,  1804;  ibid.,  III.,  97. 
12  Monroe  to  C.  J.  Fox,  February  25,  1806;  ibid.,  III.,  114. 
"Monroe  to  Madison,  January  28,  1806;  ibid.,  III.,  in. 
"Jefferson's  Writings,  Ford's  Ed.,  XIV.,  178,  n. 


THE    NORTHWESTERN    BOUNDARY    QUESTION       1 99 

for  the  present  the  boundaries  in  the  northwest  quar 
ter  of  the  Union,  and  preference  should  be  given  to  a 
proviso  against  any  constructive  effect  of  the  Louisiana 
convention  on  the  intention  of  the  parties  at  the  sig 
nature  of  the  depending  convention,  you  may  concur 
in  the  alteration  with  a  view  to  bring  the  subject  in 
that  form  before  the  ratifying  authority  of  the  United 
States."  15 

The  treaty  which  Monroe  and  Pinkney  signed  with 
Vassal  Holland  and  Auckland  was  not  submitted  to 
the  Senate  by  Jefferson,  as  it  contained  no  abandon 
ment  of  Great  Britain's  claim  to  impress  American 
citizens.10  Pinkney  and  Monroe  continued  their  nego 
tiations  until  Grenville's  ministry  retired  and  Canning 
became  secretary  for  foreign  affairs.  Monroe  and 
Pinkney  reported  that  Canning's  professions  were,  on 
the  whole,  conciliatory."  Negotiations  were  soon  re 
newed  for  a  convention  upon  the  boundary.  The 
American  commissioners  proposed  that  "the  division 
line  between  our  respective  territories  [upon  the  north 
west]  ought  to  be  drawn  from  the  most  northwestern 
point  of  the  Lake  of  the  Woods  due  north  or  south 
until  it  shall  intersect  the  parallel  of  forty-nine  degrees, 
and  from  the  point  of  such  intersection  due  west  along 
and  with  that  parallel."  This  was  agreed  to  by  the 
British  commissioners,  who,  however,  followed  by  pro 
posing  that  "this  line  of  forty-nine  degrees  should  ex- 

15  Madison  to  Monroe,  May  15,  1806;     Am.  State  Papers, 
For.  Rel.,  III.,  119. 

16  Madison  to  Monroe  and  Pinkney,  February  3,  1807 ;  ibid., 
HI,   153- 

"Monroe  and  Pinkney  to  Madison,  April  22,  1807;  ibid., 
III.,  160.  They  had  not  then  heard  of  Jefferson's  attitude 
toward  their  treaty. 


2OO  DIPLOMACY   UND£R  TYI^R  AND   POLK 

tend  west  as  far  as  the  territories  of  the  United  States 
extend  in  that  quarter."  :  The  purpose  of  the  British 
suggestion  was  evident  to  Monroe  and  Pinkney.  Both 
sides  agreed  that  nothing  in  the  article  "should  be  con 
strued  to  extend  to  the  northwest  coast  of  America,  or 
to  the  territories  belonging  to  or  claimed  by  either 
party  on  the  continent  of  America  to  the  westward  of 
the  Stony  Mountains." ]  To  limit  the  line  of  forty- 
nine  degrees  so  that  it  would  go  only  as  far  as  the 
territories  of  the  United  States  might  extend  in  that 
quarter  would,  so  Monroe  and  Pinkney  believed,  leave 
it  open  for  Great  Britain  afterwards  to  found  a  claim 
to  any  part  of  the  country  west  of  the  beginning  of 
that  line.  The  American  commissioners  feared  that 
such  a  claim  might  be  made  on  the  ground  of  occupa 
tion  or  even  by  purchase  from  Spain,  and  their  feelings 
were  shared  by  Madison,  who  wanted  no  such  proviso. 
"It  would  have  little  other  effect,"  he  wrote,  "than  as 
an  offensive  intimation  to  Spain  that  our  claims  ex 
tend  to  the  Pacific  Ocean.  However  reasonable  such 
claims  may  be  compared  with  those  others,  it  is  im 
politic,  especially  at  the  present  moment,  to  strengthen 
Spanish  jealousies  of  the  United  States,  which  it  is 
probably  an  object  with  Great  Britain  to  excite  by  the 
clause  in  question." "  Before  Madison's  warning 
reached  Monroe  and  Pinkney  the  question  of  a  boun 
dary  was  overshadowed  by  a  more  serious  affair,  that 
of  the  Leopard  and  Chesapeake.21  The  matter  of  the 

18  Monroe   and    Pinkney  to   Madison,   April  25,    1807 ;   ibid., 
III.,   162.  "Ibid.,  III.,  165. 

20  Madison  to  Monroe  and  Pinkney,  July  30,  1807;  ibid.,  III., 
185. 

21  Canning  to  Monroe,  July  25,  1807 ;  ibid.f  III.,  187. 


THE:    NORTHWESTERN    BOUNDARY    QUESTION      2OI 

northwestern  boundary  was  not  discussed  again  until 
after  the  War  of  1812.  The  negotiation  of  Monroe 
and  Pinkney,  though  fruitless,  had  some  lasting  effect. 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  were  agreed  that 
the  line  of  forty-nine  degrees  was  suitable,  at  least 
as  far  as  the  Rocky  Mountains.  Neither  Madison, 
Monroe,  nor  Pinkney  was  certain  as  to  the  extent  of 
Louisiana  to  the  west,  but  none  of  them  contended 
that  the  United  States  had  any  rights  to  the  west  of 
the  Rocky  Mountains  as  against  Spain.  Then,  too, 
Madison  was  unwilling  to  discuss  the  question  of  boun 
dary  indefinitely  westward  along  the  line  of  forty- 
nine  degrees  for  fear  of  offending  Spain.  Further 
more,  as  the  whole  question  of  right  to  the  western 
country  was  at  that  time  deemed  of  little  importance, 
Madison  was  perfectly  willing  to  leave  the  matter  in 
abeyance. 

At  the  first  conference  of  the  American  and  British 
peace  commissioners  at  Ghent,  held  August  8,  1814, 
the  latter  proposed  the  revision  of  the  boundary  line 
without  specifying  what  part  of  it  should  be  altered. 
They  disclaimed  any  intention  of  desiring  to  acquire 
additional  territory,  and  represented  the  proposed  re 
vision  as  intended  merely  for  the  purpose  of  prevent 
ing  uncertainty  and  dispute.22  At  a  later  conference28 
a  more  specific  proposal  was  made.  The  British  com 
missioners  proposed  that  the  boundary  line  west  of 
Lake  Superior  and  thence  to  the  Mississippi  be  re 
vised  and  the  treaty  right  of  Great  Britain  to  the  navi 
gation  of  the  Mississippi  be  continued.  Surprised  at 

22  American    Commissioners    to    Monroe,    August    12,    1814; 
ibid.,  III.,  705. 

23  August   19,   1814. 


2O2  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER  AND   POLK 

such  a  proposition,  the  American  members  asked  if 
the  Lake  of  the  Woods  were  not  meant  instead  of 
Lake  Superior.  "The  British  commissioners  repeated 
that  they  meant  the  line  from  Lake  Superior  to  that 
river."  :  The  American  answer  to  this  was  that  what 
ever  the  object  of  Great  Britain  might  be  in  thus  pro 
posing  to  take  over  a  tract  of  territory  larger  than  the 
whole  island  of  Great  Britain,  the  duty  of  the  Ameri 
can  commissioners  was  plain :  "they  have  no  authority 
to  cede  any  part  of  the  United  States,  and  to  no  stipu 
lation  to  that  effect  will  they  subscribe."25  To  this 
it  was  replied  that  as  the  necessity  for  fixing  some 
boundary  for  the  northwestern  frontier  had  been 
mutually  acknowledged,  a  proposal  for  a  discussion 
of  that  subject  could  not  be  considered  as  a  demand 
for  a  cession  of  territory,  "unless  the  United  States 
were  prepared  to  assert  that  there  is  no  limit  to  their 
territories  in  that  direction." :  The  British  commis 
sioners  then  proposed  the  line  from  the  Lake  of  the 
Woods  to  the  Mississippi  (as  set  forth  in  the  King- 
Hawkesbury  convention  of  1803),  but  they  admitted 
that  they  were  willing  to  discuss  any  other  boundary. 
In  the  refusal  of  Adams  and  his  colleagues  to  permit 
a  boundary  line  between  the  territory  of  the  United 
States  and  the  Indian  nations,  the  British  sought  to 
show  that  the  Americans  were  actuated  only  by  mo- 

24  Adams,  et  al.,  to  Monroe,  August  19,  1814;  Am.  State 
Papers,  For.  Rel,  III.,  709. 

^American  to  British  Commissioners,  August  24,  1814; 
ibid.,  III.,  712. 

26  British  to  American  Commissioners,  September  4,  1814; 
ibid.,  III.,  714. 


THE)    NORTHWESTERN    BOUNDARY    QUESTION      2O3 

lives  of  aggrandizement  "afforded  by  the  purchase  of 
Louisiana  from  France."  " 

To  dwell  upon  the  successive  steps  of  the  long  and 
difficult  negotiation  which  resulted  in  the  adoption  of 
the  status  quo  ante  bellum,  with  the  exception  of  the 
islands  in  Passamaquoddy  Bay,  is  manifestly  im 
possible  in  the  limits  of  this  chapter.  As  the  boundary 
lines  were  uncertain,  it  was  a  logical  step  to  arrange 
for  the  appointment  of  commissioners  to  trace  the  dis 
puted  boundary  line  according  to  the  terms  of  the 
treaty  of  1783.  In  the  consideration  of  the  restitution 
by  Great  Britain  of  all  the  places  taken  by  her  of 
which  the  United  States  had  possession  prior  to  hos 
tilities,  Monroe  reminded  the  Americans  at  Ghent  that 
"the  United  States  had  in  their  possession  at  the  com 
mencement  of  the  war,  a  post  at  the  mouth  of  the 
River  Columbia,  which  commanded  the  river,  which 
ought  to  be  comprised  in  the  stipulation,  should  the 
possession  have  been  wrested  from  us  during  the  war. 
On  no  pretext  can  the  British  Government  set  up  a 
claim  to  territory  south  of  the  northern  boundary  of 
the  United  States.  It  is  not  believed  that  they  have 
any  claim  whatever  to  territory  on  the  Pacific  ocean. 
You  will,  however,  be  careful,  should  a  definition  of 
boundary  be  attempted,  not  to  countenance  in  any 
manner,  or  in  any  quarter,  a  pretension  in  the  British 
Government  to  territory  south  of  that  line." '  Mon 
roe  thus  proceeded  upon  the  same  theory  according 
to  which  Madison  had  instructed  him  in  1804.  Madi- 

27  British  to  American  Commissioners,  September   19,   1814; 
ibid.,  Ill,  718. 

28  Monroe    to    American    Commissioners,    March    22,    1814; 
ibid.,  III.,  73L 


2O4  DIPLOMACY    UNDER   TYI^R   AND    POLK 

son's  assumption  was  that  by  the  Louisiana  treaty  the 
United  States  acquired  an  indefinite  westward  stretch 
of  territory  bounded  on  the  north  by  the  line  of  forty- 
nine  degrees.  For  the  first  time  the  line  was  suggested 
as  extending  as  far  west  as  the  Pacific  Coast.  As  has 
been  seen,  there  was  no  foundation  for  such  an  as 
sumption.  The  settlement  at  the  mouth  of  the  Colum 
bia  was  not  made  because  of  the  Louisiana  cession. 
The  foundations  of  a  claim  for  the  mouth  of  the 
Columbia  were  (i)  the  sea-ward  discovery  of  that 
river  by  Gray  in  1792;  (2)  the  results  of  the  Lewis 
and  Clark  expedition,  and  (3)  the  settlements  made 
by  Astor's  fur-traders  shortly  before  the  War  of  1812. 
The  rights  growing  out  of  these  various  elements 
appear  in  the  later  phases  of  the  discussion.  At 
present  it  is  noteworthy  that  Monroe  did  not  base  the 
right  of  the  United  States  to  the  restoration  of  As 
toria,  the  settlement  at  the  mouth  of  the  Columbia,  upon 
any  of  them.  It  was  boldly  asserted  that  Great  Britain, 
if  it1  had  any  claim  on  the  Pacific,  certainly  had  none 
south  of  forty-nine  degrees. 

The  question  as  to  the  sovereignty  and  possession 
of  the  mouth  of  the  Columbia  was  only  incidentally 
touched  upon  during  the  Ghent  negotiation.  Although 
the  principle  of  status  quo  ante  bellum  had  been  ad 
mitted,  the  British  commissioners  proposed  to  limit 
the  restoration  of  the  territory  taken  by  either  party 
during  the  war  to  those  places  that,  belonging  to 
one  party,  had  been  taken  by  the  other.  To  this  modi 
fication  of  the  principle  the  Americans  strenuously 
objected.  Restoration,  according  to  them,  should  be 
predicated  upon  the  fact  of  possession  prior  to  the 
war  and  not  upon  the  mere  right.  The  adoption  of 


THE)    NORTHWESTERN    BOUNDARY    QUESTION      205 

the  British  point  of  view  would  have  entailed  endless 
disputes  upon  every  possession  in  question.  During" 
the  discussion  Bayard  stated  that  the  proposed  altera 
tion  would  give  rise  to  a  new  dispute,  even  with  the 
utmost  fidelity  and  sincerity  on  both  sides.  "One 
party  claims  the  delivery  of  territory  taken  from  it, 
and  which  it  sincerely  and  honestly  believes  to  belong 
to  it.  The  other  refuses  to  deliver  it,  believing  with 
equal  sincerity  and  confidence  that  it  belongs  to  itself. 
Suppose  the  case  that  the  place  belongs  to  neither  of 
the  parties.  Suppose  the  case  that  it  belongs  to  both. 
On  either  of  these  suppositions  you  have  immediately 
a  new  dispute.  The  restoration  of  the  state  existing 
before  the  war  is  a  plain  and  simple  principle,  a  mat 
ter  of  fact,  about  which  no  dispute  can  arise."  :  This 
exposition  by  Bayard,  to  which  no  reply  was  made, 
had,  as  he  told  Adams,  particular  reference  to  the 
settlement  of  Astoria,  concerning  which  the  American 
commissioners  had  been  specifically  instructed. 

The  American  commissioners  made  a  proposal  simi 
lar  to  the  one  agreed  to  by  Monroe,  Pinkney,  Auck 
land  and  Holland  in  iSo/:30  that  the  line  drawn  due 
north  and  south  from  the  Lake  of  the  Woods  to  the 
line  of  forty-nine  degrees,  thence  west  along  that 
parallel,  should  be  "the  dividing  line  between  His 
Majesty's  territories  and  those  of  the  United  States, 
as  far  as  the  said  respective  territories  extend  in  that 
quarter."  The  British  counter-project  was  that  the 
line  should  extend  only  as  far  as  the  territories  of  the 
United  States  might  extend.  Both  agreed  that  the 

29  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  III.,  81.     Cf.    Greenhow's  Oregon, 
ed.  of   1847,  306. 

30  J.   Q.   Adams,  Memoirs,  III.,  84. 


2O6  DIPLOMACY    UNDER  TYI^R   AND   POLK 

article  should  not  be  construed  to  refer  to  any  terri 
tories  to  the  west  of  the  Rocky  Mountains  or  upon 
the  Pacific  Ocean.31  The  British  also  asked  for  access 
to  the  Mississippi.  Upon  this  last  proposition  and  the 
attempt  to  hedge  in  the  claims  of  the  United  States 
to  the  west  the  mission  disagreed.82  Finally  the  Ameri 
cans  offered  to  omit  altogether  the  article  relative  to 
the  northwestern  boundary,33  and  the  treaty  of  peace 
was  signed  with  the  line  of  boundary  from  the  Lake 
of  the  Woods  to  the  west  undetermined. 

The  treaty  provided  for  commissioners  to  run  the 
line  to  the  Lake  of  the  Woods  and  to  fix  the  most 
northwest  point  of  that  lake,  but  further  than  this 
nothing  was  stipulated.  The  line  of  forty-nine  degrees 
as  far  west  as  the  Rocky  Mountains  was  acceptable 
to  both  parties,  and  although  the  article  was  nearly 
agreed  upon,  the  discussion  went  off  upon  a  collateral 
incident 34  and  the  treaty  left  the  question  open. 

After  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  of  Ghent,  the 
question  of  Astoria  presented  itself  as  one  distinct 
from  the  general  question  of  the  northwestern  boun 
dary.  With  the  history  of  the  settlement  of  the  mouth 
of  the  Columbia  and  the  American  attempt  to  dispute 
the  British  monopoly  of  the  fur-trade  in  the  northwest 

31  Article  8  of  projet  and  counter-projet;  Am.  State  Papers, 
For.  Rel,  III,  738. 

32  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  III,  72,  84. 

33  Ibid.,  Ill,  85.     Gallatin  stated  that  while  it  would  be  a 
convenience  to  have  the  boundary  settled,  yet  the  lands  were 
of  so  little  value  and  the  period  when  they  might  be  settled 
was  so  remote  that  the  United   States   was  perfectly  willing 
that    the   boundary    should    remain    without    any    further    ar 
rangement. 

34  Adams  to  Gallatin,  May  22,  1818;  Am.  State  Papers,  For. 
Rel.,  IV,  371.     J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  III,  94,  120. 


THE    NORTHWESTERN    BOUNDARY    QUESTION      2O7 

it  is  impossible  here  to  concern  ourselves.  It  has  been 
shown  that  Monroe  instructed  Adams  and  his  fellow- 
negotiators  to  see  that  Astoria  should  be  restored  to 
the  United  States  because  Great  Britain  was  believed 
to  have  no  claims  upon  the  west  coast  of  America, 
at  least  south  of  the  line  of  forty-nine  degrees.  Mon 
roe's  assertion  was  remarkable  for  what  was  omitted : 
that  Astoria  had  been  an  effective  occupation,  the 
proper  sequence  of  the  American  discovery  of  the 
mouth  of  the  Columbia  by  Gray  in  1792.  This  argu 
ment  was  not  brought  forward  until,  in  later  negotia 
tions,  the  question  of  the  sovereignty  over  the  north 
west  coast  had  become  inseparably  connected  with  the 
general  question  of  the  northwestern  boundary. 

The  settlement  at  Astoria  under  the  auspices  of  the 
Pacific  Fur  Company  was  begun  in  1811.  Within  a 
few  months  thereafter  the  agents  of  the  British  North 
west  Company  reached  the  American  settlement  over 
land  by  way  of  the  northern  branch  of  the  Columbia. 
With  varying  fortunes  the  factory  at  Astoria  was 
maintained  by  the  Pacific  Fur  Company  until  after 
the  outbreak  of  the  war  with  Great  Britain.  In  the 
fall  of  1813,  in  anticipation  of  capture  by  a  British 
squadron  (information  having  reached  Astoria  that 
a  naval  force  was  on  its  way  to  take  and  destroy  every 
thing  American  on  the  northwest  coast),  the  agents 
of  the  Pacific  Fur  Company  sold  all  of  their  establish 
ments,  furs,  and  stock  on  hand  to  the  British  North 
west  Company.35  Some  ten  weeks  after  the  transfer 
had  been  made  the  British  sloop  of  war  Raccoon  ap- 

35  October  16,  1813.  Greenhow,  442,  gives  the  text  of  the 
agreement  between  the  agents  of  the  two  companies. 


2O8  DIPLOMACY   UNDER   TYLER   AND   POLK 

peared  at  the  mouth  of  the  Columbia.  To  the  disgust 
of  the  commander,  who  had  visions  of  battering  down 
the  American  fortifications  and  perhaps  of  securing 
some  booty,  the  place  had  already  been  put  into  the 
possession  of  the  British  company.  The  establishment 
of  the  Pacific  Fur  Company,  which  had  been  dreaded 
as  a  rival,  no  longer  existed.  Astoria  was  renamed 
Fort  George,  and  the  Raccoon  left  the  Columbia. 
Thus  was  the  settlement  of  Astoria  one  of  those  places 
directly  affected  by  that  clause  in  the  treaty  of  peace 
which  required  the  restoration  of  all  places  possessed 
by  either  party  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  It 
is  manifest  that  the  restoration  of  Astoria  under  the 
treaty,  according  to  the  view  for  which  Bayard  had 
so  earnestly  contended,  was  wholly  inconclusive  as 
to  rights  of  sovereignty  over  the  mouth  of  the  Colum 
bia.  The  question  of  possession  before  the  war  was 
one  of  fact,  and  this  the  United  States  was  not  slow 
to  raise. 

The  treaty  of  peace  was  proclaimed  February  18, 
i8i5.36  During  the  negotiations  at  Ghent,  Bentzon,  a 
son-in-law  of  Astor,  reported  to  Gallatin  that  steps 
would  be  taken,  as  soon  as  he  learned  of  the  terms  of 
the  peace  agreement,  to  renew  the  settlement  at  the 
Columbia  before  the  British  could  anticipate  the  move 
ment.37  As  all  the  commissioners  were  under  a  promise 
of  secrecy,  it  is  possible  that  Bentzon  did  not  know 
what  the  treaty  contained  until  it  had  been  signed.88 
Astor's  activities  were  directed  in  urging  Madison's 
administration  to  effect  the  restoration  of  Astoria 

36  Treaties  and  Conventions,  399. 
87  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  III.,  90. 
"/&*'</.,  III.,  127. 


THE)    NORTHWESTERN    BOUNDARY    QUESTION      209 

under  the  provisions  of  the  treaty.  In  July,  1815, 
Monroe  drew  the  attention  of  Baker,  the  British 
charge,  to  the  fact  that  an  expedition  that  had  been 
sent  by  the  British  government  "against  a  post  of 
the  United  States,  established  on  Columbia  River,  had 
succeeded  in  taking  possession  of  it."  Baker  was  then 
informed  that,  as  the  United  States  would  be  entitled 
to  the  possession  of  this  post  under  the  treaty,  measures 
would  be  taken  to  reoccupy  it  without  delay.  "It  is 
probable  that  your  government  may  have  given  orders 
for  its  restitution;  to  prevent,  however,  any  difficulty 
on  the  subject,  I  have  to  request  that  you  will  have 
the  goodness  to  furnish  me  with  a  letter  to  the  British 
commander  there  to  that  effect." !  Baker  in  reply 
pleaded  lack  of  instructions  upon  the  subject/0  No 
further  action  was  taken  during  Madison's  term  of 
office.  In  September,  1817,  the  sloop  of  war  Ontario 
was  despatched  to  the  mouth  of  the  Columbia  in  ac 
cordance  with  the  notice  peremptorily  given  Baker. 
Captain  Biddle,  commanding  the  vessel,  and  J.  B.  Pre- 
vost  were  jointly  commissioned  to  restore  the  Ameri 
can  flag  over  Astoria  and  to  "assert  the  claim  of  the 
United  States  to  the  sovereignty  of  the  adjacent  coun 
try  in  a  friendly  and  peaceable  manner  and  without 
the  employment  of  force."  No  attempt  was  made  to 
conceal  the  purpose  of  this  mission,  although  no  com 
munication  was  made  to  Bagot,  the  British  minister, 
concerning  it.41  Bagot,  after  a  personal  inquiry  from 

89  Monroe  to  Baker,  July  18,  1815;  Am.  State  Papers,  For. 
Rel,  IV.,  852. 

40  Baker  to  Monroe,  July  23,  1823 ;  ibid. 

"Adams  said  the  omission  was  accidental.  Adams  to  Rush, 
May  20,  1818;  ibid.t  IV.,  853. 


2IO  DIPLOMACY   UNDER   TYI^R   AND   POLK 

Adams,  formally  asked  for  an  explanation  of  the  ac 
tion  of  the  United  States  in  reference  to  the  settle 
ment  upon  the  Columbia.  He  insisted  that  while 
Astoria  had  been  captured  during  the  war,  the  Ameri 
cans  had  previously  retired  from  it  under  an  agree 
ment  with  the  Northwest  Company,  "who  had  pur 
chased  their  effects,  and  who  had  ever  since  retained 
peaceable  possession  of  the  coast."  '  In  his  interviews 
with  Adams,  Bagot  suggested  that  Great  Britain  had 
claims  upon  the  northwest  coast  that  would  conflict 
with  the  American  occupation  of  the  Columbia.  He 
then  definitely  asked  what  the  intentions  of  the  United 
States  were  toward  the  northwest  coast.  Adams  de 
clined  answering  the  inquiry  or  discussing  the  claims 
otherwise  than  in  writing.  The  correspondence  ended 
with  a  request  for  an  explanation  as  to  the  purpose 
of  the  Ontario  voyage.  Castlereagh  sought  to  obtain 
from  Rush,  who  had  just  arrived  as  minister  to  the 
Court  of  St.  James,  the  explanation  that  Bagot  had 
failed  to  have  from  Adams.  The  British  foreign  sec 
retary  coupled  for  the  first  time  the  matter  of  the 
possession  of  the  Columbia  with  the  general  question 
of  the  northwestern  boundary.  The  second  step  of 
the  negotiation  was  thus  reached.  Before  this,  all 
discussion  turned  upon  the  question  of  the  boundary 
between  the  British  possessions  and  the  United  States 
to  the  west  of  the  Lake  of  the  Woods.  Possession 
of  the  mouth  of  the  Columbia  was  an  isolated  ques 
tion,  at  first  completely  separated  from  the  general 
one  of  boundary.  From  now  on  until  the  Oregon 
compromise  was  effected  the  northwestern  boundary 

42  Bagot  to  Adams,  November  26,   1817;  ibid.,  852. 


THE    NORTHWESTERN    BOUNDARY    QUESTION      211 

question  was  merged  into  that  of  Oregon ;  Oregon  be 
came  the  general  term  to  designate  the  valley  of  the 
Columbia. 

Castlereagh,  considering  jointly  the  two  subjects 
of  the  northwestern  boundary  and  of  the  post  at  the 
Columbia  River,  proposed  to  Rush  that  the  question 
of  title  to  the  territory  upon  the  northwest  coast,  to 
gether  with  the  northeastern  and  northwestern  boun 
dary  disputes,  should  be  referred  to  commissioners  for 
settlement,  with  a  provision  for  arbitration  in  case  the 
commissioners  could  not  agree.43  Rush  naturally 
pleaded  lack  of  instructions.  As  far  as  the  line 
west  of  the  Lake  of  the  Woods  was  concerned, 
doubted  if  any  arrangement  could  be  had, 
as  the  original  boundary  did  not  touch  the  Mississippi, 
and  any  modification  of  it  to  the  south  would  bring 
:he  line  through  territory  admittedly  within  the  limits 
>f  the  United  States.  The  Astoria  matter  Rush  declined 
:o  discuss  further  than  to  declare  that  the  right  of  the 
LJnited  States  to  restitution  could  not  be  impeached 
under  the  stipulations  of  the  Ghent  treaty.  "I  men 
tioned  the  cases  of  Nootka  Sound  and  Falkland  Islands. 
In  these,  Great  Britain,  under  circumstances  far  less 
strong,  had  asserted  the  principle  of  which  we  claimed 
the  benefit."  " 

The  Nootka  Sound  treaty,  which  was  afterwards 
to  play  an  important  part  in  the  Oregon  question,  was 
introduced  by  the  United  States  as  an  argument  for 
the  restitution  of  Astoria.  In  October,  1790,  the  rep 
resentatives  of  Great  Britain  and  Spain  signed  the 

43  Rush's  Residence,  ed.  of  1833,  73-76. 

44  Ibid.,  74.     Rush  to  Adams,  February  14,  1818;  Am.  State 
Papers,  For.  Rel,  IV.,  853. 


212  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

convention  of  the  Escurial,  commonly  called  the 
Nootka  Sound  treaty.  To  attempt  in  this  place  an 
account  of  the  controversy  ended  by  the  convention 
of  the  Escurial  would  be  collateral  to  the  general 
subject.45  In  1789  the  Spanish  seized  two  English 
vessels  at  Nootka  Sound  and  carried  a  part  of  their 
officers  and  crews  as  prisoners  to  Mexico.  Plans  for 
an  English  establishment  at  Nootka  were  thus  forcibly 
interrupted.  The  action  of  the  Spanish  officials,, 
viewed  as  an  isolated  event,  would,  perhaps,  have  had 
important  results,  but  taken  in  connection  with  the 
strained  relations  then  existing  between  Great  Britain 
and  Spain,  and  the  general  political  condition  of  Eu 
rope,  the  occurrence  at  far-off  Nootka  brought  the  two 
countries  to  the  verge  of  war. 

The  first  purpose  of  the  Escurial  convention  was, 
as  Rush  suggested,  to  effect  the  restitution  of  the 
British  establishments  at  Nootka.  Spain  agreed  to 
restore  to  the  British  subjects  "the  buildings  and  tracts 
of  land  situated  on  the  Northwest  Coast  of  North 
America,  or  on  islands  adjacent  to  that  continent  of 
which  the  subjects  of  his  Britannic  Majesty  were  dis 
possessed  in  April,  1789.'"  Mutual  restitution  was 
agreed  upon  for  any  similar  acts  of  either  party 
toward  the  other  subsequent  to  the  occurrence  at 
Nootka.  So  far  the  treaty  is  easily  capable  of  inter 
pretation.  In  later  articles  more  general  terms  were 
employed,  and  upon  the  scope  of  these  all  claims 
founded  upon  the  Nootka  treaty  really  rested.  It  was 

45  For  a  comprehensive  account,  see  Manning's  "The  Nootka 
Sound  Controversy"  in  Report  of  the  Am.  Hist.  Association, 
1904,  pp.  279-478. 

46  Article  2  of  Treaty  of  October  28,  1790.     Manning,  454. 


THE    NORTHWESTERN    BOUNDARY    QUESTION      213 

agreed  that  the  respective  subjects  of  Spain  and  Great 
Britain  should  not  be  disturbed  or  molested  either  in 
navigating  or  in  carrying  on  their  fisheries  in  the 
Pacific  Ocean  or  in  the  South  Seas,  or  in  landing  on 
the  coasts  of  those  seas  in  places  not  already  occupied, 
for  the  purpose  of  carrying  on  their  commerce  with 
the  natives  of  the  country  or  of  making  establishments 
there."  This  general  provision,  which  was  manifestly 
a  concession  from  Spain  to  Great  Britain,  was  speci 
fically  restricted  by  the  stipulation  that  British  sub 
jects  should  not  carry  on  navigation  or  fishing  within 
ten  leagues  of  "any  part  of  the  coast  already  occupied 
by  Spain."  The  concession  was  not  to  be  made  a  cloak 
for  illicit  trade  with  the  Spanish  colonies  in  America, 
either  in  North  or  South  America.  The  fifth  article 
of  the  treaty  refers  to  the  northwest  coast  only :  "It 
is  agreed  that  as  well  in  the  places  which  are  to  be 
restored  to  British  subjects  by  virtue  of  the  first  article 
as  in  all  other  parts  of  the  Northwest  Coast  of  North 
America  or  of  the  isles  adjacent,  situated  to  the  north 
of  the  parts  of  the  said  coast  already  occupied  by 
Spain,  wherever  the  subjects  of  either  of  the  two 
powers  shall  have  made  settlements  since  the  month 
of  April,  1789,  or  shall  hereafter  make  any,  the  sub 
jects  of  the  other  shall  have  free  access  and  shall 
carry  on  their  commerce  without  disturbance  or  mo 
lestation."  48 

What  did  Great  Britain  gain  by  this  convention? 
Did  she  acquire  from  Spain  sovereign  rights  or  any 
title  to  any  part  of  the  Pacific  Coast?  Or  did  Great 

47  "Pour    y    former    des    etablissements."      French   text   in 
Martens,  Recueil,  IV.,  495. 
"Ibid.,  455-     Cf.     Von  Hoist,  III.,  42. 


214  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLKR   AND   POI<K 


Britain  succeed  in  limiting  the  commercial  system  of 
Spain  to  those  parts  of  America  that  were  Spanish 
colonies  in  fact  as  well  as  in  name?  In  other  words^ 
was  the  Nootka  Sound  convention  an  agreement  re 
specting  territorial  title  or  colonial  commerce?  "It 
was  the  first  express  renunciation  of  Spain's  ancient 
claim  to  exclusive  sovereignty  over  the  American 
shores  of  the  Pacific  Ocean  and  the  South  Seas.  It 
marks  the  beginning  of  the  collapse  of  the  Spanish" 
colonial  system." 4  It  was  an  admission  that  the 
Spanish  system  of  monopolizing  colonial  trade  was 
to  be  limited  to  those  countries  that  were  in  fact 
colonies;  .that  in  a  large  part  of  the  territories  over 
which  Spain  claimed  sovereignty  it  was  impossible 
to  extend  the  Spanish  colonial  system  and  to  inhibit 
trade  that  was  in  theory  illicit.  It  is  impossible  to 
read  into  the  Nootka  treaty  the  broad  doctrine  that 
for  the  northwest  coast  of  America  there  must  be  an 
effective  occupation  in  order  to  give  good  title.50  No 
amount  of  effective  possession  by  Great  Britain  south 
of  the  actual  Spanish  settlements  of  1790  could  have 
produced  under  the  treaty  a  good  title  as  against 
Spain.  Viewing  the  treaty  as  a  whole  (and  of  course 
in  no  other  way  can  it  be  interpreted),  the  conclusion 
is  irresistible  that  by  it  the  theory  of  the  Spanish 
colonial  system  was  modified  to  meet  actual  conditions 
upon  the  Pacific  coast  of  America.  Spain  agreed, 
provided  Great  Britain  did  not  attempt  any  exclusive 
methods  in  the  same  territories,  not  to  consider  as 
illicit  the  trade  along  those  coasts  to  which  she  had  long 

49  Manning,  462. 

50  Such  a  principle  as  e.  g.,  the  Berlin  act  of  1885,  adopted 
for  the  conventional  basin  of  the  Congo. 


THE    NORTHWESTERN    BOUNDARY    QUESTION 

claimed  title,  but  over  which  her  colonial  administra 
tion  had  not  actually  extended. 

The  treaty  was  criticised  in  Spain  for  having  "con-  . 
ceded  to  England  what  had  always  been  resisted  and 
refused  to  all  powers  since  the  discovery  of  the 
Indies." !  ''Our  right,  before  the  convention,"  said 
Fox  in  opposition,  "whether  admitted  or  denied  by 
Spain  was  of  no  consequence, — was  to  settle  in  any 
part  of  South  or  Northwest  America,  not  fortified 
against  us  by  previous  occupancy ;  and  we  were  now 
restricted  to  settle  in  certain  places  only,  and  under 
certain  conditions.  Our  rights  of  fishing  extended  to 
the  whole  ocean ;  and  now  it  was  limited,  and  not  to 
be  exercised  within  certain  distances  of  the  Spanish 
settlements.  Our  right  of  making  settlements  was  not, 
as  now,  a  right  to  build  huts,  but  to  plant  colonies,  if 
we  thought  proper."  52 

The  sequel  to  the  Nootka  treaty  is  very  significant. 
In  January,  1794,  a  convention  was  signed  at  Madrid 
which  provided  for  the  abandonment  of  Nootka  not 
only  by  Spain,  but  by  Great  Britain  as  well.  Acknowl 
edging  that  by  the  treaty  of  1790  the  subjects  of  both 
powers  had  equal  rights  of  frequenting  the  port  of 
Nootka,  it  was  now  agreed  that  "neither  of  the  said 
parties  shall  form  any  permanent  establishment  in  the 
said  port  or  claim  any  right  of  sovereignty  or  terri 
torial  dominion  there  to  the  exclusion  of  the  other. 
And  their  respective  Majesties  will  mutually  aid  each 
other  to  maintain  for  their  subjects  free  access  to  the 

51  Iriarte  to  Floridablanca,  October  27,  1790 ;  quoted  by 
Manning,  457. 

"Quoted  by  Greenhow,  Oregon,  213;  and  by  Von  Hoist, 
III.,  42. 


2l6  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

port  of  Nootka  against  any  other  nation  which  may 
attempt  to  establish  there  any  sovereignty  or  do 
minion."  ' 

Except  as  an  argument  for  the  restitution  of  Astoria 
under  the  treaty  of  Ghent  as  raised  by  Rush,  the 
Nootka  Sound  question  was  not  regarded  as  germane 
to  the  subject  of  the  respective  territorial  claims  of 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  in  1818.  Upon 
Rush's  report  of  his  conversation  with  Castlereagh, 
Adams  wrote,  May  20,  1818,  that  "as  it  was  not  an 
ticipated  that  any  disposition  existed  in  the  British 
Government  to  start  questions  of  title  with  us  on  the 
borders  of  the  South  Sea,"  the  United  States  had 
nothing  to  conceal  about  the  purposes  of  the  voyage 
of  the  Ontario.  Adams  instructed  Rush  to  suggest 
to  Castlereagh,  "though  not  unless  in  a  manner  to 
avoid  everything  offensive  in  the  suggestion,  that,  from 
the  nature  of  things,  if  in  the  course  of  future  events 
it  should  ever  become  an  object  of  serious  importance 
to  the  United  States,  it  can  scarcely  be  supposed  that 
Great  Britain  would  find  it  useful  or  advisable  to  re 
sist  their  claim  to  possession  by  systematic  opposition. 
If  the  United  States  leave  her  in  undisturbed  enjoy 
ment  of  all  her  holds  upon  Europe,  Asia,  arid  Africa, 
with  all  her  actual  possessions  in  this  hemisphere,  we 
may  very  fairly  expect  that  she  will  not  think  it  con 
sistent  either  with  a  wise  or  friendly  policy  to  watch 
with  eyes  of  jealousy  and  alarm  every  possibility  of 

83  /.  e.,  Russia.  Cf.  Monroe  to  Madison,  September  8,  1804 ; 
Am.  State  Papers,  For.  ReL,  III.,  95.  Text  of  the  Madrid 
convention  in  Manning,  469.  It  was  first  published  by  Calvo 
in  1862,  and  hence  probably  nothing  was  known  of  it  by 
American  diplomats  during  the  Oregon  controversy. 


THE)    NORTHWESTERN    BOUNDARY    QUESTION      21 7 

extension  to  our  natural  dominion  in  North  America, 
which  she  can  have  no  solid  interest  to  prevent, 
until  all  possibility  of  her  preventing  it  shall  have 
vanished."  64 

This  was  bold  language.  There  was  something  of 
an  absurdity  in  the  idea  that  the  United  States  would 
leave  undisturbed  the  British  possessions  in  Europe, 
Asia  and  Africa.  As  to  her  rights  in  America,  a  more 
practical  view  was  taken :  the  United  States  desired 
Great  Britain  not  only  to  keep  within  her  acknowl 
edged  limits,  but  to  interpose  no  objection  to  the  ter 
ritorial  expansion  of  the  United  States  as  a  matter  in 
which  she  had  no  concern  or  interest.  It  is  doubtful 
if  Rush  found  an  opportunity  to  communicate  Adams's 
surprising  suggestion  to  Castlereagh  "without  avoid 
ing  everything  offensive,"  for  Rush,  soon  after  the 
receipt  of  Adams's  letter,  had  an  interview  with  Cas 
tlereagh  in  which  he  went  over  the  whole  range  of 
unsettled  matters  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain.  The  conversation  was  amicable,  and  Rush 
offered  to  reopen  the  negotiation  of  the  northwestern 
boundary,  joining  with  it  the  question  of  the  title  to 
the  Columbia.55  If  Great  Britain  would  consider  these 
two  subjects,  together  with  that  of  the  slaves  carried  off 
in  contravention  of  the  treaty  of  Ghent  and  that  of  the 
fisheries,  in  addition  to  the  general  question  of  com 
merce,  the  United  States  would  appoint  a  plenipoten 
tiary  to  act  with  Rush.  Castlereagh  promptly  ac 
cepted  Rush's  invitation,  and  Gallatin,  the  minister  to 

"Adams  to  Rush,  May  20,  1818;  Am.  State  Papers,  For. 
Rel,  IV.,  854- 

55  Rush's  Residence,  269-74.  Rush  to  Adams,  July  25,  1818; 
Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rel,  IV.,  374,  854. 


2l8  DIPLOMACY    UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

France,  who  had  been  appointed  special  minister  at 
the  Court  of  St.  James  some  months  before,58  arrived 
at  London  in  August,"  and  the  negotiation  was  imme 
diately  begun.58  During  the  negotiation  Castlereagh 
left  England  to  attend  the  Congress  at  Aix-la-Chapelle. 
The  British  case  was  entrusted  to  Robinson,  -president 
of  the  Board  of  Trade,  and  Goulburn,  an  under-sec- 
retary  of  state.  The  details  of  the  negotiation  as  to 
commerce,  fisheries  and  slaves  are  outside  the  scope 
of  the  present  inquiry.  Adams  had  proposed  under 
separate  heads  the  discussion  of  the  northwestern 
boundary  and  the  title  to  the  Columbia.  Rush  noticed 
that  the  two  subjects  could  not  be  kept  apart.69  The 
subject  of  the  northwest  boundary  line,  which  as 
Adams  wrote  Gallatin  was  all  but  agreed  upon  at 
Ghent  but  "went  off  upon  a  collateral  incident,"  eo  was 
opened  just  as  it  had  been  in  the  earlier  negotiations 
in  1806  and  1814.  Adams  instructed  the  American 
plenipotentiaries  that  the  earlier  British  proposals 
could  not  be  agreed  to;  this  was  to  take  the  line  of 
forty-nine  degrees  westward  from  the  Lake  of  the 
Woods  as  far  as  the  territories  of  the  United  States 
extended  in  that  direction,  with  a  caveat  against  its 
extension  beyond  the  Rocky  Mountains.  Adams  made 
two  objections  to  this:  (i)  that  it  was  not  certain  that 
any  part  of  the  Lake  of  the  Woods  was  in  latitude 
forty-nine,  and  (2)  that  Great  Britain  "always  affected 

"Adams  to  Gallatin,  May  22,  1818;  Am.  State  Papers,  For. 
Rel,  IV.,  371- 

57  August  16.    Rush's  Residence,  306. 
"August  23,  at  Lord  Castlereagh's  country  seat;  ibid. 

59  Ibid.,  339- 

60  Adams  to  Gallatin,  May  22,  1818;  Am.  State  Papers,  For. 
Rel,  IV.,  372. 


THE)    NORTHWESTERN    BOUNDARY    QUESTION      219 

to  apply  the  indefinite  limit  of  extension  'as  far  as  the 
territories  extend'  to  the  territories  of  the  United 
States,  and  not  to  those  of  Great  Britain,  leaving  a 
nest-egg  for  future  pretensions  on  their  part  south  of 
latitude  forty-nine." '  Gallatin  and  Rush  were  in 
structed  to  hold  to  the  line  of  forty-nine  degrees  as 
far  as  the  territories  of  both  parties  extended,  with  a 
proviso  against  extension  beyond  the  Rockies.  Such 
an  instruction  separated  the  northwestern  boundary 
from  the  consideration  of  the  title  to  the  Columbia. 
Upon  these  questions  Adams  declined  an  arbitration, 
especially  one  by  Russia,  which  had  "pretensions"  upon 
the  northwest  coast.  "The  delineation  of  an  unsettled 
boundary  across  the  western  deserts  of  this  continent, 
the  title  to  establishments  upon  the  Pacific  ocean, 
.  .  .  where,  save  pretensions,  there  is  no  object 
to  any  party  worth  contending  for, — to  create  burden 
some  commissions  and  make  solemn  references  to  a 
foreign  sovereign  for  these,  appears  scarcely  to  be 
necessary,  if  altogether  justifiable." ' 

Throughout  the  course  of  the  negotiation  Robinson 
and  Goulburn  refused  to  discuss  the  boundary  line 
unless  some  arrangement  were  made  as  to  the  terri 
tories  west  of  the  Rocky  Mountains.  Rush  and  Gal 
latin  thereupon  proposed  that  the  line  of  forty-nine 
be  extended  to  the  Pacific.  "We  did  not  assert  that 
the  United  States  had  a  perfect  right  to  the  country, 
but  that  their  claim  was  at  least  good  as  against  Great 
Britain."  Believing  that  the  line  of  forty-nine  had 
been  fixed  under  the  treaty  of  Utrecht,  there  was  no 
reason  why  it  should  not  be  extended  to  the  Pacific. 

61  Adams  to  Gallatin  and  Rush,  July  28,  1818;  ibid.,  IV.,  377. 
92  Ibid.,  IV.,  378. 


22O  DIPLOMACY    UNDER  TYI^R   AND   POLK 

So  far  as  discovery  gave  any  claim,  Rush  and  Gallatin 
maintained  that  Gray's  finding  of  the  mouth  of  the 
Columbia,  followed  by  the  discoveries  of  Lewis  and 
Clark,  gave  a  claim  to  the  United  States  that  was  in 
disputable.  Robinson  and  Goulburn  answered  that  the 
discoveries  of  Cook  forestalled  any  rights  claimed 
under  Gray's  voyage,  and  that  no  boundary  would  be 
agreed  to  which  did  not  at  least  leave  the  mouth  of  the 
Columbia  in  common  with  the  United  States.  To  this 
the  American  representatives  said  that  rather  than 
concede  any  such  right  they  would  prefer  to  leave 
open  the  whole  question  of  possession  and  sovereignty 
west  of  the  Rocky  Mountains. 

Immediate  settlement  was  urged  by  Robinson  and 
Goulburn,  and  they  proposed  a  boundary  westward  of 
the  Rockies  as  follows:  "In  order  to  prevent  any  dis 
putes  as  to  the  territorial  rights  of  either  of  the  con 
tracting  parties  on  the  northwest  coast  of  America, 
or  anywhere  to  the  westward  of  the  Stony  mountains, 
it  is  agreed  that  so  much  of  the  said  country  as  lies 
between  the  forty-fifth  and  forty-ninth  parallels  of  lati 
tude,  together  with  its  harbors,  bays,  and  creeks,  and 
the  navigation  of  all  rivers  within  the  same,  shall  be 
free  and  open  to  the  subjects  and  citizens  of  the  two 
states,  respectively,  for  the  purpose  of  trade  and  com 
merce  ;  it  being  well  understood  that,  although  by  vir 
tue  of  this  arrangement,  the  two  high  contracting 
parties  agree  not  to  exercise  as  against  each  other  any 
sovereign  or  territorial  authority  within  the  above 
mentioned  country  lying  between  the  forty-fifth  and 
forty-ninth  parallels  of  latitude,  this  agreement  is  not 
to  be  construed  to  the  prejudice  of  any  claim  to  which 
either  of  the  two  high  contracting  parties  may  have 


THE    NORTHWESTERN    BOUNDARY    QUESTION      221 

to  any  territorial  authority  in  any  part  of  the  country 
lying  within  the  said  limits ;  nor  shall  it  be  taken  to 
affect  the  claim  of  any  other  Power  or  State  to  any 
part  of  the  said  country;  the  only  object  of  the  two 
high  contracting  parties  being  to  prevent  disputes  and 


lifferences  between  themselves." 


In  this  British  proposition  is  the  principle  of  joint 
occupancy  and  possession.  There  was  in  it  no  recog 
nition  of  the  sovereignty  of  either  Great  Britain  or  the 
United  States  over  the  territory.  No  attempt  was  made 
to  prejudge  the  claims  of  Spain.  Manifestly  it  was  a 
proposal  to  which  the  United  States  could  not  agree. 
Nothing  whatever  was  said  about  the  territory  north 
of  the  line  of  forty-nine,  to  which  as  yet  the  United 
States  had  laid  no  claim.  The  British  representatives 
sought  to  gain  joint  possession  of  all  the  territory 
westward  of  the  Rocky  Mountains  over  which  the 
United  States  asserted  sovereignty.  Gallatin  and  Rush 
rejected  the  proposed  article,  declaring  that  they  would 
sign  no  boundary  agreement  to  territory  either  west  or 
east  of  the  Rocky  Mountains  rather  than  acquiesce 
in  such  an  arrangement.  "We  did  not  know  with  pre 
cision  what  value  our  Government  set  on  the  country 
to  the  westward  of  those  mountains,  but  we  were  not 
authorized  to  enter  into  any  agreement  which  would 
be  tantamount  to  an  abandonment  of  the  claim  to  it." ' 

The  American  representatives,  however,  did  not  drop 
the  boundary  question.  They  would  not  throw  into  a 
common  stock  that  part  only  of  the  country  to  which 

83  Article  B,  annexed  to  Protocol  of  5th  Conference,  October 
6,  1818;  ibid.,  IV.,  391. 

64  Rush  and  Gallatin  to  Adams,  October  20,  1818;  ibid.,  IV., 
38i. 


222  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYI^R  AND   POLK 

the  United  States  denied  the  claim  of  Great  Britain, 
which  lay  south  of  forty-nine  degrees.  They  were 
not  authorized  to  agree  to  any  expressions  implying 
a  renunciation  of  territorial  sovereignty,  although  they 
did  not  insist  on  an  extension  of  the  line  of  forty-nine 
west  of  the  mountains.65  The  line  of  the  forty-ninth 
degree  as  far  as  the  Rockies  was  acceptable  to  both 
parties.  Provided  no  limits  were  placed  upon  the  ter 
ritory  to  the  west  of  the  mountains,  Gallatin  and  Rush 
were  willing  to  accept  the  principle  of  joint  occupation 
for  a  limited  term  of  years  as  a  modus  Vivendi,  and  to 
this,  though  with  a  show  of  reluctance,  Goulburn  and 
Robinson  agreed.*8 

Thus  the  idea  of  joint  occupation  proposed  by  Great 
Britain,  in  terms  unlimited  as  to  time  but  limited  to 
the  territory  south  of  forty-nine  degrees,  was  modified 
by  the  representatives  of  the  United  States  by  a  limita 
tion  of  time  to  ten  years  and  the  removal  of  all  terri 
torial  limitations.  The  British  position  was  intended, 
of  course,  to  secure  the  fur-trade  of  the  West.  Joint 
occupation  would  interfere  in  no  way  with  the  only 
sort  of  commerce  that  the  western  country  then  af 
forded.  The  idea  that  the  vast  territories  beyond  the 
Rockies  and  along  the  Pacific  Coast  were  susceptible 
of  settlement  had  not  yet  arisen.  The  acceptance  by 
the  United  States  of  the  programme  of  joint  occupa 
tion  had  in  no  sense  the  character  of  permanence.  As 
yet  the  idea  of  territorial  expansion  in  its  proper  sense 
found  no  place  in  the  discussion  of  the  Oregon  ques 
tion.  Joint  occupation  was  agreed  to  as  a  practicable 

"Protocol  5,  ibid.,  IV.,  392. 

68  Protocol  6,  October  9,  1818 ;  ibid.,  IV.,  393.  Gallatin  and 
Rush  to  Adams,  October  20,  1818;  ibid.,  IV.,  381. 


NORTHWESTERN    BOUNDARY    QUESTION      223 

modus  Vivendi  under  which  territorial  claims  might 
be  conserved  until  conditions  were  ready  and  public 
sentiment  was  ripe  for  a  solid  and  definite  assertion  of 
those  claims.  It  was  believed  that  the  question  had 
no  immediate  importance.  Though  basing  territorial 
claims  upon  discovery  and  settlement,  the  United 
States  admitted  that  it  had  no  perfect  right  to  the 
valley  of  the  Columbia  and  the  northwest  coast.  Upon 
the  receipt  of  the  convention  for  joint  occupation, 
Monroe  accepted  the  work  of  Gallatin  and  Rush,  and 
the  Senate  ratified  it  with  but  little  debate."  By  it 
the  restoration  of  Astoria  was  confirmed,  the  British 
surrendered  all  claim  to  access  to  the  Mississippi,  the 
northwestern  boundary  was  settled  as  far  as  the  Rocky 
Mountains,  and  the  territory  to  the  west  was  left  under 
joint  occupation  for  ten  years ;  the  only  object  of  the 
whole  being  "to  prevent  disputes  and  differences 
amongst  themselves."  That  the  object  failed  to  serve 
its  purpose  will  be  seen  in  the  next  chapter  upon  the 
development  of  the  Oregon  dispute  during  the  period 
of  joint  occupation. 

67  Convention  signed  October  20,  1818,  sent  to  Senate  De 
cember  29,  1818,  and  ratified  January  30,  1819;  Treaties  and 
Conventions  of  U.  S.  and  Foreign  Powers,  415. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  JOINT  OCCUPATION  OF  OREGON 
1818-1846 

The  period  of  joint  occupation  (1818-1846)  cannot 
be  described  within  the  limits  of  the  present  volume 
with  all  the  detail  that  the  proper  treatment  of  the 
subject  merits.  The  events  of  these  three  decades  can 
be  discussed  but  briefly  and  then  only  as  they  bear 
upon  the  question  of  the  development  of  the  problem 
that  so  many  American  diplomatists  tried  to  solve. 
Adams,  Clay,  Rush,  Gallatin,  and  Calhoun,  each  of 
these  devoted  much  attention  to  it.  The  attempted 
settlement  of  1823-24  resulted  only  in  a  restatement 
of  the  conflicting  claims  of  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States.  When  the  first  joint-occupation  agree 
ment  expired  by  limitation  in  1828,  the  parties  to  it 
were  so  far  apart  that  no  solution  was  possible.  Joint 
occupation  was  continued  indefinitely.  In  the  nego 
tiations  of  1823-24  and  of  1827-28  many  new  elements 
entered  into  the  discussion,  complicating  the  general 
problem. 

Rush's  negotiation  of  1823-24  was  really  a  collateral 
incident  in  the  more  general  matter  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  The  discussion  began  upon  the  publication 
of  the  Czar's  ukase  of  September  4-16,  1821,  by  which 
Russian  subjects  were  granted  exclusive  rights  along 
the  western  coast  of  North  America  north  of  the 
fifty-first  degree  of  latitude.  In  the  discussion  that 
followed  Adams's  protest  against  the  Czar's  preten 
sions,  Poletica,  the  Russian  minister  at  Washington, 


JOINT  OCCUPATION  OF  OREGON        225 

stated  that  the  line  claimed  as  the  southern  limit  of 
Russia's  pretension  was  half  way  between  the  northern 
most  settlement  of  the  United  States,  that  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Columbia  in  latitude  forty-six  degrees,  and  the 
Russian  post  of  New  Archangel  in  latitude  fifty-seven 
degrees/  Adams  forebore  entering  into  an  argument 
with  Poletica  further  than  to  state  that  Russia's  claim 
to  the  fifty-first  degree,  as  a  line  equidistant  from  the 
Columbia  and  New  Archangel,  was  greater  than  that 
made  in  1799,  when  the  line  of  fifty-five  degrees  was 
defined  as  the  southern  limit  of  the  grant  to  the 
Russian-American  Company.2 

The  ratifications  of  the  Florida  treaty  of  1819  were 
exchanged  February  22,  1821.  By  it  Spain  ceded  all 
of  her  American  territory  north  of  forty-two  degrees. 
Before  the  treaty  was  signed  Adams  had  stated  to 
Rush  that  he  did  not  anticipate  that  Great  Britain 
would  start  questions  of  title  with  the  United  States 
on  the  borders  of  the  Pacific.8  The  claim  of  the  United 
States  west  of  the  Rocky  Mountains  and  north  of 
forty-two  degrees  was  then  based  upon  discovery,  on 
the  Pacific  side  by  Gray  and  his  successors,  and  over 
land  by  Lewis  and  Clark,  and  upon  the  indefinite  ex 
tent  of  the  Louisiana  Purchase,  as  well  as  upon  the 
establishments  made  along  the  coast  by  American 
traders.  As  the  successor  of  Spain  upon  the  Pacific 
Coast  north  of  forty-two  degrees,  the  United  States 

Poletica  to  Adams,  February  28,  1822;  Am.  State  Papers, 
For.  Rel,  IV.,  861-63.  See  Hildt,  Early  Diplomatic  Negotia 
tions  of  the  United  States  with  Russia.  JOHNS  HOPKINS 
UNIV.  STUDIES,  XXIV.,  160,  sqq. 

2  Adams  to  Poletica,  March  30,  1822;  Am.  State  Papers, 
For.  Rel,  IV.,  863. 

'Adams    to    Rush,    May   20,    1818;    ibid.,   IV.,   853. 


226  DIPLOMACY   UNDER   TYLER  AND   POLK 

began  the  negotiations  by  which  Adams  hoped  a  de 
limitation  of  the  territorial  claims  of  Russia  and  Great 
Britain  might  be  effected.  The  questions  raised  by 
Poletica  Adams  sent  to  Middleton  at  St.  Petersburg 
for  further  discussion.  The  instructions  to  Middleton, 
dated  July  22,  1823,  and  those  to  Rush  at  London  bear 
ing  the  same  date/  are  of  the  utmost  importance,  not 
only  on  account  of  the  statement  of  the  claims  of  the 
United  States  as  against  Russia  and  Great  Britain, 
but  because  they  contain  the  formal  statement  as  to 
the  territorial  pretensions  of  European  powers  in 
North  America  that  reappears  in  Monroe's  famous 
message  of  December  2,  1823. 

This  is  no  place  for  a  discussion  of  that  much- 
discussed  and  much-abused  term,  "The  Monroe  Doc 
trine,"  the  meaning  of  which  varies  with  each  succes 
sive  clash  between  the  United  States  and  any  European 
power  concerning  American  affairs.  Writing  to  Mid 
dleton,  Adams  said  that  the  United  States  had  ac 
quired  all  the  rights  of  Spain  north  of  forty-two 
degrees;  that  by  the  treaty  of  1818  with  Great  Britain 
any  country  claimed  by  either  party  was  open  to  the 
citizens  and  subjects  of  the  two  powers  without 
prejudice  to  the  claims  of  either  party  or  of  any  other 
state.  As  Russia  had  claims  upon  the  Pacific  Coast, 
Adams  authorized  Middleton  to  propose  an  article  of 
the  same  import  for  a  term  of  ten  years  from  the 
signature  of  a  joint  convention  between  the  United 
States,  Great  Britain,  and  Russia.  "The  right  of  the 
United  States  from  the  forty-second  to  the  forty-ninth  \ 
parallel  of  latitude  on  the  Pacific  Ocean  we  consider ) 

4  Ibid.,  V.,  436-48;  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI.,  163. 


JOINT  OCCUPATION  OF  OREGON         227 

as  unquestionable,"  and  the  firmest  basis  of  that  right 
Adams  stated  to  be  the  cession  from  Spain  under  the 
Florida  treaty.  "This  territory  is  to  the  United  States 
of  an  importance  which  no  possession  in  North 
America  can  be  of  to  any  European  nation,  not  only 
as  it  is  but  the  continuity  of  their  possessions  from 
the  Atlantic  to  the  Pacific  Ocean,  but  as  it  offers  their 
inhabitants  the  means  of  establishing  hereafter  com 
munications  from  the  one  to  the  other."  Adams  be 
lieved  that  Russia  could  have  but  one  reason  for  de-x 
siring  possessions  in  America,  and  that  was  for  the 
purpose  of  trading  with  the  natives.  "By  offering  free 
and  equal  access  for  a  term  of  years  to  navigation  and 
intercourse  with  the  natives  to  Russia,  within  the  limits 
to  which  our  claims  are  indisputable,  we  concede  much 
more  than  we  obtain."  Adams's  observations  as  to 
Russia's  claim  were  given  in  an  enclosure  to  the  letter 
just  quoted.  In  the  course  of  it  Adams  made  use  of 
the  following  memorable  words :  "There  can,  perhaps, 
be  no  better  time  for  saying,  frankly  and  explicitly,  to 
the  Russian  Government,  that  the  future  peace  of  the 
world,  and  the  interest  of  Russia  herself,  cannot  be 
promoted  by  Russian  settlements  upon  any  part  of  the 
American  Continent.  With  the  exception  of  the  Brit 
ish  establishments  north  of  the  United  States,6  the  re 
mainder  of  both  the  American  continents  must 
henceforth  be  left  to  the  management  of  American 
hands.  It  cannot  possibly  be  the  purpose  of  Russia 
to  form  extensive  colonial  establishments  in  America. 
The  new  American  Republics  will  be  as  impatient  of 
a  Russian  neighbor  as  the  United  States;  and  the 

5i.  e.,  east  of  the  Rocky  Mountains. 


228  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYL^R   AND   POLK 

claim  of  Russia  to  territorial  possession,  extending  to 
the  fifty-first  degree  of  north  latitude,  is  equally  in 
compatible  with  the  British  pretensions."  Therefore, 
"the  United  States  can  in  nowise  admit  the  right  of 
Russia  to  exclusive  territorial  possession  on  any  part 
of  the  continent  of  North  America  south  of  the  sixtieth 
degree  of  north  latitude." 

The  instructions  to  Rush,  bearing  the  same  date, 
repeated  the  arguments  given  to  Middleton.  "It  is 
not  imaginable  that,  in  the  present  condition  of  the 
world,  any  European  nation  should  entertain  the  pro 
ject  of  settling  a  colony  on  the  Northwest  Coast  of 
America.  That  the  United  States  should  form  estab 
lishments  there,  with  views  of  absolute  territorial  right 
and  inland  communication,  is  not  only  to  be  expected, 
but  is  pointed  out  by  the  finger  of  nature,  and  has  been 
for  many  years  a  subject  of  serious  deliberation  in 
Congress."  As  Great  Britain  had  also  protested 
against  the  ukase  of  1821,  Adams  believed  that  the 
proper  time  had  arrived  for  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  to  come  to  a  "mutual  understanding 
with  respect  to  their  respective  pretensions,  as  well  as 
upon  their  joint  views  with  those  of  Russia." 

With  these  instructions  of  Adams  to  Middleton 
and  Rush  were  begun  the  prolonged  negotiations 
as  to  Oregon  that  Polk  finally  settled  upon  a 
compromise  basis.  They  are  the  starting  point 
of  the  various  lines  of  argument  that  succeed 
ing  secretaries  of  state  made  use  of.  In  Adams's 
position  were  elements  both  of  strength  and 
weakness.  He  proposed  a  tripartite  agreement  by 
which  Russia,  Great  Britain,  and  the  United  States 
were  to  be  secured  each  in  its  own  possessions.  He 


JOINT  OCCUPATION  OF  OREGON        22Q 

emphasized  the  rights  that  the  United  States  had 
acquired  from  Spain.  He  brought  forward  the  Nootka 
Sound  convention  in  support  of  the  claims  of  the 
United  States  under  the  Florida  treaty,  as  a  fair  and 
subsisting  agreement.  His  introduction  of  the  doc 
trine  that  the  American  continent  was  no  longer  to 
be  the  field  for  European  colonial  enterprise  became  the 
rock  upon  which  was  shattered  any  hope  of  agreement 
with  Great  Britain,  either  alone  or  in  a  tripartite  agree 
ment  with  Russia.  The  Nootka  Sound  convention  was 
susceptible  of  two  interpretations :  either  it  was  an 
agreement  between  Great  Britain  and  Spain, 
which  had  expired  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war 
in  1/96  and  was  not  afterwards  renewed,  or 
it  embodied  such  general  principles  relating  to 
commerce,  navigation,  and  territorial  possessions 
on  the  Pacific  as  not  only  to  give  it  perma 
nency,  but  to  bind  the  United  States  as  the  successor 
of  Spain.  If  the  latter  were  the  correct  interpreta 
tion,  Great  Britain  would  be  in  a  position  to  combat 
the  claims  of  the  United  States  to  the  exclusive 
ownership  of  any  territory  west  of  the  Rockies  and 
north  of  forty-two  degrees.  By  Adams's  interjection 
of  the  Nootka  Sound  convention  into  the  question  of 
the  northwest  coast  in  support  of  the  American  claim, 
the  United  States  was  estopped  from  asserting  that 
it  was  an  agreement  concerning  a  condition  of  affairs 
no  longer  existing." 

6  Cf.  Greenhow,  History  of  Oregon  and  California,  340 : 
"The  introduction.  ...  of  the  Nootka  convention.  .  .  . 
appears  to  have  been  wholly  unnecessary,  and  was  certainly 
impolitic.  No  allusion  had  been  made  to  that  arrangement 
in  any  of  the  previous  discussions  with  regard  to  the  north- 


23O  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYI^R   AND   POLK 

Adams  held  that  the  "principles"  settled  by  the 
Nootka  Sound  convention  were :  ( I )  that  the  rights  of 
fishing  and  of  trade  with  the  natives  on  the  northwest 
coast  and  "of  making  settlements  on  the  coast  itself 
for  the  purposes  of  that  trade,  north  of  the  actual  set 
tlements  of  Spain,  were  common  to  all  the  European 
nations,  and  of  course -to  the  United  States,  and  (2) 
that  Spain's  exclusive  territorial  rights,  as  they  existed 
in  1790,  extended  ten  miles  from  the  coasts  so  actually 
occupied  .  .  .  The  exclusive  rights  of  Spain  to 
any  part  of  the  American  continent  have  ceased.  That 
portion  of  the  convention,  therefore,  which  recognizes 
the  exclusive  colonial  rights  of  Spain  on  these  conti 
nents,  .  .  .  has  been  extinguished  by  the  fact  of 

west  coasts,  and  it  was  doubtless  considered  extinct;  but  when 
it  was  thus  brought  forward  by  the  American  government 
in  connection  with  the  declaration  against  European  coloniza 
tion,  as  a  settlement  of  general  principles  with  regard  to  those 
coasts,  an  argument  was  afforded  in  favor  of  the  subsistence 
of  the  convention,  of  which  the  British  government  did  not 
fail  to  take  advantage."  Cf.,  also,  Twiss,  The  Oregon  Ques 
tion  Examined,  289.  "In  the  course  of  the  conference,  the 
American  plenipotentiary  stated  that  he  was  instructed  to 
insist  on  the  principle  that  no  part  of  the  American  continent 
was  henceforward  to  be  open  to  colonization  from  Europe. 
To  explain  the  principle,  he  stated  that  the  independence  of 
the  late  Spanish  provinces  precluded  any  new  settlement 
within  the  limits  of  their  respective  jurisdictions;  that  the 
United  States  claimed  the  exclusive  sovereignty  of  all  'the 
territory  within  the  parallels  of  latitude  which  include  as 
well  the  mouth  of  the  Columbia  as  the  heads  of  that  river, 
and  of  all  its  tributary  streams  [i.  e.,  to  fifty-one  degrees] ; 
and  that  with  respect  to  the  whole  of  the  remainder  of  that 
continent  not  actually  occupied,  the  powers  of  Europe  were 
debarred  from  making  new  settlements  by  the  claim  of  the 
United  States  as  derived  under  their  title  from  Spain. 

"The  British  plenipotentiaries   asserted,   in  utter  denial  of 
the  above  principle,  that  they  considered  the  unoccupied  parts 


JOINT  OCCUPATION  OF  OREGON        231 

the  independence  of  the  South  American  nation  [sic] 
and  of  Mexico.  Those  independent  nations  will  pos 
sess  the  rights  incident  to  that  condition,  and  their 
territories  will,  of  course,  be  subject  to  no  exclusive 
right  of  navigation  in  their  vicinity,  or  of  access  to 
them  by  any  foreign  nation."  From  these  statements 
Adams  drew  the  principle  of  non-colonization :  "A 
necessary  consequence  of  this  state  of  things  will  be, 
that  the  American  continents,  henceforth,  will  no 
longer  be  subjects  of  colonization.  Occupied  by  civil 
ized  independent  nations,  they  will  be  accessible  to 
Europeans  and  to  each  other  on  that  footing  alone,  and 
the  Pacific  Ocean  in  every  part  of  it  will  remain  open 
to  the  navigation  of  all  nations,  in  like  manner  with 
the  Atlantic."  Without  entering  on  a  discussion  as  to 

of  America  just  as  much  open  as  hitherto  to  colonization  by 
Great  Britain,  as  well  as  by  other  European  powers,  agreeably 
to  the  convention  of  1790  between  the  British  and  Spanish 
Governments,  and  that  the  United  States  would  have  no  right 
whatever  to  take  umbrage  at  the  establishment  of  new  colonies 
from  Europe  in  any  such  parts  of  the  American  continent." 
Protocol  of  June  29,  1824;  Am,  State  Papers,  For.  Rel., 
V,  563- 

Thus  the  United  States  derived  the  principle  of  non- 
colonization  from  the  territorial  rights  of  Spain,  to  one  part 
of  which  the  Spanish-American  states  had  succeeded  by  their 
wars  of  independence,  and  to  the  other  the  United  States  under 
the  Florida  treaty.  Great  Britain  opposed  it  upon  the  ground 
that  by  the  Nootka  Sound  convention  Spain  had  waived  her 
exclusive  territorial  sovereignty  in  favor  of  the  doctrine  of 
actual  settlements.  It  was  unfortunate  that  Adams  and  Rush 
made  use  of  the  phrases  "actual  settlements"  and  "actually  oc 
cupied,"  which  appear  in  the  Nootka  Sound  convention.  "The 
principle  upon  which  England  insists  is,  that  the  Northwest 
coast  of  America,  north  of  the  actual  establishments  of  Spain, 
ought  not  to  be  deemed  to  belong  exclusively  to  any  Euro 
pean."  Confidential  Memorial,  ibid.,  V.,  450. 


232  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYU3R   AND   POLK 

the  correctness  of  Adams's  construction  of  the  Nootka 
Sound  convention,  it  is  manifest  that  the  introduction 
of  the  so-called  non-colonization  principle  into  the  in 
structions  to  Middleton  and  Rush  was  largely  by  a 
statement  of  fact,  being  a  description  of  the  condition 
of  affairs  in  America  as  they  existed  June  22,  1823. 
Adams  made  a  statement  of  fact  which  he  doubtless 
believed  would  assist  in  settling  the  claims  of  the  three 
powers  to  the  Pacific  Coast  north  of  latitude  forty- 
two  degrees.  That  the  American  continents  were  no 
longer  subject  to  European  colonization  was  an  asser 
tion  that  the  American  continents  contained  no  un 
occupied  land.  The  former  colonies  of  Spain  in  South 
America  had  been  recognized  as  independent  nations. 
What  had  been  the  Portuguese  colony  of  Brazil  was  no 
longer  subject  to  Portugal,  although  governed  by  the 
House  of  Braganza.  France,  Holland,  and  Great 
Britain,  it  is  true,  supported  colonies  upon  the  South 
American  continent,  but  each  colony  was  hedged  about 
by  the  territory  of  an  independent  state.  In  North 
America  the  conditions  south  of  the  line  of  forty-two 
degrees  were  precisely  similar.  The  Central  American 
states  were  independent,  as  well  as  Mexico,  and  sur 
rounded  the  British  colony  of  Belize,  the  only  Euro 
pean  colony  on  the  continent  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  Adams  admitted 
that  both  Russia  and  Great  Britain  had  territorial 
rights  upon  the  northwest  coast:  "You  are  authorized 
.  .  .  with  a  view  to  draw  a  definite  line  of  demar- 
kation  for  the  future,  to  stipulate  that  no  settlement 
shall  hereafter  be  made  on  the  Northwest  Coast  or  on 
any  of  the  islands  thereto  adjoining  by  Russian  sub 
jects  south  of  latitude  fifty-five  degrees,  by  citizens 


JOINT  OCCUPATION  OF  OREGON        233 

of  the  United  States  north  of  latitude  fifty-one  degrees, 
or  by  British  subjects  either  south  of  fifty-one  degrees 
or  north  of  fifty-five  degrees.  I  mention  the  latitude 
of  fifty-one  degrees,  as  the  bound  within  which  we  are 
willing  to  limit  the  future  settlement  of  the  United 
States.  .  .  .  As,  however,  the  line  already  runs  in 
latitude  forty-nine  degrees  to  the  Stony  mountains, 
should  it  be  earnestly  insisted  upon  by  Great  Britain, 
we  will  consent  to  carry  it  in  continuance  on  the  same 
parallel  to  the  sea."  : 

That  Adams  should  have  sought  to  arrange  a  line 
with  Great  Britain  to  the  exclusion  of  Russia  or  with 
Russia  to  the  exclusion  of  Great  Britain  occasions  no 
surprise  or  criticism.  When  Rush  made  known  to 
Canning  the  tenor  of  his  instructions,  the  proposition 
that  the  United  States  should  limit  Great  Britain  on 
the  north  to  fifty-five  degrees,*  Canning  declined  to 
join  with  the  United  States  in  negotiating  with  Russia. 
Rush  was  given  to  understand  that  Great  Britain  would 
proceed  separately.  Canning's  willingness  to  enter 
into  a  joint  negotiation  with  Russia  and  the  United 
States  had  been  based  upon  the  idea  that  Russia's  ex 
travagant  maritime  pretensions  in  the  Pacific  would  be 
the  only  subject  for  settlement.  Into  the  discussion 
of  the  relative  territorial  pretensions  of  Russia  and 
the  United  States  he  refused  to  enter.8 

"The  resumption  of  its  original  course  by  this  Gov- 

T  Adams  to  Rush,  July  22,  1822;  Am.  State  Papers,  For. 
Rel,  V.,  446-48. 

8  Rush  to  Middleton,  December  22,  1823 ;  ibid.,  V.,  463. 

9  Hildt,  Early  Diplomatic  Negotiations  of  the  United  States 
with  Russia,    170. 


234  DIPLOMACY   UNDER   TYLER   AND   POLK 

ernment  [Great  Britain]  has  arisen  chiefly  from  the 
principle  which  our  government  has  adopted,  of  not 
considering  the  American  continents  as  subject  to  future 
colonization  by  any  of  the  European  powers,  a  principle 
to  which  Great  Britain  does  not  accede."  3 

The  negotiation  upon  which  Rush  was  instructed 
was  thus  discredited  before  it  was  begun.  He  was 
forced  to  report  in  August,  1824,  that  after  eight 
months  the  negotiation  had  been  brought  to  a  close 
without  any  treaty  or  other  arrangement  on  any  of  the 
subjects  entrusted  to  him.11  The  prolonged  discussions, 
however,  gave  opportunity  for  both  the  British  and 
American  claims  to  be  set  forth  fully  for  the  first  time. 
Rush  assumed  responsibility  for  proceeding  after  Can 
ning  had  refused  to  enter  into  a  joint  negotiation  with 
Russia  and  the  United  States.  He  proposed  an  ex 
tension  for  a  further  term  of  ten  years  of  the  joint- 
occupation  agreement  of  1818,  coupling  it  with  a  pro 
viso  that  Great  Britain  during  that  time  should  make 
no  settlements  between  the  fifty-first  and  fifty-fifth 
degrees,  and  the  United  States  should  make  none  north 
of  latitude  fifty-one.  The  British  plenipotentiaries, 
Huskisson  and  Stratford  Canning,  promptly  declined 
Rush's  proposition.  They  offered  as  a  counter-propo 
sition  that  the  joint-occupation  agreement  be  termi 
nated  and  that  the  boundary  line  of  forty-nine  degrees 
be  extended  west  beyond  the  Rocky  Mountains  "to 
the  point  where  it  strikes  the  northeasternmost  branch 
of  the  Columbia,  and  thence  down  the  middle  of  the 
Columbia  to  the  Pacific  Ocean." 

10  Rush  to  Middleton,  January  9,  1824:  Am.  State  Papers, 
For.  Rel,  V.,  463. 

11  Rush  to  Adams,  August  12,  1824 ;  ibid.,  V.,  533-82. 


JOINT  OCCUPATION  OF  OREGON        235 

Rush  immediately  declared  his  inability  to  accept  the 
proposed  boundary,  but  in  accordance  with  Adams's 
permission  offered  the  line  of  forty-nine  degrees  to 
the  Pacific.  Huskisson  and  Canning  held  Rush's  final 
offer  under  consideration  for  a  fortnight,  and  then  re 
jected  it,  making  no  new  proposal  in  return.  They 
told  Rush  that  what  they  had  offered  was  as  much  as 
Great  Britain  would  concede. 

In  the  mean  time  Middleton  at  St.  Petersburg  was 
endeavoring  to  reach  an  understanding  with  Nessel- 
rode.  He  felt  himself  handicapped  by  the  defection 
of  Great  Britain,  whose  minister  was  engaged  in  an 
independent  negotiation.  Middleton  believed  that 
Great  Britain  had  abandoned  all  thoughts  of  keeping 
open  the  trade  upon  the  northwest  coast.  "Her  object 
in  this  negotiation  seems  to  be  to  obtain  an  abandon 
ment  of  the  extravagant  maritime  pretensions  set  up 
by  Russia,  and  at  the  same  time  to  acquire  for  herself 
territorial  rights."  ]  Although  Adams  had  said  that 
the  United  States  could  not  admit  the  right  of  Russia 
to  exclusive  territorial  possessions  in  America  south 
of  sixty  degrees,  he  was  willing,  in  case  Great  Britain 
and  Russia  joined  in  a  treaty  settling  their  respective 
territorial  claims,  to  recognize  Russia's  claim  as  far 
south  as  fifty-five  degrees.  Middleton  proceeded  to 
treat  with  Russia  according  to  the  terms  of  the  in 
structions  that  were  framed  for  the  tripartite  agree 
ment. 

Middleton's  first  pro  jet  was  that  "no  settlement  shall 
be  made  hereafter  on  the  northwest  coast  of  America, 
or  on  any  of  the  islands  adjacent  thereto,  north  of  the 

12  Middleton  to  Adams,  April  19,  1824 ;  ibid.,  V.,  461. 


236  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

fifty-fifth  degree  of  north  latitude,  by  citizens  of  the 
United  States.  .  .  .  nor  by  the  Russian  subjects 
.  .  .  south  of  the  same  parallel  of  latitude.""  The 
line  of  fifty-five  degrees  was  approximately  the  south 
ern  limit  of  the  grant  of  1799.  Middleton  was  con 
vinced  that  Russia's  claim  to  so  much  of  the  northwest 
coast  was  valid,  as  the  ukase  of  1799,  although  a  domes 
tic  act  and  never  communicated  to  the  other  powers, 
had  remained  unquestioned  for  more  than  twenty-five 
years.  The  Emperor  he  found  willing  enough  to 
rescind  the  ukase  of  1821,  but  not  the  earlier  one,  as 
"the  act  of  his  father  must  be  maintained."  3 

"The  fifty-fifth  degree  was  therefore  a  barrier  not 
to  be  broken  through ;  and  a  further  small  addition  was 
required  because  the  point  of  an  island  [Prince  of 
Wales  Island]  was  cut  off  by  that  parallel.  In  conse 
quence  of  this,  it  was  urgently  pressed  by  the  Russian 
plenipotentiaries  to  make  the  line  of  delimitation  run 
upon  a  parallel  of  fifty-four  degrees,  forty  minutes,  a 
small  deviation  from  the  instructions  I  had  received. 
To  this  I  thought  I  could,  without  impropriety, 
accede."  : 

The  convention  as  signed  April  17,  1824,  preserved 
Middleton's  phraseology :  that  the  citizens  of  the 
United  States  should  not  form  any  establishment  on 
the  northwest  coast  of  America  north  of  fifty-four  de- 

13  Pro  jet  of  the  United  States  of  February  8,  1824;  ibid., 
V.,  464- 

"Middleton  to  Adams,  April  19,  1824;  ibid.,  V.,  461. 

la  Ibid.,  V.,  461.  "The  proposal  of  inserting  fifty-four  de 
grees,  forty  minutes,  instead  of  fifty-five  degrees,  was  with  a 
view  to  preserving  to  Russia  two  points  of  the  island  in  which 
the  port,  called  Bucarelli  by  the  Spaniards,  is  situate;"  ibid., 
V.,  459- 


JOINT  OCCUPATION  OF  OREGON        237 

grees,  forty  minutes,  and  that  Russian  subjects  should 
form  none  south  of  that  line.  The  convention  further 
stipulated  that  for  a  period  of  ten  years  the  citizens  or 
subjects  of  either  power  should  have  free  access  "upon 
the  coast  mentioned"  for  the  purpose  of  fishing  and 
trading  with  the  natives.16  There  was  no  ambiguity 
in  the  terms  of  this  convention,  but  Russia  proceeded 
upon  the  theory  that  while  her  rights  were  secure 
north  of  fifty-four  degrees,  forty  minutes,  the  United 
States  had  no  rights  south  of  that  line  which  she  was 
bound  to  respect."  In  February,  1825,  Great  Britain 
and  Russia  concluded  a  treaty  by  which  it  was  stipu-_ 
lated  that  "the  line  of  demarkation  between  the  pos 
sessions  of  the  high  contracting  parties  upon  the  coast 
of  the  continent,  and  the  islands  of  America  to  the 
northwest"  should  begin  at  the  southernmost  point  of 
Prince  of  Wales  Island,  in  latitude  fifty-four  degrees, 
forty  minutes,  thence  eastward  to  the  Portland  Channel, 
thence  to  the  fifty-sixth  degree,  "which  line  shall  form 
the  limit  between  the  Russian  and  British  possessions 
in  the  continent  of  America  to  the  northward."  1 

The  negotiation  begun  by  Adams  for  the  settlement 
of  the  northwestern  boundary  dispute  was  a  failure. 
His  assertion  of  the  "non-colonization"  principle  put 
the  British  government  in  no  proper  mood  for  friendly 
negotiation.  Adams's  plan  for  a  tripartite  settlement 
of  the  questions  of  boundary  was  one  which,  if  Great 
Britain  had  any  territorial  rights  whatever  upon  the 

"  Treaties  and  Conventions  between  the  United  States  and 
Foreign  Powers,  931.  The  treaty  was  proclaimed  January 

12,    1825. 

17  Greenhow,  op.  cit.}  342. 

"Text  of  treaty  in  Greenhow,  479-8i. 


238  DIPLOMACY   UNDER   TYL£R   AND   POLK 

Pacific  coast,  she  could  hardly  agree  to.  Canning  told 
Rush  that  he  could  see  a  motive  for  the  United  States' 
desiring  to  stop  the  settlements  of  Great  Britain  south 
ward,  but  that  the  boundary  between  the  British  and 
Russian  possessions  was  not  a  matter  in  which  the 
United  States  could  be  interested.  Canning's  position 
was  sound.  Adams  had  stated  in  1818  that  he  did 
not  anticipate  that  Great  Britain  would  start  questions 
of  title  with  the  United  States  on  the  Pacific.  Four 
years  later  he  asserted  that  Russia  could  have  no 
motive  for  establishing  colonies  in  America.  Yet  he 
offered  to  limit  the  claims  of  the  United  States  if 
Russia  and  Great  Britain  would  jointly  agree  to  limit 
theirs.  The  convention  that  Middleton  signed  fur 
nished  a  phrase  that  afterwards  came  perilously  near 
becoming  a  war-cry,  but  it  gave  to  the  United  States 
no  rights  that  she  could  use  against  Great  Britain. 
Middleton's  convention  merely  stipulated  that  Ameri 
can  citizens  should  not  settle  north  of  fifty-four  de 
grees,  forty  minutes,  or  Russian  subjects  south  of  it. 
The  Russo-British  treaty  made  a  definite  boundary  line 
between  the  possessions  of  the  two  countries,  and  each 
power  recognized  the  right  of  the  other  in  and  to  the 
northwest  coast  north  and  south  of  fifty-four  degrees, 
forty  minutes. 

All  the  lines  of  argument  which  in  later  negotiations 
were  elaborated  by  Rush  and  Gallatin,  and  by  Calhoun, 
were  taken  up  by  Adams  in  the  first  negotiation  after 
the  Florida  treaty  had  made  the  United  States  the  suc 
cessor  of  Spain  north  of  forty-two  degrees.  Discovery, 
settlement,  contiguity,  and  purchase  from  Spain, 
Adams  argued,  together  gave  to  the  United  States 
complete  title  to  the  northwest  coast.  But  how  far 


JOINT  OCCUPATION  OF  OREGON        239 

to  the  north  ?  As  against  Russia  he  first  claimed  to  the 
sixtieth  parallel,  then  to  the  fifty-fifth ;  as  against 
Great  Britain  to  the  fifty-first  and  finally  to  the  forty- 
ninth.  At  the  close  of  Adams's  negotiation  the  posi 
tion  of  the  United  States  was  the  same  as  when  Polk 
took  up  the  problem  in  1845.  The  United  States, 
though  claiming  that  her  rights  extended  much  farther 
to  the  north,  was  willing  as  a  compromise  to  accept  the 
line  of  forty-nine  degrees  westward  from  the  Rocky 
Mountains  to  the  Pacific.  Great  Britain  insisted  upon 
the  line  of  forty-nine  degrees  only  as  far  west  as  the 
Columbia.  It  was  upon  the  Columbia  River  that  the 
powers  split.  The  exclusive  right  to  the  Columbia 
was  one  that  neither  would  concede  to  the  other. 

As  the  ten  years'  period  of  joint  occupation  under 
the  convention  of  1818  was  about  to  expire,  Canning 
suggested  in  April,  1826,  that  the  negotiations  for  the 
settlement  of  the  northwestern  boundary  be  resumed.19 
Adams  and  Clay  selected  Gallatin  to  reopen  the  ques 
tion  at  London.  Clay's  instructions  to  Gallatin  fol 
lowed  closely  those  that  Adams  had  given  to  Rush 
three  years  before.20  The  extension  of  the  line  of 
forty-nine  degrees  to  the  Pacific  coast  Gallatin  was 
told  to  announce  as  an  ultimatum.  Later  Clay  author 
ized  him  to  concede  to  Great  Britain  the  free  naviga 
tion  of  the  Columbia.21 

Gallatin's  negotiation,  which  lasted  until  August, 
1827,  resulted  in  the  renewal  of  the  agreement  for  joint 
occupation  for  an  indefinite  period,  terminable  by  either 

"Canning  to  King,  April  20,  1826;  Am.  State  Papers,  For. 
Rel,  VI.,  645. 

20  Clay  to  Gallatin,  June  19,  1826;  ibid.,  VI.,  644. 

21  Clay  to  Gallatin,  August  9,  1826 ;  ibid.,  VI.,  646. 


240  DIPLOMACY   UNDKR  TYL^R   AND   POLK 

party  upon  twelve  months'  notice.  The  text  of  the 
convention  is  brief,  reciting  that  the  third  article  of 
the  convention  of  1818  was  renewed.  The  provision 
of  the  earlier  instrument  was  continued  to  the  effect 
that  joint  occupation  should  not  be  construed  to  im 
pair  or  to  affect  the  claims  of  either  power  to  the 
territory  west  of  the  Rockies.  The  convention  of 
1818  reserved  the  rights  of  any  third  power  as  well 
as  of  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States.  As  the 
United  States  had  succeeded  to  the  rights  of  Spain, 
and  Russia  had  been  limited  to  the  territory  north  of 
fifty-four  degrees,  forty  minutes,  this  clause  was  not 
renewed. 

It  is  impossible  to  enter  into  detail  as  to  the  nego 
tiation  of  the  convention  of  1827.  The  arguments  pre 
sented  by  both  sides  were  similar  to  those  of  Rush, 
Huskisson,  and  Stratford  Canning  at  an  earlier  date. 
The  temper  of  the  British  had  not  changed,  and  Gallatin 
was  all  the  time  conscious  of  the  influence  that  Mon 
roe's  non-colonization  principle  had  in  arousing  the 
jealous  suspicions  of  the  British  ministry.22  The  Brit 
ish  commissioners  rested  their  case  upon  the  Nootka 
Sound  convention,  and  insisted  that  all  of  the  territory 
west  of  the  Rocky  Mountains  and  north  of  forty-two 
degrees  was  vacant.  Gallatin's  argument  ably  pre 
sented  the  claim  of  the  United  States  to  fifty-four  de 
grees,  forty  minutes,  and  combated  the  validity  of  the 
Nootka  Sound  convention  upon  the  ground  that  it  was 
abrogated  by  the  war  of  1796.  In  the  course  of  the 
proceedings  Gallatin's  views  changed.  He  soon  be 
came  convinced  that  there  could  be  no  agreement  upon 

22  Gallatin  to  Clay,  December  20,  1826 ;  ibid.,  VI.,  659. 


JOINT  OCCUPATION  OF  OREGON         241 

the  line  of  forty-nine  degrees,  but  he  was  opposed  to 
a  renewal  of  the  joint-occupation  article,  fearing  that 
Great  Britain  would  consolidate  actual  possession  of 
the  whole,  or  nearly  the  whole,  of  the  territory  in  dis 
pute.23  Later  he  came  to  favor  the  renewal  of  that 
article  after  the  reiterated  declaration  by  the  British 
commissioners  that  Great  Britain  had  no  exclusive 
claim  upon  the  disputed  territory.  Gallatin  was  con 
vinced  that  after  all  "what  the  United  States  might 
want  was  the  very  object  which  Great  Britain  declared 
to  be  hers,  viz.,  the  preservation  of  peace  until  the 
whole  country  was  occupied."  : 

The  approval  by  George  Canning  of  Gallatin's  plan 
for  a  renewal  of  the  joint-occupation  agreement  was 
about  the  last  act  of  that  statesman.  In  forwarding  the 
new  agreement  to  Clay,  Gallatin  remarked :  "National 
pride  prevents  any  abrupt  relinquishment  of  her  pre 
tensions  ;  but  Great  Britain  does  not  seem  indisposed 
to  let  the  country  gradually  and  silently  slide  into  the 
hands  of  the  United  States ;  and  she  is  anxious  that 
it  should  not  in  any  case  become  the  cause  of  a  rupture 
between  the  powers.  .  .  .  My  opinion  is  that  the 
country  must  necessarily  be  settled  by  the  United 
States,  and  ultimately  fall  into  their  hands,  provided 
the  natural  course  of  events  is  not  prevented,  and 
merely  by  suffering  them  to  take  their  course."  : 

The  debates  in  Congress,  the  various  plans  of  forti 
fying  the  territory  held  by  joint  occupation,  the  schemes 
for  its  territorial  organization  and  for  the  settlement 
of  the  country  by  emigrants  from  the  United  States, 

23  Gallatin  to  Clay,  October  30,  1826 ;  ibid.,  VI.,  647. 

24  Gallatin  to  Clay,  June  27,  1827;  ibid.,  VI.,  680. 

25  Gallatin  to  Clay,  August  10,  1827;  ibid.,  VI.,  694. 


242  DIPLOMACY    UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

are  outside  the  scope  of  the  present  inquiry.  The 
steady  stream  of  settlers  along  the  Oregon  Trail  that 
began  in  the  late  thirties  showed  that  Gallatin's  judg 
ment  was  correct.  The  danger  was  that  by  aggressive 
measures  on  the  part  of  Congress  for  the  occupation 
pf  Oregon  the  "natural  course  of  events  might  be 
prevented." 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  OREGON  TREATY 
1846 

Although  Aberdeen  had  given  Ashburton  specific 
and  detailed  instructions  for  the  settlement  of 
the  northwestern  boundary  question  as  well  as 
of  the  other  matters  in  dispute  between  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States,  little  if  anything 
was  done  toward  it.  The  northeastern  question 
was  considered  the  more  pressing,  and  Webster 
feared  that  if  he  and  Ashburton  attempted  to 
settle  both  boundary  difficulties  the  whole  of  the  nego 
tiation  would  fall  through.1  As  soon  as  the  ratifica 
tions  of  the  Ashburton  treaty  were  exchanged,  Aber 
deen  urged  that  the  remaining  cause  of  friction  be 
tween  the  two  countries  be  removed.  Fox  communi 
cated  Aberdeen's  overture  to  Webster,  who  stated  that 
the  President  favored  giving  the  Oregon  question  im 
mediate  attention/  In  his  message  to  Congress  at  the 
beginning  of  the  session  in  December,  1842,  Tyler  said 
that  he  would  not  delay  to  urge  upon  Great  Britain 
the  importance  of  an  early  settlement  of  this  long 
standing  controversy.3  As  it  was  Aberdeen  and  not 
Tyler  who  had  opened  the.  door  for  negotiation,  the 

1  Aberdeen    to ''Fox,    October     18,     1842'     Correspondence 
relative    .     .     .     to     the     Oregon     Territory,     Parliamentary 
Papers,  1846,  folio,  I. 

2  Webster  to  Fox,  November  25,  1842 ;  ibid.,  2. 

3  Tyler's  message  of  December  6,  1842;  Richardson's  Mes 
sages,  IV.,   196. 


244  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER  AND   POLK 

statement  of  Tyler  was  not  altogether  frank.  Aber 
deen  complained  to  Fox  of  Tyler's  failure  to  state 
"that  he  had  already  received  from  the  British  govern 
ment  a  pressing  overture  to  negotiate  an  adjustment."  ' 
When  the  President  was  called  upon  by  the  Senate 
for  information  as  to  the  state  of  the  negotiation  and 
the  reasons  why  it  had  not  been  included  in  the  Ash- 
burton  treaty,  Tyler  replied  that  as  the  matter  was 
then  pending  it  was  inexpedient  to  make  any  communi 
cation  upon  the  subject. 5  At  the  time  this  message 
was  made  no  step  had  been  taken  by  Webster  in  ac 
cordance  with  Aberdeen's  suggestion.  Tyler  contem 
plated  sending  Webster  on  a  special  mission  to  London, 
and  only  reluctantly  abandoned  the  idea.  Webster 
left  Tyler's  cabinet  without  entering  upon  the  discus 
sion  of  the  Oregon  question.  After  Upshur's  appoint 
ment  Aberdeen  again  urged  that  the  business  be  taken 
up,  either  through  Everett  at  London,  or  through  Fox 
at  Washington.6  Upshur  informed  Fox  that  the  Presi 
dent  was  anxious  to  have  the  matter  settled,  and  pre 
ferred  that  the  negotiation  proceed  at  Washington.7 
In  the  face  of  this  do-nothing  attitude,  Tyler  stated 
in  his  annual  message  of  1843  that  "our  minister  at 
London  has  under  instructions  again  brought  the  sub 
ject  to  the  attention  of  that  government;  and  while 
nothing  will  be  done  to  compromit  the  rights  or  honor 
of  the  United  States,  every  proper  expedient  will  be 

*  Aberdeen  to  Fox,  January  18,  1843 ;  Correspondence 
relative  .  .  .  to  the  Oregon  Territory,  3. 

5  Tyler's  message  of  December  23,  1842 ;  Richardson's  Mes 
sages,  IV.,  210. 

"Aberdeen  to  Fox,  August  18,  1843;  Correspondence  rela 
tive  .  .  .  to  the  Oregon  Territory,  5. 

7  Fox  to  Aberdeen,  September  12,  1843 ;  ibid.,  5. 


THE:  OREGON  TREATY  245 

resorted  to  in  order  to  bring  the  negotiation,  now  in 
the  progress  of  resumption,  to  a  speedy  and  happy 
termination." '  "After  the  most  rigid  and,  as  far  as 
practicable,  unbiased  examination  of  the  subject,  the 
United  States  have  always  contended  that  their  rights 
appertain  to  the  entire  region  of  country  lying  on  the 
Pacific  and  embraced  within  forty-two  degrees  and 
fifty-four  degrees,  forty  minutes  of  north  latitude." 
This  statement,  although  not  conciliatory,  was  not 
offensively  bold,  nor  did  Aberdeen  so  consider  it.9 
Tyler  again  recommended  the  establishment  of  military 
posts  along  the  overland  routes  to  Oregon  for  the  se 
curity  and  protection  of  emigrants  against  the  Indians. 
"Our  laws  should  also  follow  [the  emigrants] ,  so  modi 
fied  as  the  circumstances  of  the  case  seem  to  require. 
Under  the  influence  of  our  free  system  of  government, 
new  republics  are  destined  to  spring  up  at  no  distant 
day  on  the  shores  of  the  Pacific  similar  in  policy  and 
in  feeling  to  those  existing  on  this  side  of  the  Rocky 
Mountains,  and  giving  a  wider  and  more  extensive 
spread  to  the  principles  of  civil  and  religious  liberty." 
Late  in  1843  Pakenham  replaced  Fox,  and  Aberdeen 
entrusted  the  Oregon  negotiation  to  him,  as  he  pre 
ferred  to  have  it  conducted  at  Washington  while  Con- 

8  Tyler's  message  of  December  5,  1843 ;  Richardson's  Mes 
sages,  IV.,  258.  Cf.  Tyler's  Tylers,  II.,  439-  While  Everett 
was  instructed  by  Upshur,  October  9,  1843,  to  propose  the 
line  of  forty-nine  degrees  and  "any  other  terms  of  compro 
mise  which  in  the  progress  of  his  discussions  might  appear 
to  promise  a  satisfactory  adjustment  of  this  important  ques 
tion,"  the  tender  was  to  be  made  informally.  Aberdeen  wrote 
Pakenham,  December  28,  1843,  that  nothing  had  been  accom 
plished  since  December,  1842. 

"Aberdeen  to  Pakenham,  December  5,  1843;  Correspond 
ence  relative  .  .  .  to  the  Oregon  Territory,  7. 


246  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

gress  was  in  session.  Before  Pakenham  and  Upshur 
began  the  consideration  of  the  question  the  disaster 
upon  the  Princeton  occurred.  Not  until  late  in  August, 
1844,  did  Upshur Js  successor,  Calhoun,  announce  that 
he  was  ready  to  resume  the  negotiation,  which  had  re 
mained  as  Gallatin  left  it  in  1827. 

Calhoun's  position  upon  the  Oregon  question  had 
been  fully  set  forth  in  his  speech  in  the  Senate  of 
January  24,  i843.10  He  favored  a  policy  of  "wise  and 
masterly  inactivity."  In  but  one  way,  he  stated,  could 
the  Oregon  territory  be  preserved  to  the  United  States. 
"Time  is  acting  for  us ;  and  if  we  shall  have  the  wis 
dom  to  trust  its  operation,  it  will  assert  and  maintain 
our  right  with  resistless  force,  without  costing  a  cent 
of  money  or  a  drop  of  blood."  He  opposed  any  propo 
sition  for  the  occupation  of  Oregon  upon  the  ground 
that  it  would  invite  a  contest  by  Great  Britain  resulting 
in  the  loss  of  the  whole  country.  Gallatin's  idea,  that 
the  preservation  of  the  status  quo  of  joint  occupation 
was  the  surest  method  not  only  of  keeping  peace  but 
of  ultimately  holding  the  disputed  region,  was  adopted 
by  Calhoun.  After  the  failure  of  the  Texas  treaty  he 
was  disinclined  to  open  the  Oregon  question.  It  is 
stated  that  he  was  "peremptorily"  ordered  to  take  up 
the  subject  where  Upshur  had  left  it,  and  try  for  a 
settlement  by  the  line  of  forty-nine  degrees.11  Tyler 
was  anxious  that  the  long-pending  question  should  be 
ended  during  his  administration.  Calhoun,  whose 
views  as  to  the  advisability  of  delay  had  not  changed, 
began  the  discussion  with  Pakenham.  His  method 
was  one  that  promised  an  immediate  settlement  upon 

10  Calhoun's  Works,  IV.,  238. 
"Tyler's  Tylers,  II.,  441. 


THE   OREGON    TREATY  247 

the  basis  of  compromise.  The  plan  that  Webster  and 
Ashburton  had  adopted,  of  considering  the  matter 
without  protocols,  was  abandoned.  Pakenham  re 
newed  the  former  proposal  of  Great  Britain,  that  the 
line  of  forty-nine  degrees  be  extended  west  from  the 
Rocky  Mountains  to  the  Columbia,  thence  to  the 
Pacific.  Calhoun  declined  the  offer,  insisting  that  the 
United  States  had  a  well-founded  claim  to  all  the 
valley  of  the  Columbia.  In  support  of  this  assertion, 
he  reviewed  the  history  of  the  question  in  a  long  state 
ment  that  rehearsed  the  earlier  arguments  of  Adams, 
Rush,  and  Gallatin.  Nothing  was  added  by  him  to 
what  his  predecessors  had  said,  but  unlike  them  he 
confined  his  claim,  not  to  all  the  territory  up  to  fifty- 
four  degrees,  forty  minutes,  but  to  the  valley  of  the 
Columbia.12 

Pakenham  did  not  contend,  as  the  representatives 
of  Great  Britain  had  formerly  done,  that  all  of  the 
country  north  of  forty-two  degrees  and  west  of  the 
Rockies  was  vacant  territory  to  which  no  nation  had 
a  perfect  claim.  He  asserted  that  the  Nootka  Sound 
convention  had  limited  Spain's  sovereignty  and 
acknowledged  Great  Britain's  rights  on  the  northwest 
coast.  As  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  owned 
the  country  in  common  the  only  solution  of  the  diffi 
culty  was  "an  equitable  partition  of  the  whole  between 
the  two  powers."  ]  The  long  arguments  of  Calhoun 
and  Pakenham  left  the  matter  no  nearer  an  adjustment 
than  it  had  been  in  1827.  The  United  States  continued 
to  insist  upon  the  line  of  forty-nine  degrees;  Great 

12  Calhoun  to   Pakenham,   September  3,    1844 ;   Correspond 
ence  relative    .    .     .     to  the  Oregon  Territory,  13. 

13  Pakenham  to  Calhoun,  September  12,  1844 ;  ibid.,  19. 


248  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYI^R   AND   POLK 

Britain  claimed  to  the  middle  of  the  Columbia  River. 
Aberdeen  thereupon  proposed  arbitration.1*  Pakenham 
delayed  offering  Aberdeen's  proposal  until  after  Tyler's 
message  to  Congress  had  been  made  public.  The 
President  renewed  his  recommendations  for  the  estab 
lishment  of  military  posts  across  the  continent  and  the 
extension  of  the  federal  laws  to  protect  the  emigrants 
in  Oregon.  As  to  the  pending  negotiation  little  was 
said;  he  hoped  for  a  happy  and  favorable  termination 
of  it  in  a  manner  "compatible  with  the  public  honor."  : 
In  January  Calhoun  declined  the  offer  of  arbitration 
on  the  ground  that  such  a  method  of  settlement  would 
retard  rather  than  expedite  its  final  adjustment.18  Thus 
Tyler's  administration  ended  with  the  northwestern 
boundary  question  still  at  issue.  It  is  probable  that  Cal 
houn  had  been  dragged  into  the  controversy  against  his 
better  judgment.  He  was  opposed  to  the  plank  in  the 
Democratic  platform  of  1844  calling  for  the  "re-occu 
pation  of  Oregon."  Tyler  proposed  to  have  the  credit 
of  accomplishing  the  settlement  of  the  northwestern 
boundary  question  as  well  as  of  the  annexation  of 
Texas  before  his  term  expired.  Calhoun  made  no  at 
tempt  to  claim  any  territory  for  the  United  States  be 
yond  the  forty-ninth  parallel.  While  he  believed  that 
by  delay  the  Oregon  country  proper,  i.  e.,  the  valley 
of  the  Columbia,  would  be  saved  to  the  United  States, 
he  reluctantly  asserted  the  claim  and  then  only  to  the 
line  of  forty-nine  degrees. 

14  Aberdeen  to  Pakenham,  November  I,   1844 ;  ibid.,  28. 

15  Tyler's    message,    December   3,    1844 ;    Richardson's    Mes 
sages,  IV.,  337. 

16  Pakenham    to    Calhoun,    January    15,    I&45 ;    Ctflh«un    to 
Pakenham,  January  21,  1845;  Correspondence  relative    .     .     . 
to  the  Oregon  Territory,  30,  31. 


THE)    OREGON    TREATY  249 

Calhoun  has  been  assailed  as  unfriendly  to  the  in 
terests  of  the  northwest ;  as  being,  as  a  southerner, 
willing  to  sacrifice  northern  territory.  Such  a  charge 
is  unjust.  Calhoun's  attitude  upon  the  Oregon  question 
was  deliberately  chosen,  and  it  was  placed  upon  the  plane 
of  statesmanship,  with  no  eye  to  popular  approval. 
He  believed  that  the  British  title  under  the  Nootka 
Sound  convention  was  a  mere  usufruct  and  conferred 
no  exclusive  claim ;  that  the  title  of  the  United  States 
as  derived  from  Spain  was  invalid  north  of  the  Colum 
bia  valley.  As  far  as  claims  were  based  upon  discovery 
and  occupation,  the  British  had  discovered  and  occu 
pied  Fraser's  River  and  the  Americans  the  Columbia; 
neither  had  a  valid  title  to  the  country  between  the  two. 
He  was  therefore  in  favor  of  the  line  of  forty-nine  de 
grees  to  the  Pacific  as  a  just  and  equitable  division 
of  the  territory  in  dispute.17 

In  his  inaugural  address  the  incoming  President 
stated  that  it  would  become  his  duty  "to  assert  and 
maintain  by  all  constitutional  means  the  right  of  the 
United  States  to  that  portion  of  our  territory  which 
lies  beyond  the  Rocky  Mountains.  Our  title  to  the 
country  of  the  Oregon  is  'clear  and  unquestionable.' ' 
Polk  did  not  say  that  "the  whole  of  Oregon"  meant 
the  country  as  far  north  as  fifty-four  degrees,  forty 
minutes,  although  this  was  the  interpretation  given  to 
his  words.19  Calhoun  had  taken  "the  whole  of  Oregon" 
to  mean  the  valley  of  the  Columbia.  It  remained  for 
Polk  seriously  to  assert  that  our  title  was  "clear  and 

17  Folk's  Diary,  January  10,  1846 ;  MS. 

18  Richardson's  Messages,  IV.,  381.     The  phrase  quoted  was 
from  the  Democratic  platform. 

19  Curtis,  Buchanan,  II.,  552,  so  states  it. 


250  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

unquestionable  up  to  fifty-four  degrees,  forty  minutes." 
Tyler's  term  closed  soon  after  the  rejection  of  Aber 
deen's  offer  of  arbitration.  Soon  after  Buchanan  took 
charge  of  the  state  department  under  Polk,  Paken- 
ham  again  urged  that  the  Oregon  matter  be  arbitrated. 
This  was  in  accordance  with  Aberdeen's  instructions, 
in  the  hope  that  the  new  administration  might  reverse 
Tyler's  decision.20  "Mr.  Buchanan  observed  that  he 
had  not  yet  had  an  opportunity  of  ascertaining  what 
might  be  the  views  of  the  President  on  this  particular 
point  connected  with  the  Oregon  question ;  but  he  said 
he  would  not  fail  to  take  advantage  of  the  earliest 
moment  to  direct  the  President's  attention  to  it.  For 
his  own  part,  although  he  did  not  seem  to  be  much 
taken  with  the  idea  of  an  arbitration,  he  did  not  ap 
pear  prepared  altogether  to  reject  it;  what  he  said 
was  that  he  did  not  at  all  despair  of  effecting  a  settle 
ment  of  the  question  by  negotiation,  'by  adopting/  to 
use  his  own  words,  'the  principle  of  giving  and 
taking.' ';  "To  give  and  take"  may  have  been 
Buchanan's  idea  of  the  proper  method  of  negotiating 
with  Pakenham.  That  he  would  settle  the  Oregon 
question  was  a  part  of  Polk's  programme  as  formu 
lated  by  him  before  he  was  inaugurated.  Not  until  July 
did  the  President  decide  how  to  proceed.  Buchanan 
resumed  the  subject  where  Calhoun  and  Pakenham 
had  dropped  it  in  the  preceding  September  by  renew 
ing  the  offer  of  the  line  of  forty-nine  degrees.  Bu 
chanan's  note  to  Pakenham  of  July  12,  1845,  was  a 
carefully  prepared  argument  in  favor  of  the  full 

20  Aberdeen  to   Pakenham,  March  3,   1845 ;   Correspondence 
relative    .     .     .     to  the  Oregon  Territory,  31. 

21  Pakenham  to  Aberdeen,  March  29,  1845 ;  ibid.,  32. 


THE   OREGON    TREATY  251 

American  claim  of  fifty-four  degrees,  forty  minutes. 
This  he  based  upon  the  Florida  treaty  of  1819,  at 
which  time,  he  alleged,  Spain  had  a  good  title  as 
against  Great  Britain  to  the  whole  of  the  Oregon  ter 
ritory.  As  Great  Britain  had  attempted  to  cloud  this 
title  by  the  prior  Nootka  Sound  convention,  Buchanan 
took  the  ground  that  that  instrument  was  transient  in 
its  very  nature ;  that  it  conferred  upon  Great  Britain 
no  right  but  that  of  merely  trading  with  the  Indians 
whilst  the  country  should  remain  unsettled,  and  mak 
ing  the  necessary  settlements  for  that  purpose ;  that 
it  did  not  interfere  with  the  ultimate  sovereignty  of 
Spain  over  the  territory;  and  above  all,  that  it  was 
annulled  by  the  war  between  Spain  and  Great  Britain 
in  1/96,  and  had  never  been  renewed  by  the  parties.22 
The  original  American  title  to  the  valley  of  the  Colum 
bia  Buchanan  grounded,  as  Calhoun  had  done,  upon 
discovery,  exploration,  and  possession.  It  was  to  the 
coast-line  between  forty-six  degrees  and  fifty-four  de 
grees,  forty  minutes,  that  the  Florida  treaty  ga/ve  'title 
to  the  exclusion  of  Great  Britain.  Buchanan 'thus  took 
a  position  essentially  at  variance  with  Calhoun's.  If 
the  United  States  had  a  claim  to  the  Columbia  based 
upon  discovery  and  settlement  it  was  in  derogation 
of  the  paper-title  of  Spain.  If  Spain's  title  to  all  of 
the  northwest  coast  was  not  strong  enough  to  with 
stand  the  claim  of  the  United  States  to  the  Columbia, 
it  was  not  sufficient  to  exclude  Great  Britain  from 
claiming  the  Fraser  River  valley,  a  claim  also  based 
upon  discovery,  settlement,  and  possession. 

Buchanan's  contention  was  the  reverse  of  Adams's, 

22  Buchanan  to  Pakenham,  July  12,  1845 ;  ibid.,  34. 


252  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

which  was  that  by  the  very  terms  of  the  Nootka  Sound 
convention,  which  Buchanan  held  to  be  transient  in 
nature,  Spain  had  forfeited  her  claim  to  exclusive 
sovereignty  upon  the  Pacific  coast,  so  that  the  Ameri 
can  settlements  at  the  mouth  of  the  Columbia  furnished 
a  claim  of  territorial  sovereignty  good  as  against  the 
world.  That  Great  Britain  had  a  show  of  title  be 
tween  fifty-one  degrees  and  fifty-five  degrees  had  been 
admitted  by  the  United  States,  since  Adams  had  pro 
posed  a  tripartite  arrangement  between  the  United 
States,  Russia,  and  Great  Britain  in  1822.  Polk,  how 
ever,  intimated  that  he  was  not  bound  by  any  previous 
admissions  by  the  United  States.  "Our  own  American 
title  to  the  extent  of  the  Valley  of  the  Columbia,  rest 
ing  as  it  does  on  discovery,  exploration,  and  posses 
sion, — a  possession  acknowledged  by  a  most  solemn 
act  of  the  British  Government  itself, — is  a  sufficient 
assurance  against  all  mankind,  whilst  our  superadded 
title  derived  from  Spain  extends  our  exclusive  rights 
over  the  whole  territory  in  dispute  as  against  Great 
Britain.  -Such  being  the  opinion  of  the  President  in 
regard  to  the  title  of  the  United  States  he  would  not 
have  consented  to  yield  any  portion  of  the  Oregon 
Territory  had  he  not  found  himself  embarrassed,  if  not 
committed,  by  the  acts  of  his  predecessors."  : 

Folk's  offer  of  the  line  of  forty-nine  degrees  without 
conceding  the  free  navigation  of  the  Columbia  was, 
therefore,  made  only  because  his  predecessors  had  com 
mitted  him  to  it.  The  inference  was  that  had  he  not 
been  embarrassed  by  their  spirit  of  compromise  he 
would  inflexibly  adhere  to  the  line  of  fifty-four  degrees, 

23  Ibid. 


THE   OREGON    TREATY  253 

forty  minutes,  thereby  excluding  Great  Britain  from 
the  Pacific  coast. 

Pakenham's  answer  was  a  blunder.  He  attacked 
all  the  points  of  Buchanan's  argument  and  bluntly  de 
clined  the  proposed  line  of  forty-nine  degrees.  He 
did  not  refer  the  matter  to  his  home  government  but 
asked  that  Buchanan  "offer  some  further  proposal  for 
the  settlement  of  the  Oregon  Question  more  con 
sistent  with  fairness  and  equity,  and  with  the  reason 
able  expectations  of  the  British  Government."  :  For 
tunately  for  the  cause  of  peace,  Pakenham's  curt 
lefusal  of  Buchanan's  offer  did  not  become  public 
until  after  Congress  met  in  December.25  The  answer 
was  ill-considered  in  that  it  gave  to  Polk  the  oppor-  / 
tunity  of  standing  for  the  whole  claim  without  being 
"embarrassed"  by  the  admissions  of  his  predecessors. 
"The  only  way  to  treat  John  Bull,"  the  President  told 
a  member  of  Congress,  "was  to  look  him  straight  in 
the  eye.  I  considered  a  bold  and  firm  course  on  our 
part  the  pacific  one."  :  Buchanan  was  ordered  to  with 
draw  the  offer  of  forty-nine  degrees,  leaving  Great 
Britain  to  make  the  next  move.  The  method  of  treat 
ing  Pakenham's  answer  was  Folk's  own  idea,  and 
Buchanan  was  opposed  to  it.  He  wrote  to  McLane 
at  London  deprecating  Pakenham's  action  and  express 
ing  the  hope  that  the  unfortunate  result  of  it  might  be 
avoided.27  Buchanan's  extended  official  reply  to  Paken- 

24  Pakenham  to  Buchanan,  July  29,  1845 ;  ibid.,  39. 

25  Curtis's  Buchanan,  II.,  553,  554. 

26  Folk's  Diary,  January  4,   1846 ;   Conversation  with  James 
A.  Black  of  South  Carolina.     Polk  added:  "If  Congress  fal 
tered  or  hesitated  in  their  course,  John  Bull  would  immedi 
ately  become  arrogant  and  more  grasping  in  his  demands." 

27  Curtis's  Buchanan,  II.,  553. 


254  DIPLOMACY   UNDER   TYLER   AND   POLK 

ham  of  August  30,  1845,  was  contentious  in  the  ex 
treme.  He  derided  the  argument  that  the  two  grounds 
for  the  American  title,  the  one  based  upon  discovery 
and  settlement,  the  other  upon  the  treaty  of  1819, 
were  antagonistic.  The  British  claims  were  styled 
mere  pretensions  with  no  sufficient  foundation.  The 
President,  he  stated,  owed  it  to  his  country,  with  a 
just  appreciation  of  her  title  to  the  Oregon  territory, 
to  withdraw  his  proposition  to  the  British  govern 
ment.28  "Mr.  Buchanan  said,  'Well,  the  deed  is  done, 
but  he  did  not  think  it  was  the  part  of  wise  statesman 
ship  to  deliver  such  a  paper  in  the  existing  state  of 
our  relations  with  Mexico.'  The  President  said  he  was 
glad  it  was  delivered;  that  it  was  right  in  itself  and 
he  saw  no  reason  for  delaying  it  because  of  our  re 
lations  with  Mexico."  : 

Writing  privately  to  McLane,  Buchanan  said  that 
the  Oregon  question  was  now  critical ;  that  a  concilia 
tory  course  on  the  part  of  both  governments  was 
necessary.  He  thought  it  improbable  that  the  British 
government  would  offer  acceptable  terms  of  compro 
mise,  but  said  that  the  withdrawal  of  the  offer  did  not 
preclude  it  from  making  a  new  proposal.  He  then 
stated  that  the  President  would  submit  to  the  Senate 
any  proposition  that  Great  Britain  might  make,  if 
it  were  such  as  the  Senate  would  be  likely  to  approve.30 
Before  enough  time  had  elapsed  to  have  an  answer  to 
his  letter,  Buchanan  received  an  account  of  McLane's 

28  Buchanan  to  Pakenham,  August  30,  1845 ;  Correspondence 
relative     .     .     .     to  the  Oregon  Territory,  46. 

29  Folk's   Diary,   August  30,   1845;   MS. 

30  Buchanan    to    McLane,    September    13,    1845 ;    MS.,    copy, 
Lenox  Library,  New  York. 


THE   OREGON    TREATY  255 

interview  with  Aberdeen  upon  the  subject  of  Paken- 
ham's  declination  of  the  line  of  forty-nine  degrees. 
Aberdeen  told  McLane  of  his  regret  that  Pakenham 
had  rejected  the  offer  of  compromise,  and  intimated  a 
willingness  to  agree  to  a  modified  proposition.81  After 
reading  McLane's  letter  to  Polk,  Buchanan  said  that 
he  believed  Pakenham  had  received  fresh  instructions, 
and  he  wanted  to  know  what  to  do.  "The  President  said 
our  course  was  a  plain  one.  We  had  made  a  propo 
sition  which  had  been  rejected  in  terms,  not  very  cour 
teous.  The  British  had  afterwards  been  informed  in 
the  note  of  Mr.  Buchanan  of  August  30  that  our 
proposition  was  withdrawn  and  no  longer  to  be  con 
sidered  as  pending.  In  the  close  of  that  note  the  door 
of  further  negotiations  was  left  open.  If  the  British 
minister,  therefore,  called  on  Mr.  Buchanan  and  made 
the  ingenuous  (?)  suggestion,  all  that  could  be  said  to 
him  was:  that  if  he  had  any  further  proposition  to 
make  on  his  part,  it  would  be  received  and  considered. 
This  was  all  that  could  with  propriety  be  said  to  him. 
No  intimation  should  be  given  to  him  of  what  the 
views  or  intentions  of  the  administration  were,  and 
leave  him  to  take  his  own  course.  The  President  said, 
it  was  manifest  that  the  tone  of  the  British  Government 
was  considerably  lowered  on  the  subject.  Mr.  Bu 
chanan  said  that  if  we  stopped  the  negotiation  where 
it  was  it  would  immediately  lead  to  war.  The  Presi 
dent  went  on  at  some  length  to  state,  as  he  had  done 
on  former  occasions,  the  reasons  which  had  induced 
him  in  deference  to  the  acts  of  his  predecessors  and  the 
commitments  of  the  Government  reluctantly  to  yield 

31  McLane  to  Buchanan,  October  3,  1845,  received  October 
21,  1845;  MS.,  Archives.     Folk's  Diary,  October  21,  1845. 


256  DIPLOMACY   UNDER   TYLER   AND   POLK 

his  assent  to  the  proposition  which  had  been  made  and 
rejected  and  that  he  was  never  satisfied  with  the  posi 
tion  in  which  the  matter  stood.  He  said  if  the  same 
proposition  were  now  made  by  the  British  minister 
(he,  the  President,  having  now  discharged  his  duty) 
he  would  not  accept  it.  He  said  the  British  minister 
would  not,  he  was  sure,  make  any  new  proposal  which 
we  could  accept ;  that  when  his  proposal  was  received 
(if  he  made  one)  he  would  either  reject  it  or  submit 
it  to  the  Senate  for  their  advice  before  he  acted  on 
[it]  according  to  its  character.  Mr.  Buchanan  asked 
if  he  might  say  in  the  conversation  which  he  antici 
pated  Mr.  Pakenham  would  seek  with  him,  that  if  he 
made  a  proposition  of  a  character  to  justify  it,  the 
President  would  submit  it  to  the  Senate.  The  Presi 
dent  replied  that  would  be  improper.  Mr.  Buchanan 
thought  we  ought  not  to  precipitate  a  crisis.  By  delay 
the  Oregon  territory  might  be  saved ;  by  strong  meas 
ures  hastily  taken,  we  would  have  war  and  might  lose 
it.  The  President  said  he  was  satisfied  with  the  state 
of  the  negotiation  as  it  stood;  that  in  his  message  he 
would  take  bold  and  strong  ground  and  re-affirm  Mr. 
Monroe's  doctrine  against  permitting  any  European 
power  to  plant  or  establish  any  new  colony  on  the 
American  Continent."32  The  day  following  Polk's 
statement  to  his  cabinet  Pakenham  called  upon  Bu 
chanan,  who  was  impressed  with  his  concern  over  the 
awkward  position  in  which  he  had  placed  himself.33 
From  Buchanan's  reports  of  this  and  other  conversa 
tions  with  Pakenham,  Polk  continued  in  the  belief 
that  there  was  no  probability  of  adjusting  the  subject 

32  Polk's  Diary,  October  21,  1845;  MS. 
id.f  October  22,   1845. 


THE   OREGON    TREATY  257 

by  negotiation.  The  President  then  submitted  the 
clause  of  his  message  referring  to  the  Oregon  question 
and  the  Monroe  doctrine  to  his  cabinet,  every  member 
of  which  agreed  with  the  stand  that  he  had  taken. 
It  may  be  believed,  however,  that  Buchanan's 
approval  was  not  without  reservation,  for  he  still 
iavored  the  idea  that  the  negotiation  should  be  resumed 
where  it  had  been  interrupted.34 

At  one  of  the  conferences  Pakenham  left  a  note 
with  Buchanan,  in  which  he  tried  to  smooth  away  the 
asperities  of  his  earlier  refusal.  Pakenham  stated  that 
his  government  would  be  glad  to  hear  again  from  the 
United  States  on  the  subject,  and  denied  that  in  his 
earlier  letter  he  had  rejected  Buchanan's  proposal. 
"What  I  said  was  that  I  did  not  feel  at  liberty  to  ac 
cept  it."  !  This  may  have  seemed  to  be  a  distinction 
Avithout  a  difference.  Buchanan  felt  that  it  was 
enough  of  a  concession  to  allow  the  negotiation  to  be 
resumed,  and  he  prepared  an  answer  to  it  accordingly. 
Polk  declared  that  Buchanan's  answer  was  too  concilia 
tory  and  refused  to  have  it  delivered.38  The  President 
then  drafted  what  he  believed  to  be  a  proper  reply  to 
Pakenham,  with  the  injunction  that  it  must  be  delivered 
and  not  merely  read  to  the  British  minister,  and  that 
all  of  Pakenham's  and  Buchanan's  correspondence 
must  be  official.  Upon  learning  Folk's  attitude,  Paken 
ham  withdrew  his  conciliatory  note.  For  this  the 

34  Ibid.,  October  25,  27,  and  29,  1845. 

35  Pakenham    to    Buchanan,    October   25,    1845 ;    MS.,    copy, 
Lenox  Library,   New   York.     Endorsed:   "25   Oct.  45.     Copy 
of   a   note   from   Mr.    Pakenham,    afterwards   withdrawn.     A 
true  copy  taken  by  me  from  the  original  note  of  Mr.  Paken 
ham.     Oct.  28,   1845.     J.  Knox.  Walker," 

38  Folk's  Diary,  October  28,  1845. 


258  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER  AND   POLK 

President  blamed  Buchanan.  "The  result  of  the 
whole,"  Polk  noted  in  his  diary,  "is  that  after  two  cab 
inet  meetings  and  much  anxious  discussion,  the  mat 
ter  ended  where  it  began."  ! 

Folk's  discussion  of  the  Oregon  question  in  his  mes 
sage  delivered  at  the  opening  of  Congress  was  as 
"firm"  as  the  most  rabid  of  the  Anglophobes,  such  as 
Cass  and  Hannegan,  could  have  desired.  He  depre 
cated  the  early  attempts  at  compromise  with  which  the 
names  of  Adams,  Rush,  Gallatin,  and  Calhoun  were 
associated.  In  his  declaration  for  the  "whole  of  Ore 
gon,"  even  to  fifty-four  degrees,  forty  minutes,  he 
seemed  to  rejoice  that  a  compromise  line  was  impos 
sible  ;  as  the  American  title  to  all  of  the  northwest  coast 
was  clear  and  undisputed,  Great  Britain  had  then  no 
thing  but  vain  pretensions.  To  gain  additional  popu 
lar  approval  of  his  stand,  he  "re-affirmed"  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  with  an  eye,  as  he  said,  as  much  to  California 
and  the  fine  bay  of  San  Francisco  as  to  Oregon.88 
Surely  Polk  was  looking  John  Bull  firmly  in  the  eye. 
Was  he  sincere  in  his  position? 

It  has  been  seen  that  nearly  three  months  before 
Buchanan  had  written  to  McLane  that  the  President 
would  probably  submit  a  proposition  to  the  Senate  if 
it  were  reasonable.  Buchanan  had  not  abandoned  the 
idea  that  the  line  of  forty-nine  degrees  could  be  agreed 
upon.  It  is  hard  to  believe  that  Polk  ever  very  seri 
ously  looked  for  war  over  the  question  of  Oregon. 
Late  in  December  Buchanan  told  him  that  the  next 
two  weeks  would  mean  peace  or  war,  and  that  he  was 
in  favor  of  vigorous  war  preparatibns.  Polk  agreed 

37  Ibid.,  October  29,  1845. 

38  Ibid.,  October  24,  1845. 


THE    OREGON    TREATY  259 

as  to  the  latter  part  of  Buchanan's  remark.  The  cab 
inet  was  then  expecting  Pakenham  to  propose  arbitra 
tion.  None  favored  that  plan  of  settling  the  difficulty. 
The  President  thereupon  said  that  if  Pakenham  would 
offer  an  equivalent  of  free  ports  to  the  north  of  forty- 
nine  degrees,  with  the  Strait  of  Fuca,  he  would  "con 
sult  confidentially  three  or  four  Senators  from  different 
parts  of  the  Union  and  might  submit  it  to  the 
Senate  for  their  previous  advice." 39  At  a  later 
session  Polk  asked  the  cabinet  what  he  should 
do  if  Pakenham  offered  the  line  of  forty-nine 
degrees.  "All  said  he  should  refer  it  to  the 
Senate."40  This  was  the  advice  that  Polk  had 
already  received  from  Allen,  the  chairman  of  the 
Senate  committee  on  foreign  affairs.  Just  when  this 
plan  of  treating  the  matter  took  shape  in  Polk's  mind 
it  is  difficult  to  state  precisely.  There  was  no  element 
of  novelty  in  Allen's  suggestion,  for  Buchanan  had 
been  urging  it  for  months  and  he  had  privately  so 
advised  McLane. 

Just  at  this  time  Pakenham  proposed  that  arbitration 
be  had  of  "the  whole  question  of  an  equitable  division 
of  the  territory"  in  dispute.41  Buchanan  said  to  him 
that  even  if  the  President  agreed  to  arbitration,  which 
was  unlikely,  the  Senate  would  never  sanction  it.  That 
there  would  be  a  war  Pakenham  seemed  to  doubt,  for 
even  if  arbitration  were  finally  declined,  his  govern- 

3t  Ibid.,  December  23,  1845.  Curtis's  Buchanan,  II.,  555. 
McLane  to  Buchanan,  December  I,  1845,  stated  that  Aberdeen 
favored  arbitration. 

40  Polk's   Diary,   December  27,    1845. 

41  Pakenham  to  Buchanan,  December  27,  1845 ;  Correspond 
ence  relative    .     .     .     to   the  Oregon  Territory,  65.     Curtis's 
Buchanan,  II.,  556. 


260  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER  AND   POLK 

ment  would  let  the  affair  remain  where  it  was  and  not 
disturb  it.  "He  said  the  British  Government  would  be 
glad  to  get  clear  of  the  question  on  almost  any  terms ; 
that  they  did  not  care  if  the  arbitrator  should  award  the 
whole  territory  to  us.  They  would  yield  it  without  a 
murmur.  I  said  I  had  no  doubt  of  it.  They  never 
played  the  part  of  the  fox;  but  always  of  the  lion. 
They  would  preserve  their  faith  inviolate.  He  said 
they  wished  for  peace ;  but  intimated  this  was  not  our 
wish.  I  asked  him  why  we  should  desire  war.  Would 
not  their  superiority  at  sea  give  them  command  of  the 
Coasts  of  Oregon  ?  Yes,  he  said,  that  was  true,  but  the 
war  would  not  be  confined  to  that  region.  That  he 
would  willingly  make  a  bargain  to  fight  it  out  with 
us  there,  if  we  would  agree  to  that."  ° 

Buchanan  declined  Pakenham's  proposal  for  arbi 
tration.  The  British  minister  renewed  the  offer,  this 
time  agreeing  to  include  the  question  of  title.43  Bu 
chanan  replied  that  the  United  States  would  arbitrate 
no  question  involving  its  territorial  rights.44 

To  McLane  the  secretary  of  state  now  opened  the 
door  for  the  British  government  to  come  forward  with 
a  compromise  proposition.  The  President  would  never 
put  it  into  the  power  of  any  arbitrator  to  deprive  the 
United  States  of  a  "foot  of  the  soil  of  the  continent 
south  of  the  forty-ninth  parallel  of  latitude,  and  of  the 
valuable  harbors  of  Puget  Sound."  He  thought  likely 
that  Congress  would  order  notice  to  be  given,  and 
therefore  if  the  British  government  had  a  proposition 

42  Buchanan's  memorandum,  Curtis's  Buchanan,  II.,  557, 

43  Pakenham  to  Buchanan,  January  16,  1846 ;  Correspondence 
relative    .     .     .     to    the    Oregon    Territory,   67. 

"Buchanan  to  Pakenham,  February  4,  1846;  ibid.,  69. 


THE:   OREGON    TREATY  26l 

it  should  be  made  at  once.  "They  have  not  an  hour  to 
lose  if  they  desire  a  peaceful  termination  of  this  con 
troversy."  '  Even  while  McLane  reported  that  Great 
Britain  was  making  extensive  preparations  for  war, 
Polk  felt  that  Peel  and  Aberdeen,  like  Pakenham,  were 
for  peace.46  Polk  gave  it  out  that  his  own  desire  was 
to  stand  for  fifty-four  degrees,  forty  minutes,  but  that 
he  would  refer  any  suitable  proposition  to  the  Senate. 
Thus  Aberdeen  was  given  to  understand  that  the 
President  would  not  reject  an  offer  to  settle  upon  the 
line  of  forty-nine  degrees.  Later  despatches  to  Mc 
Lane  put  forth  this  idea  more  definitely.  McLane 
suggested  that  Aberdeen  would  probably  propose  that 
line.  Polk  consented,  although  "with  reluctance,"  to 
submit  it,  if  made,  to  the  Senate,  but  he  stipulated  that 
the  negotiation  should  not  be  transferred  to  London. 
Thus  the  two  powers  were  as  early  as  February,  1846, 
not  far  apart.  McLane  was  certain  that  Aberdeen 
was  willing  to  agree  to  the  line  of  forty-nine  degrees. 
Polk  was  willing  to  submit  such  a  compromise  to  the 
Senate,  knowing  that  the  Senate  committee  on  foreign 
affairs  would  favor  it.  From  this  time  until  June, 
when  the  treaty  was  finally  signed,  there  was  no 
serious  danger  of  any  rupture.  The  speeches  in  Con 
gress,  it  is  true,  were  full  of  belligerency,  but  the 
resolutions  for  the  abrogation  of  the  joint-occupation 
convention  were  so  amended  that  they  lost  all  charac 
ter  likely  to  embarrass  the  peaceable  settlement  of  the 
question.  Polk  was  authorized  in  his  discretion  to 
give  the  necessary  notice,  which  he  did  April  28.  With 

45  Buchanan  to  McLane,  January  29,  1846;  Cong.  Globe,  Ap 
pendix;  29  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  1175. 
**  Folk's  Diary,  January  10,  1846. 


262  DIPLOMACY    UNDER  TYIvSR   AND 


the  copy  of  the  notice  sent  to  McLane,  Buchanan  in 
vited  the  British  government  to  make  a  proposal  for 
the  settlement  of  the  question.  The  rest  of  the  nego 
tiation  was  really  the  formal  carrying  out  of  what  each 
government  already  knew  the  other  would  agree  to. 
Upon  the  receipt  of  Folk's  notice  that  the  convention 
of  1827  was  abrogated,  Aberdeen  formally  instructed 
Pakenham  to  offer  the  line  of  forty-nine  degrees  to  the 
Pacific,  reserving  to  Great  Britain,  however,  the  whole 
of  Vancouver  Island  and  the  free  navigation  of  the 
Columbia.47 

Aberdeen's  offer  came  directly  after  the  repeal  of  the 
Corn  Laws  had  passed  the  House  of  Commons.48 
Within  a  few  days  after  the  Corn  Bill  became  a  law, 
Peel's  ministry  resigned  and  Aberdeen  went  out  of 
office.  Pakenham  proceeded  at  once  with  the  nego 
tiations  as  instructed  by  Aberdeen.  On  the  fifteenth 
of  June  he  and  Buchanan  signed  a  convention  sub 
stantially  on  the  lines  that  Aberdeen  had  outlined  to 
McLane.  The  line  of  forty-nine  degrees  extended  to 
the  Pacific  ;  the  whole  of  Vancouver  Island  remained  in 
Great  Britain's  hands  and  the  free  navigation  of  the 
Columbia  was  conceded.  Before  the  treaty  was  signed, 
Polk  stated  to  the  Senate  that  his  own  opinions  upon 
the  Oregon  question  remained  as  they  had  been  ex 
pressed  in  his  annual  message.  It  was  a  wise  plan, 
he  stated,  which  Washington  had  adopted,  of  asking 
the  previous  advice  of  the  Senate  upon  pending 
negotiations.  A  matter  of  such  magnitude  as 

47  McLane  to  Buchanan,   May  18,   1846  ;   Cong.   Globe,  Ap 
pendix;  29  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  1170. 

48  The  Corn  Bill  passed  the  House  of  Commons  upon  third 
reading  May  15.    The  Lords  passed  it  June  25. 


THE   OREGON    TREATY  263 

the  Oregon  question,  upon  the  decision  of  which 
hung  peace  or  war,  was  in  his  judgment  very 
properly  left  to  the  Senate,  not  only  as  a  part 
of  the  treaty-  but  of  the  war-making  power.4* 
The  Senate  with  but  little  debate  resolved  that  the 
President  was  "advised  to  accept  the  proposal  of  the 
British  Government."  !  Thus  he  evaded  all  responsi 
bility  for  the  compromise  line.  He  made  it  appear 
that  the  proposal  for  such  a  settlement  came  wholly 
from  Great  Britain.  It  was  true  that  the  official  pro 
posal  did  so  come,  but  not  until  Polk  had  let  it  be 
understood  by  Aberdeen  and  Pakenham  that  he  would 
not  reject  it.  He  cast  upon  the  Senate  the  responsi 
bility  for  the  compromise,  warning  them,  however, 
that  its  rejection  might  mean  war. 

Polk  had  looked  John  Bull  firmly  in  the  eye,  and 
John  Bull  proposed  what  he  had  so  often  refused. 
But  was  Folk's  firmness  the  cause  of  the  peaceful  and 
fair  settlement?  Had  Palmerston  been  in  Aberdeen's 
position  at  the  time  of  Folk's  "firm"  pronouncement, 
Polk  might  have  lost  Oregon.  That  the  Oregon  ques 
tion  was  settled  in  the  manner  it  was  is  one  of  the 
glories  of  the  administration  of  Sir  Robert  Peel.  Aber 
deen's  large-mindedness  and  consistent  belief  that  the 
friendship  of  the  United  States  was  worth  much  more 
to  Great  Britain  than  a  few  degrees  of  latitude  on  the 
Pacific  coast  are  responsible  for  the  settlement  that 
Polk  thought  to  gain  by  a  firm  policy.  That  Aberdeen 
was  "bluffed"  by  Polk  is  absurd.  Peel  knew  that  he 
could  not  retain  office  after  the  repeal  of  the  Corn 

48  Folk's   message,   June    10,    1846;    Richardson's   Messages, 
IV.,  449- 
80  Cong.  Globe,  Appendix;  29  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  1168. 


264  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYI^R  AND  POLK 

Laws,  and  it  was  the  part  of  great  statesmanship  not 
to  leave  to  his  successors  in  office  an  impasse  that 
had  been  brought  about  during  his  administration. 
Peel  could  not  go  into  opposition  with  a  war  of  his 
own  creation  upon  his  hands.  He  would  not  aggra 
vate  the  warlike  feelings  of  England  for  the  purpose 
of  maintaining  his  hold  upon  office.  McLane  was 
correctly  advised  of  Peel's  attitude  when  Aberdeen 
sent  Pakenham  his  instructions  to  propose  the  com 
promise  line.  He  wrote  to  Buchanan  that  Peel's  min 
istry  would  resign  before  the  end  of  June,  and  that 
in  case  the  new  proposal  were  not  accepted  promptly, 
the  new  ministry  might  not  agree  to  as  favorable 
terms.51  Upon  the  day  that  the  Peel  administration  re-* 
signed,  news  came  that  the  United  States  had  agreed 
to  Aberdeen's  offer  of  settlement,  and  the  second  great 
boundary  controversy  with  the  mother-country  was  at 
an  end.  '- 

In  all  the  history  of  the  relations  of  the  United  States 
with  Great  Britain  no  Englishman  showed  himself 
to  be  a  better  friend  to  the  United  States  than  did 
Lord  Aberdeen  in  his  handling  of  the  Ashburton  and 
Pakenham  negotiations. 

01  McLane  to  Buchanan,  May  18,  1846;  ibid.,  1170. 


CHAPTER  XI 

PORK'S  ATTEMPTED  NEGOTIATION  FOR  CALIFORNIA 
1845-1846 

The  most  important  source  of  information  for  the 
administration  of  President  Polk  is  unfortunately  still 
in  manuscript.  In  the  library  of  the  Chicago  Historical 
Society  is  a  set  of  small  note-books  in  which  James 
K.  Polk  entered  from  day  to  day  his  comments  upon 
the  measures  and  men  of  his  time.  Beginning  in 
August,  1845,  the  diary  continues  without  a  break  until 
he  left  public  life.  George  Bancroft,  whose  asso 
ciation  with  Polk  was  intimate,  first  as  secretary  of 
the  navy  and  afterwards  as  minister  at  the  Court  of 
St.  James,  would,  had  life  and  mental  vigor  permitted 
him,  have  been  the  historian  and  perhaps  the  apologist 
of  the  administration  in  which  he  played  so  conspicu 
ous  a  part.  In  the  Lenox  Library  at  New  York  is 
a  manuscript  copy  of  Folk's  diary  made  under  the 
direction  of  Bancroft.  In  addition  to  the  originals  of 
the  diary,  the  Chicago  Historical  Society  owns  a  num 
ber  of  letters  to  and  from  Polk.  A  large  collection  of 
Folk's  correspondence,  in  all  over  ten  thousand  letters, 
has  recently  been  acquired  by  the  Library  of  Congress. 
Of  these  much  is  related  to  the  years  1845  to  1849. 
Thus  the  material  for  a  study  of  Folk's  administration 
is  enormous,  but  being  divided  among  the  libraries  of 
Washington,  New  York,  and  Chicago  and  still  un- 
printed,  it  is  unfortunately  somewhat  difficult  of  access. 
The  writing  of  a  life  of  Polk  and  of  a  history  of  his  ad 
ministration  based  upon  the  mass  of  unpublished  mat- 


266  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYL^R  AND 


ter  connected  with  it  is  a  labor  yet  to  be  accomplished. 
The  history  of  the  diplomatic  events  of  this  adminis 
tration  also  rests  largely  upon  imprinted  material. 
Those  portions  of  the  official  correspondence  printed  at 
the  time  can  be  found  only  in  the  executive  documents 
of  the  Senate  and  House,  which,  buried  in  government 
publications,  rather  difficult  to  obtain,  may  be  said  to 
have  been  printed  and  not  published.  The  fragments 
so  printed  are  but  a  small  part  of  the  letters  and  in 
structions  to  be  found  in  the  department  of  state.  The 
same  may  be  said  of  the  naval  and  military  history 
of  the  Mexican  War.  It  is  believed  that  no  one  has 
ever  examined  all  of  the  records  of  the  war  and  navy 
departments  from  1845  to  1849  for  the  purposes  of 
historical  investigation.  The  best  history  of  the  war 
is  Ripley's,  written  soon  after  the  war  closed.  As  to 
the  Mexican  sources  upon  the  war,  it  is  to  be  hoped  that 
before  long  a  report  will  be  made  as  to  their  complete 
ness  and  accessibility. 

The  reasons  for  the  lack  of  published  materials  for 
Folk's  administration  are  obvious.  The  results  of 
Folk's  policy,  namely,  the  conquest  of  New  Mexico  and 
California,  gave  rise  to  such  a  rapid  succession  of 
political  events  ending  in  civil  war  that  public  atten 
tion  was  drawn  away  from  the  causes  to  the  conse 
quences  of  the  Mexican  War.  Folk's  administration 
had  no  apologists  but  many  vehement  critics.  The 
dominating  influence  of  slavery  left  the  Mexican  War 
as  a  mere  incident  in  the  history  of  the  larger  question. 

The  history  of  the  Mexican  War,  therefore,  aside 
from  the  purely  military  part  of  it,  has  been  written 
chiefly  as  a  chapter  in  the  history  of  the  slavery  ques 
tion.  The  momentous  national  issues  that  pressed 


POLK    AND    CALIFORNIA  267 

for  attention  even  before  Polk  retired  from  office  have 
given  a  twist  to  the  many  accounts  of  the  period  from 
1845  ^0  1848.  Books  appearing  soon  after  the  event, 
animated  not  by  a  spirit  of  unbiased  historical  investi 
gation,  but  written  with  the  professed  purpose  of  pre 
senting  a  brief  against  the  aggressions  of  slavery,  have 
furnished  in  large  measure  the  materials  for  the  history 
of  the  period.  The  treatment  of  the  subject  of  the 
Mexican  War  in  the  "reviews"  of  Jay 1  and  Livermore,2 
well  constructed  and  widely  distributed  as  they  were, 
and  fortified  by  an  examination  of  published  docu 
ments  and  newspapers,  has  grown  into  the  narrative 
of  Von  Hoist. 

Polk  came  into  the  presidential  chair  with  a  well- 
defined  programme.  It  was,  in  the  main,  not  one  dic 
tated  to  the  President  by  his  party  nor  was  it  formu 
lated  for  him  by  his  political  associates  and  advisers. 
His  mind  alone  gave  form  to  the  last  part  of  it,  and 
four  years  saw  it  accomplished.  This  programme  was : 
(i)  the  reduction  of  the  tariff;  (2)  the  establishment  of 
the  subtreasury ;  (3)  the  settlement  of  the  Oregon 
question,  and  (4)  the  acquisition  of  California.  This 
was  a  large  task  to  be  performed  in  four  years,  but 
the  accession  of  the  Whig  party  to  power  found  it  com 
pleted.  "Who  is  Polk?"  had  been  the  sneer  of  his 
political  adversaries  of  1844.  The  question  was  suffi 
ciently  answered  when  he  left  office. 

At  the  time  of  Tyler's  retirement  diplomatic  relations 
with  Mexico  had  been  suspended.  Almonte,  the  Mexi- 

1  William  Jay,  A   Review  of  the  Causes  and  Consequences 
of  the  Mexican  War  (Boston,  1849). 

2  Abiel  Abbot  Livermore,  The  War  with  Mexico  Reviewed 
(Boston,   1850). 


268  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYL£R   AND   POLK 

can  minister  at  Washington,  surrendered  his  passports 
to  the  secretary  of  state,  accompanying  his  note  of 
leave-taking  with  an  angry  review  of  the  alleged  hos 
tile  attitude  of  the  United  States  toward  his  country, 
as  shown  by  the  annexation  of  Texas.  Meanwhile, 
Wilson  Shannon,  our  minister  to  Mexico,  had  de 
manded  his  passports  from  Rejon,  the  minister  of 
foreign  relations.  Shannon's  predecessor,  Thompson, 
had  pursued  the  same  course  but  had  calculated  cor 
rectly  that  the  request  would  not  be  granted.  It  was 
otherwise  with  Shannon ;  Rejon  gave  him  his  passports 
and  accompanied  them  with  a  fierce  denunciation  of  the 
policy  of  the  United  States  toward  Mexico. 

There  is  a  characteristic  vein  running  through  the 
diplomatic  correspondence  of  Spanish-speaking  envoys, 
from  D'Yrujo  to  De  Lome.  However  much  pride 
and  vainglory  one  may  see  in  it,  there  has  been  little 
hypocrisy.  In  the  communications  to  Gorostiza,  Al 
monte,  and  Rejon,  both  official  and  unofficial,  invective, 
accusation,  and  abuse  were  set  forth  in  terms  hardly 
diplomatic.  On  our  side  there  was  as  well  a  continu 
ous  alternation  of  threat  and  lecture.  The  only  basis 
for  successful  diplomatic  negotiation,  which  rests 
upon  a  thorough  knowledge  and  appreciation  of  the 
Spanish  character,  was  conspicuously  lacking. 

Polk  lost  no  time  after  his  inauguration  in  making 
plans  for  carrying  out  the  fourth  item  of  his  scheme. 
The  stipulation  in  the  Texas  joint  resolution,  which 
left  the  adjustment  of  the  boundaries  of  Texas  to  the 
United  States,  gave  him  his  opportunity,  and  he 
grasped  it  at  once.  Almonte  left  New  York  for  Mexico 
April  3,  1845.  The  same  ship  carried  an  agent  secretly 
sent  by  the  President  to  make  an  effort  to  reopen  dip- 


POLK    AND    CALIFORNIA  269 

lomatic  relations  with  the  Mexican  government.  This 
secret  agent  was  Dr.  William  S.  Parrott,  who  had 
practised  dentistry  some  years  previously  in  the  City 
of  Mexico.  He  had  afterwards  engaged  in  business 
there  and  had  failed,  one  of  his  assets  being  a  claim 
against  the  Mexican  government,  though  of  this  claim 
Polk,  at  the  time  of  Parrott's  appointment,  probably 
knew  nothing. 

The  instructions  given  Parrott  were  to  reach  the 
president  and  other  high  officials  of  the  Mexican  gov 
ernment  and  by  every  honorable  means  to  convince 
them  that  it  was  the  true  interest  of  their  country  to 
restore  friendly  relations  between  the  two  republics; 
not  until  he  had  definitely  ascertained  the  willing 
ness  of  Mexico  to  receive  an  envoy  from  the  United 
States  was  he  to  disclose  his  own  official  character. 
"Whilst  you  ought  not  to  conceal  that  the  re-union  of 
Texas  with  the  United  States  is  already  decreed  and 
can  never  under  any  consideration  be  abandoned,  you 
are  at  liberty  to  state  your  confident  belief  that  in 
regard  to  all  unsettled  questions,  we  are  pre 
pared  to  meet  Mexico  in  a  liberal  and  friendly  spirit." 
No  specific  instructions  were  given  as  to  the  mode  of 
proceeding.  "Should  you  clearly  ascertain  that  they 
are  willing  to  renew  our  diplomatic  intercourse,  then, 
and  not  till  then,  you  are  at  liberty  to  communicate 
to  them  your  official  character  and  to  state  that  the 
United  States  will  send  a  minister  to  Mexico  as  soon 
as  they  receive  authentic  information  that  he  will  be 
kindly  received." ' 

The  selection  of  William  S.  Parrott  as  an  agent  for 

'Buchanan  to  Parrott,  March  28,  1845;  MS.,  Archives. 


27O  DIPLOMACY   UNDER   TYI^R   AND   POLK 

the  reestablishment  of  diplomatic  relations  was  a 
strange  one.  Parrott  had  urged  his  claims  against 
Mexico  for  a  lot  of  English  ale  in  a  manner  that 
disgusted  Thompson,  as  the  records  of  the  state  de 
partment  would  have  shown.  Thompson's  comment 
upon  Parrott's  claim  was  that  it  had  grown  more  enor 
mously  than  "Jonah's  gourd." '  Polk  and  Buchanan, 
probably  ignorant  of  the  matter,  selected  Parrott  be 
cause  he  had  lived  long  in  Mexico  and  professed  an  in 
timate  knowledge  of  and  acquaintance  with  its  leading 
men.  The  agent  reached  Mexico  before  Shannon  left. 
His  official  character  was  an  open  secret,  and  although 
he  was  persona  non  grata  to  the  government  on  account 
of  his  claim,  he  was  permitted  to  remain  after  Shannon 
had  departed.  Parrott  complained  to  Buchanan  that 
British  influences  prevented  him  from  approaching  the 
members  of  the  Herrera  government.  From  the  first 
he  dwelt  upon  the  strength  of  British  influence  and  the 
danger  of  Great  Britain's  seizure  of  Upper  California.5 
Judging  from  his  correspondence,  he  seems  to  have  re 
lied  largely  upon  the  newspapers  for  his  information.6 
At  first  without  even  a  "letter  of  security,"  which 
Black,  the  consul  at  Mexico,  had  unsuccessfully  re 
quested  for  him,  and  fearful  each  day  of  expulsion, 
Parrott  managed  early  in  June  to  get  into  "indirect" 
communication  with  the  government.7  He  reported 
that  no  one  believed  that  war  would  be  declared  against 

*  Parrott's    claim    of   $986,880   was    reduced   to   $114,750   by 
the  award.     MS.,  Awards,  II.,  45;  Department  of  State. 

5  Parrott   to   Buchanan,   May   13,    1845    (received   July  2)  ; 
MS.,   Archives. 

6  Parrott  to  Buchanan,  May  30,  1845 ;  MS.,  Archives. 

T  Parrott  to  Buchanan,  June  10,  1845;  MS.,  Archives. 


POLK    AND    CALIFORNIA  271 

the  United  States  on  account  of  Texas.  "The  pre 
sumption  and  folly  of  this  people  are  great,  it  is  true, 
but  hardly  enough  so  to  force  the  administration  to 
adopt  a  measure  which  if  persisted  in  might  erelong 
endanger  the  national  existence  of  their  country." ' 
Parrott's  disposition,  however,  was  not  that  of  a  peace 
maker.  "Nothing  but  a  severe  chastisement/'  he  wrote, 
'would  secure  our  people  in  future." ' 

The  cabinet  of  Herrera,  which  had  been  loosely  held 
together,  was  reconstructed  in  August.  Parrott  re 
ported  that  the  new  cabinet  was  in  accord  with  Herrera 
and  that  no  war  would  be  waged  on  account  of  Texas. 
"There  is  a  desire,  even  publicly  manifested,  to  re 
ceive  a  commissioner  from  the  United  States  and  every 
vessel  that  arrives  at  Isla  Verde  is  said  to  have  one  on 
board.  I  have  reason  to  believe  that  an  envoy  from 
the  United  States  would  not  only  be  well  received, 
but  his  arrival  would  be  hailed  with  joy.  An  Envoy 
possessing  suitable  qualifications  for  this  Court  might 
with  comparative  ease  settle  over  a  breakfast  the  most 
important  national  question,  while  such  as  we  have 
lately  had  here  would  make  matters  worse."  : 

Polk  had  no  intention  of  returning  Shannon.  Ten 
days  after  the  letter  just  quoted  was  received  from 
Parrott,  Polk  instructed  Buchanan  to  write  to  John 
Slidell  of  Louisiana,  who  had  previously  been  offered 
and  had  accepted  the  Mexican  mission,  that  he  should 

8  Parrott  to  Buchanan,  July  12,  1845  (received  September  i)  ; 
MS.,  Archives. 

9  Parrott  to  Buchanan,  July  26,  1845   (received  August  25)  ; 
MS.,  Archives. 

10  Parrott  to  Buchanan,  August  26,  1845  (received  September 
16)  ;  MS.,  Archives. 


272  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYI^R  AND   POLK 

hold  himself  in  readiness  to  leave  for  his  post  upo 
one  day's  notice.11 

On  that  date,  the  diary  informs  us,  the  Presiderr 
announced  clearly  to  his  cabinet  that  he  would  try  t< 
adjust  through  this  Texas  question  a  permanent  boun 
dary  between  Mexico  and  the  United  States  so  as  i 
comprehend  Upper  California  and  New  Mexico  anc 
to  give  us  a  line  from  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Granc 
to  latitude  thirty-two  degrees  north  and  thence  wes 
to  the  Pacific.  For  such  a  boundary  he  was  willing  tc 
pay,  he  said,  forty  million  dollars,  but  he  could  prob 
ably  get  it  for  fifteen  or  twenty  millions.  In  these 
views  the  cabinet  unanimously  concurred.  The  ap 
pointment  of  John  Slidell  followed  quickly  upon  thisi 
decision  of  the  cabinet. 

Slidell,  upon  whom  the  strictest  secrecy  concerning 
his  appointment  was  enjoined,  replied  that  it  was  be 
yond  belief  that  the  Mexican  government  would  sc 
soon  receive  a  diplomatic  representative  from  the 
United  States.12  He  felt,  as  had  Polk  and  his  cabinet 
that  no  one  would  dare  make  any  overtures  pending 
the  election  of  the  president  of  Mexico,  which  was 
soon  to  take  place.  Parrott's  reports,  however,  al 
though  corroborated  by  Black  and  Dimond,  consuls 
at  Mexico  and  Vera  Cruz  respectively,  did  not  fully 
convince  the  President  that  Herrera,  the  president 
ad  interim,  who  was  now  reflected,  was  not  trying 
to  win  political  capital  by  warlike  threats  against  the 
United  States.13 

"Folk's  Diary,  September  17,   1845. 
"Slidell     to     Buchanan,     September     25,     1845;     Curtis's 
Buchanan,  I.,  591. 
13  Cf.    Curtis's  Buchanan,  I,  588. 


POLK    AND    CALIFORNIA  2/3 

What  Parrott  had  done  was,  however,  no  secret  in 
Mexico.  On  November  i,  HI  Amigo  del  Pueblo,  a  Mexi 
can  newspaper,  denounced  the  government  of  Herrera 
as  engaged  in  a  "horrible  treason."  "This  vile  govern 
ment,"  it  said,  "has  been  and  is  in  correspondence  with 
the  usurpers.  The  Yankee  Parrott  and  the  American 
consul  at  Mexico  are  those  who  have  agreed  with  the 
government  for  the  loss  of  Texas,  and  this  same  Par 
rott  has  departed  for  the  North  to  say  to  his  govern 
ment  to  send  a  commissioner  to  make  with  our  gov 
ernment  an  ignominious  treaty  on  the  basis  of  the 
surrender  of  Texas  and  we  know  not  what  other  part 
of  the  republic.  This  is  as  certain  as  the  existence  of 
God  in  Heaven."  The  article  proceeded  in  scurrilous 
fashion  to  characterize  Parrott  as  a  shameless  sharper 
and  adventurer,  concluding  with  the  statement  that 
Parrott  had  himself  disclosed  these  secrets  on  the  eve 
of  his  departure.  From  Commodore  Conner,  com 
manding  the  naval  forces  in  the  Gulf,  came  despatches 
stating  that  Mexico  was  willing  to  renew  diplomatic 
relations  and  to  receive  a  minister  from  the  United 
States.14  The  cabinet  thereupon  unanimously  agreed 
to  Slidell's  instructions.15 

Parrott's  work  in  Mexico  was  completed  by  October 
1 8,  when  he  left  for  Washington  with  a  note  from 
Black,  the  American  consul,  which  stated  that  he  had 
positive  and  official  assurance  that  the  Mexican  minis 
try  was  favorable  to  an  adjustment  of  the  questions  in 
dispute  between  the  two  republics.  The  cabinet  had 
agreed  that  Slidell's  formal  appointment  should  be  de- 


14  Folk's  Diary,  November  6,  1845. 
*Ibid.,  November  7,  1845. 


274  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

layed  until  some  official  assurances  should  be  had 
that  Mexico  would  receive  an  envoy,  and  Black  was 
asked  to  procure  them.  Parrott  arrived  at  Wash 
ington  November  9.  Upon  the  tenth  Buchanan 
sent  Slidell  his  instructions,  which  had  been  drafted 
seven  weeks  before.18  These  instructions  to  Slidell 
are  of  fundamental  importance  in  rightly  under 
standing  Folk's  policy  toward  Mexico.  The  Presi 
dent  told  Bancroft  soon  after  the  inauguration 
that  the  acquisition  of  California  would  be  one  of 
the  main  objects  of  his  administration.  Slidell's  ap 
pointment  was  a  secret.  Every  precaution  was  ob 
served  by  Polk  to  keep  his  instructions  from  becom 
ing  public.  While  confidential  instructions  may  have 
been  given  Slidell  before  he  left  Washington  in  the 
spring,  yet  Buchanan's  instructions  to  him  are  the 
official  expression  of  Folk's  policy  toward  Mexico,  and 
these  were  consistently  adhered  to.  That  Polk  so  con 
sidered  them  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  they  accom 
panied  the  instructions  of  Commissioner  Trist  a  year 
and  a  half  later,  and  that  they  were  given  official  pub 
licity  only  when  the  final  treaty  was  submitted  to  the 
Senate  for  ratification.  When  the  House  called  for 
them  Polk  stood  upon  his  constitutional  prerogative 
and  refused  to  make  them  public,  claiming  that  to  do 
so  "could  not  fail  to  produce  serious  embarrassments 
in  any  future  negotiation  between  the  two  countries." 
This  was  as  late  as  January  12,  1848,  more  than  two 
years  after  the  instructions  had  been  drafted,  and  when 
the  war  was  practically  at  an  end.  The  cabinet  agreed 
with  Polk  that  Slidell's  instructions  should  be  kept 

16  Ibid.,   September  22,   1845. 


POLK    AND    CALIFORNIA  2/5 

secret  "because  the  French  and  British  ministers  might 
try  to  thwart  or  defeat  the  objects  of  the  mission."11 

Parrott's  mission  and  Slidell's  instructions  taken  to 
gether  prove  two  things:  (i)  that  the  Mexican  War 
was  not  the  result  of  the  annexation  of  Texas,  and 
(2)  that  the  reopening  of  diplomatic  relations  with 
Mexico  was  for  the  purpose  of  securing  California  by 
purchase.  These  instructions  are  the  key-note  to  Folk's 
aggressive  policy  of  expansion.  The  President  de 
veloped  a  plan  by  which  he  believed  that  expansion 
could  be  effected  by  peaceful  means.  Claims  against 
Mexico,  under  discussion  as  far  back  as  Jackson's 
time,  furnished  the  groundwork  of  the  plan;  the  joint 
resolution  annexing  Texas  gave  the  President  some 
thing  to  build  upon.  Mexico  could  not  pay  the  claims 
in  cash ;  the  Texan  boundary  was  unsettled.  The  idea 
of  territorial  indemnity  was  an  irresistible  conclusion : 
let  her  pay  in  land. 

The  instructions  to  Slidell  first  dwelt  upon  the  re 
ported  designs  of  European  countries  upon  Mexico,  a 
subject  which  ever  afforded  an  opportunity  for  decided 
statement.  Buchanan  then  said  that  the  claims  of 
American  citizens  upon  Mexico  would  first  en 
gage  Slidell's  attention  as  matters  yet  unsettled 
by  the  unratified  treaty  of  1843.  As  Mexico 
was  not  in  a  position  to  settle  these  claims  in 
money,  the  United  States  must  assume  them. 
The  plan  of  doing  this  is  then  developed.  "Fortu 
nately,"  Buchanan  said,  "the  joint  resolution  of  Con 
gress,  approved  March  I,  1845,  for  annexing  Texas, 
presents  the  means  of  satisfying  these  claims  in  perfect 

"Ibid.,  September  16,  1845. 


276  DIPLOMACY    UNDER   TYLER   AND   POLK 

consistency  with  the  interests  as  well  as  the  honor  of 
both  republics"  by  the  reservation  therein  to  the  United 
States  of  the  right  to  adjust  all  questions  of  boundary 
that  might  arise  between  it  and  Mexico.  The  Rio 
Grande  boundary  was  then  discussed,  and  as  to  it, 
Buchanan  said,  "there  can  be  no  serious  doubt,"  based 
upon  the  independence  of  Texas  as  a  fact  not  to  be 
called  in  question.  New  Mexico,  on  the  other  hand, 
presented  a  different  question,  as  it  had  never  been 
conquered  or  taken  possession  of  by  the  Texans.  In 
case  Mexico  should  agree  to  fix  the  boundary  from  the 
mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande  up  the  middle  of  the  prin 
cipal  stream  to  the  point  where  it  touches  the  line  of 
New  Mexico,  thence  west  and  north  to  the  forty- 
second  parallel,  so  as  to  include  the  whole  within  the 
United  States,  then  this  country  would  assume  the 
payment  of  her  citizens'  claims  against  Mexico  and 
would  pay  five  millions  in  addition.  The  cession 
of  Upper  California  was  the  next  topic  con 
sidered.  This  province,  said  Buchanan,  was  al 
ready  practically  lost  to  Mexico  and  coveted  by 
Great  Britain  and  France.  "If  you  can  obtain 
a  cession  of  it,"  the  secretary  said,  "you  will 
render  immense  service  to  your  country  and  es 
tablish  an  enviable  reputation  for  yourself.  Money 
would  be  no  object  when  compared  with  the  value  of 
the  acquisition."  For  it  he  might  offer  twenty-five  mil 
lions,  in  addition  to  the  assumption  of  the  claims,  or 
five  millions  less  if  the  southern  line  was  north  of  Mon 
terey  but  included  the  Bay  of  San  Francisco.  Such  was 
the  difficult  errand  upon  which  John  Slidell  went  to 
Mexico ;  as  his  instructions  stated,  it  was  "one  of  the 
most  delicate  and  important  missions  which  had  ever 


POLK    AND    CALIFORNIA  2/7 

been  confided  to  a  citizen  of  the  United  States."  "The 
people  to  whom  you  will  be  sent  are  proverbially  jeal 
ous  ;  and  they  have  been  irritated  against  the  United 
States  by  recent  events  and  the  intrigues  of  foreign 
powers.  To  conciliate  their  good  will  is  indispensable 
to  your  success.  It  would  be  difficult  to  raise  a  point 
of  honor  between  the  United  States  and  so  feeble  and 
distracted  a  power  as  Mexico."  ] 

Folk's  disposition  of  the  military  and  naval  forces 
of  the  United  States  was  in  thorough  accord  with  his 
diplomatic  policy.  In  May,  1845,  Taylor  was  ordered 
to  cross  the  Sabine  into  Texas  to  protect  it  pending 
annexation.  Taylor  proceeded  to  advance  as  far  as 
Corpus  Christi.  Jones,  the  president  of  Texas,  claimed 
that  Donelson,  together  with  Captain  Stockton,  com 
manding  the  naval  forces  upon  the  coast  of  Texas, 
attempted  to  dragoon  him  into  demanding  a  strong 
concentration  of  United  States  forces,  naval  and  mili 
tary,  upon  the  western  border  of  Texas  in  anticipation 
of  war  between  Mexico  and  the  United  States.  Jones 
even  went  so  far  as  to  state  that  it  was  evidently  the 
determination  of  Donelson  and  Stockton  to  force  a 
war  with  Mexico  for  the  purposes  of  further  territorial 
aggrandizement.  He  threw  upon  Taylor  the  responsi 
bility  of  his  advance  to  Corpus  Christi,  claiming  that 
Texas  was  not  seriously  menaced.19 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  individual  activities  of 
Folk's  agents,  the  President  did  not  proceed  to  force 
Mexico  into  a  war.  Polk  worked  for  peace,  but  at 
the  same  time  prepared  for  war.  If  war  resulted,  the 
conquest  of  California  should  be  its  fruit. 

18  Buchanan  to  Slidell,  November  10,  1845 ;  S.  Ex.  Doc.  52, 
30  Cong.,  I  Sess.,  71. 

"Jones,  Official  Correspondence,  passim. 


278  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

The  gulf  squadron  under  Conner  was  ordered  to 
blockade  Vera  Cruz  in  the  event  of  war  and  to  develop 
the  fortifications  of  San  Juan  d'  Ulloa.20  The  naval 
forces  in  the  Pacific  under  the  command  of  Commodore 
Sloat  were  reinforced  by  parts  of  the  Mediterranean 
and  East  India  squadrons.21  Sloat  was  ordered,  in  case 
he  should  hear  of  hostilities  between  the  United  States 
and  Mexico,  to  seize  San  Francisco  at  once,  together 
with  such  other  Pacific  ports  as  his  forces  would  per 
mit.  In  case  war  did  not  occur  his  squadron  was  to 
cruise  along  the  coast  of  California  to  Oregon,  "to 
cheer  our  citizens  in  that  region  by  the  presence  of  the 
American  flag."  * 

At  Monterey,  Thomas  O.  Larkin,  the  foremost 
American  merchant  there,  had  for  some  time  per 
formed  the  slight  duties  of  the  consular  office.  During 
the  summer  of  1845  Buchanan  received  from  him  re 
ports  upon  the  political  conditions  of  California;  the 
consul  reported  that  the  population  was  apathetic  and 
even  disloyal  to  Mexico,  and  that  Great  Britain  and 
France  had  evident  designs  upon  the  province.23 
Lieutenant  Archibald  H.  Gillespie  of  the  marine  corps 
was  despatched  to  Monterey  to  get  into  communication 
with  Larkin.  Gillespie's  instructions  were  secret.  No 
copy  of  them  has  been  found  in  the  navy  department, 

20  Bancroft    to    Conner,    "confidential,"    August     16,     1845 ; 
August  30,   1845,  "secret;"  MS.,  Archives,  Navy  Department. 

21  Bancroft  to  Commodore  Smith,  May  13,   1845 ;   Bancroft 
to  Parker,  June  24,  1845;  MS.,  Archives,  Navy  Department. 

22  Bancroft  to   Sloat,   June  24,    1845 ;   H.   Ex.   Doc.   60,  30 
Cong.,  I  Sess.,  231. 

23  Larkin  to  Buchanan,  June  6,  1845  (received  September  16) 
and  July  10,  1845  (received  October  n)  ;  MS.,  Archives. 


POLK    AND    CALIFORNIA  279 

and  the  precise  nature  of  them  cannot  be  determined.84 
After  a  dangerous  trip  through  Mexico,  in  the  course 
of  which  he  was  forced  to  destroy  all  of  his  papers, 
the  lieutenant  arrived  in  Monterey  in  April,  1846,  just 
as  active  hostilities  with  Mexico  began.25  Gillespie  had 
been  sent  upon  his  errand  November  i,  1845.  Shortly 
before  this  Stockton,  who  had  been  appointed  to  the 
command  of  the  Pacific  squadron,  was  instructed  to 
sail  under  sealed  orders  to  the  Sandwich  Islands  and 
thence  directly  to  Monterey,  California.  "You  will  con 
fer  with  the  consul,  gain  all  the  information  you  can  on 
Mexican  affairs  and  do  all  in  your  power  to  conciliate 
the  good  feelings  of  the  people  of  that  place  toward 
the  United  States."  26  To  Stockton  was  entrusted  Bu 
chanan's  letter  to  Larkin,  a  copy  of  which  Gillespie 
took  at  the  same  time.27  The  policy  of  Polk  in  refer 
ence  to  the  acquisition  of  California  was  therein  out 
lined. 

"In  the  contest  between  Mexico  and  California  we 
can  take  no  part  unless  the  former  should  commence 
hostilities  against  the  United  States ;  but  should  Cali 
fornia  assert  and  maintain  her  independence,  we  shall 
render  her  all  the  kind  offices  in  our  power  as  a  sister 

"Folk's  Diary,  October  30,  1845.  Bancroft  to  Gillespie, 
November  i,  1845.  Gillespie  received  orders  April  26,  1843, 
November  i,  1845,  and  April  23,  1846.  None  contained  in 
structions  relative  to  this  errand.  MS.,  Archives,  Navy  De 
partment. 

25  Larkin  to  Buchanan,  April   17,  1846 ;  MS.,  Archives. 

28  Sealed  orders  to  Stockton  (not  to  be  opened  until  he 
passed  the  Capes),  October  12,  1845;  MS.,  Archives,  Navy 
Department. 

27  Gillespie  committed  to  memory  the  contents  of  Buchanan's 
letter  to  Larkin,  and  destroyed  the  copy  upon  his  arrival  at 
Vera  Cruz. 


280  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYL^R   AND   POLK 


republic.  This  government  has  no  ambitious  aspira 
tions  to  gratify  and  no  desire  to  extend  our  federal 
system  over  more  territory  than  we  already  possess, 
unless  by  the  free  and  spontaneous  wish  of  all  the  in 
dependent  people  of  adjoining  territories.  The  exer 
cise  of  compulsion  or  improper  influence  to  accomplish 
such  a  result  would  be  repugnant  to  both  the  policy 
and  principles  of  the  government.  But  whilst  these 
are  the  sentiments  of  the  President,  he  could  not  view 
with  indifference  the  transfer  of  California  to  Great 
Britain  or  any  other  European  power.  .  .  .  The 
true  policy  for  the  present  in  regard  to  this  question 
is  to  let  events  take  their  own  course,  unless  an  at 
tempt  should  be  made  to  transfer  them  [i.  e.,  the  people 
of  California]  without  their  consent  to  Great  Britain 
or  any  other  European  power.  .  .  .  Lieut.  Archi 
bald  H.  Gillespie  of  the  marine  corps  will  immediately 
proceed  to  Monterey  and  will  probably  reach  you  be 
fore  this  despatch.  He  is  a  gentleman  in  whom  the 
President  reposes  entire  confidence.  He  has  seen  these 
instructions  and  will  cooperate  with  you  in  carrying 
them  into  execution."  : 

Thus  while  Polk  upon  the  one  hand  awaited  official 
assurances  from  Mexico  that  she  would  peacefully 
reestablish  diplomatic  relation's  with  the  United  States, 
upon  the  other  he  signified  that  he  would  aid  in  the  dis 
memberment  of  Mexico.  The  expeditions  of  Fremont 
are  beyond  the  scope  of  the  present  narrative,  but  it 
may  be  stated  here  that  the  instructions  to  Larkin,  the 
.secret  mission  of  Gillespie,  and  the  exploits  of  Fre 
mont  are  parts  of  one  and  the  same  policy:  if  peace 

28  Buchanan  to  Larkin,  October  17,  1845;  MS.,  Archives. 


POLK    AND    CALIFORNIA  28l 

continued  with  Mexico,  to  attempt  to  purchase  Cali 
fornia  ;  if  purchase  failed,  to  assist  California  to  throw 
off  the  Mexican  yoke.  The  instructions  to  Larkin  and 
Stockton  can  be  read  in  no  other  light.  Events,  how 
ever,  moved  in  a  different  channel.  War  and  not 
peace  followed.  California  became  part  of  the  United 
States  through  conquest. 

John  Slidell's  appointment  \vas  as  envoy  extraor 
dinary  and  minister  plenipotentiary  to  Mexico.  Upon 
the  capacity  in  which  Slidell  presented  himself  at 
Mexico  turned  the  question  of  his  reception.  The 
point  was  that  while  Mexico  might  be  willing  to  receive 
from  the  United  States  a  commissioner  ad  hoc  to  treat 
concerning  the  question  over  which  there  had  been  a 
rupture  of  diplomatic  relations — namely,  the  annexa 
tion  of  Texas  to  the  United  States — it  was  a  totally 
different  matter  for  her  to  receive  a  regular  minister 
to  take  up  the  usual  diplomatic  functions  of  the  lega 
tion.  A  commissioner  would  be  instructed  to  settle 
one  definite  dispute  and  the  matters  collateral  to  it. 
The  reception  by  Mexico  of  a  minister  would  open  the 
door  to  the  general  course  of  diplomatic  negotiations 
upon  which  the  American  minister  might  be  instructed. 
Again,  Mexico  as  a  matter  of  pride  would  hesitate  to 
receive  a  minister,  thus  acknowledging  her  announce 
ment,  that  annexation  was  equivalent  to  war,  to  be  a 
vain  and  empty  threat.  So  far  as  Polk  and  Buchanan 
were  concerned  they  would  not  have  sacrificed  any 
national  self-respect  had  a  commissioner  been  sent  in 
stead  of  an  envoy.  The  boundary  between  Texas  and 
Mexico,  since  the  action  of  the  Texan  congress  and 
convention,  was  unsettled.  It  had  purposely  been  left 
so  by  the,  joint  resolutions  of  annexation.  Why  Polk 


282  DIPLOMACY    UNDER   TYI^R   AND   POI,K 

and  Buchanan  insisted  upon  sending  a  minister  is  a 
matter  of  conjecture.  As  far  as  Parrott's  letters  re 
ported  upon  the  reception  of  a  representative,  refer 
ence  is  made  to  a  minister  or  to  an  envoy.  Polk  used 
the  same  expression  in  his  diary,  though  he  must  have 
known  of  the  doubts  expressed  at  Washington  of  the 
reception  of  a  representative  with  such  general  func 
tions.29  Mexico's  attitude  toward  Slidell  turned  upon 
this  one  point,  which  was  seized  upon  as  soon  as  the 
purport  of  his  instructions  became  known  to  Herrera's 
government.  How  these  secret  instructions  leaked  out 
is  not  known. 

Slidell  arrived  at  Vera  Cruz  late  in  November  and 
proceeded  at  once  to  the  City  of  Mexico.  Parrott,  who 
had  been  appointed  secretary  of  legation,  followed  him 
in  company  with  Gillespie,  en  route  with  despatches 
for  Larkin  at  Monterey.30 

Slidell's  arrival  at  the  City  of  Mexico  evidently  em 
barrassed  Herrera,  whose  government,  never  a  strong 
one,  was  beginning  to  fear  a  revolution  against  it. 
Pefia  y  Pena,  the  secretary  of  foreign  affairs,  told 
Black  that  Slidell  was  not  expected  until  January,  and 
that  if  "Mexico  received  a  commissioner"  now  it  would 
endanger  the  government.31  He  positively  refused  to 
receive  Parrott  as  secretary  of  legation.  The  enemies 
of  Herrera  were  strong  and  immediately  used  Slidell's 
arrival  as  political  capital  against  the  existing  admin 
istration.  As  soon  as  Slidell  reached  Mexico  broad- 

29  Tyler's  Tylers,  III.,  176;  statement  of  Benjamin  E.  Green. 

30  Slidell  to  Buchanan,  December  17,  1845;  postcript.     MS., 
Archives.      Parrott    to    Buchanan,    December    n,    1845;    MS., 
Archives. 

81  Black  to  Buchanan,  December  18,  1845;  S.  Ex.  Doc.  337, 
rp  Cong.,  i  Sess. 


POLK    AND    CALIFORNIA  283 

sides  appeared  over  the  city  and  told  of  his  plans:  to 
negotiate  with  Herrera's  government  for  the  sale  of 
Texas,  New  Mexico  and  the  Californias.  The  recep 
tion  of  Slidell  by  Herrera,  said  the  broadsides,  would 
be  an  act  of  treason. 

Slidell's  despatch,  which  enclosed  one  of  these  hand 
bills,  was  received  in  Washington  January  12,  1846. 
Taylor  was  ordered  forward  from  Corpus  Christi  to 
the  Rio  Grande  the  following  day.32  Thus  the  refusal 
to  receive  Slidell  in  his  capacity  as  minister  was  taken 
as  sufficient  grounds  for  the  occupation  of  the  country 
beyond  the  Nueces.  Slidell,  however,  did  not  believe 
that  his  rejection  was  final.  Bankhead,  the  British 
minister,  was  requested  by  Peiia  y  Pefia  to  state  to 
Slidell  "that  the  government  had  in  its  present  critical 
position,  feared  to  compromise  themselves  by  receiving 
him,  that  had  they  been  free  to  act  they  would  have 
pursued  a  different  course,  and  that,  should  they  suc 
ceed  in  putting  down  the  movements  of  Paredes,  they 
would  take  the  necessary  steps  to  bring  about  a  renewal 
of  diplomatic  relations."  ; 

Buchanan  supplemented  Slidell's  instructions  by 
stating  that  the  President  desired  the  negotiations 
brought  to  a  conclusion  with  as  little  delay  as  possible. 
"He  desires  to  submit  the  result  to  Congress  before 
the  termination  of  the  approaching  session,  so  that, 
in  the  event  of  a  failure,  prompt  and  energetic  meas 
ures  may  be  adopted  on  our  part  to  redress  the  injuries 
which  our  citizens  have  sustained  from  Mexico." '  If 

32  Folk's  Diary,  January  13,   1846. 

33  Slidell  to  Buchanan,  December  29,  1845  (received  January 
23,   1846)  ;  MS.,  Archives. 

"Buchanan  to  Slidell,  November  19,  1845;  MS.,  Archives. 


284  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYI^R   AND   POLK 

Slidell  succeeded  in  concluding  a  treaty  upon  the  lines 
of  his  instructions,  he  was  to  have  it  ratified  by  the 
Mexican  government  before  its  transmission,  to  the 
United  States.  After  the  receipt  of  Slidell's  first  letter, 
in  which  he  reported  that  Herrera  declined  receiving 
him  immediately,  Buchanan  advised  him  of  the  orders 
to  Taylor  and  to  the  gulf  squadron,  which  was  to 
rendezvous  before  Vera  Cruz.  "Should  war  become 
inevitable,  the  President  will  be  prepared  to  conduct 
it  with  vigor."  * 

The  revolution  under  Paredes  gained  headway,  and 
soon  the  government  of  Herrera  was  overthrown. 
Paredes  was  as  belligerent  as  Herrera  had  been  peace 
able.  Slidell,  however,  continued  to  feel  assured  that 
the  new  government  would  receive  him.  He  waited 
until  the  middle  of  March,  hoping  each  day  that 
Paredes  would  direct  that  he  be  received.  His  expec 
tations  were  in  vain.  The  new  minister  of  foreign 
affairs  sent  Slidell  his  passports  and  definitely  refused 
to  receive  him.36  "Be  assured,"  wrote  Slidell  to  Bu 
chanan,  enclosing  Castillo's  refusal,  "that  nothing  is 
to  be  done  with  these  people  until  they  shall  have  been 
chastised."  3I 

Polk,  however,  had  long  since  made  up  his  mind  to 
"chastise"  Mexico.  The  Oregon  negotiations  pre 
sented  one  obstacle  to  the  immediate  carrying  out  of 
his  plans.  The  danger  of  having  two  wars  on  hand 

35  Buchanan  to  Slidell,  January  20,   1846;  S.  Ex.  Doc.  337, 
29  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  44. 

36  Castillo  y  Lanzas  to   Slidell,   March   12,    1846;    Slidell   to 
Castillo  y  Lanzas,   March   17,   1846;   ibid. 

37  Slidell   to   Buchanan,  private,   March    15,    1846    (received 
April   17,  "night")  ;   MS.,  Archives. 


POLK    AND    CALIFORNIA  285 

was  grave  enough  to  delay  active  measures  against 
Mexico,  although  at  no  time  did  Polk  seem  seriously 
to  fear  a  rupture  with  Great  Britain  on  account  of 
Oregon.  It  was  apparent  that  Slidell's  mission  was 
a  failure.  California  was  not  to  be  purchased  as  the 
result  of  a  negotiation  upon  the  claims  and  the  Texas 
boundary.  The  next  step  was  to  be  an  openly  aggres 
sive  movement  against  Mexico.  Until  the  Oregon  ques 
tion  was  out  of  the  way,  Polk  wanted  Slidell  to  tem 
porize  and  not  finally  to  close  the  door  to  negotiation. 
Instead  of  calling  Slidell  home,  he  was  ordered  to 
make  further  efforts  to  obtain  recognition.  Buchanan 
wrote  Slidell,  March  12,  1846:  "The  Oregon  question 
is  rapidly  approaching  a  crisis.  By  the  steam  packet 
which  will  leave  Liverpool  on  the  4th  of  April, 
if  not  by  that  which  left  on  the  4th  instant,  the  Presi 
dent  expects  information  which  will  be  decisive  on  the 
subject.  The  prospect  is  that  our  differences  with 
Great  Britain  may  be  peacefully  adjusted,  though  this 
is  by  no  means  certain.  Your  return  to  the  United 
States  before  the  result  is  known,  would  produce  con 
siderable  alarm  in  the  public  mind  and  might  possibly 
exercise  an  injurious  influence  on  our  relations  with 
Great  Britain."  38 

Slidell,  who  had  previously  no  intimation  that  his 
mission  had  any  connection  with  the  Oregon  negotia 
tion,  was  on  his  way  home  when  Buchanan's  last  let 
ter  reached  him.  "Had  such  a  hint  been  given  to  me 
there  could  have  been  no  difficulty  in  procrastinating 
indefinitely  an  issue  with  the  Mexican  government, 
and  however  disagreeable  and  even  false,  my  personal 

38  Buchanan  to  Slidell,  March  12,  1846;  MS.,  Archives. 


286  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLSR  AND   POLK 

position  might  have  been,  ...  no  inconvenience 
to  myself  would  have  prevented  me  from  performing 
my  duty."  39  With  the  departure  of  Slidell  the  plan  of 
acquiring  California  by  peaceful  means  was  shown  to 
be  a  failure. 

Slidell  did  not  believe  that  the  Paredes  government 
would  be  able  to  maintain  itself.  The  eyes  of  many 
Mexicans  were  turned  to  Cuba,  where  Santa  Anna 
was  living  in  exile.  No  one  else  could  rally  about  him 
so  much  strength  as  the  former  popular  idol.  In  the 
letter  in  which  he  reported  the  definite  refusal  of  the 
Paredes  government,  Slidell  wrote :  "I  shall  not  be 
surprised  soon  to  hear  of  Santa  Anna  arrived  at  Vera 
Cruz  and  of  a  pronunciamento  in  his  favor  by  the  gar 
rison  there.  If  he  have  the  nerve  to  take  the  step 
and  get  possession  of  Vera  Cruz,  he  will  easily  put 
down  Paredes.  Should  he  arrive  before  my  departure, 
I  will  ascertain  his  views  in  relation  to  the  United 
States,  and  if  I  find  them  favorable,  will  not  hurry  my 
departure  from  Vera  Cruz,  but  in  the  meanwhile,  my 
expectation  of  amicable  arrangements  through  Santa 
Anna  ought  not  to  delay  the  application  which  the 
President  intends  making  Congress."  *°  "Should  Santa 
Anna  be  the  successor  of  Paredes,  the  prospect  would 
be  better,  but  some  time  would  be  necessary  to  prepare 
his  partisans  for  a  step  so  unpopular  as  negotiation, 
and  should  he  be  disposed  to  take  it,  he  would  not 
scruple  to  make  the  preliminary  overtures." ' 

"Slidell  to  Buchanan,  April  2,  1846;  MS.,  Archives. 

40  Slidell  to  Buchanan,   March   15,   1846    (received  April   i, 
"night")  ;  MS.,  Archives. 

41  Slidell  to  Buchanan,  April  2,   1846    (received  April   16)  ; 
MS.,  Archives. 


POLK    AND    CALIFORNIA  287 

Santa  Anna  was  the  successor  of  Paredes.  Polk  was 
already  in  possession  of  Santa  Anna's  pretended  views 
toward  the  United  States.  Events  were  now  rapidly 
approaching  war.  The  clash  with  Taylor  at  the  Rio 
Grande  was  a  fortunate  circumstance  for  the  adminis 
tration.  Before  the  news  of  Taylor's  fight  reached 
him  Polk  had  determined  to  declare  war  upon  Mexico. 
His  statement  that  "war  existed  by  the  act  of  Mexico" 
was  as  inaccurate  as  the  belief  that  war  was  the  neces 
sary  consequence  of  the  annexation  of  Texas. 


CHAPTER  XII 
THE)  OUTBREAK  OF  THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

It  has  been  demonstrated,  it  is  believed,  that  the 
Mexican  War  was  not  the  result  of  the  annexation  of 
Texas.  The  Mexican  War  was  waged  for  the  pur 
pose  of  conquest,  for  the  fulfillment  of  Folk's  designs 
upon  California.  War  would  have  been  declared 
against  Mexico  had  the  Mexicans  not  crossed  the  Rio 
Grande  or  come  into  conflict  with  Taylor.  Again,  Polk 
believed  war  with  Mexico  would  be  a  small  affair, 
scarcely  ninety  days  in  duration,  to  be  terminated  by 
a  peaceful  surrender  of  California,  arranged  by  Santa 
Anna. 

The  first  part  of  Folk's  policy  toward  Mexico  had 
been  to  acquire  California  by  purchase.  This  attempt 
failed  under  Slidell.  Herrera's  successor,  Paredes,  re 
fused  to  receive  Slidell.  Nothing  was  to  be  hoped  for 
through  diplomacy. 

One  day  in  February,  after  Polk  had  ordered  Taylor 
forward  to  the  Rio  Grande  and  was  awaiting  the  news 
of  Slidell's  final  rejection,  a  visitor  was  admitted  to  the 
White  House  for  a  confidential  conversation  with  the 
President.  Polk,  whose  diary  is  usually  terse  in  its 
comment  upon  men  and  things,  deemed  the  communi 
cation  of  his  visitor  to  be  of  sufficient  importance  to 
be  entered  in  full  in  his  book.  Through  this  entry  in 
the  diary  one  is  let  more  fully  into  the  confidences  of 
this  close-mouthed  and  secretive  President  than  were 
the  members  of  his  own  cabinet.  No  less  an  authority 
than  Bancroft  has  stated  that  Polk  was  the  "master  - 


OUTBREAK    OF   THE    MEXICAN    WAR  289 

of  his  own  cabinet  and  not  ruled  by  the  ablest  of  his 
advisers.  One  trait  which  gave  him  this  controlling 
advantage  was  his  power  of  secrecy,  which  was  so 
great  that  those  whose  official  intercourse  was  closest 
with  him,  were  ..unable  to  trace  the  course  of  his 
thoughts."  The  diary  has  disclosed  the  secrets  kept 
from  the  cabinet. 

"Friday,  Feby.  13-1846 — Some  company  today  until 
12  o'clock,"  says  the  diary.  "Among  those  who  called 
was  Col.  Atacha,  who  called  on  me  in  June  last.  He 
is  a  Spaniard  by  birth,  but  says  he  has  become  a 
naturalized  citizen  of  the  U.  S.  He  has  lived  at  New 
Orleans  and  spent  many  years  in  Mexico.  He  was 
with  Santa  Anna  when  his  government  was  over 
thrown  last  year,  was  himself  arrested  but  it  being 
made  known  that  he  was  a  naturalized  citizen  of  the 
U.  S.,  he  was  ordered  out  of  the  country.  He  called 
on  me  in  June  last  to  present  claims  against  the  gov 
ernment  of  Mexico,  with  a  view  to  have  their  payment 
urged  by  the  Govt.  of  the  U.  S.  Col.  Atacha  stated 
this  A.  M.  he  had  visited  Genl.  Santa  Anna  in  his 
exile  at  Havannah  &  that  he  had  left  him  a  month 
ago — His  conversation  with  me,  he  said,  he  desired  to 
be  confidential.  He  represented  that  Santa  Anna  was 
in  constant  communication  with  his  friends  in  Mexico 
and  received  by  every  vessel  that  left  Vera  Cruz  hun 
dreds  of  letters.  He  intimated  that  the  recent  revo 
lution  in  Mexico  headed  by  Paredes  met  Santa  Anna's 
sanction,  &  that  Santa  Anna  might  soon  be  in  power 
again  in  Mexico.  He  said  that  Santa  Anna  was  in 
favor  of  a  Treaty  with  the  U.  S.  and  that  in  adjusting 
the  boundary  between  the  two  countries  the  Del  Norte 
should  be  the  western  Texas  line  and  the  Colorado  of 


DIPLOMACY    UNDER  TYI^R   AND   POLK 

the  west,  drawn  through  the  bay  of  San  Francisco 
to  the  sea,  should  be  the  Mexican  line  on  the  north  & 
that  Mexico  should  cede  all  east  and  north  of  these 
natural  boundaries  to  the  U.  S.  for  a  pecuniary  con 
sideration,  &  mentioned  thirty  millions  of  dollars  as 
the  sum.  This  sum,  he  said,  Santa  Anna  believed 
would  pay  the  most  pressing  debts  of  Mexico  &  sup 
port  the  army  until  the  condition  of  the  finances  could 
be  improved  &  enable  the  govt.  to  be  placed  on  a  per 
manent  footing.  Col.  Atacha  said  that  Santa  Anna 
was  surprised  that  the  U.  S.  naval  force  had  been  with 
drawn  from  Vera  Cruz  last  fall,  &  that  Genl.  Taylor's 
army  was  kept  at  Corpus  Christi  instead  of  being  sta 
tioned  on  the  Del  Norte  &  that  the  U.  S.  would  never 
be  able  to  treat  with  Mexico  without  the  presence  of  an 
imposing  force  by  land  and  sea,  &  this  Col.  Atacha 
added  was  his  own  opinion.  Col.  Atacha  did  not  say 
that  he  was  sent  by  Santa.  Anna  to  hold  this  conver 
sation  with  me.  He  said  that  he  had  told  Santa  Anna 
he  had  seen  me  in  June  &  that  he  would  see  me  again, 
as  soon  as  he  reached  Washington.  Col.  Atacha  re 
quested  that  this  conversation  should  be  considered  as 
confidential."  1 

At  the  cabinet  meeting  the  next  day  Polk  related  the 
substance  of  Atecha's  conversation.  "Different  mem 
bers  .  .  .  expressed  opinions  concerning  it.  The 
idea  of  sending  a  confidential  agent  to  confer  with 
Santa  Anna  was  mentioned.  Mr.  Walker  was  inclined 
to  favor  it  &  Mr.  Buchanan  was  decidedly  opposed  to 
it.  I  remarked  that  if  such  an  agent  were  to  be  sent 
Gen.  C.  P.  Van  Ness,  former  minister  to  Spain,  would 

1  Folk's  Diary,  February  13,  1846. 


OUTBREAK   OF   THE    MEXICAN    WAR  29! 

be  the  best  selection  in  the  country.  I  stated  that  I 
did  not  propose  to  send  such  a  messenger  but  had 
merely  suggested  it,  in  view  of  the  information  given 
me  ...  by  Col.  Atacha.  The  subject  after  a 
short  conversation  was  dropped." :  Santa  Anna's 
emissary  had  made  enough  of  an  impression  upon  the 
President  for  Polk  to  cast  about  for  a  suitable  person  to 
meet  Santa  Anna.  Atecha  did  not  let  the  matter  rest, 
but,  once  having  the  ear  of  the  President,  returned  at 
the  earliest  opportunity  for  a  further  conference.  The 
diary  records:  "He  repeated  that  Gen.  Santa  Anna 
was  in  favor  of  a  treaty  between  Mexico  and  the  U. 
States,  by  which  the  former  should  for  a  pecuniary 
consideration  cede  to  the  U.  States  all  the  country 
east  of  the  Del  Norte  and  north  of  the  Colorado  of 
the  West,  &  had  named  thirty  millions  of  dollars  as 
a  sum  that  would  be  satisfactory.  I  then  remarked 
that  Mexico  must  satisfy  the  claims  of  American  citi 
zens,  &  that  if  the  Government  of  Mexico  had  any 
proposition  to  make,  such  as  was  suggested,  it  would 
be  considered  when  made,  to  which  Col.  Atacfia  said 
that  no  government  in  Mexico  dared  to  make  such  a 
proposition,  for  if  they  did  so,  there  would  be  another 
revolution  by  which  they  would  be  overthrown.  He 
said  they  must  appear  to  be  forced  to  agree  to  such 
a  proposition.  He  went  on  to  give  his  own  opinion 
and  as  he  said  that  of  Gen.  Santa  Anna  that  the  U. 
States  should  take  strong  measures  before  any  settle 
ment  could  be  effected.  He  said  an  army  should  be 
marched  at  once  from  Corpus  Christi  to  the  Del  Norte 
&  a  strong  naval  force  assembled  at  Vera  Cruz,  that 

''Ibid.,  February  14,   1846. 


2Q2  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

our  minister  should  withdraw  from  Jalapa  &  go  on 
board  one  of  our  ships  at  Vera  Cruz  &  in  that  position 
should  demand  the  payment  of  amount  due  our  citi 
zens  ;  that  it  was  well  known  the  Mexican  Government 
was  unable  to  pay  in  money  &  that  when  they  saw  a 
strong  naval  force  ready  to  strike  on  their  coasts  and 
border,  they  would,  he  had  no  doubt,  feel  their  danger 
&  agree  to  the  boundary  suggested.  He  said  that 
Paredes,  Almonte  &  Genl.  Santa  Anna  were  all  will 
ing  for  such  an  arrangement,  but  that  they  dare  not 
make  it,  until  it  was  made  apparent  to  the  Archbishop 
of  Mexico  &  the  people  generally  that  it  was  necessary 
to  save  their  country  from  war  with  the  U.  States.  He 
said  the  last  words  which  Genl.  Santa  Anna  said  to 
him,  when  he  was  leaving  Havana,  a  month  ago,  was 
'When  you  see  the  President,  tell  him  to  take  strong 
measures,  &  such  a  treaty  can  be  made  &  I  will  sus 
tain  it/  Col.  Atacha  said  the  Government  of  Mexico 
was  indebted  to  the  Archbishop  half  a  million  of  dol 
lars,  &  he  would  be  reconciled,  by  an  assurance  by  the 
Mexican  Government  that  he  should  be  paid,  when 
this  consideration  should  be  paid  by  the  U.  States. 
He  said  Paredes  and  Almonte  were  both  in  favor 
of  such  a  settlement  if  they  dare  make  it,  and  that 
Genl.  Santa  Anna  concurring  with  them  would  sup 
port  them  in  it.  He  said  (Genl.  Santa  Anna)  that  the 
state  of  things  would  be  in  such  a  condition  that  he 
would  return  to  Mexico  in  April  or  May,  &  would 
probably  go  into  power  again,  but  that  he  &  Paredes 
must  have  money  to  sustain  themselves.  He  said  that 
with  half  a  million  in  hand  they  could  make  the  Treaty 
&  sustain  themselves  for  a  few  months  &  until  the 
balance  was  paid.  ...  He  (Col.  A)  intimated  an 


OUTBREAK    OF   THE    MEXICAN    WAR  293 

intention  to  return  to  Havana  &  as  I  inferred  a  desire 
to  bear  to  Gen.  S.  A.  the  views  of  the  Govt.  here.  To 
this  intimation  I  gave  no  reply.  My  object  in  the  con 
versation  being  to  obtain  information  but  not  to  dis 
close  my  own  views.  Col.  A.  is  [a]  person  to  who  [m] 
I  would  not  give  my  confidence.  He  is  evidently  a 
man  of  talents  and  education  but  his  whole  manner 
of  conversation  impressed  me  with  a  belief  that  he 
would  betray  any  confidence  reposed  in  him  when  it 
was  his  interest  to  do  so.  I  therefore  heard  all  he  said 
but  communicated  nothing  to  him."  ' 

In  all  this  there  is  no  intimation  that  Polk  con 
sidered  it  reprehensible  to  hold  conferences  with  an 
agent  of  Santa  Anna,  an  exile  from  Mexico,  who  was 
plotting  to  regain  power  and  to  that  end  desired  the 
assistance  of  the  United  States.  Atecha's  proposition 
was  that  Polk  should  assist  Santa  Anna  back  into 
Mexico  upon  the  understanding  that  the  dismember 
ment  of  Mexico  would  follow.  Had  Polk  done  no 
thing  more  than  listen  to  Atecha's  suggestions^ 
these  entries  in  the  diary  would  not  be  of  more  than 
passing  interest.  The  confidential  communications, 
however,  became  the  basis  for  Folk's  actions. 

In  the  cabinet  at  its  next  meeting  Polk  again  re 
ferred  to  Atecha's  communications.  The  President 
told  the  cabinet  that  new  instructions  should  be  given 
Slidell ;  that  he  should  press  for  an  immediate  decision 
from  Paredes  as  to  his  reception ;  and  that  in  case  he 
were  definitely  refused  he  should  go  upon  one  of  the 
United  States  vessels  of  war  off  Vera  Cruz  and  from 
it  demand  the  immediate  payment  of  the  claims  against 

'Ibid.,  February   16,   1846. 


294  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYIv^R   AND   POIyK 

Mexico.  In  case  no  answer  was  made  to  Slidell's 
demand,  the  President  would  send  a  message  to  Con 
gress  "calling  on  that  body  to  cause  another  demand 
to  be  made  by  Mr.  Slidell  from  on  board  a  vessel  of 
war  on  the  Mexican  Government  to  pay  our  demands 
and  if  this  was  refused  by  Mexico  to  confer  authority 
on  the  Executive  to  take  redress  into  our  own  hands 
by  aggressive  measures." ' 

Folk's  plan  did  not  have  the  unanimous  approval  of 
his  cabinet.  Buchanan,  always  timid,  opposed  it. 
Walker,  Marcy,  and  Bancroft  coincided  with  Polk. 
Johnson,  the  postmaster-general,  inclined  to  side  with 
Buchanan  but  was  willing  "to  acquiesce."  Polk  notes 
that  Buchanan  was  "in  a  bad  mood,"  but  finally, 
though  not  with  good  grace,  agreed  to  prepare  Slidell's 
new  instructions  as  the  President  desired.5  Under 
more  recent  information  from  Vera  Cruz  Polk  delayed 
the  letter  to  Slidell  until  March  12,  when  Slidell  was 
ordered  to  get  a  final  answer  from  Paredes  as  to  his 
reception.  A  part  of  these  instructions  was  printed 
under  a  call  from  the  Senate.  A  part  of  them  was 
omitted.  In  this  suppressed  part  Slidell  was  told,  be 
fore  finally  closing  his  mission,  to  sound  Paredes  on 
the  subject  of  the  financial  necessities  of  his  govern 
ment.  "It  would  be  easy  for  you  to  make  known  to 
him  in  some  discreet  manner  that  the  United  States 
were  both  able  and  willing  to  relieve  his  administration 
from  pecuniary  embarrassment,  if  he  would  do  us 
justice  and  settle  the  question  of  boundary  between 
the  two  republics.  A  treaty  for  this  purpose,  under 
your  instructions,  if  ratified  by  Mexico  and  trans- 

4  Ibid.,  February  17,   1846. 
6  Ibid.,  February  17,   1846. 


OUTBREAK   OF   THE    MEXICAN    WAR  2Q5 

mitted  to  the  United  States,  could  be  returned  in  a 
brief  space  with  the  ratification  of  the  President  and 
Senate.  In  the  meantime  Paredes  could  command 
immediately  funds  on  such  an  assurance." ' 

As  has  been  seen,  by  the  time  Slidell  received  this 
communication  he  had  left  for  the  United  States. 
No  further  overtures  were  made  to  Paredes.  Polk 
had  Santa  Anna  in  his  mind  and  based  his  hopes  upon 
that  exile's  return  to  power. 

From  now  on  Polk  proceeded  to  act  upon  his  de 
cision  to  call  upon  Congress  to  take  aggressive  action 
toward  Mexico  upon  the  assumption  that  Slidell's  mis 
sion  was  a  failure.  He  took  certain  members  of  the 
House  and  Senate  into  his  confidence  and  asked  them 
to  support  an  appropriation  of  a  million  dollars  to  be 
placed  in  his  hands  "to  be  used  in  exacting  an  adjust 
ment  of  our  differences  with  Mexico."  Calhoun  was 
willing  to  grant  all  the  money  needed  for  obtaining 
the  cession  of  Mexican  territory,  but  he  opposed  an 
"appropriation  in  advance  as  it  would  become  public 
and  embarrass  the  Oregon  negotiation."  T  From  Slidell 
came  finally  (April  7)  the  news  that  Paredes  would 
not  receive  him.  Polk  told  the  cabinet  that  he  would 
make  a  communication  to  Congress  asking  "for  legis 
lative  measures  &  take  the  remedy  into  our  own  hands." 
With  this  idea  all  the  cabinet  agreed.8  The  message 
Polk  decided  to  delay  until  Slidell  had  returned  to 
Washington,  but  he  was  so  eager  for  action  that,  upon 

'Buchanan  to  Slidell,  March  12,  1846;  partly  printed  in 
S.  Ex.  Doc.  337,  29  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  54.  MS.,  Archives.  Curtis's 
Buchanan,  I.,  596. 

'Folk's   Diary,   March  30,   1846. 

*  Ibid.,  April  7,  1846. 


296  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLSR   AND   POLK 

Calhoun's  remonstrance  that  nothing  be  done  until  the 
Oregon  question  was  settled,  he  replied  that  he  would 
proceed  against  Mexico  during  the  present  session  of 
Congress  whether  the  Oregon  difficulty  was  settled 
or  not.9  On  the  twenty-eighth  of  April  the  notice  as 
to  Oregon,  passed  by  Congress,  was  signed.  The  cabi 
net  decided  that  it  was  time  to  act  toward  Mexico.10 
Soon  afterwards  Slidell  arrived  in  Washington.  He 
told  Polk  that  "but  one  course  towards  Mexico  was 
left  to  the  United  States,  and  that  was  to  take  the 
redress  of  the  wrongs  and  injuries  which  we  had  so 
long  borne  from  Mexico  into  our  OWTL  hands  and  act 
with  promptness  and  energy.  In  this  I  agreed  with 
him  and  told  him  it  was  only  a  matter  of  time 
when  I  would  make  a  communication  to  Congress  upon 
that  subject  and  that  I  had  made  up  my  mind  to  do 
so  very  soon."  ] 

On  May  9  the  cabinet  agreed  that  if  the  Mexi 
cans  at  Matamoros  committed  any  act  of  hostility 
against  Taylor  war  should  follow,  with  a  message  to 
Congress.  Polk  said  he  had  no  neiv  advices,  but  that 
we  had  ample  cause  for  war ;  that  things  could  not 
remain  in  statu  quo  nor  would  he  remain  silent  much 
longer.  He  then  stated  that  he  expected  to  make  his 
communication  to  Congress  by  the  following  Tuesday, 
May  12.  He  asked  the  cabinet  if  he  should  then  de 
clare  war.  All  said  yes  except  Bancroft,  who  stated 
that  he  would  "feel  better  satisfied  in  his  course  if  the 
Mexican  forces  had,  or  should,  commit  any  act  of 
hostility."  Thus  in  a  cabinet  meeting,  confessing  that 

9  Ibid.,  April  18,  1846. 
™  Ibid.,  April  28,  1846. 
11  Ibid.,  May  8,   1846. 


OUTBREAK   OF   THE    MEXICAN    WAR  297 

no  new  advices  had  been  received  from  Taylor,  and 
acknowledging  that  the  Mexicans  had  not  committed 
any  aggression  against  the  American  forces,  Polk  and 
his  cabinet  agreed  to  ask  Congress  to  declare  war 
against  Mexico.  Not  only  this,  but  the  date  was  set 
for  the  delivery  of  the  war  message." 

By  one  of  those  strange  happenings  that  result  in 
the  concealment  of  man's  real  motives,  on  the  very 
.night  following  the  meeting  of  the  cabinet  at  which 
Polk  had  named  a  date  for  the  sending  of  his  war 
message  came  the  news  of  the  passage  of  the  Rio 
Grande  by  the  Mexicans  and  of  the  killing  of  Taylor's 
troops.  The  next  day  Polk  spent  in  preparing  his 
message.  Circumstances  now  permitted  this  to  be 
drafted  in  accordance  with  the  wishes  that  Bancroft 
had  expressed.  That  day  was  Sunday,  May  10.  Folk's 
entry  in  his  diary  is  as  follows :  "At  10^2  o'clock  I 
retired  to  rest.  It  was  a  day  of  great  anxiety  to  me, 
and  I  regretted  the  necessity  which  had  existed,  to 
make  it  necessary  for  me  to  spend  the  Sabbath  in  the 
manner  I  have."  ] 

"War  exists  by  the  act  of  Mexico,"  Polk  told  Con 
gress  May  n,  1846.  Had  the  news  from  Taylor  not 
been  received  when  it  was,  Congress  might  have  been 
informed  that  on  account  of  the  refusal  of  Paredes  to 
receive  Slidell,  who  had  gone  to  make  settlement  of  the 
claims  of  American  citizens,  the  patience  of  the  United 
States  was  exhausted;  and  that  the  honor  and  self- 
respect  of  the  United  States  could  no  longer  permit 
Mexico  to  delay  payment  of  righteous  and  long  delayed 
claims.  Whether  Congress,  which  followed  Polk  in 

"Ibid.,  May  9,   1846. 
"Ibid.,  May  10,  1846. 


2Q8  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

declaring  that  war  existed  by  the  act  of  Mexico,  would 
have  sustained  the  President  in  a  war  that  from  the 
outset  would  admittedly  have  been  one  of  aggression, 
it  is  impossible  to  state.  Taylor's  skirmish  with  the 
Mexicans  was  an  occurrence  that  saved  Polk  from 
a  dangerous  situation. 

In  all  this  Polk  did  not  lose  sight  of  Santa  Anna. 
The  reports  of  Slidell,  Conner,  and  finally  of  Atecha 
were  not  forgotten.  Two  days  after  the  war  message, 
Bancroft  sent  this  order  to  Conner,  commanding  the 
naval  forces  before  Vera  Cruz.  "Private  and  confi 
dential.  If  Santa  Anna  endeavors  to  enter  the  Mexi 
can  ports,  you  will  allow  him  to  pass  freely."  Atecha 
had  said  that  Santa  Anna  would  attempt  to  return  to 
Mexico  in  April  or  May.  The  date  of  Bancroft's 
order  gives  the  impression  that  Polk  believed  Atecha's 
prediction  would  be  verified.  Polk  was  premature  in 
this.  Paredes  was  still  in  control  of  the  government. 
A  month  later  Polk  sent  Commander  Alexander  Slidell 
Mackenzie  to  Havana  with  a  copy  of  Bancroft's  order. 
What  Mackenzie  was  ordered  to  do  further  than  to 
get  into  communication  with  Santa  Anna  and  to  sound 
him  as  to  his  attitude  cannot  be  ascertained  from  the 
records  of  the  navy  department.14 

Among  the  Bancroft-Polk  papers  in  the  Lenox  Li 
brary,  New  York,  are  copies  of  these  reports  made  by 
Mackenzie  to  Buchanan.  The  following  is  the  fullest 

14  MS.,  Records,  Navy  Department.  Copy  of  Conner's  order 
placed  in  Mackenzie's  hand  June  4,  1846.  Mackenzie  to  Ban 
croft,  June  (July)  7,  1846  (received  July  22),  says  he  arrived 
at  Havana  June  5,  and  has  attended  to  the  matters  for  which 
he  was  instructed.  Buchanan's  overture  for  peace  was  dated 
July  27.  Schouler,  IV.,  536;  Benton,  II.,  681.  See  also  des 
patches  of  Consul  Campbell  at  Havana.  MS.,  Archives. 


OUTBREAK   OF  THE    MEXICAN    WAR  299 

and  is  included  here  in  exienso  because  it  is  believed 
not  to  have  been  published  hitherto.  No  apology  is 
offered  for  the  insertion  of  so  long  a  document,  for 
it  is  a  necessary  link  in  the  chain  of  events  in  which 
Polk  and  Santa  Anna  played  so  important  a  part." 

"Havana  7  June  1846 
"Sir. 

"I  have  the  honour  to  state  that  I  arrived  here  on 
the  evening  of  the  5.  July,  and  early  on  the  6.  saw 
the  U.  S.  Consul,  and  delivered  to  him  your  letter. 
Mr.  Campbell  readily  and  cordially  complied  with  your 
request  to  assist  me  in  the  business  with  which  I  was 
charged.  He  immediately  conducted  me  for  the  pur 
pose  of  introduction  to  General  Santa  Anna's  house. 
General  Santa  had  given  orders  not  to  be  disturbed. 
I  left  my  card,  writing  on  it  that  I  bore  a  message  from 
the  President  of  the  United  States  and  would  return 
at  8  P.  M.  I  did  so,  and  was  courteously  received, 
I  had  only  read  to  him  your  letter  to  the  Consul, 
stating  that  I  possessed  the  confidence  of  the  Presi 
dent,  and  the  copy  of  the  order  which  had  been  given 
by  Commodore  Connor  to  allow  him  to  pass,  and  added 
a  few  words  of  the  President's  message,  when  he  told 
me  that  he  had  visitors  in  the  adjoining  room,  but 
would  be  glad  to  see  me  at  7  the  following  morning, 
when  he  would  talk  with  more  freedom. 

"I.  waited  upon  him  accordingly  this  morning  and 
remained  with  him  three  hours.  I  began  by  reading  to 
him  a  paper  which  I  prepared  on  the  evening  of  the 

"These  copies  are  dated  June  (July)  7  and  July  n,  1846. 
Santa  Anna  in  his  autobiography  says  nothing  about  Mac 
kenzie's  visit. 


3OO  DIPLOMACY   UND£R   TYI^R  AND   POLK 

day  on  which  I  received  the  President's  instructions, 
and  subsequently  submitted  to  Mr.  Slidell  who  was 
present,  to  be  verified  by  his  recollections.  The  fol 
lowing  is  a  copy  of  the  paper  thus  translated  to  him : 

"  'The  United  States  having  taken  up  arms  to  re 
sist  the  attack  of  the  intrusive  Military  Government 
of  General  Paredes  in  Mexico,  are  determined  to 
prosecute  the  war  with  vigour,  until  full  redress  is  ob 
tained  for  the  wrongs  which  their  citizens  have  re 
ceived  from  Mexico  through  a  long  series  of  years. 

"  'Still  the  President  of  the  United  States  is  desir 
ous,  as  he  stated  in  his  message  to  Congress,  recom 
mending  the  recognition  of  the  existence  of  the  war 
thus  begun  by  Mexico  not  only  to  terminate  hostilities 
speedily,  but  to  bring  all  matters  in  dispute  between 
his  government  and  Mexico,  to  an  early  and  amicable 
adjustment. 

"  'To  attain  this  object  the  President  would  hail  with 
pleasure  the  over-throw  of  the  existing  military  des 
potism  of  General  Paredes,  which  has  sprung  into 
power  by  cherishing  hostility  among  his  countrymen 
against  the  United  States,  and  which  has  no  hope  for 
support  but  in  the  prolongation  of  the  war;  to  be  re 
placed  by  a  government  more  in  harmony  with  the 
wishes  and  true  interests  of  the  Mexican  people,  which 
cannot  be  allowed  by  a  prolongation  of  the  war;  a 
government  sufficiently  enlightened  and  sufficiently 
strong  to  do  justice  to  foreign  nations  and  to  Mexico 
herself. 

"  'Believing  that  General  Santa  Ana  best  unites  the 
high  qualifications  necessary  to  establish  such  a  gov 
ernment,  and  that  as  a  well-wisher  of  his  country  he 
cannot  desire  the  prolongation  of  a  disastrous  war,  the 


OUTBREAK   OF   THE    MEXICAN    WAR  3OI 

President  of  the  United  States  would  see  with  pleasure 
his  restoration  to  power  in  Mexico.  In  order  to  pro 
mote  as  far  as  he  is  able  such  a  result,  he  has  already 
given  orders  to  the  squadron  blockading  the  Mexican 
ports,  to  allow  General  Santa  freely  to  return  to  his 
country. 

"  'The  President  of  the  United  States  will  agree  to 
no  armistice  with  General  Paredes,  until  he  himself 
proposes  to  treat  of  peace,  and  gives  satisfactory  guar 
antees  of  his  sincerity.  With  General  Santa  \na,  should 
he  return  to  power  in  Mexico,  the  President  would 
consent  to  the  suspension  of  active  hostilities  by  land, 
still  maintaining  the  blockade  of  the  mexican  coasts, 
on  either  ocean,  provided  General  Santa  Ana  announces 
his  readiness  to  treat.  In  that  event  an  American 
Minister,  clothed  with  full  powers,  will  be  at  hand  to 
proceed  at  once  to  Mexico,  and  offer  General  Santa 
Ana  terms  for  the  settlement  of  every  existing  difficulty 
between  the  two  countries. 

"  'These  terms  will  be  liberal ;  measured  less  by  the 
power  of  the  United  States,  by  the  comparative  weak 
ness  of  Mexico  in  existing  circumstances,  by  the  rights 
which  conquest  and  the  usage  of  nations  might  justify, 
than  by  a  sense  of  their  own  magnanimity.  As  at 
present  advised  the  President  might  demand  no  in 
demnification  for  the  expenses  of  the  war.  Having 
obtained  full  recognition  of  the  claims  due  for  spolia 
tions  on  his  aggrieved  countrymen — ,  he  would  be 
prompted  to  pay  liberally  for  the  establishment  of 
such  a  permanent  geographical  boundary  between  the 
two  countries  as  would  effectually  tend  to  the  con 
solidation  of  both. 


3O2  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYI^R  AND   POLK 

"  Tortions  of  the  northern  territory  of  Mexico  con 
sist  of  unappropriated  lands,  or  of  tracts  thinly  peo 
pled;  partly  peopled  already  by  natives  of  the  United 
States.  These  portions  of  her  territory,  probably  at 
this  moment  in  the  military  possession  of  the  United 
States,  Mexico  in  the  adjustment  of  such  a  treaty  will 
be  invited  to  cede  for  an  ample  consideration  in  ready 
money,  which  will  serve  to  restore  her  finances,  con 
solidate  her  government  and  institutions,  and  building 
up  her  power  and  prosperity,  tend  to  protect  her 
against  further  encroachments,  and  secure  her  that 
station  among  the  republics  of  the  new  world,  which 
the  President  of  the  United  States  desires  to  see  her 
occupy;  and  which  he  believes  will  alike  contribute  to 
the  greatness  and  happiness  of  Mexico,  and  of  the 
United  States. 

'  'Such  objects  being  happily  obtained,  the  animosi 
ties  between  the  two  countries  being  buried  with  the 
conflict  in  which  they  have  been  engaged,  the  President 
would  hope  to  see  a  beneficial  intercourse  of  friendship 
and  commerce  grow  up  between  them,  to  be  perpetu 
ally  augmented  with  the  lapse  of  years ;  and  with  no 
other  rivalry  between  them — ,  than  that  of  a  noble 
competition  in  the  cause  of  civilization,  and  in  doing 
honor  to  their  common  name  of  Republics/ 

"General  Santa  Ana  received  the  message  of  the 
President  with  evident  satisfaction,  and  expressed  his 
thanks  for  the  order  that  had  been  given  with  regard 
to  the  Gulf  Squadron's  permitting  him  to  return  to 
Mexico.  He  spoke  with  deep  interest  of  his  interview 
with  General  Jackson  in  Washington,  and  of  the  man 
ner  in  which  that  venerable  man  had  himself  raised  in 
the  bed  of  sickness  on  which  he  was  extended,  to  greet 


OUTBREAK    OF   THE    MEXICAN    WAR  303 

with  cordiality  a  brother  soldier  in  distress ;  and  seemed 
duly  to  estimate  the  high  and  noble  qualities  which  dis 
tinguished  him.  He  spoke  also  of  the  kindness  he  had 
received  from  Mr.  Forsyth  and  of  the  favorable  im 
pression  that  gentleman  had  made  on  him.  He  re 
marked  that  if  he  was  disappointed  in  his  hopes  of  re 
turning  to  his  country;  if  monarchy  should  be  estab 
lished  there,  or  if  it  should  remain  a  prey  to  anarchy, 
he  intended  to  settle  permanently  in  Texas,  and  be 
coming  a  citizen  of  the  United  States,  share  with  his 
children  the  destinies  of  our  country.  He  dwelt  with 
apparent  frankness  on  his  regrets  for  the  errors  of 
his  past  administration  of  the  affairs  of  his  country, 
and  on  his  intentions  should  he  be  again  restored  to 
power  to  govern  in  the  interests  of  the  masses,  instead 
of  parties,  and  classes.  Among  the  measures  of  re 
form  which  he  contemplated  was  reducing  the  wealth 
and  power  of  the  clergy,  and  the  establishment  of  free 
trade.  He  showed  me  a  letter  which  he  had  just  re 
ceived  from  an  influential  friend  in  the  City  of  Mexico, 
urging  his  speedy  return,  and  giving  a  lamentable  pic 
ture  of  the  conflict  of  parties  in  his  unhappy  country. 
In  the  course  of  our  conversation  as  to  the  nature  of 
the  boundary  we  would  require,  he  spoke  of  the 
Nueces,  as  having  always  been  the  boundary  of  Texas, 
and  enumerated  the  various  states,  portions  of  which 
lay  to  the  north  of  the  Rio  Bravo.  I  told  him  that 
neither  the  President  nor  the  people  of  the  United 
States  would  ever  consent  to  any  line  north  of  the  Rio 
Bravo,  which  was  a  large  river,  indicated  by  nature 
as  a  suitable  boundary  between  two  great  states ;  that 
I  was  unacquainted  with  the  precise  views  of  the 
President,  further  than  they  might  be  in  conformity 
with  the  general  sentiment  of  the  country,  as  to  the 


304  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

extent  of  the  cession  Mexico  would  be  required  to 
make.  That  the  popular  sentiment  would  look  for  a 
line,  which,  starting  from  a  given  point  on  the  Rio 
Bravo,  would  run  due  west  to  the  Pacific  along  a 
parallel  of  latitude,  so  as  at  least  to  take  in  the  port  of 
San  Francisco  in  California.  That  in  general  terms 
we  should  retain  what  would  be  deemed  sufficient  to 
give  us  a  permanent  boundary,  from  what  we  had 
already  conquered ;  but  that  in  doing  so  we  would  not 
avail  ourselves,  like  other  great  nations,  of  the  rights 
of  conquest,  but  from  a  sense  of  magnanimity,  and  for 
our  own  satisfaction,  as  well  as  to  conciliate  the 
friendship  of  Mexico,  we  would  pay  liberally  for  what 
ever  we  might  retain.  In  reply  to  an  enquiry  I  made 
of  him,  he  informed  me  that  no  commissions  for  pri 
vateers  had  been  issued  by  the  Mexican  Government, 
of  whose  movements  his  correspondence  kept  him  fully 
informed.  Such  a  measure  of  annoyance  had  been 
considered  by  the  existing  government,  but  it  had  been 
deemed  impracticable. 

"Subsequently  to  or  during  the  continuance  of  this 
conversation  in  part,  he  drew  up  the  following  note 
of  what  he  desired  to  communicate  in  reply  to  the 
President.  This  I  copied  at  his  request  and  read  over 
to  him  to  see  that  it  corresponded  word  for  word  with 
the  original,  which  he  then  destroyed. 

"  'Senor  Santa  Ana  says :  that  he  deplores  the  situa 
tion  of  his  country :  that  being  in  power,  he  would 
not  hesitate  to  make  concessions  rather  than  to  see 
Mexico  ruled  by  a  foreign  prince,  which  the  monarch 
ists  are  endeavoring  to  introduce  ('Elevar/  rather 
'raise  up')  ;  that  being  restored  his  country,  he  would 
enter  into  negotiations  to  arrange  a  peace  bv  means  of 
a  treaty  of  limits ;  that  he  especially  prefers  a  friendly 


OUTBREAK    OF   THE    MEXICAN    WAR  305 

arrangement  to  the  ravages  of  war  which  must  be 
calamitous  for  his  country:  that  although  the  repub 
licans  of  Mexico  labour  to  recall  him  and  place  him 
at  the  head  of  the  government,  they  are  opposed  by 
the  monarchists,  headed  by  Paredes  and  Bravo:  That 
he  desires  that  republican  principles  should  triumph  in 
Mexico,  and  that  an  entirely  liberal  constitution  should 
be  established  there;  and  this  is  now  his  programe: 
That  if  the  government  of  the  United  States  shall  pro 
mote  his  patriotic  desires,  he  offers  to  respond  with 
such  a  peace  as  has  been  described.  He  desires  that 
the  mediation  of  England  and  France  may  not  be  ac 
cepted ;  and  that  every  effort  should  be  directed  to 
wards  promoting  his  return  to  power  in  Mexico,  by 
protecting  the  Republican  party.  To  attain  this  object 
he  considers  it  necessary  that  General  Taylor's  army 
should  advance  to  the  city  of  Saltillo,  which  is  a  good 
military  position,18  compelling  General  Paredes  to  fight 
as  he  considers  his  overthrow  easy :  "  and  this  being 
effected  General  Taylor  may  advance  to  San  Louis 
Potosi,  which  movement  will  compell  Mexicans  of  all 
parties  to  recall  Santa  Ana. 

8  "On  asking  him  at  this  point  if  Monterey  was  a  good 
Military  position  he  said  it  was  not."  (Mackenzie's  note.) 

7  "He  remarked  to  me  at  this  point :  'Que  Taylor  le  fes- 
tija  bien !'  literally,  'let  Taylor  feast  or  entertain  him  well' — 
meaning  'follow  him  up,'  'keep  him  going.'  He  added  that 
Paredes  was  not  brave.  I  told  him  that  the  opinion  concern 
ing  Paredes  in  the  U.  S.  was  that  he  was  weak-minded  and 
wrong  headed,  but  impetuous  and  brave.  He  said  that  in 
a  battle  which  he  named,  but  which  I  have  forgotten,  Paredes 
being  his  aid-de-camp  hid  himself  in  a  thicket,  from  which 
he  had  drawn  him  with  reproaches.  I  know  not  how  far 
allowance  should  be  made  for  personal  hatred  in  receiving 
this  statement,  though  the  words  were  given,  and  the  scene 
described  with  particularity."  (Mackenzie's  note.) 


306  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

"  'General  Santa  Ana  also  desires  that  the  greatest 
secrecy  be  observed  concerning  these  communications, 
and  that  they  be  only  communicated  by  the  bearer  as 
far  as  may  be  necessary,  since  his  countrymen  not 
appreciating  his  benevolent  intentions  to  free  them 
from  war  and  other  evils  might  form  a  doubtful 
opinion  of  his  patriotism.  That  all  the  American 
cruisers  should  be  directed  under  the  strictest  injunc 
tions  of  secrecy  not  to  impede  his  return  to  Mexico. 
He  likewise  enjoins  that  the  people  of  the  towns  occu 
pied  by  the  American  army  should  not  be  maltreated, 
lest  their  hatred  should  be  excited.18  He  considers  it 
important  to  attack  Ulloa,  and  judges  that  it  would 
be  best  first  to  take  the  city,  whose  walls  are  not  strong : 
the  disembarkation  of  three  or  four  thousand  men 
would  effect  it  easily.19  He  considers  important  the 
occupation  of  Tampico,  and  wonders  that  it  has  not 
been  effected,  since  it  might  be  so  easily  done.  The 
climate  is  healthy  in  October  and  continues  so  until 
March.  Finally  he  desires  that  his  good  repute  may 
be  protected  by  the  newspapers  of  the  United  States, 
and  that  they  represent  him  as  the  Mexican  who  best 
understands  the  interests  of  his  country,  and  as  the 
republican  who  will  never  compromise  with  the  mon 
archists,  nor  ever  be  in  favor  of  foreign  and  European 
intervention.  He  says  that  it  will  be  well  not  to  block 
ade  the  ports  of  Yuchatan,  as  he  counts  upon  that 

8  "I  told  him  that  it  might  be  in  harmony  with  our  political 
sentiments  to  protect  the  republican  party,  but  opposed  to  our 
national  character  to  oppress  any  one.  I  told  him  what  had 
been  and  would  continue  to  be,  the  conduct  of  our  army." 
(Mackenzie's  note.) 

19  "At  my  request  he  named  October  as  the  proper  month  for 
this  service,  and  the  beach,  without  cannon-shot,  as  the  proper 
place  of  disembarkation."  (Mackenzie's  note.) 


OUTBREAK  OF  THE:  MEXICAN  WAR  307 

state,  being  in  communication  with  its  authorities ;  and 
perhaps  he  will  transfer  himself  to  that  point,  if  cir 
cumstances  prove  favourable/ 

"The  military  suggestions  contained  in  General  Santa 
Ana's  note  seemed  to  me  of  so  much  importance  that 
in  order  to  save  time,  so  valuable  in  war,  I  suggested  to 
him  the  propriety  of  their  being  at  once  communicated 
to  General  Taylor,  to  be  used  by  him,  if  he  should 
deem  them  important,  within  the  limits  of  his  orders 
and  discretionary  power.  He  asked  if  General  Taylor 
was  reserved  and  incommunicative.  I  replied  that  all 
I  knew  of  him  was  in  common  with  the  public,  from 
his  recent  acts,  and  the  written  reports  in  which  he 
had  made  them  known  to  the  government,  which 
proved  him  not  only  to  possess  the  highest  qualities 
of  a  commander,  but  to  be  a  man  of  prudence,  modera 
tion  and  reserve.  He  admitted  that  his  reports  strongly 
conveyed  this  impression,  and  thought  favourably  of 
my  proposition  to  proceed  at  once  to  the  head  quarters 
of  our  army.  This  though  not  contemplated  by  my 
instructions  I  have  determined  to  do. 

"If  I  have  made  a  mistake  and  exaggerated  the  im 
portance  of  this  information,  I  hope  that  an  excuse 
may  be  found  in  my  motive,  which  was  by  any  means 
in  my  power  to  render  service  to  my  country. 

"I  have  the  honor  to  be  very  respectfully, 
"your  most  obedient 

"Alex.  Slidell  Mackenzie. 

"Hon.  James*  Buchanan 
"Secretary  of  State, 
"Washington."  " 

20"Rec'd  Aug.  3." 


308  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

Early  in  August  Santa  Anna  passed  the  American 
blockade  and  landed  at  Vera  Cruz.  That  city  received 
him  as  a  hero,  and  he  proceeded  to  the  capital  as  the 
savior  of  the  nation.  By  the  middle  of  August  he  was 
in  command  of  the  Mexican  forces  and  president  ad 
interim  of  the  Mexican  Republic.  Hardly  had  he  ar 
rived  at  the  City  of  Mexico  when  Buchanan's  note  was 
submitted  to  him,  suggesting  that  peace  negotiations 
be  forthwith  begun.21  The  offer  was  declined.22  Santa 
Anna  as  a  military  chieftain  was  not  Santa  Anna  in 
exile.  Buchanan's  answer  to  the  refusal  was  that 
henceforth  the  war  would  be  prosecuted  with  vigor 
until  Mexico  offered  to  make  terms.23 


21  Buchanan    to    the   Mexican    Minister   of    Foreign    Affairs, 
July  27,  1846 ;  Cong.  Globe,  Appendix,  29  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  24. 

22  The   Mexican   Minister   of  Foreign   Affairs   to   Buchanan, 
August  31,  1846,  ibid. 

23  Buchanan    to   the    Mexican    Minister   of    Foreign    Affairs, 
September  26,   1846;  ibid. 


CHAPTER  XIII 
THE:  TREATY  OF  GUADALUPE  HIDALGO,  1848 

From  September,  1846,  when  Mexico  was  notified 
that  hostilities  would  not  be  interrupted  until  she 
offered  to  make  peace,  the  war  was  waged  in  earnest. 
It  appeared  no  longer  to  be  a  little  war.  Scott  took 
command  of  the  army,  and  the  storm-center  shifted 
from  the  northern  provinces  to  Vera  Cruz.  And  yet 
Mexico  gave  no  sign  of  a  desire  for  peace.  Polk  there 
fore  was  again  compelled  to  make  overtures  for  settle 
ment,  and  this  time  by  offering  a  specific  proposition. 
In  January  Buchanan  wrote  to  the  Mexican  minister 
of  foreign  affairs  that  although  making  "a  renewed 
overture  for  peace"  might  "be  regarded  by  the  world 
as  too  great  a  concession  to  Mexico,  yet  he"  was  "will 
ing  to  subject  himself  to  this  reproach."  If  Mexico 
so  agreed  he  would  send  commissioners  either  to 
Havana  or  Jalapa  clothed  with  full  powers  to  con 
clude  a  treaty  of  peace  and  given  authority  to  suspend 
hostilities  and  raise  blockades  as^soon  as  the  Mexican 
commissioners  met  them.1  The  Mexican  answer  was 
in  spirit  like  its  predecessors :  Mexico  would  appoint 
commissioners  as  suggested,  but  not  until  the  block 
ades  were  raised  and  all  the  territory  of  the  Mexican 
Republic  was  evacuated  by  the  invading  army.2  Such  an 
answer  was  tantamount  to  a  refusal,  and  so  Polk  con 
sidered  it.  When,  in  the  middle  of  April,  news  of  the 

1  Buchanan    to    the    Mexican    Minister    of    Foreign    Affairs, 
January  18,  1847;  5.  Ex.  Doc.  I,  30  Cong.,  I  Scss.,  36. 
a  Monasterio1  to  Buchanan,  February  22,  1847;  ibid.,  37- 


3IO  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYL^R   AND   POLK 

fall  of  Vera  Cruz  reached  Washington,  it  was  thought 
that  Santa  Anna  could  no  longer  refuse  to  negotiate, 
for  the  American  arms  were  everywhere  victorious, 
and  Scott's  army  was  on  the  march  toward  the  capital. 
Now  was  the  time,  in  Polk's  strange  phrase,  to 
"conquer  a  peace."  Buchanan  informed  Mexico  that 
the  offer  to  negotiate  would  not  be  renewed  (strong 
language  until  the  context  is  heard)  until  the  Presi 
dent  had  reason  to  believe  that  it  would  be  accepted 
by  the  Mexican  government.  "The  President  . 
devoted  ...  to  honorable  peace,"  so  wrote  Bu 
chanan  to  the  Mexican  minister  of  foreign  affairs,3  "is 
determined  that  the  evils  of  the  war  shall  not  be  pro 
tracted  one  day  longer  than  shall  be  rendered  abso 
lutely  necessary  by  the  Mexican  republic.  For  the 
purpose  of  carrying  this  determination  into  effect  with 
the  least  possible  delay,  he  will  forthwith  send  to  the 
head-quarters  of  the  army  in  Mexico,  Nicholas  P.  Trist, 
esq.,  the  officer  next  in  rank  to  the  undersigned  in  our 
department  of  foreign  affairs,  as  a  commissioner,  in 
vested  with  full  powers  to  conclude  a  definite  treaty 
of  peace  with  the  United  Mexican  States."  Thus  did 
Polk  act  upon  a  plan  for  negotiation  by  an  agent  not 
confirmed  by  the  Senate,  a  method  quite  without  pre 
cedent  or  parallel.  The  appointment  of  public  com 
missioners  might  only  subject  the  United  States  to  the 
indignity  of  another  refusal  and  give  the  Mexicans  en 
couragement  in  their  opinion  concerning  the  Presi 
dent's  motives  for  desiring  the  termination  of  the  war. 
Influenced  by  these  considerations,  he  hit  upon  the 

3  Buchanan  to  the  Mexican  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
April  15,  1847;  ibid.,  38-39.  Also  in  Raphael  Semmes,  Service 
Afloat  and  Ashore  during  the  Mexican  War,  303-6. 


THE   TREATY    OF    GUADALUPE    HIDALGO  3!  I 

plan  of  sending  "to  the  head-quarters  of  the  army  a 
confidential  agent,  fully  acquainted  with  the  views  of 
this  government,  and  clothed  with  full  powers  to  con 
clude  a  treaty  of  peace  with  the  Mexican  government, 
should  it  be  so  inclined."  He  would  be  enabled  in  that 
case  "to  take  advantage,  at  the  propitious  moment,  of 
any  favorable  circumstances  which  might  dispose  that 
government  to  peace."  '  In  the  selection  of  this  agent 
the  President  again  proceeded  upon  altogether  un 
usual  lines.  General  Scott  is  authority  for  the  state 
ment  that  Polk  wanted  Silas  Wright  to  undertake  the 
mission,  intimating  that  Scott  would  be  Wright's  asso 
ciate.5  This  was  surely  a  strange  selection,  for  Wright 
was  a  wrell-known  advocate  of  the  Wilmot  Proviso, 
and  Scott  was  personally  obnoxious  to  the  President. 
"Scott,"  said  Polk,  "is  utterly  unqualified  for  such  a 
business." '  No  man  of  national  prominence  could  be 
expected  to  assume  the  role  of  a  confidential  agent  to 
accompany  the  army  and  jump  at  a. propitious  moment 
to  conclude  a  treaty.  The  chief  clerk  of  Buchanan's 
department,  personally  little  known  to  the  President, 
was  selected  for  the  mission,  a  man  with  but  meager 
training  in  diplomatic  affairs,  anything  but  robust  in 
health,  irritable,  suspicious,  and  timid,  and,  moreover, 
given  to  great  verbosity  of  statement. 

Nicholas  Philip  Trist  was  a  Virginian  by  birth  and 
was  for  a  time  a  cadet  at  West  Point.  He  did  not 
graduate,  however,  but  began  the  study  of  law  under 
Jefferson,  whose  granddaughter  he  had  married.  At 

4  Buchanan  to  Trist,  April  15,  1847 ;  S.  Ex.  Doc.  52,  30  Cong., 
i  Sess.,  81. 

5  Scott's  Autobiography,  II.,  576. 
'Folk's    Diary,   July    15,    1847. 


312  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER  AND   POLK 

twenty-eight  he  was  a  clerk  in  the  treasury  depart 
ment  when  Jackson  selected  him  as  his  private  secre 
tary.  After  a  short  service  in  that  capacity  he  was 
consul  at  Havana  for  eight  years,  whence  he  was  re 
called  on  the  ground  that  he  had  aided  the  slave-trade.7 
Soon  after  the  beginning  of  Folk's  administration  he 
was  made  chief  clerk  of  the  state  department,  and  dur 
ing  his  service  there  he  appeared  as  a  hard-working 
administrative  officer  in  the  department  presided  over 
by  the  somewhat  timid  Buchanan  and  really  directed  by 
the  energetic  Polk.  The  chief  clerk  gave  evidence  of 
uncompromising  loyalty  to  the  President  and  thorough 
sympathy  with  his  plans.  His  selection  for  this  deli 
cate  mission  was  probably  due  not  so  much  to  Folk's 
overestimation  of  Trist's  diplomatic  abilities  as  to  an 
underestimate  of  the  difficulties  of  the  undertaking. 
It  had  appeared  a  simple  thing  to  send  Slidell  to 
Mexico  as  the  representative  of  a  strong  power  to 
strike  a  bargain,  through  claims  and  a  bonus,  for  the 
cession  of  New  Mexico  and  California — how  could  so 
"feeble  and  distracted  a  nation  as  Mexico"  refuse  a 
liberal  cash  offer?  The  answer  to  that  question  had 
been  wrar.  Now  that  Congress  had  placed  three  mil 
lions  of  dollars  in  Folk's  hands  for  the  "speedy  and 
honorable  conclusion  of  the  war,"  the  President  seemed 
to  think  that  to  negotiate  a  peace  treaty  upon  terms 
dictated  by  himself  was  a  mere  clerical  act  for  an 
agent  accompanying  a  victorious  army. 

7Trist  was  commissioned  consul  at  Havana  April  24,  1833. 
Tyler  ordered  his  recall  June  22,  1841.  There  is  a  mass  of 
correspondence  connecting  Trist  with  aiding  the  slave-trade 
attached  to  a  complaint  from  Fox  to  Forsyth,  February  12, 
1840;  MS.,  Notes  from  British  Legation  to  the  Department 
of  State. 


THE  TREATY   OF   GUADALUPE   HIDALGO  313 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  oral  instructions  that 
Trist  received  from  the  President,  the  official  letter 
from  Buchanan  gave  him  small  discretionary  powers. 
Trist  was  handed  a  pro  jet  of  a  treaty,  and  with  it  the 
statement  that  the  extension  of  the  boundaries  of  the 
United  States  over  New  Mexico  and  Upper  California 
was  to  be  considered  a  sine  qua  non  of  any  treaty. 
What  Buchanan  had  authorized  Slidell  to  do  before 
the  war  began  was  now,  thanks  to  the  victorious  ad 
vance  of  the  army,  made  an  ultimatum.  Trist  was 
.authorized  to  pay  in  addition  to  the  claims  not  more 
than  twenty  millions  for  the  cession  of  New  Mexico  and 
Upper  California,  and  not  more  than  five  millions  ad 
ditional  for  Lower  California,  while  the  right  of  tran 
sit  and  passage  over  Tehuantepec  was  held  to  be  worth 
another  five  millions,  the  consideration  to  be  paid  in 
annual  instalments  of  three  millions  each.  In  any 
event  the  southwestern  boundary  was,  of  course,  to 
be  the  Rio  Grande.  WThat  Slidell  had  been  authorized 
to  offer  twenty-five  millions  for,  Trist  was  instructed  to 
secure  for  twenty.  The  provisions  as  to  Lower  Califor 
nia  and  the  right  of  transit  over  Tehuantepec  were  new, 
no  mention  of  them  having  been  made  when  Slidell 
was  sent  upon  his  mission.  The  pro  jet  accompanying 
Trist's  instructions  contained  eleven  articles  covering 
the  points  just  referred  to.  The  third  article  provided 
that  as  soon  as  the  treaty  was  ratified  by  Mexico  the 
military  and  naval  commanders  of  both  sides  should 
be  informed  of  the  action  as  quickly  as  possible,  after 
which  an  immediate  suspension  of  hostilities  should 
take  place.  Such  was  the  expression  of  Folk's  idea 
of  ''conquering  a  peace."  Pending  the  negotiations 
of  peace  the  United  States  was  not  to  bind  itself  to 


314  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYI^R  AND   POLK 

discontinue  offensive  operations  against  Mexico;  hos 
tilities  were  not  to  cease  until  Mexico  had  actually 
ratified  the  peace  treaty  upon  our  own  terms.8 

The  confidential  agent  and  commissioner  left  the 
capital  for  Mexico,  and  soon  Buchanan  began  to  re 
ceive  Trist's  long  and  tediously  circumstantial  com 
munications.  From  New  Orleans  he  wrote  a  dozen 
pages  minutely  describing  his  trip  and  the  dangers  of 
the  journey  from  Mobile  thither.  Arrived  at  Vera 
Cruz,  May  6,  he  quickly  despatched  two  more  reports, 
filled  with  his  views  upon  the  officers  of  the  army  and 
things  in  general.  Illness  seems  to  have  held  him  for 
a  while,  as  his  next  letter  is  from  Jalapa,  dated  two 
weeks  later.  By  this  time  he  was  involved  in  a  high- 
tempered  and  wordy  epistolary  quarrel  with  the  com 
manding  general.  Trist  had  been  directed  by  Bu 
chanan  to  communicate  his  instructions  in  confidence 
to  Scott  and  to  deliver  to  him  Buchanan's  letter  for 
transmission  to  the  Mexican  minister  of  foreign  affairs. 
Instead  of  waiving  formalities  and  putting  himself  on 
friendly  and  confidential  terms  with  Scott,  Trist  imme 
diately  on  his  arrival  at  Vera  Cruz  sent  the  American 
commander  a  note  inclosing  the  letter  from  Buchanan, 
sealed,  and  with  it  orders  from  Marcy.  Scott  was  ever 
suspicious  of  the  administration  at  Washington,  and 
now  he  opened  the  vials  of  his  wrath  upon  the  com 
missioner.  He  was  ordered  by  the  secretary  of  war 
to  yield  to  Trist  the  right  to  decide  upon  the  suspension 
of  military  operations.  It  is  doubtful  if  a  more  astound 
ing  order  was  ever  sent  to  a  commanding  officer  in  the 
field,  and  Scott  replied  to  Trist  that  the  secretary  of 

8  Buchanan's  projet,  S.  Ex.  Doc.  52,  30  Cong.,  I  Sess.,  85-89. 


THE   TREATY   OF   GUADALUPE   HIDALGO  315 

war  proposed  to  degrade  him  by  requiring  that  he,  as 
commander  of  the  army,  should  defer  to  the  chief  clerk 
of  the  department  of  state  the  question  of  continuing 
or  discontinuing  hostilities.9  Consequently  Scott  re 
turned  the  sealed  letter  from  the  department  of  state 
and,  as  a  purely  military  question,  declined  to  obey  the 
order  of  the  secretary  of  war,  unless  Trist  was  clothed 
with  military  rank  over  him.  The  next  month  was 
spent  by  the  commissioner  in  writing  voluminous  letters 
to  Scott,  which  the  latter  answered  in  kind.  Trist 
lectured  the  general  upon  his  lack  of  respect  for  the 
commissioner  sent  by  the  President.  Scott  replied  that 
Trist's  letter  was  such  a  farrago  of  insolence,  conceit, 
and  arrogance  as  to  be  a  choice  specimen  of  diplomatic 
literature  and  manners.  "The  Jacobin  convention  of 
France  never  sent  to  one  of  its  armies  in  the  field  a 
more  amiable  and  accomplished  instrument.  If  you 
were  armed  with  an  ambulatory  guillotine,  you  would 
be  the  personification  of  Danton,  Marat,  and  St.  Just, 
all  in  one."  :  On  June  4  Scott  wrote  to  Marcy,  asking 
to  be  recalled,  owing  to  the  many  "cruel  disappoint 
ments  and  mortifications"  he  had  "been  made  to  feel 
since"  leaving  "Washington,  and  the  total  want  of  sup 
port  and  sympathy  on  the  part  of  the  War  Depart 
ment."  :  The  administration  responded  with  orders 
to  each  to  cease  the  disgraceful  quarrel  and  to  join  in 
carrying  out  the  plans  of  the  government.12 

Much   of  this   quarrel   doubtless  had  its  origin  in 

"Scott  to  Trist,  May  7,  1847;  ibid.,  157-59- 

10  Scott  to  Trist,  May  29,  1847;  ibid.,  172.' 

11  Scott  to  Marcy,  June  4,  1847 ;  ibid.,  129-31. 

12  Marcy  to   Scott,  July   12,    1847;   ibid.,   131.     Buchanan   to 
Trist,  July  13,  1847;  ibid.,  113. 


3l6  DIPLOMACY    UNDER   TYI^R   AND   POLK 

politics.  The  military  history  of  the  Mexican  War  is 
largely  made  up  of  jealousy  and  its  consequent  wran 
gles,  which,  ending  in  arrests  and  courts-martial,  were 
transferred  from  the  field  of  operations  to  Washing 
ton.  "The  truth  is,"  Polk  wrote  in  his  diary,  June  12. 
"I  have  been  compelled  from  the  beginning  to  conduct 
the  war  against  Mexico  through  the  agency  of  two 
generals,  highest  in  rank,  who  have  not  only  no  sym 
pathies  with  the  government,  but  are  hostile  to  my  ad 
ministration.  Both  of  them  have  assumed  to  control 
the  government.  To  this  I  will  not  submit  and  will  as 
certainly  remove  General  Scott  from  the  chief  com 
mand  as  he  shall  refuse  or  delay  to  obey  the  order 
borne  him  by  Mr.  Trist." '  For  some  time,  however, 
as  their  despatches  show,  Trist  and  Scott  continued 
their  unseemly  altercation.  "Between  them,"  the  diary 
says,  "the  orders  of  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  Sec 
retary  of  State  have  been  disregarded  and  the  danger 
has  become  imminent  that  the  golden  moment  for  con 
cluding  a  peace  with  Mexico  may  have  passed."  The 
President  was  for  recalling  both  Scott  and  Trist,  but 
the  cabinet  was  unanimous  in  the  opinion  that  it  would 
be  bad  policy  to  do  so.  Realizing  Trist's  inefficiency, 
Polk  then  suggested  that  Soule  or  Jefferson  Davis  be 
associated  with  him,  but  nothing  came  of  the  sug 
gestion.15 

Writing  from  Puebla,  June  13,  Trist  stated  that  he 
had  had  no  intercourse  with  Scott  for  a  month,  al 
though  he  had  been  near  him  for  more  than  that  time.16 

13  Folk's  Diary,  June  12,  1847. 

14 Ibid.  "Ibid.,  July  9,  1847. 

16  Trist  to  Buchanan,  June  13,  1847;  S.  Ex.  Doc.  52,  30 
Cong.,  i  Scss.,  178-81. 


THE   TREATY   OF   GUADAI,UPE    HIDALGO  317 

His  next  letter,  dated  July  7,  in  which  he  is  supposed 
to  have  given  his  reasons  for  making  peace  with  the 
general,  was  never  received  at  Washington.  Scott 
made  no  report  to  -the  secretary  of  war  from  June  4 
to  July  25.  At  that  time  each  asked  that  the  corre 
spondence  relating  to  the  quarrel  be  suppressed."  What 
caused  the  reconciliation,  as  far  as  their  letters 
show,  must  remain  a  mystery.  During  the  time  in 
which  Trist  and  Scott  were  quarreling,  Trist  asked 
the  British  minister,  Bankhead,  and  Thornton,  the 
British  secretary  of  legation,  to  transmit  to  the  Mexi 
can  authorities  Buchanan's  letter,  which  Scott  had  re 
fused  to  receive.  Bankhead  and  Thornton  readily  ac 
quiesced  in  his  request  and  forwarded  the  letter  to 
Ibarra,  the  acting  minister  of  foreign  affairs.  In  a 
few  days  the  commissioner  received  through  the  same 
channel  of  communication  the  answer  of  the  Mexican 
government.  It  was  that  the  determination  of  the  ques 
tion  of  peace  must  rest  with  the  Mexican  congress." 

So  far  there  was  no  reason  to  believe  the  way  open 
for  negotiations.  Santa  Anna  sent  a  message  to  the 
congress  in  which  he  peremptorily  ordered  it  to  state 
whether  or  not  any  propositions  for  peace  should  be 
listened  to.18  When  the  Mexican  congress  scattered 
and  made  no  answer  to  the  message,  Santa  Anna  in 
formed  Mackintosh,  the  British  consul  at  the  City  of 

17  Scott    to    Marcy,    July   25,    1847 :    "Since    about    the    26th 
ultimo,  our  intercourse  has  been  frequent  and  cordial;  and  I 
have  found  him  [Trist J  able,  discreet,  courteous,  and  amiable." 
Ibid.,  135.    Trist  to  Buchanan,  July  23,  1847:  Scott's  "character 
I  now  believe  that  I  had  entirely  misconceived."    Ibid.,  302. 

18  Ibarra  to  Trist,  June  22,   1847;   MS.,   Archives. 

19  Santa  Anna  to  the  Mexican  Congress,  July   16,   1847 ;  S. 
Ex.  Doc.  52,  30  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  302-5. 


318  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYL£R   AND   POLK 

Mexico,  that  as  he  was  abandoned  by  the  congress,  he 
must,  as  military  chief,  endeavor  to  make  peace.20  His 
secret  agents  then  intimated  to  Trist  that  while  nothing 
could  be  done  without  the  use  of  money,  yet  if  a  mil 
lion  dollars  were  placed  in  his  hands  at  the  conclusion  of 
the  peace  and  ten  thousand  immediately,  commissioners 
would  be  sent  to  meet  the  American  commissioner  and 
negotiations  begun.21  It  was  at  this  juncture  that  Scott 
and  Trist  began  to  be  upon  the  most  friendly  terms, 
and  Trist  was  a  welcome  guest  at  Scott's  headquarters. 
Trist  reported  to  Buchanan,  upon  the  authority  of 
Thornton,  that  Santa  Anna  would  let  Scott  advance 
close  to  the  City  of  Mexico  and  then  negotiate.22  What 
was  not  reported  was  that  Scott  paid  the  ten  thousand 
dollars  of  earnest-money  after  consultation  with  his 
officers.23  The  matter  did  not  come  to  Folk's  attention 
until  December,  when  General  Pillow,  enraged  at  what 
Polk  called  Scott's  persecution  of  that  officer,  wrote 
of  it  to  the  President.24  Scott  reported  the  expenditures 

20  Thornton  to  Trist,  July  29,  1847;  MS.,  copy,  Bureau  of 
Indexes  and  Archives,  Department  of  State. 

21Ripley's  War  with  Mexico,  II.,  148-70.  Folk's  Diary, 
December  18,  1847. 

22  Trist  to  Buchanan,  July  23,  1847 ;  MS.,  Bureau  of  Indexes 
and  Archives,  Department  of  State. 

23Ripley's  War  with  Mexico,  II.,  148-70.  General  Shields, 
however,  told  Polk  that  Trist  was  not  present  at  the  confer 
ence.  Folk's  Diary,  December  28,  1847. 

24  Folk's  Diary,  February  16,  1848 :  "The  chief  clerk  of  the 
War  Department  brought  to  me  today  a  letter  received  from 
Majr.  Genl.  Pillow,  dated  at  the  City  of  Mexico  on  the  i8th. 
of  January  in  answer  to  a  letter  of  the  Secretary  of  War 
addressed  to  him  in  relation  to  certain  proceedings  of  General 
Scott  and  Mr.  Trist  at  Puebla  in  July  last  concerning  an 
attempt  to  use  money  without  any  authority  or  sanction  of  the 
government,  to  bribe  the  authorities  in  Mexico,  to  secure 


THE:  TREATY  OF  GUADAUJPE  HIDALGO         319 

as  those  for  secret  service  and  asserted  that  he  had 
never  tempted  the  honor  or  patriotism  of  any  man, 
but  held  it  as  lawful  in  morals  as  in  war  to  purchase 
valuable  information  or  services  voluntarily  tendered 
him.25  "General  Scott's  answer  is  evasive,"  is  the 
entry  in  the  diary,  "and  leaves  the  irresistible  inference 
that  such  a  transaction  took  place  and  that  it  will  not 
bear  the  light."  :  Writing  to  Buchanan,  July  23,  Trist 
copied  a  letter  received  by  him  from  an  unnamed 
source.  Trist's  correspondent,  in  whom  undoubtedly 
the  commissioner  placed  great  confidence,  wrote: 
"Santa  Anna  is  afraid  to  make  peace  now  and  cannot. 
M—  2T  can  do  nothing  with  him,  even  with  the  aid 
he  possesses  from  you.  S.  A.  now  says  secretly  that 
he  shall  allow  your  army  to  approach  this  city 
[Mexico],  even  as  far  as  the  Penon,  and  then 
endeavour  to  make  peace." :  The  advance  of  the 
army,  however,  was  by  no  means  unobstructed.  The 
decisive  victory  at  Contreras,  followed  by  that  at 
Churubusco,  opened  the  way  to  the  capital.  Instead 
of  pushing  on  to  clinch  the  former  victories,  as  the 

peace.  This  letter  discloses  some  astounding  facts  in  rela 
tion  to  that  infamous  transaction  and  must  lead  to  a  further 
investigation."  In  the  letters-received  book  of  the  war  de 
partment  is  the  following  entry  under  date  of  March  31,  1848: 
"Pillow,  Maj.  Genl.  G.  J.,  Mexico,  Jany.  18,  1848.  In  answer 
to  letter  of  Sec.  War,  Dec.  24,  1847,  and  relates  to  negotia 
tions  carried  on  at  Puebla  in  July  and  Aug.  47."  The  letter 
referred  to  cannot  be  found  in  the  war  department.  See 
Tyler's  Tylers,  III.,  172. 

^Scott  to  Marcy,  February  6,  1848;  H.  Ex.  Doc.  60,  30 
Cong.,  i  Sess.,  1085.  There  is  some  discrepancy  in  the  date. 

28  Folk's  Diary,  February   19,   1848. 

27  Mackintosh  ? 

28  Trist   to   Buchanan,   July  23,    1847,    P.    S.,  July  25;    MS., 
Bureau  of  Indexes  and  Archives,  Despatches,  Mexico,  Vol.  14. 


32O  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYLER   AND   POLK 

rules  of  military  science  would  seem  to  have  dictated 
Scott  halted  his  army  and  proposed  an  armistice.  Was 
this  done,  as  Scott  said,  lest  the  elements  of  peace 
might  be  scattered,  or  was  it  with  the  expectation  that 
Santa  Anna,  with  a  part  of  the  consideration  cash  in 
hand,  would  carry  out  the  balance  of  the  bargain? 
Through  the  good  offices  of  Thornton,  who  with  Bank- 
head  and  Mackintosh  played  a  large  part  in  all  these 
negotiations,  the  armistice  became  effective  August  24. 
Santa  Anna  appointed  as  commissioners  four  well- 
known  peace  men  to  meet  the  American  commissioner. 
The  opportunity  for  which  Trist  had  been  waiting 
since  May  was  now  presented.  Santa  Anna's  com 
missioners  met  him  as  agreed.  No  further  evidence 
of  Trist's  utter  incapacity  is  needed  than  his  own 
account  of  the  conferences.  Two  days  before  the  first 
meeting  he  made  known  to  Santa  Anna  that  in  order 
to  secure  the  boundary  defined  in  his  projet,  with  the 
right  of  transit  over  the  isthmus,  he  was  authorized 
and  willing  to  go  as  high  as  the  highest  sum  named 
in  his  instructions.  This  amount,  he  said,  might  be 
paid  in  such  a  way  as  to  enable  Santa  Anna  to  convert 
all  of  it  into  cash  as  soon  as  the  treaty  was  ratified.29 
Such  an  unfortunate  admission  had  the  result  he  might 
have  expected.  Santa  Anna's  commissioners  submitted 
a  counter-pro  jet  conceding  nothing  but  Upper  Cali 
fornia  north  of  the  thirty-seventh  parallel,  for  which 
the  United  States  was  expected  to  assume  the  claims 
and  pay  a  bonus.30  The  Mexican  commissioners  in 
sisted  on  the  Nueces  as  a  boundary,  declaring  that  if 

29  Trist  to   Buchanan,    September  4,    1847;    MS.,   Bureau   of 
Indexes  and  Archives,  Department  of  State. 

30  S.  E.v.  Doc.  52,  jo  Cong.,  i  Scss.,  339. 


THE  TREATY   OF   GUADALUPE   HIDALGO  32! 

peace  were  made  the  line  must  be  at  that  river.  Trist 
hesitated  and  then  offered  to  refer  the  question  to 
Washington,  thereby  proposing  to  extend  the  armis 
tice  for  at  least  forty-five  days.31  No  more  flagrant 
disobedience  of  orders  was  ever  committed.  The  war 
had  been  begun  and  waged  upon  the  theory  that  the 
Rio  Grande  was  the  ancient  boundary  of  Texas.  What 
persuaded  Trist  to  submit  the  matter  for  further  in 
structions  is  incomprehensible.  He  himself  explained 
it  by  saying  that  the  Mexican  commissioners  led  him 
to  believe  that  a  part  of  New  Mexico  would  be  ceded 
if  the  Nueces  were  accepted  as  a  boundary.  There  was 
no  reasonable  foundation  in  fact,  however,  for  any 
such  belief,  for  Mexico  demanded  Trist's  decision 
within  three  days  upon  the  counter-pro  jet,  by  the  terms 
of  which  New  Mexico  was  to  remain  a  Mexican  pro 
vince.  Before  that  short  time  had  elapsed  Santa 
Anna's  violations  of  the  armistice  became  so  notorious 
that  Scott  gave  notice  of  its  termination.  The  Ameri 
can  army  moved  toward  the  capital  and  entered  it  only 
after  two  of  the  bloodiest  battles  of  the  war.  Santa 
Anna's  army  was  scattered  and  without  a  leader.  Not 
withstanding  all  this,  Trist  was  blind  to  Santa  Anna's 
duplicity.  As  late  as  September  27  he  wrote  that  he 
was  perfectly  convinced  of  Santa  Anna's  sincere  de 
sire  for  peace,  but  that  peace  was  an  impossibility  upon 
the  terms  of  Buchanan's  instructions.82  The  armistice 
was  a  strategic  blunder,  giving  Santa  Anna  oppor 
tunity  to  mass  his  forces  for  the  defense  of  the  capital, 
and  the  heavy  losses  suffered  by  Scott's  army  at  Molino 

31  The  Mexican  Commissioners  to  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Relations,  September  7,   1847;  ibid.,  344-46- 
"Trist  to  Buchanan,  September  27,  1847;  ibid.,  201. 


322  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYI^R   AND   POLK 

del  Rey  were  the  price  paid  for  it.  The  overtures  for 
peace  displayed  the  gullibility  of  Trist,  whose  per 
sistent  belief  that  Santa  Anna  once  bought  would  stay 
bought  led  him  to  ignore  his  instructions  and  to  dis 
obey  Folk's  most  positive  orders. 

Before  Trist's  reports  of  his  inglorious  conferences 
reached  Washington,  Polk  had  read  the  Mexican  ac 
counts  of  the  affair  sent  from  Vera  Cruz.  The  Presi 
dent  at  once  ordered  Trist's  recall.  "Mr.  Trist  is  re 
called,"  says  the  diary,  "because  his  remaining  longer 
with  the  army  could  not  probably  accomplish  the  ob 
jects  of  his  mission,  and  because  his  remaining  longer 
might  and  probably  would  impress  the  Mexican  gov 
ernment  with  the  belief  that  the  United  States  are  so 
anxious  for  peace,  that  they  would  ultimate  [ly]  con 
clude  one  upon  Mexican  terms.  Mexico  must  now  sue 
for  peace  and  when  she  does,  we  will  hear  her  propo 
sition."  j  Trist's  actions  had  surely  merited  his  recall, 
but  Folk's  policy  of  continually  making  overtures, 
first  by  a  series  of  notes  suggesting  peace  and  finally 
by  sending  a  commissioner,  gave  Mexico  exactly  the 
belief  that  Polk  attributed  to  Trist's  blundering  ef 
forts  alone.  The  policy  was  ill-advised  and  its  instru 
ment  incompetent. 

The  occupation  of  the  City  of  Mexico,  September  14, 
completely  changed  the  complexion  of  affairs.  Two 
days  later  Santa  Anna  resigned  the  presidency,  and 
by  so  doing  removed  the  one  great  obstacle  to  peace. 
Within  a  week  after  Santa  Anna's  abdication  plans 
were  well  under  way  for  the  reorganization  of  the 
government  under  the  auspices  of  well-known 

83  Folk's  Diary,  October  5,  1847.  Trist's  despatch  of  Sep 
tember  4  was  received  October  21. 


THE:  TREATY  OF  GUADALUPE;  HIDALGO         323 

moderados.  Before  it  had  been  accomplished  Trist 
again  asked  the  Mexican  commissioners  to  meet  him. 
A  month  elapsed  before  he  had  an  answer,  and  he 
asked  Buchanan  for  permission  to  return  home,  as 
the  weakness  of  the  new  government  might  keep  him 
"hanging  here  for  an  indefinite  period"  without  accom 
plishing  anything.34  Buchanan's  letter  of  recall  reached 
Trist  November  16  Trist  acknowledged  it,  waived 
for  the  moment  any  defense  of  his  actions,  and  stated 
that  he  would  start  home  at  once.  Following  hard 
upon  the  receipt  of  his  recall  Trist  received  word,  again 
through  Thornton,  that  the  new  Mexican  administra 
tion  had  appointed  commissioners.35  He  replied,  No 
vember  24,  that,  as  he  was  about  to  return  to  the 
United  States,  whatever  overtures  Mexico  desired  to 
make  would  be  forwarded  through  Scott  to  Washing 
ton.36  Despite  this  statement  and  notwithstanding  his 
orders  to  return,  he  began  immediately  to  negotiate 
with  the  Mexican  commissioners  upon  the  basis  of  his 
original  instructions.  The  reasons  for  this  change  in 
plans  are  set  forth  in  a  letter  of  sixty  pages  written 
December  6.87  This  letter  was  certainly  of  a  character 
to  arouse  the  President's  indignation.  The  diary  de 
scribes  it  as  "impudent,  arrogant,  very  insulting  to  the 
government  and  personally  offensive  to  the  President." 
The  writer  of  it  was  "destitute  of  honor  or  principle 
and  contemptibly  base."  "It  is  manifest  to  me,"  wrote 

34  Trist  to  Buchanan,  October  31,  1847;  S.  Ex.  Doc.  52,  30 
Cong.,  i  Scss.,  213. 

35  Thornton  to  Trist,  November  22,  1847,  and  to  Pena  y  Pefia, 
November  24,  1847;  ibid.,  231. 

38  Trist  to  Pefia  y  Pefia,  November  24,  1847;  ibid. 
37  Trist  to   Buchanan,   December  6,   1847    (received  January 
15,  1848)  ;  ibid.,  231-66. 


324  DIPLOMACY   UNDER   TYI^R   AND   POLK 

Polk,  "that  he  has  become  the  tool  of  General  Scott 
and  his  menial  instrument  and  that  the  paper  was 
written  at  Scott's  instance  and  direction.  I  directed 
the  Secretary  of  War  to  write  to  Major  General  But-* 
ler  [who  had  superseded  Scott] ,  directing  him,  if  Mr. 
Trist  was  still  with  the  headquarters  of  the  army,  to 
order  him  off  and  to  inform  the  authorities  of  Mexico 
that  he  had  no  authority  to  treat."  :  Scott,  writing  at 
the  same  time,  said :  "No  proposition  has  been  made  to 
me,  looking  to  a  peace,  by  the  federal  government  of 
this  republic,  or  its  commissioners;  the  latter  under 
stood  to  be  still  in  this  city.  I  have  not  seen  them."  ! 

This  long  despatch  of  Trist's  doubtless  justified 
Folk's  suspicion  that  Scott  instigated  it.  While  Trist 
said  that  the  government  would  be  left  at  liberty  to 
disavow  his  act,  he  set  forth  his  reasons  for  reopening 
negotiations  as:  (i)  that  peace  was  still  the  desire  of 
the  President;  (2)  that  unless  he  seized  the  oppor 
tunity  offered,  no  other  chance  for  peace  would  re 
main;  (3)  that  the  boundaries  stipulated  in  his  instruc 
tions  were  as  much  as  Mexico  would  ever  yield;  and 
(4)  that  his  recall  was  based  upon  a  supposed  state 
of  facts  the  reverse  of  the  truth.  Underlying  all  of 
his  arguments  in  support  of  these  reasons  is  the  thinly 
disguised  innuendo  that  the  President  had  changed 
his  plans  and  now  favored  the  annexation  of  -all 
Mexico.  In  other  words,  Trist  proceeded  to  make  a 
treaty  embodying  Polk's  original  idea  of  territorial 
indemnity  with  the  express  intention  of  throwing  upon 
the  President  the  unpleasant  alternative  of  either  ac- 

88  Polk's  Diary,  January   15,   1848. 

39  Scott  to  Marcy,  December  4,  1847;  H.  Ex.  Doc.  60,  30 
Cong.,  i  Sess.,  1033-35. 


TH£  TREATY   OF   GUADALUPE    HIDALGO  325 

cepting  the  treaty  or  rejecting  it.  If  Polk  rejected  it, 
he  must  bear  the  odium  of  seeking  to  annihilate  Mexico 
as  a  nation  and  of  renewing  a  war  which  was  now  un 
popular.  If  he  accepted  it,  he  would  then,  according 
to  Trist's  belief,  sacrifice  his  cherished  wish,  the  con 
quest  of  the  whole  of  Mexico.  Such  is  the  import  of 
this  unique  despatch.  Trist's  assumption  that  Polk 
desired  the  absorption  of  all  Mexico  has  been  proved 
to  be  baseless.40  Reasonably  enough,  the  President  felt 
that  the  amount  of  money  to  be  paid  Mexico  for  the 
cession  should  be  less  than  would  have  been  the  case 
had  the  war  ceased  seven  months  before.  Pillow  was 
in  favor  of  greater  territorial  indemnity  and  claimed 
while  in  Mexico  to  be  the  President's  mouthpiece. 
Trist  shared  Scott's  hatred  of  that  officer,  and  the 
parts  of  the  despatch  not  directly  or  by  inference  at 
tacking  Polk  are  filled  with  venom  against  Pillow. 

Before  Butler  had  an  opportunity  to  carry  out 
Polk's  order,  Trist  had  signed  the  treaty  and  sent  it  on 
its  way  to  Washington.  There  are  no  detailed  accounts 
of  the  conferences  of  which  the  treaty  was  the  result. 
We  know  that  for  two  months  Trist  met  the  commis 
sioners  daily,  that  the  original  pro  jet  was  taken  as  a 
basis  for  the  negotiation,  and  that  there  was  apparently 
little  difficulty  in  agreeing  upon  boundaries.  The  ques 
tion  of  claims  and  of  the  condition  of  the  inhabitants 
of  the  ceded  territory  occupied  most  of  the  meetings. 
The  result  was  in  hand  February  2,  1848,  when  Trist 
met  the  Mexican  commissioners  to  sign  the  treaty  at 
Guadalupe  Hidalgo,  "a  spot,"  said  Trist,  "which, 

40  "The  United  States  and  Mexico,  1847-1848,"  by  Professor 
E.  G.  Bourne,  in  American  Historical  Review,  V.,  491-502, 
April,  1900. 


326  DIPLOMACY    UNDER   TYI^R   AND    POLK 

agreeably  to  the  creed  of  this  country,  is  the  most 
sacred  on  earth,  as  being  the  scene  of  the  miraculous 
appearance  of  the  Virgin,  for  the  purpose  of  declaring 
that  Mexico  was  taken  under  her  special  protection,"  ' 

Seventeen  days  later  Polk  had  in  his  hands  the  grant 
of  territory  that  he  had  hoped  to  obtain  through  the 
peaceful  negotiations  of  Slidell.  The  Rio  Grande  was 
acknowledged  as  the  boundary  of  Texas ;  New  Mexico 
and  Upper  California  were  ours;  and  the  sum  to  be 
paid  was  that  named  in  Trist's  projet:  the  treaty  in 
cluded  all  of  Folk's  sine  qua  non.  That  the  right  of 
transit  over  Tehuantepec  was  not  included  was  a  small 
matter,  for  the  recent  treaty  with  New  Granada  af 
forded  a  better  route  to  the  Pacific.  Benton's  comment 
upon  the  treaty  was  that  it  was  a  fortunate  event  for 
the  United  States  and  especially  for  Folk's  adminis 
tration.  "The  Congress  elections  were  going  against 
the  administration,  and  the  aspirants  for  the  presidency 
in  the  cabinet  were  struck  with  terror  at  the  view  of 
the  great  military  reputations  which  were  growing 
up." 

Haste  in  acting  upon  the  treaty  was  of  the  utmost 
importance  for  two  reasons :  first,  that  the  treaty  might 
be  returned  to  Mexico  for  ratification  before  the 
Mexican  government  should  be  overthrown;  and  sec 
ond,  that  the  growing  sentiment  for  "all  of  Mexico," 
both  in  the  cabinet  and  out  of  it,  a  sentiment  to  which 
the  President  was  opposed,  might  be  effectually  stifled.43 

**Trist  to  Buchanan,  February  2,  1848;  S.  Ex.  Doc.  52,  30 
Cong.,  i  Sess.,  102. 

^Benton's  Thirty  Years'  Viezv,  II.,  710. 

"Professor  Bourne's  article  as  cited.  The  treaty  arrived' 
in  Washington  February  19;  Polk  decided  to  send  it  to  the 
Senate  for  ratification  February  21.  Folk's  Diary,  February 


THE   TREATY   OF   GUADALUPE)    HIDALGO  327 

Polk  made  up  his  mind  at  once  not  to  reject  the  treaty 
because  of  Trist's  conduct.  His  desire  for  peace  was 
so  great  that  he  did  not  permit  himself  to  be  influenced 
by  his  indignation  at  Trist's  insulting  letters.  He  de 
cided,  after  stating  his  views  to  the  cabinet,  to  send  the 
document  to  the  Senate,  suggesting  certain  amendments, 
and  by  so  doing  to  show  a  "magnanimous  forbear 
ance  toward  Mexico."  Every  member  of  the  Senate 
committee  on  foreign  relations,  with  the  exception  of 
the  chairman,  Sevier,  was  at  first  opposed  to  ratifica 
tion.  The  reason  for  their  attitude,  as  reported  by  the 
chairman  to  Polk,  was  not  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  but 
Trist's  lack  of  authority  to  negotiate.  "I  told  Sevier," 
the  diary  records,  "that  the  treaty  was  the  subject  for 
consideration,  not  Trist's  conduct  and  that  if  the  pro 
visions  of  the  treaty  were  such  as  would  be  accepted, 
it  would  be  worse  than  an  idle  ceremony  to  send  out 
a  grand  commission  to  re-negotiate  the  same  treaty." ' 
The  Senate  committee  reported  the  treaty  without 
amendment  on  the  same  day,  and  after  two  weeks'  dis 
cussion  the  Senate  first  amended  and  then  ratified  it 
by  a  vote  of  thirty-eight  to  fourteen.  The  most  im 
portant  of  the  amendments  was  made  at  the  suggestion 
of  the  President,  and  by  it  the  tenth  article,  relating  to 
the  disposition  of  the  public  lands  in  Texas,  was 
stricken  out.  An  additional  secret  article,  delaying  for 

21,  1848.  Calhoun  wrote  to  Clemson,  March  7,  1848:  "The 
greatest  danger  is  that  the  [Mexican]  Government  may  not 
hold  together  until  the  treaty  is  exchanged.  Nothing  but  the 
countenance  of  our  Government  and  the  support  of  capitalists 
interested  in  preserving  it,  can  continue  it  in  existence.  It  is, 
indeed,  but  the  shadow  of  a  Government."  Report  of  Ameri 
can  Historical  Association,  1899,  II.,  746. 
44  Folk's  Diary,  February  28,  1848. 


328  DIPLOMACY   UNDER  TYL^R   AND   POLK 

eight  months  the  time  of  Mexico's  ratification,  was  for 
obvious  reasons  omitted  by  a  unanimous  vote.  Sevier 
and  Clifford,  the  latter  Folk's  attorney-general,  were 
appointed  commissioners  in  accordance  with  the  pro 
vision  of  the  treaty  permitting  the  exchange  of  ratifica 
tions  at  the  City  of  Mexico.  As  their  duties  were 
merely  the  gaining  of  Mexico's  consent  to  the  Senate's 
amendments,  and  the  hastening  of  final  ratification, 
their  task  was  light.  As  soon  as  it  was  known  that 
the  Senate  was  modifying  the  terms  of  the  agreement 
as  signed,  the  Mexican  government  ceased  all  efforts 
for  ratification  until  the  nature  of  the  amendments  was 
known.  A  few  days  after  the  arrival  of  Sevier  and 
Clifford  at  Mexico  with  the  amended  treaty  the  Mexi 
can  congress  agreed  to  ratification  by  practically  a 
unanimous  vote. 

There  was  no  glory  in  all  this  for  Trist.  Polk  char 
acterized  him  as  an  "impudent  and  unqualified  scoun 
drel."  Upon  his  arrival  at  Washington  the  former 
chief  clerk  of  the  state  department  found  the  doors 
closed  to  him.  He  could  get  the  ear  of  no  one,  and 
after  vainly  trying  for  some  time  to  collect  his  salary 
after  the  date  of  his  recall,  he  left  Washington.  In 
sisting  on  having  a  hearing,  he  addressed  a  long  com 
munication  to  the  speaker  of  the  House  August  7, 
1848,  accusing  the  President  of  high  crimes  and  mis 
demeanors,  including  subornation  of  perjury,  and  sug 
gesting  that  he  be  impeached.45  But  there  was  no 
need  for  stirring  up  the  matter  in  the  hope  of  finding 
political  capital  against  Polk.  The  time  had  gone  by 
for  that.  The  letter  was  received  during  the  last  days 

"Cong.  Globe,  30  Cong.,  i  Sess.,  1057-58. 


THE:  TREATY   OF   GUADALUPE    HIDALGO  329 

of  the  session  and  referred  to  the  committee  on  foreign 
affairs,  and  there  it  slept.  The  war  was  over ;  Folk's 
term  was  drawing  to  a  close ;  and  the  country  was  in 
the  midst  of  a  presidential  campaign.  Trist  was  soon 
forgotten.  The  result  of  the  election  of  1848  was  the 
choice  for  president  of  Taylor,  one  of  the  two  great 
Whig  generals  who  had  reaped  the  political  popularity 
that  Polk  had  coveted.  Scott  was  for  the  time  passed 
by,  and  nobody  had  any  consideration  for  the  assertive 
and  talkative  commissioner  who  had  made  the  treaty 
of  Guadalupe  Hidalgo.  But  the  persistent  Trist  did 
not  despair,  and  twenty-two  years  later  he  secured 
from  Congress  the  reward  for  his  successful  presump 
tion.46  The  feeble  old  man,  who  had  been  one  of  Jef 
ferson's  family  and  afterward  the  friend  of  Jackson, 
was  at  last  secure  in  the  belief  that  he  had  been  vin 
dicated  by  his  government. 

48  Senate  Report,  41  Cong.,  2  Sess. 


INDEX 


Aberdeen,  Lord,  27;  policy  of,  31; 
upon  right  of  visitation  and  search, 
32,  33,  109;  acquiesces  in  Ameri 
can  expansion,  102;  and  Texas, 
124,  129;  and  abolition  in  Texas, 
127;  on  Texan  annexation,  151- 
152;  and  Texan  Diplomatic  Act, 
172;  overture  on  northwestern 
boundary  question,  243;  offers 
line  of  49°,  262. 

Adams,  John  Quincy,  comment  on 
Tyler  and  Webster,  27;  favors 
retention  of  Texas  in  1819,  59; 
attempts  by,  to  regain  Texas,  60; 
comment  upon  Butler,  69,  70,  75; 
comment  upon  Jackson's  attitude 
toward  Texas,  85;  and  right  of 
petition,  89,  90,  93,  114;  address 
on  annexation  of  Texas,  122;  in 
structions  to  Rush  on  northwest 
boundary,  216;  instructions  to 
Gallatin  on  same,  218;  instruc 
tions  to  Middleton  and  Rush  on 
same,  1823,  226-231;  proposition 
for  tripartite  agreement  on  same, 
233,  237-238. 

Alaman,  conference  with  Butler,  71, 
72. 

Almonte,  Gen.  Juan  N.,  minister  to 
the  United  States,  99;  suspends 
relations  with  U.  S.,  188;  leaves 
U.  S.,  268. 

Andrews,  S.  P.,  126. 

Annexation  of  Texas  by  joint  resolu 
tion,  162-189. 

Armistice  between  Mexico  and  Texas, 
122, 

Armistice  between  U.  S.  and  Mexico, 
317-322. 

Aroostook  War,  11. 

Ashburton,  Lady,  40. 

Ashburton,  Alexander  Baring,  Lord, 
27,  39,  42,  43-57,  110. 


Ashburton  Treaty,  28-57,    108-110. 

Astoria,  204,  206-210. 

Atecha,  Col.  Alexander,  288-294. 

Bagot,  210. 

Bankhead,  317. 

Battle  of  the  Maps,  56. 

Bentori,  T.  H.,  44,  56,  326;  plan  for 
Texan  annexation,  184. 

Bocanegra,  J.  M.  de,  97;  minister 
at  Washington,  98-100;  protest 
against  annexation  of  Texas,  157. 

Brougham,  Lord,  interpellation  of, 
upon  Texas,  132. 

Buchanan,  James,  report  of,  on  Maine 
boundary,  56,  138;  secretary  of 
state  under  Polk,  188;  negotia 
tion  with  Pakenham  over  Oregon, 
250-264;  opposition  of,  to  Folk's 
policy,  253;  instructions  to  Slidell, 
274;  instructions  to  Trist,  313. 

Butler,  Anthony,  68-75. 

Butler,  Gen.  W.  O.,  324. 

Calhoun,  John  C.,  90,  112;  and  the 
presidency,  1844,  120;  offered 
state  portfolio  under  Tyler,  138; 
favorable  to  Texan  annexation, 
120;  and  the  tariff,  121;  and  the 
attempted  annexation  of  Texas  by 
treaty,  138-161;  Upshur's  suc 
cessor,  137;  secretary  of  state 
under  Tyler,  141;  reverses  Nel 
son's  position  as  to  Texas,  144; 
signs  Texas  treaty,  148;  corres 
pondence  with  Pakenham  over 
Texas,  150-155;  instructions  to 
Green,  charge"  at  Mexico,  156; 
promise  of  protection  to  Texas, 
170-171;  comment  upon  the  so- 
called  Diplomatic  Act,  173-174; 
position  upon  Oregon  question, 
246-249;  negotiation  with  Paken 
ham  over  Oregon,  246-249; 
dropped  by  Polk,  185. 


332 


INDEX 


"Calhoun  conspiracy,"   119-120,  14*1. 
California,  conquest  of,  48,  326. 
Canning,  George,  proposes  negotiation 

over    northwest    boundary,     239; 

approves     continuation     of    joint 

occupation,  241. 
Caroline  case,  16,  18,  23-25,  55. 
Cass,  Lewis,  on  the  McLeod  case,  19; 

on  the   Quintuple  Treaty,   33-37, 

109. 

Castillo  y  Lanzas,  76. 
Castlereagh  and  Rush,  and  the  north 
west  boundary,  211,  217. 
Childress,  George  C.,  77,  78. 
Churubusco,  319. 
Claims  against  Mexico,  76,  107. 
Clay,     Henry,     22;      instructions     to 

Poinsett,      61-64;       letter      upon 

Texas,  158. 
Clifford,  Nathan,  328. 
Conventional  line  for  northeast  bound 
ary,  14,  45-46. 
Corn  laws,  repeal  of,  263. 
Creole  case,  47-49,  55. 
Davis,  Governor,  43. 
Donelson,  A.  J.,  charg£  to  Texas,  178; 

180-182,  186-188. 
Doyle,  Percy,  activity  of,  on  behalf  of 

Texas,  122. 
Edwards,  Ninian,  60. 
Elliott,  122-123;    reports  to  Houston, 

147;  arranges  armistice,  186-187. 
Ellis,  Powhatan,  75-79,  86,  87,  94-97. 
Escurial,  convention  of  the,  211-216. 
Everett,  Edward,  33,  39,  48,  102,  109, 

111;      reports     upon     Aberdeen's 

policy,  132. 

Expansion  sentiment,  58. 
Extradition,  55. 
Fairfield,  Governor,  41,  42. 
Florida  treaty,  59,  60,  63,  64,  70,  73, 

225. 
Forsyth,  John,  10,  12,  13,  73,  78,  83, 

84,  86,  95. 
Forty-ninth  parallel,  history  of,  193- 

196. 
Fox,  H.  S.,  12,  23-26,  38. 


France  and  Texan  diplomatic  act,  172. 

Gaines,  Gen.  E.  P.,  79. 

Gallatin,  Albert,  9;  negotiation  of 
1818,  218-223;  negotiation  of 
1826-7,  239-241. 

Ghent,  negotiations  at,  201-206. 

Gillespie,  Lieut.  A.  H.,  278-281. 

Gilmer,  Thomas  W.,  letter  of,  119, 
120;  appeal  of  to  Calhoun,  139. 

Gorostiza,  M.  E.  de,  79,  80,  86. 

Goulburn,  218-223. 

Gray,  Captain  Robert,  204. 

Great  Britain  and  Texas,  122;  and 
abolition,  133. 

Green,  Benj.  E.,  156. 

Green,  Duff,  112;  in  England,  124-125; 
report  to  Upshur,  129;  consul  at 
Galveston,  179,  183. 

Greville's  Journals,  quoted,  41. 

Grey,  Lord,  28-29. 

Guadalupe  Hidalgo,  treaty  of,  309- 
329;  signed,  327;  terms  of,  326; 
ratified,  328. 

Guizot,  34-37. 

Hamilton,  Robert,  77,  78. 

Harrison,  W.  H.  H.,  22,  25. 

Hawkesbury,  Lord,  5. 

Harrowby,  Lord,  197,  198. 

Henderson,  Gen.  J.  P.,  81,  82;  at 
Washington,  137,  145. 

Herrera,  189,  284. 

Hernandez,  74. 

Houston,  Sam,  87;  attitude  toward 
Great  Britain,  115-119;  overture 
to  U.  S.,  116;  letter  to  Jackson, 
121;  declines  Upshur's  overture, 
135;  change  in  policy  of,  136; 
requests  protection  from  Murphy, 
136;  double  policy,  146;  upon 
annexation,  160;  policy  after  re 
jection  of  treaty,  160;  enmity 
toward  Jones,  167;  and  Diploma 
tic  Act,  175;  final  message,  181. 

Howard,  Tilghman  A.,  165,  178. 

Hunt,  Memucan,  81-87. 

Ingersoll,  Charles  J.,  138. 


INDEX 


333 


Jackson,  Andrew,  10;  declines  ap 
pointment  as  minister  to  Mexico, 
60;  policy  toward  Mexico  in  1829, 
64;  instructions  to  Poinsett,  67; 
and  Butler,  70-75;  and  Texan 
revolution,  76-79;  and  Texan  an 
nexation,  80-82,  92,  93;  and  claims 
against  Mexico,  84-86;  and  Florida 
treaty,  89. 

Jay,  William,  90. 

Jay's  treaty,  4. 

JeiTerson,  Thomas,  4. 

Joint-cruising  agreement,  53,  54,  109. 

Joint  occupation  of  Oregon  proposed, 
221;  convention  of  1818,  218-223; 
convention  of  1827,  239-242. 

Jones,  Anson,  84,  146;  agrees  to 
armistice,  123;  attitude  toward 
Houston,  167,  175-177;  policy  as 
president  of  Texas,  186. 

Jones,  Commodore  Thomas  Ap  C.,  93, 
99,  103-105. 

Kendall,  George  M.,  94. 

King,  Rufus,  4,  5. 

King-Hawkesbury  negotiation,   192, 
193. 

La  Branche,  Alcde,  79. 

Lamar,  Mirabeau  B.,  83,  87,  93,  94, 
114. 

Larkin,  Thomas  O.,  105,  278-281. 

Legare",  Hugh  S.,  111. 

Livingston,  Edward,  71,  72. 

Livingston,  Robert  R.,  5. 

Louisiana  Treaty  and  northwest 
boundary,  193. 

McDuffie,  George,  142,  153. 

Mackenzie,  Commander  A.  S.,  298- 
308. 

Mackintosh,  317,  319. 

McLeod  case,  16,  19,  22-27,  38. 

Madawaska  settlements,  49. 

Madison,  James,  15. 

Manifest  destiny,  58. 

Martinez,  86. 

Maxcy,  Virgil,  140,  143. 

Melbourne,  Lord,  28,  29. 

Mexican  War,  58.  288-329. 


Mexico  and  Texan  annexation,  156. 
Mexico,  relations  with,  58-88. 
Mexico,  City  of,  occupied  by  Scott, 

322. 
Middleton,     negotiations    of,    at    St. 

Petersburg,  226-237. 
Mitchell's  map,  9. 

Monroe,  James,  6,  59,  60,  61;   negotia 
tion  of,  198-200. 
Monroe  Doctrine,  61,  224-238. 
Monterey,  capture  of,  93,  103-107. 
Morfit,  Henry  M.,  78. 
Murphy,  W.  S.,   116;    and  Houston, 

123;     urges   annexation,    131-132; 

promises  protection  to  Texas,  136; 

rejected  by  the  Senate,  159. 
Nelson,  John,  143. 
Nesselrode,  Count,  235. 
Netherlands,  King  of  the,  9. 
Nootka  Sound  treaty,  211-216. 
Northeastern   boundary   controversy, 

1-16,  38,  41-47,  49-53,  56. 
Northwestern  boundary,  under  treaty 

of  1783,  192;   1803-1818,  190-223; 

1818-1846,  224-242;   1846,  243-264. 
Nueces  Rives,  67,  320. 
Oregon  question,    102,    110,    190-223; 

224-242;    243-264. 
Oregon  treaty,   243-264;    signed  and 

ratified,  263. 
Pakenham,  Richard,  and  Texas,  150- 

155,    245;     and  Oregon,    246-249; 

and  Buchanan,  252,  257. 
Palmerston,  Lord,  12,  15,  17,  26,  28- 

30,  36,  38,  39. 
Paredes,  284. 

Parrott,  W.  S.,  107;   mission  to  Mex 
ico,  269-271. 
Peel,  Sir  Robert,  27,  28,  36,  40;    and 

Oregon,  263. 

Petition,  right  of,  59,  89. 
Pillow,  Gen.  G.  J.,  318. 
Pinkney,     William,     negotiation     of, 

198-200. 
Poinsett,  Joel  R.,  61-70. 


334 


INDEX 


Polk,  James  K.,  58,  159;  election  of, 
176-177;  and  Oregon,  249-264; 
withdraws  offer  of  49°,  252-254; 
policy  toward  England,  254-257; 
message  of  1845,  258;  refuses  to 
arbitrate,  259;  seeks  consent  of 
Senate  in  Oregon  matter,  259,  261; 
sources  for  history  of  administra 
tion  of,  265;  programme  as  Presi 
dent,  267;  plans  war  against 
Mexico,  294-298;  and  Santa  Anna, 
298-308;  overtures  to  Mexico,  309; 
plan  for  conquering  peace,  310. 

Presidential  campaign  of  1844,  157. 

Princeton  disaster,  137,  140,  141. 

Quintuple  treaty,  30,  31,  39,  109. 

Reily,  James,  117. 

Rio  del  Norte,  61,  63,  67,  80,  94,  321, 
326. 

Rives,  resolution  of,  upon  annexa 
tion,  166. 

Rouse's  Point,  46. 

Rush,  Richard,  negotiation  of,  224- 
235;  conversations  with  Castle- 
reagh,  211,  217. 

Russian  ukase  of  1821,  224-225. 

Russo-American  treaty  of  1824,  236. 

Russo-British  treaty  of  1824,  238. 

Saligny,  186,  187. 

Santa  Anna,  72-74,  80,  81,  99,  122; 
overthrown,  184;  probable  suc 
cessor  of  Paredes,  286-287;  granted 
permission  to  reenter  Mexico, 
298;  and  Trist,  317-322;  abdica 
tion  of,  322. 

Santa  F<5  expedition,  93-95,  118. 

Scott,  Gen.  Winfield  S.,  311. 

Sevier,  Ambrose  P.,  328. 

Seward,  William  H.,  25. 

Shannon,  Wilson,  169,  170;  methods 
in  Mexico,  182;  leaves  post,  268. 

Slave-trade,  20-22,  30,  35,  36,  53. 

Slidell,  John,  mission  of,  271-277; 
281-286. 

Smith,  Ashbel,  126. 

Sniveley's  expedition,  118. 

Spain's  claim  to  northwest  coast  in 
1807,  200. 

Sparks,  Jared,  43. 


Stevenson,  Andrew,  19-22,  28,  31. 

Taylor,  Gen.  Zachary,  297. 

Texas,  annexation  of,  58,  60;  made 
a  sectional  question  under  Calhoun, 
137;  negotiation  for,  begun  by 
Tyler,  139;  by  joint  resolution, 
162-189. 

Texas,  commercial  treaty  with,  70, 
87,  88. 

Texas,  negotiations  with  Mexico  con 
cerning,  58-88;  negotiations  for, 
under  Upshur,  114-137;  under 
Calhoun,  138-186. 

Thompson,  Waddy,  87,  100,  106,  107. 

Thornton,  Edward,  317,  323. 

Treaty  of  annexation  with  Texas,  114- 
161;  doubt  as  to  ratification,  146; 
terms  of,  148,  150;  vote  upon,  158, 
159. 

Treaty  of  1819,  59,  60,  63,  64,  70,  73. 

Treaty  of  1827,  9,  237-242. 

Treaty  of  1846,  243-264. 

Treaty  of  Guadalupe  Hidalgo,  309- 
329. 

Treaty  of  Ghent,  6-9,  12. 

Treaty  of  peace  with  England,  1,  52. 

Treaty  of  Utrecht,  6,  194-196. 

Treaty,  commercial,  with  Texas,  70, 
87,  88;  rejected,  118. 

Treaty  of  Washington,  28-47. 

Trist,  N.  P.,  consul  at  Havana,  31, 
311-329;  mission  to  Mexico,  313; 
instructions  to,  313;  quarrel  with 
Scott,  314-317;  and  Santa  Anna, 
317-322;  recalled,  323;  negotiates 
treaty  of  Guadalupe  Hidalgo,  324- 
326;  payment  to,  329. 

Tyler,  John,  25,  27,  33-38,  44,  47, 
54,  57,  58,  60,  90-93,  100,  102, 
111,  112;  presses  annexation,  114, 
116;  reasons  for  delay,  118;  offers 
state  portfolio  to  Calhoun,  138; 
attitude  toward  Calhoun,  142; 
sends  Texas  treaty  to  Senate, 
155,  156,  161;  message  favoring 
annexation  by  joint  resolution, 
160-161;  nomination  for  the 
Presidency,  162;  message  to 
House  upon  Texas,  164;  promise 


335 


of  protection  to  Texas,  169; 
adopts  House  plan,  185;  and 
Oregon,  243-244. 

Upshur,  A.  P.,  93,  112;  becomes  sec 
retary  of  state,  124;  instructions 
to  Murphy,  131;  proposes  annexa 
tion,  134;  attitude  toward  Mur 
phy,  134;  relations  with  the 
Senate,  135;  and  Oregon,  244; 
killed,  137. 

Utrecht,  treaty  of,  6,  194-196. 

Van  Buren,  Martin,  11,  64-67,  82,  85, 
89;  presidential  candidate  in  1844, 
120;  letter  upon  annexation,  158. 

Van  Zandt,  Isaac,  119;  requests  pro 
tection  from  Upshur,  136;  and 
Henderson,  144. 

Visitation  and  search,  right  of,  17, 
30-32. 

Von  Hoist's  Constitutional  History, 
65,  84,  85,  90. 

Walker,  R.  J.,  163. 

Walpole,  Sir  Spencer,  quoted,  29. 


Webster,  Daniel,  criticism  on  Van 
Buren,  12;  plan  for  conventional 
boundary,  13-15;  becomes  secre 
tary  of  state,  22;  and  McLeod  and 
Caroline  cases,  24-27,  38,  55-56; 
and  the  slave-trade,  33;  and  Cass, 
37,  109;  overture  for  a  conven 
tional  line,  40-42;  negotiation 
with  Ashburton,  42-56;  and  the 
Creole  case,  47-49,  55;  and 
Texas,  91,  92;  and  Santa  Fe" 
prisoners,  94,  95;  and  claims 
against  Mexico,  96,  97;  attitude 
toward  Mexico,  97-100;  and 
California,  100-102,  110;  and  the 
Monterey  incident,  106. 

Wheaton,  Henry,  36. 

Wilkins,  138. 

Williams,  Reuel,  41,  42. 

Wilmot  Proviso,  90. 

Wise,  minister  to    France,    111,    172. 

Woll.  General,  168. 

Wright,  Silas,  311. 


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GENERAL  LIBRARY -U.C.  BERK 


